The risk of abandoning all global water-related goals

© Solidarités International – Distribution of water and kits 6 months after hurricane Chido in Mayotte

A Second UN Water Conference in Late 2026

In December 2026, the second UN Water Conference of the 21st Century will take place in Abu Dhabi. This is a very important event, as nations have never before gathered at the United Nations to work together on issues related to inland waters. The first conference took place in January 2023 in New York. That first conference yielded positive results. National leaders realized that they all faced water challenges and concluded that there was a global crisis in this area. Furthermore, a taboo was broken. Thanks to several countries, including France, discussions were able to begin regarding the shortcomings of what has since been termed global water governance. And it was decided to hold a second UN Water Conference focusing on global goals, which had not been the priority in 2023. This new Conference is much better prepared than the first. In particular, all countries met in Dakar last January at the ministerial level to begin discussing together, following the thematic structure planned for the Conference itself. This intergovernmental meeting in Dakar showed that attitudes have shifted significantly since 2023: many countries are now calling for these UN Water Conferences to become a permanent fixture, a far greater number than in 2023. The hope is that water will be managed much more effectively on a global scale in the future.

© Solidarités International – Distribution of water by Solidarités International in Tawila – Darfur, Sudan

The December discussions will be organized around six major themes covering all key water-related issues. For each topic, countries will seek to drive progress. This will be the case for global water governance, which is one of the six major themes. We can hope that this will advance the cause. Several avenues are being explored.

But if we are not careful, it could also regress, as there is a subtle threat that few stakeholders are currently aware of. It is the risk of losing our bearings and having no global water goals left in five years!

To understand and assess this threat, it is helpful to first take stock of recent progress in global water governance.

 

A headless duck

When it came to water, the international community at the start of the 21st century was like a headless chicken: no shared vision of the issues, no common goals, little shared statistical data, and no collective memory. Many UN agencies were working on water issues but without any real coordination. Countries did not meet at the United Nations to discuss water. The only place where governments discussed water was at the diplomatic conferences organized by the host countries of the World Water Forums. These conferences were very useful—they helped, for example, to establish the human rights to safe drinking water and sanitation—but they were short-lived and did not allow for collective decision-making, as such decisions are made at the UN. Countries’ water-related goals were disparate, and their actions rarely addressed global needs. Oh, there was indeed a global goal for access to safe drinking water adopted in 2000, but it was not ambitious and was declared achieved in 2012—three years ahead of schedule—despite the billions of people who still had access only to contaminated water. Without a shared understanding of the issues at stake, without common goals, without a mechanism for tracking progress, and without a forum for regular diplomatic discussions, global water governance was virtually nonexistent compared to many other issues—such as health or food security—which had clear objectives, regular intergovernmental meetings, actionable decisions, and permanent UN structures.

 

Real Progress in Global Governance

The graph in Figure 1 schematically illustrates the progress made since 2000 and its relative importance in terms of governance. The vertical axis represents a subjective assessment of the quality of global governance relative to that of health or food issues.

Fig. 1: Recent and Expected Progress in “Global Water Governance”

Beyond the existence of the World Water Forums, the first major steps forward were the Millennium Development Goals, which included a target for safe drinking water in 2000 and another for sanitation in 2003. Then, in 2010, access to safe drinking water and sanitation was recognized as a human right. In and of itself, this recognition was very significant. However, for it to serve to improve the lives of the billions of people whose rights are being violated, a large-scale operational implementation program was needed. Such a program, the 2030 Agenda and its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), was adopted in 2015. This was an opportunity for all countries to decide, for the first time, that they wanted to ensure universal access to safe drinking water and quality sanitation at affordable prices, thereby largely meeting human rights requirements. Better yet, the 2030 Agenda adopted in 2015 includes some twenty ambitious global water-related goals aimed at addressing all major global water challenges within a clear overarching vision. These global goals thus address issues ranging from population access to pollution control, water resource sustainability, and water-related disasters (see Figure 2). With a clear overarching vision and goals addressing all major challenges, the duck found its way. In 2015, the world found a compass. Better yet, progress indicators were defined and developed, which within a few years provided a much more precise and objective understanding of the global situation regarding these issues. I would point out, for example, that until 2021, no one in the world had the slightest idea of the global proportion of wastewater flows that are treated before being discharged into the environment—a fact that was quite convenient for justifying inaction but did nothing to help us move forward.

