Favored region for non-state armed groups since the early 2000s, the Central Sahel is the scene of an unprecedented security and humanitarian crisis. From Mali to Chad, through Burkina Faso, Niger, and Nigeria, the presence of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) has continued to grow since 2012. But while the affected states and the international community struggle to stabilize this critical region, new fronts are quietly emerging along the borders of coastal countries. In northern Benin, a unique area brings together environmental, economic, and security challenges, the combined effects of which have disastrous consequences for civilian populations: the W-Arly-Pendjari transboundary natural complex.

 

The Origins of the Crisis

Just as NATO’s intervention in Libya was drawing to a close in October 2011, a war broke out in northern Mali in the first month of the new year over the independence of Azawad[1]. Faced with the Tuareg rebellion as well as the jihadist movement Ansar Dine, the Malian army failed to quell the insurgency and ultimately lost control of this strategic portion of territory. Initially in Tuareg hands, the major cities of Azawad quickly fell under Islamic law thanks to crucial support from AQIM. The destruction of mausoleums, the radical enforcement of Sharia law, and the amputation of limbs as acts of retaliation… the non-state armed groups’ ambition to expand toward Timbuktu resulted in particularly brutal methods against civilians, thereby prompting international forces—notably French ones—to intervene in the conflict in 2013.

While these military operations succeeded in neutralizing several of AQIM’s Arab leaders, they nevertheless paved the way for a new Tuareg and Fulani leader whose community affiliation is of fundamental importance. In 2017, Iyad Ag Ghali succeeded in uniting and merging Ansar Dine, AQIM, and two other jihadist groups: JNIM (Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin) was born. Through its new trans-ethnic character and a moderation of its radical application of Sharia law, it was thus able to expand its recruitment base—particularly within the Fulani and Bambara communities—and began a gradual expansion into the rest of the central Sahel.

Although Islamist fighters have been venturing beyond Mali’s borders for years, the country remains the epicenter of the crisis and is regularly subjected to attacks with disastrous consequences for both civilians and the central government. On April 25, 2026, the JNIM and separatists from the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) jointly targeted strategic locations in Bamako, Kati, Gao, Mopti, Sévaré, and Kidal, leading to the tragic death of Defense Minister Sadio Camara and the occupation of several northern cities, including Kidal—a key city for the Malian state, located on the border with Algeria.

 

A push southward justified by the rejection of foreign interference

Naturally, JNIM’s territorial expansion primarily serves strategic interests. It involves controlling new trade routes to supply the movement, expanding the recruitment pool, and establishing safe havens where fighters can withdraw from the front lines to rest and receive medical care.

However, its initial incursions into Burkina Faso and Niger are justified in an entirely different way by its command. Marked by the struggle against Western influence, they are thus presented as a means of attacking the French military presence deployed in the three countries.

Launched in 2013, Operation Serval aimed to halt the advance of jihadists toward the Malian capital and restore state sovereignty over the entire country. Although successful, it was extended by Operation Barkhane in July 2014. This time, the operation also expanded into Niger, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mauritania. But after nine years of French political and military engagement in Mali, the weakening of the Malian president led to a military coup, a call by the junta to the Russian Wagner Group, and a demand for the withdrawal of French and European troops, followed by that of MINUSMA (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali) in 2020. This was followed by coups in Burkina Faso in 2022 and then in Niger in 2023. Bolstered by their anti-Western stance, these new regimes proclaimed their determination to finally secure their triple border—the focal point of the Sahel crisis.

But the JNIM, far from being content to consolidate its foothold in Niger and Burkina Faso, is continuing its advance southward and has recently begun establishing a presence in the countries of the Gulf of Guinea. Having been present in northern Benin for several years, it is strengthening its presence there in 2021 and 2022, to the detriment of its rival, EIGS, whose foothold there remains marginal as of 2025.

At the same time, this series of coups d’état sent shockwaves through West Africa. To express its disapproval, ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) then imposed various sanctions against the coup governments. In particular, it ordered the closure of every border shared by its member states with the three countries. Engaging in a full-blown standoff, the coup governments responded by signing the “Liptako-Gourma Charter,” which formalized their secession and established the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) in September 2022.

