Despite a rather busy geopolitical context at the beginning of the year, it is difficult to miss the 3rd edition of the FHE held in Brussels on 18 and 19 March. The opportunity for the European Union to reaffirm its ambition of major humanitarian power. Successful bet? Thierry Benlahsen gives us his reading elements.

“Make no mistake, the humanitarian lifeboat is sinking.”

It is through this resolutely sinister observation that the European Commissioner for Crisis Management, Janez Lenarčič, decided to open the third edition of the European Humanitarian Forum (EHF) on 18 and 19 March.

It must be admitted that the international context of the beginning of 2024 lends itself particularly well to this introductory tone. The number of active conflicts around the world has reached an all-time high since the end of the Second World War. Added to this is the palpable mistrust of a growing number of countries vis-à-vis the global multilateral order, recently characterized by the geopolitical schism around the conflict in Ukraine or by the accusations, words used by Josep Borell[1] itself, of a policy of double standards of the members of the UN Security Council around the question of Gaza. The world is becoming more dangerous, civilians are paying a high price, and the ability of the humanitarian sector to respond to the explosion of needs is being questioned.

This state of affairs was also relayed by the two main themes of this 3rd EHF. The humanitarian funding gap, while far from being a new topic, took on a whole new meaning in 2023 following the announcement of drastic budget cuts by several major aid contributors (United States, Germany, Sweden, and France more recently). Neglected crises, supposedly victims of the agglomeration of these funds around contexts with greater media and political coverage, were a priority for the Belgian Presidency of the EU – which co-hosted the event with DG ECHO – with the aim of maintaining a strong response to chronic crises, notably in the DRC, but also in Yemen, Nigeria and CAR.

After a 2nd edition (2023) marked by the presence of many Foreign Ministers of the EU Member States, this third occurrence was expected by many as an opportunity to see the European Union mark its position as ahumanitarian flag in an increasingly polarized world.

The right size?

What about the event and its highlights?

A slightly too cynical observer would probably conclude with “not much”. After passing the first introductory words, some brilliant, others very agreed, the forum took again a structure already well known. Between a dozen sessions of contextual illustration focusing this year on forgotten crises were inserted numerous thematic panels covering almost all current issues. These panels, some of which decried the more descriptive vocation (of the problems) than prescriptive (of solutions or recommendations) were for the most part persistent of the program of the previous year and that of most events in the sector (HNPW, etc.), all in a rather technical language and in a certain inter-self.

These are the main criticisms of this type of event format at the mixed audience. Humanitarian professionals will inevitably deplore the lack of results, commitments and concrete action points for the sector. The political and institutional profiles, who have secured agreements and levers on the margins of the forum, will regret the lack of scope – precisely – the latter and the absence of government representatives sufficiently calibrated to allow direct negotiation on pressing issues (Gaza, commitments on the level of financial contributions to aid, etc.).

These frustrations are legitimate: the magnitude of the challenges ahead for the sector, coupled with the role of the EU – and often complacently endorsed by the EU – as a global humanitarian power, obviously leads to high expectations in terms of deliverables around the “hard” issues of the humanitarian system: sector reform, political and institutional changes, strong consensus.

But is this really the issue of this forum? The ambition of Commissioner Lenarčič’s office has always been to raise the visibility and brand of the EU’s humanitarian response. This is first of all with the other Directorates-General of the Commission – regularly annoyed by the administrative exception granted to DG ECHO in terms of flexibility vis-à-vis the EU’s usually very rigid administrative rules – but also Member States whose support is key to securing its budget in the long term.

A year 2024 with very high stakes for European humanitarian aid.

In fact, the immediate stakes within the European Commission are already high enough to justify the need for a humanitarian spotlight as the forum’s sole purpose.

In June, the European elections will lead to the renewal of a large number of EU institutions, including the Commission, in which Ursula Von der Leyen will run for a second term. There is no doubt that this next round will prioritise a realignment around issues of defence and protection of the European space. The question of linking civil protection files to this component could have major consequences for the DG ECHO portfolio.

The other issue of interest – echoing the EU’s stated desire to develop its own capacity for international influence – is the operationalisation of the Global Gateway, this new external aid paradigm often described as the European response to the Road and Belt initiative[2] of the Chinese government. This mechanism, supported directly by President Von der Leyen, and housed within DG INTPA, intends to gradually deploy development resources hitherto unmatched with partners in the South considered strategic. In the background, many are already worried that European ODA will turn drastically away from the traditional Sustainable Development Goals, or SDGs, in favour of a primary principle of protecting the economic, geopolitical and security interests of the Union.

These two dynamics, if they do not openly threaten the humanitarian space stricto sensu at this stage, however, testify to a growing appetite within the EU, for a form of decompiled realgeopolitik. The latter would be open to power relations and would be ready to question certain privileges of multilateralism, particularly the United Nations, when deemed inappropriate. Without prejudging the appropriateness of this reorientation of the European narrative in a changing world or the scale of this transition, we can only understand the stake of this forum for DG ECHO: demonstrate to its Member States the importance of the European humanitarian citadel” for the sector and the human cost of its disengagement, even minimal.