 

Fig. 2: The 2030 Agenda includes targets directly related to water (blue arrows) in many of the SDGs

And then countries finally began to come together at the UN, holding a first Conference on Water in All Its Aspects in January 2023, followed by a second one in December 2026. Since the UN serves as the secretariat for these conferences, the debates are recorded and accessible, decisions are implemented and at least partially monitored, and progress reports are produced regularly. At the same time, UN-Water has grown in strength, and a UN Water Strategy has emerged, which has greatly improved internal coordination among UN agencies. Today, the duck knows much better where it needs to go and whether it is getting there.

However, progress is far too slow. Setting goals such as universal access to truly safe drinking water, halving the volume of untreated wastewater discharged, and ensuring the sustainability of water resources helps guide policy. But the results achieved in relation to these goals are woefully inadequate. Défis Humanitaires published two of my articles[1] detailing this shortfall in drinking water and sanitation in its March 22, 2025, issue. Subsequent updates to global statistics have confirmed the trends described in these articles.

 

Further Progress Expected at Abu Dhabi 2026

However, there is still work to be done to achieve a level of global governance comparable to that in the fields of health or food. By virtue of its very existence, the December 2026 Conference will already represent further progress, as for the first time, nations will come together to assess their woefully inadequate progress toward global water-related goals. The need is enormous, as there is a gaping gap between the goals and the sum of the results of national policies. Could this discussion finally trigger the corrective measures and the political acceleration process that is absolutely necessary? Will this enable all sectors to be mobilized toward achieving the water goals by engaging the Ministers of Finance, Agriculture, Energy, Industry, and Cities? Will this Conference help us understand and acknowledge that if the goals are not being met, it is simply because many national policies today do not aim to achieve them, and that ambitious goals are not achieved by chance? Many of us hope so.

 

The Risk of Losing Everything by 2030

When we look at all the progress made since 2000, it becomes clear that the coherent and balanced vision, the ambitious goals, and the statistical indicators established in 2015 represent a fantastic collective treasure. These are, of course, global public goods, but in reality they are much more than that. Because they are shared by all, they are what enable the duck—pardon me, the international community—to know where it needs to go, where it is heading, and whether it is actually getting there.

© Solidarités International – Distributions of kits and construction/rehabilitation of waterholes on the Al Mokha base in Yemen

This treasure is largely invisible because, with the exception of international donors, most water sector actors refer to the SDGs only symbolically and do not incorporate the SDG targets into their concrete objectives and operational activities. Even at the national level, many countries enthusiastically endorsed the SDGs in 2015 but have never sought to adapt their national policies to ensure their contributions to achieving these shared goals.

This treasure, created in 2015, holds great political value, and I am proud to have been able to make a modest contribution to it. But it is fragile, as it will disappear in 2030. It is, in fact, tied to the 2030 Agenda, which, as its name suggests, will come to an end in late 2030. The value of this collective treasure is currently greatly underestimated in international reports and debates. It is only when it disappears in 2030 that this value will become apparent to everyone.

So, of course, those familiar with the inertia of large UN structures are confident that a new global 2030–2045 agenda will be adopted and assume that this new agenda will include goals for water. This is indeed a possibility, as negotiations on post-2030 global goals will begin in July 2027. But will they succeed in the current geopolitical context? And if they do succeed, how ambitious will the water-related goals be? Will they ensure continuity of efforts by maintaining the same goals? No one knows, of course.