 

The W-Arly Pendjari Natural Complex: A Hotbed of Risks and Vulnerabilities

Coupled with the advance of the Sahara Desert, which depletes the soil, erodes vegetation cover, and forces populations—including fighters from non-state armed groups—to move further and further south, the territorial expansion of JNIM now affects a crucial area: a natural complex listed as a UNESCO World Heritage Site since 1996, straddling the borders of Niger, Burkina Faso, and Benin. At the intersection of major security and environmental challenges, this tri-border region combines numerous factors of vulnerability for civilian populations due to its very assets.

Against a backdrop of worsening drought and desertification, the Central Sahel region is grappling with significant climate change. Among the Sahelian populations suffering from water stress, land degradation, and the resulting displacement, certain communities in the tri-border area are particularly hard hit. From sedentary farmers to nomadic herders, particularly the Fulani, livelihoods are shrinking considerably and exacerbating an already severe precariousness. A true oasis in the middle of the desert, the WAP complex thus concentrates precious and contested resources. Farmland, pastures, water, timber, game… so many sources of contention that fuel violent inter-community conflicts among populations already living in precarious conditions.

The closure of transhumance corridors, the numerous restrictions, and the displacement of civilians into buffer zones—or Controlled Occupation Zones (COZs)—outside the park, imposed by public authorities, have in fact greatly fueled these rivalries over resource sharing. By further intensifying pressure on these resources within small, densely populated areas, this approach to securing the park paradoxically encourages local populations to carry out illegal incursions into the complex in order to meet their growing needs.

Located far from urban centers and health, administrative, and educational infrastructure, the marginal areas that make up the WAP also place the communities living there on the periphery of national economies and vital services. This chronic vulnerability leaves them particularly exposed to abuse, exploitation, extortion, sexual violence, child labor, and forced marriage.

But this context of economic instability is also compounded by significant security challenges. Covering an area of 94,000 km², the WAP’s remarkable vegetation stands out in the heart of such an arid region. Nevertheless, this distinctive feature has drawn the keen interest of non-state armed groups for reasons other than its unusual greenery. Dotted with trees, the complex provides forest cover that allows fighters to hide more easily and significantly hinders surveillance and state control. By limiting access to the all-terrain vehicles of forest rangers and the army, as well as the use of drones, this area has consequently become a preferred deployment base for jihadists from JNIM and ISSP, who frequently target civilians through acts of physical violence or extortion. Furthermore, due to recent tensions between ECOWAS and the AES, security cooperation mechanisms in this border area have been significantly weakened. Thus, much like the Wagadou Forest between Mali and Mauritania, the WAP has gradually become a rear base for non-state armed groups.

In regions marked by extreme poverty, unemployment, a lack of education, and limited opportunities for social mobility, widespread frustration arises toward the central government and its inability to meet the needs of the population and protect them from violence. This precarious situation thus provides fertile ground for forced recruitment by non-state armed groups, which present themselves as alternatives to states deemed failing and in the face of growing needs.

 

Vital needs that continue to grow: a heavy humanitarian toll

Amid intensifying climate change and jihadist activity in the region, the needs of the populations in the WAP complex continue to grow, even as humanitarian responses face challenges related to field accessibility and a drastic decline in public funding.

The country-specific monitoring and figures published online by Solidarités International in May 2026 speak volumes and powerfully illustrate the scale of the crisis in the countries of the Central Sahel over the past few years. Particularly shaken by violence and the recent coup, Burkina Faso has been reaching dramatic record highs for several months, with nearly 2.1 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 5.9 million people in need of humanitarian aid of all kinds. In Niger, the NGO counts nearly 2.2 million people facing food insecurity, and UNHCR reports 460,000 internally displaced persons as of October 2025. In both countries, frequent breakdowns at water distribution points are forcing civilians to consume contaminated water that makes them sick; there is also limited access to education due to displacement, widespread rationing of meals, and often very precarious living conditions following displacement.

But while these countries have traditionally been prioritized by humanitarian organizations because they have been at the heart of the crisis from the outset, the crisis is also beginning to affect regions in northern Benin. Indeed, many internally displaced persons and asylum seekers are increasingly seeking refuge in the south, far from the combat zones. Furthermore, as of September 30, 2025, there were already 27,294 IDPs and 27,854 refugees. While nearly 280,000 people are at risk of facing an acute food and livelihood crisis, nearly 50% of households are adopting survival strategies that put them in danger: reducing the number of meals, depriving adults to feed children, consuming contaminated water… In fact, more than half of households in northern Benin rely on unsafe water sources, due to often unreliable water points and the long distances they must travel to reach them—journeys that are sometimes very dangerous for the young women and girls who are generally responsible for fetching water.