American and British organizations have understood this by reinvesting quite massively this year. One example is the IRC and the publication of a report dedicated to the rather ambiguous name: «Raising the bar: recommendations for European leadership in a world of growing crises».

What real progress can we expect?

It is always difficult to anticipate the impact of this type of event, for the reasons explained above. However, it would be dishonest to ignore them completely and thereby overlook the potential of this annual event as a catalyst for institutional solutions.

Let’s take the example of the humanitarian funding gap, one of the key themes of this forum for the second consecutive year. A few months after EHF 2023, the European Council – bringing together the governments of all Member States – issued a series of conclusions on «the measures to be taken to fill the humanitarian funding gap» in which it reaffirmed the commitment of its members to devote 0.07% of their gross national income to humanitarian aid. It is likely that this year will first be devoted to monitoring this collective commitment, despite unexpected announcements of cuts by some members, including France. The enlargement of the base of contributing States, beyond the EU, to the major alternative economies (BRICS, Gulf countries, Southeast and South Asian countries) will probably become one of the new work axes, even if discussions about how to approach these emerging or non-aligned donors remain embryonic. The institutional considerations related to the mobilization of the private sector seem to reach a glass ceiling, once the perspective of a taxation or a dedicated taxation is removed as it seems to be clearly the case.

In counterpoint to the funding gap, the humanitarian aid prioritization agenda, announced ahead of the publication of the latest UN Overview of the World Humanitarian Situation as an absolute imperative and included in the agenda of this forum, For its part, it will undoubtedly follow a fairly predictable course: imposed by financial realities, not really framed by institutional decision-makers, and almost entirely assumed by aid operators and coordinators. As such, we can already deplore that the issue of neglected crises, yet the other key theme of this forum, has not benefited from any tangible progress in the latter allowing a fairer rebalancing of funding channels, whether through a dedicated global fund or through an objective targeting mechanism.

The protection of space and humanitarian workers is potentially the most optimistic topic. Consensus, expressed during this forum by all parties, on the importance of maintaining and developing the achievements of UNSCR 2664[3], was an important step as it must be renewed – or not – at the end of the year. The presence of Olivier Vandecasteele, released in May 2023 after 455 days of arbitrary detention in Iran, and the launch of his platform «Protect Humanitarians», was able to revitalize the subject around concrete proposals. A little optimism, from an institutional point of view, but to be put into perspective in view of the number of workers and humanitarian facilities targeted in 2023, including by UN Member States.

What does this mean for NGOs?

“Make no mistake, the humanitarian lifeboat is sinking.” The message is clearly intended to be frightening and to alert the sector to ethical pitfalls.

Faced with increasingly uninhibited narratives from European parliamentarians, government representatives or stakeholders outside the sector on aid restructuring ambitions, NGO representatives remained – with some notable exceptions – relatively discreet and cooperative during this forum.

This wait-and-see attitude can easily be explained by the lack of visibility on the directions that the next elected commission will take and by the uncertainty around the major electoral stakes of 2024 around the world. It is certainly motivated also by the desire to maintain a constructive approach with institutional partners – donors, delegations of foreign ministries – always seen as allies with their respective governments and regional organizations, and trying themselves to promote the interests of the sector in a changing political context.

That the institutional and governmental interlocutors of NGOs are revising their partition, considering new acceptable compromises and anchoring their aid strategy in new geopolitical realities is largely understandable, if only to maintain their budgetary appropriations.

On the other hand, one can seriously wonder whether NGOs would not win – even if it were to be considered retrograde – to show a little more teeth now in order to create a counterbalance to some of these dynamics, when the latter are likely to undermine in medium-The European Union has a long history of supporting the development of the European Union. A «humanitarian consciousness» which today is finally carried by very few voices audible within this type of event.

In 2025, the EHF will be co-organised by the Polish Presidency, which has already confirmed its interest in humanitarian issues. If the election of Donald Tusk, pro-European, as Prime Minister makes this government respectable for many interlocutors, it is very likely that the priorities for the EHF of this new presidency differ strongly from previous ones. More than ever, the position of NGOs vis-à-vis the strong stakes of the sector will be decisive and cannot suffer from a contrite silence… if not forced.

 

[1] Vice President of the European Commission: “We must take action now on what is happening (in Gaza). Complaining is no longer enough.” (opening of EHF2024).

[2] The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), or New Silk Road, is the development assistance strategy of the Chinese government, anchored on the promotion of economic and structural partnerships.

[3] This November 2022 resolution formalizes the exemption of humanitarian actors and aid facilitators from the risks of sanctions – past and future – from the United Nations.

 

Thierry-Mehdi Benlahsen

Thierry-Mehdi Benlahsen has been working in the humanitarian and emergency response sector for 20 years. Formerly Director of Operations for SOLIDARITÉS INTERNATIONAL, he has multiplied deployments in several crisis contexts such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, Libya and the Middle East, before assuming more global functions. He is now an independent consultant for the sector and actively contributes to several projects on the humanitarian system, including with the Royal Egmont Institute of International Relations.