But the risk of failing to reach consensus on a post-2030 agenda—or of adopting a post-2030 agenda that is different and less ambitious than the 2030 Agenda—is inherently significant. Indeed, we must remember that the consensual adoption in 2015 by representatives of the entire global population of ambitious goals designed to address humanity’s greatest challenges was a historic event. This had never happened before in history. The likelihood of such an event recurring is inherently low. But obstacles have also accumulated, and the risk of a lack of consensus or reduced ambitions has become very high. There are many factors that could contribute to failure: a major country that disparages multilateralism has declared that the SDGs are contrary to its policies and interests[2]; national policymakers are not truly interested in the SDGs, preferring to communicate their progress rather than what remains to be done to achieve ambitious medium- or long-term goals; thinkers and decision-makers in 2030 will, as usual, want to do things differently from their predecessors in order to gain personal visibility without concern for maintaining continuity in goals, indicators, and actions; the many purists who see flaws in the content of the current SDG targets will want to rewrite them with the aim of improving them, without realizing that calling for a rewrite is the surest way to end up with nothing at all, since the historic consensus reached in 2015 is highly unlikely to be replicated in 2020, given the current context of severely weakened multilateralism. This could lead to a convergence of interests that ultimately results in the 2030–2045 agenda either not existing at all or being significantly scaled back, with goals and indicators that differ from those in place today.

© Solidarités International – Women gathering water in Darfur, Sudan

For water, this would be a disaster, as the only global water goals currently exist within the SDG framework. Without continuity in vision, goals, and indicators, global water governance would be back to square one. This would represent a major setback (see Figure 1).

 

The insurance policy offered by the French Water Partnership

Since nothing is certain regarding the post-2030 global agenda, there is a real risk of losing the collective asset described above by the end of 2030. The French Water Partnership (PFE), which brings together French stakeholders of all kinds interested in international water issues—and which some call the French National Water Team—is deeply concerned about this potential disaster. Therefore, while fighting for the adoption of a new, ambitious post-2030 agenda that retains at least the same twenty specific water-related goals and their indicators, the French Water Partnership has devised a precautionary measure to safeguard global goals without subjecting them to a game of Russian roulette in these highly uncertain post-2030 negotiations. It recommends that the United Nations General Assembly adopt a resolution on water as early as 2027, through which it would establish global goals modeled on the existing goals without any modification and without linking them to a broader global agenda with a fixed timeframe. This is the approach taken in many areas—such as biodiversity, climate, disasters, and health—where goals were established outside the 2030 Agenda but integrated into the SDGs. The same 2027 resolution would also decide to continue statistical monitoring of water-related SDG indicators. Why 2027?

Because this could be a logical follow-up to the December 2026 Conference, provided that countries recognize the risk of losing their goals and indicators and their responsibility to secure them before the major negotiations on the post-2030 goals. Why the same goals as the SDG targets? Because opening negotiations on the content of new goals risks taking years to reach a conclusion or resulting in less ambitious goals.

I had the honor of presenting this proposal on behalf of the PFE last January in Dakar to all the governments gathered to prepare for the UN Water Conference in Abu Dhabi this December.

Given the worsening water-related challenges around the world, this Conference will only be a success if it leads to progress and prevents any setbacks. Let us therefore hope that this Conference will enable States to recognize both the significant gap between the cumulative results of their national water policies and their global objectives, and their collective responsibility to intensify their efforts toward these objectives while ensuring that these objectives remain on track even after the Conference concludes.

 

Gérard Payen.

 

[1] Eau potable : que nous apprennent les statistiques mondiales au-delà des rapports officiels ?, G.Payen, Défis Humanitaires n°86 of March 6th, 2024 ; Eau potable et assainissement : Atteindre les objectifs, dans quels délais ?, G. Payen, PCM n°919 of December 2024

[2] The United States have announced their withdrawal from the UNESCO in July 2025 for 2 official reasons among which one was The UNESCO is working to promote divisive social and cultural causes and places undue emphasis on the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, a globalist and ideological agenda for international development that runs counter to our “America First” foreign policy“.


Gérard Payen

Gérard Payen has been working for over 40 years to address water-related issues in countries around the world. As Water Advisor to the United Nations Secretary-General (member of UNSGAB) from 2004 to 2015, he contributed to the recognition of the human rights to safe drinking water and sanitation, as well as to the adoption of numerous water-related Sustainable Development Goals. Today, he continues to work toward mobilizing the international community for better management of water-related issues, which requires more ambitious public policies. As Vice President of the French Water Partnership, he also advises United Nations agencies that produce global water statistics. Impressed by the number of misconceptions about the nature of water-related issues—misconceptions that hinder public authorities in their decision-making—he published a book in 2013 to debunk these myths.