With the spread and intensification of activities by non-state armed groups toward the south, as well as the growing number of displaced persons—particularly in northern Benin—these already considerable needs are expected to continue to worsen significantly. Faced with these risks and multiple vulnerability factors, humanitarian action is therefore compelled to devise hybrid, innovative responses capable of addressing sustainable natural resource management, economic development assistance, and the fight against insecurity—interrelated issues that feed into one another.

 

Humanitarian Operations Severely Hampered but Crucial

In the Central Sahel, humanitarian actors are forced to operate in increasingly complex environments. Indeed, access to the field and to populations is regularly made difficult or even impossible by the occupation of certain areas by non-state armed groups. Government-led security operations can also sometimes hinder these interventions, particularly when collaboration with local administrations is slow to materialize. This is especially the case when authorities tighten access policies. In November 2025, for example, Niger’s Ministry of the Interior suspended the activities of humanitarian NGOs and both national and international development organizations because they had not yet published their financial statements for the previous year. While Niger’s humanitarian landscape remains robust, this move dealt a severe blow to solidarity in the country: as of January 7, 2026, OCHA reported that 1,809 NGOs were authorized to continue their activities out of the 4,122 originally present in the country.

Furthermore, recent tensions between the AES countries and the coastal nations—which remain members of ECOWAS—have led to a partial paralysis of land traffic, beyond the scope of broader cooperation mechanisms. In July 2023, ECOWAS had in fact ordered the closure of the border between Benin and Niger in response to the coup that overthrew President Mohamed Bazoum. But while President Patrice Talon did reopen his side of the border upon the announcement of the end of sanctions in February 2024, General Abdourahamane Tiani—Niger’s president since his military coup—still refuses to follow suit. Although the reopening of the Tasmiya-Kamba corridor on February 9, 2026—in Kebbi State in northwestern Nigeria—now allows for a connection between the two countries, the essential transport routes at the northern tip of Benin passing through Malanville remain inoperative, much to the chagrin of merchants in the region.

To justify maintaining this closure, the coup leaders—backed by a segment of the Nigerien population—accuse the Beninese government of facilitating the deployment of foreign forces in the region and suspect it of hosting a French military base, with the aim of facilitating an incursion into Nigerien territory. Against a backdrop of opposition to foreign interference, these disputes between neighbors have disastrous consequences for both the local economy and the work of NGOs. Although Patrice Talon authorized the UN to establish a humanitarian corridor to Niger in 2023, roadblocks and armed checkpoints remain on the Nigerien side. Logistical routes dedicated to the delivery of humanitarian aid are thus directly impacted.

In addition to these challenges regarding access to the field, humanitarian efforts in the Central Sahel are being hampered by a funding crisis, just like aid organizations around the world. Already in 2021 and 2022, less than 25% of the financial needs outlined in the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) for the region were met. With the end of USAID funding and the decline in Official Development Assistance (ODA), these figures are certainly not likely to improve.

 

Perseverance, Resilience, and Innovation in a Crisis Context

Despite the many obstacles facing humanitarian actors in the Central Sahel, numerous NGOs and organizations manage to operate in these turbulent contexts to deliver vital aid tailored to the needs of the local populations. Operating in Benin, Niger, and Burkina Faso, the UN deploys its extensive network through the International Organization for Migration (IOM), UNICEF, the World Food Programme (WFP), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the World Health Organization (WHO).

But beyond traditional UN agencies, more specific and local initiatives deserve special attention. Dedicated to ecosystem conservation, the network of organizations known as the Maison des Tortues has launched a program that perfectly addresses the complex challenges faced by residents of the tri-border region. At the intersection of environmental conservation and socio-economic development, the “W-Arly-Pendjari Complex Transboundary Biosphere Reserve” or “RBT-WAP” project aims to support the development of profitable and sustainable economic activities among local communities, such as the production and processing of certain crops. From sesame to honey, including soybeans and mung beans, the goal is to teach sustainable techniques and entrepreneurial management to disadvantaged populations, in order to strengthen their resilience in the face of climate risks and environmental instability. Consequently, this NGO’s work helps ensure food security in the region, promotes diversification of income sources, and reduces pressure on the natural resources available to the WAP complex.