 


Discover the other articles of this edition :

FARM project, how effective is it in the face of global food insecurity?

Wheat field in Spasov, a village in Ukraine. @Liilia Moroz (CC-BY-SA-4.0)

One month after the start of the war in Ukraine on 24 February, France, as part of its Presidency of the Council of the European Union (EU), proposed a framework for solidarity-based coordination to address the global food insecurity caused by the blockade of Ukrainian Black Sea ports and the sanctions against Russia. Here we present to our readers and aid actors the features of this internationally adopted Food and Agriculture Resilience Mission (FARM) initiative.

Context

The impact of the war in Ukraine on food insecurity is now more than clear and affects us all. According to the UN’s World Food Security Report published in early summer 2022, nearly one in ten people suffer from hunger. Russia and Ukraine alone account for about 30% of global wheat exports. Russia, the world’s largest exporter of cereals since 2016, and Ukraine, the world’s largest and fourth largest exporter of sunflower and corn, are at the heart of the global food system and ensure the supply of cereals for a large number of countries, particularly in Africa and the Middle East. The soaring cost of imported fertilisers and the drop in production due to the conflict is seriously disrupting supply systems and putting nearly 750 million people living in countries heavily dependent on Russian and Ukrainian exports in a vulnerable position. While African countries are heavily impacted, due to their already high levels of debt, the conflict also poses significant risks to Europe. Indeed, the European continent imports sunflower oil and corn from Ukraine, as well as N and K fertilisers (nitrogen and potassium fertilisers are part of the primary nutrients for plant growth) which ensure the fertilisation of European agriculture. In this context, it is therefore essential to strengthen support for the World Food Programme (WFP) and to reinforce the coordination of the various actors to maximise the impact of humanitarian and food aid.

Women preparing fields in Niger for the rain season to avoid droughts. ©CIAT

The Food and Agriculture Resilience Mission (FARM) initiative was set up under the French Presidency of the Council of the European Union in order to respond to the food crisis caused by the war in Ukraine and to help the most vulnerable countries affected. This project was launched in March 2022, following a meeting between members of the French government, private stakeholders, representatives of the WFP and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the European Commission and the European Investment Bank, and was endorsed by the European Union, the European Council, members of the G7 and the African Union. This meeting then led to the creation of a Private Sector Coalition for Food Security (PSCFS) in which each of the companies committed to ensuring the implementation of FARM missions by supporting :

  • The Ukrainian agricultural sector in its production and export capacities, in line with European efforts
  • Access to agricultural and food commodities and inputs for the most vulnerable countries alongside the WFP
  • The development of sustainable production capacities and robust value chains in fragile countries, particularly in Africa

This initiative is based on three major pillars: trade and transparency, solidarity and sustainable production. These three pillars aim to ensure trade in cereals, guarantee cereal supplies to vulnerable countries, support Ukrainian agricultural production and develop sustainable agricultural production capacities. Within these three pillars, four areas of action have been identified: increasing local production capacity, encouraging the consumption of local products, developing local markets, and limiting food waste.

Pillar Aim  Partner organisation Key actions
Trade  Ease tensions on agricultural markets, ensure full transparency of flows as well as stocks and fight against unjustified trade barriers WTO – exemption from restrictive export measures for all WFP purchases
Solidarity Support Ukrainian agricultural capacity, ensure affordable access to agricultural commodities in the most affected countries, and prepare for the effects of the war on agricultural production levels. WFP, OECD – Solidarity corridors initiative
Sustainable production Build agricultural capacity in a sustainable manner in the countries most affected. IFAD, World Bank, African Development Bank, Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme + French Development Agency (AFD) – capitalising on and developing existing initiatives such as the Great Green Wall, the African Union’s Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) and Plant Protein,

– Agricultural Value Chain Development Support Project

 

IMPLEMENTED INITIATIVES

  1. Example of the IFAD-AFD partnership in Cameroon – Agricultural Value Chain Development Support Project (Piler Sustainable Production)

The partnership is based on three streams: a reaffirmed strategic dialogue, the development of operational synergies and the identification of coordinated financing opportunities. The aim of this IFAD-AFD partnership is, with the Cameroonian authorities, to strengthen the technical and management capacities of agricultural producers, the sustainability of agricultural practices and sustainable and responsible investment in the sector. To this end, the AFD-FIDA group is committed to strengthening human capital by offering professional training and agricultural advice.

Thus, as a first concrete and joint contribution to the FARM initiative, AFD has expressed its interest in engaging in a joint dialogue with the Cameroonian authorities and IFAD on a five million euro financial contribution to the Support Project for the Development of Agricultural Sectors – Phase 2 (PADFA II).

Inhabitants of a village in Chad facing a growing food crisis.  © EC/ECHO/Anouk Delafortrie (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)

2. Development of the Great Green Wall Initiative, CAADP and Plant Protein Initiative (Sustainable Production Pillar)

Initiated in 2007, the Great Green Wall project for ecological restoration and the fight against food insecurity in Africa aims to restore 100 million hectares of degraded land. The project covers a strip of 8,000km, from Senegal to Djibouti (including Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, Sudan, Eritrea and Ethiopia). Reforestation of this region helps combat climate change and desertification by promoting the evapotranspiration mechanism of plants on the land. Increasing the number of trees also helps to store CO2. On a socio-economic level, reforestation helps in the fight against poverty and food insecurity. Indeed, the project generates employment and produces food resources (fruits, vegetables). During the last 12 years, the project has not achieved these objectives because of several obstacles. Indeed, the project is not always the priority of governments, which are often preoccupied with geopolitical problems and violence. The countries also face a considerable lack of financial resources, which makes the implementation of the initiative more complex. Thus, the support of the FARM project to revitalise this project by increasing the financial and human resources will enable the countries to reclaim their territory in a sustainable manner.

CAADP is part of the Agenda 2063 aspiration to help African countries eliminate hunger and reduce poverty. The programme, under the FARM initiative, will be upgraded and expanded to foster economic growth by developing the agricultural sector through increased national budgetary allocations to the sector. The aim is for African countries to devote at least 10% of their national budgets to agriculture and rural development and achieve an agricultural growth rate of at least 6% per year. The African Union is emphasising African ownership and leadership to pave the way for more sustainable agricultural change.

The Plant Protein Plan was created following the launch of the Great Green Wall Accelerator in January 2021 after the One Planet Summit. The aim of the plan is to speed up the transformation of African food systems to more sustainable models. The development of protein crops contributes to food security objectives and socio-economic development in the region. The initiative aims to strengthen sustainable plant protein value chains, with the long-term goal of agricultural self-sufficiency in Africa.

These three concrete actions of the FARM initiative are in line with a sustainable food and agricultural sovereignty approach for the African continent to reduce dependence on Ukrainian exports and thus minimise the consequences of the conflict on the continent.

3. Solidarity Corridors

The main objective of the corridors, set up by the European Commission, is to help Ukraine export its agricultural products through several concrete and joint actions, but also to import the goods the country needs. In May 2022 (when these corridors were set up), the European Commission (EC) Commissioner for Transport, Adina Valean, announced that 20 million tonnes of grain would have to leave Ukraine in less than 3 months in order to free up storage capacity for the 2022 harvest. Short and long-term solutions, such as corridors, are being organised in coordination with the Ukrainian authorities and EU members.

Firstly, solidarity corridors were set up to facilitate border crossings between Ukraine and EU member states. The European Commission has asked to make additional transport means available as a matter of urgency and to set up a logistical matching platform (EU-Ukraine Business Matchmaking Platform) as well as to designate corridor-specific contact points. The Commission also calls on infrastructure managers to prioritise agricultural exports from Ukraine by reserving rail slots for them, and on national authorities to show flexibility in speeding up procedures at border crossings. Finally, the Commission calls its members to coordinate to promote and facilitate the temporary storage of Ukrainian exports.