On a smaller scale, international cooperation is also bearing fruit. Active on every continent, the French Development Agency (AFD) has launched a program focused on this extraordinary complex, running from January 2023 to December 2027. The “Enhanced Regional Cooperation around the WAP Ecological Complex” or “PASOA” project has been allocated a substantial budget of 47 million euros, of which 2 million were invested by the French Global Environment Facility. Following a similar approach to the previous initiative, this large-scale project implements socio-economic development and local consultation initiatives to benefit communities living near W Park in Benin. By also supporting the work of the NGO West African Savannas Foundation (FSOA), this program aims to reduce the long-term vulnerability of these rural households.

But beyond this unique cross-border area, humanitarian aid extends to the rest of the three countries involved. This is the case for Solidarités International, which has missions in each of them. Active since 2018 in Burkina Faso through three field offices and in Niger, where its three missions and its coordination office near Tillabéri were able to reopen in 2020, the NGO’s work is organized around three areas of intervention. The first is Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene (WASH): building and rehabilitating water points, distributing hygiene kits, installing latrine-shower blocks for communities, promoting good hygiene practices, treating water, distributing vouchers to purchase water, and reducing risks associated with water collection, particularly for women. The second focuses on the construction of emergency shelters through the distribution of kits and support for reconstruction in the event of flood damage. Finally, the third consists of providing livelihood support (SAME). This involves food distributions, support for income-generating activities, the provision of agricultural inputs, and the delivery of vocational training.

Due to “growing humanitarian needs”—for reasons highlighted in this article—as mentioned on its website, it is important to note that Solidarités International launched its first mission in northern Benin in 2023. Located in Natitingou, in the vulnerable Atacora department, the mission responds to the spread of the Sahelian crisis southward, as the NGO notes: “In northern Benin, the structurally vulnerable departments of Atacora and Alibori have been facing an intensification of attacks by non-state armed groups from the Sahel region since 2021.”

Its work here is based on four strategic priorities tailored to the specific needs of communities in northern Benin. First, the aim is to provide support to newly displaced populations by distributing multisectoral kits within 72 hours of learning of the displacement. Non-food items, hygiene supplies, food… nearly 1,365 kits have been distributed so far, in addition to targeted cash transfers. The second priority is to identify victims of violence in order to offer them psychosocial support—an approach that is particularly relevant in cases of violence against women. Common to all three countries, the third component involves managing water and sanitation through the rehabilitation of boreholes, the distribution of filters, and general support for local water governance. Finally, the NGO is also working to strengthen the resilience of local communities by supporting income-generating activities.

Alongside its partners, including Première Urgence Internationale (PUI), Action Against Hunger (ACF), the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), Humanity and Inclusion (HI), and Solidarité Développement Inclusif (SOLIDEV), Solidarités International works to mitigate the consequences of the Sahel crisis on communities living in the tri-border region. But far from merely containing chronic precarity, these initiatives stand out as remarkable case studies in a context where states are increasingly prioritizing fiscal balance and defense spending at the expense of other budgets, including those dedicated to humanitarian action and development. By tackling the very roots of socio-economic instability in the Central Sahel, these organizations strengthen the autonomy of communities caught between non-state armed groups and authorities struggling to respond to these crises. In the face of the consequences of poverty and violence, humanitarian actors work alongside local stakeholders and populations to meet essential needs and promote sustainable development solutions. Security, resilience, and solidarity are all facets of one and the same response for the future of these populations.

Salomée Languille.

 

[1] The term “Azawad” refers to a vast area in northern Mali, between Bamako and the Saharan regions, for which Tuareg rebel groups are demanding independence.

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Salomée Languille

Specialized in geopolitical and environmental risk management and co-founder of the Laboratory of Geopolitical Studies for Memory (LEGEM), Salomée is currently finishing a Master’s degree at the French Institute of Geopolitics (IFG). Directed by Alican Tayla, she wrote a thesis in 2025 about the Western Sahara conflict, for which she spend a month doing research in Rabat. Under Alain Boinet’s mentorship, she is now undertaking a 6-month internship at Défis Humanitaires, during which she carries on several missions such as crisis watch, research and communication – particularly regarding the edition and publication of the review.

 

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