Another axis of the solidarity corridors focuses on the connections between the EU member states and Ukraine, with the aim in the medium term of increasing the infrastructure capacities of the new export corridors and establishing new infrastructure connections. In this perspective, on 10 May, talks were held on an agreement on road freight transport in the EU Member States, Ukraine and Moldova. In addition, the EC has also proposed to extend the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) to Ukraine and Moldova to enable both countries to obtain European funding for their infrastructure and to facilitate post-war reconstruction in Ukraine.

The Odessa Marine port in Ukraine with wheat containers ready for exportation. @George Chernilevsky
    4. Exemption from restrictive measures on exports of WFP purchases

On April 27th 2022, the EC presented a proposal for a European Parliament and Council Regulation, approved on 24 May, to introduce trade liberalisation measures over 1 year. Three measures are proposed:

  • The temporary suspension of all customs duties for industrial products, fruit and vegetables subject to the entry price system and agricultural products subject to tariff quotas
  • Temporary suspension of anti-dumping duties on imports originating in Ukraine
  • The temporary suspension of the common import regime for imports originating in Ukraine.

The primary aim of these measures is to promote trade flows between Ukraine and the EU and to create conditions for strengthening economic and trade relations with a view to the gradual integration of the country into the EU market.

In order to benefit from these measures, Ukraine commits itself to respect the rules of origin of products and procedures, not to introduce new duties, taxes or restrictions on imports originating in the EU (unless justified in the context of war), and to respect the principles of democracy, human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law.

In this context, the signing of an agreement on 22 July in Istanbul between Russia and Ukraine on the export of Ukrainian and Russian grain from Black Sea ports, thanks to the good offices of Turkey and under the direction of the UN, is a major decision which remains to be implemented in the long term.

Possible risks of the FARM project

While the adoption and implementation of the FARM project is the most important thing, it is also useful to anticipate the risks of malfunctioning that would affect its effectiveness. The Ukrainian conflict and the food crisis, not to mention the energy crisis, is creating tensions and adjustments between countries and reshaping the framework of international relations.  Therefore, the project will only be a success if the EU member states overcome the inconsistencies that often accompany decisions taken by the 27 member states. Moreover, there is a real risk of duplicating existing initiatives in the food and agricultural sectors. Indeed, since March, three initiatives similar to FARM’s have been launched: the Global Alliance on Food Security launched by Germany (holding the G7 presidency), the Roadmap for Global Food Security by the United States and the Global Crisis Response Group on Food, Energy and Finance announced by the United Nations. These initiatives show the interest and the need for concrete measures against food insecurity but underline the importance of good international coordination to optimise the FARM project.

In this context, civil society organisations are making proposals. In a press release, CCFD-Terre Solidaire states that “any real international response to the crisis will require more market regulation, more transparency on private stocks and a profound transformation of our trade system in favour of people’s food sovereignty. CCFD-Terre Solidaire, based on the government’s past experience with agricultural and food policy, also warns against making the same mistakes. The organisation recalls the launch of the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition by the G8 in 2012 in a similar crisis situation, which had similar objectives to those of FARM. The alliance relied on multinationals and allowed legislative changes liberalising land, seeds and taxation to the detriment of local producers. Faced with its lack of results, its limitations and the negative impacts it generated (land grabs, indebtedness of farmers, lack of accountability of the companies involved), Emmanuel Macron made the choice in 2018 to withdraw from it. It is therefore important to keep these considerations in mind during future evaluations and analyses of the FARM initiative.

Aid actors, both macro and micro, are concerned at various stages by this FARM project, which aims to limit the global food consequences of the war in Ukraine, particularly for the populations of the poorest countries already affected by other crises. With this article, Humanitarian Challenges aims to better inform aid actors in order to improve the effectiveness of aid for populations at risk. We would be grateful for any testimonies or information you may have about this FARM initiative.

 

Eva Miccolis in collaboration with Axel Bonnechaux.