We are all well aware of the scale of the transformations currently underway; there is no need to list them. What matters now is understanding what they reveal.
The tensions we have seen escalate in recent years are leading to the normalization of violence within our societies and between them. Violence is surely one of the oldest mechanisms for resolving conflict; it allows political or economic objectives to be achieved quite effectively, and now at little cost. Conflicts are therefore proliferating. These conflicts, even local ones, cause shocks whose effects often spill over beyond the areas where they occur.
For these shocks do more than simply disrupt the smooth functioning of human systems. They reveal their vulnerabilities. These underlying vulnerabilities—often invisible or underestimated fault lines—are nevertheless very much present. Like a vase that breaks, perhaps not at the first impact, perhaps not at the second, but one day, a tiny jolt can trigger a disproportionate reaction, and the vase breaks where the structure is most fragile. For societies and countries, there are structural vulnerabilities—the so-called “root causes,” those deep-seated issues we can do little about: poorly defined borders, extreme climates, history, and geography. And then there are more immediate factors of fragility or resilience: governance, demographics, the management of scarce or abundant resources, levels of development and security, social cohesion, and so on.
Yet the traditional foundations of energy systems, ecological stability, governance structures, and technological infrastructure continue to shift, creating significant uncertainty about future risks. What is at stake, ultimately, is the ability of systems—economic, political, and societal—to self-regulate, absorb shocks, and adapt to them, because the only certainty is that this is not over.
Shocks of all kinds are interconnected and therefore more systemic. A regional shock in the Persian Gulf directly impacts the number of days worked in Sri Lanka, or access to healthcare in Somalia. You may also recall the 2010 eruption of Eyjafjallajökull in Iceland and its effect on air traffic across Europe.
Governments—and, even more rapidly, private companies—have begun to adapt to this era of high volatility. The insurance sector, for example, which is so fundamental to global logistics, is changing its perception of what is insurable and what is not, giving rise to hybrid public-private risk management mechanisms that are becoming key components of the globalized economic system.
In many countries, the repeated shocks since the start of the century have gradually eroded fiscal, energy, and food reserves, as well as institutional capacities and social cohesion. We are therefore indeed facing a crisis of resilience that we must all now address. Of course, countries that start out with disadvantages in governance, financial dependence, or energy dependence are the most vulnerable, and thus their fragility worsens. Some countries become trapped in cycles where each crisis reduces their capacity to respond to the next one, which is sure to follow soon.
The lack of investment in resilience and shock-absorption mechanisms thus guarantees future instability, even in countries that appear to be stable. Foreign exchange reserves and dependence on energy or fertilizer imports are making headlines right now. Dependence on food imports was highlighted at the start of the war in Ukraine. Inflation and debt levels were key factors during the financial crises and even during the COVID-19 pandemic. But societal risks are just as significant. These include educational attainment, access to healthcare and social services, energy and food, employment, the prevalence of organized crime and corruption, as well as information and religious systems, and so on. Failing to pay attention to these factors means ignoring vulnerabilities through which a crisis could arise or resilience factors that can be leveraged.
In this context, economic and social development is certainly a positive step toward increasing these absorption capacities, and the idea that better-off countries should assist those less fortunate is a matter of common sense, given the regional or global repercussions of even localized instability.
The Sustainable Development Goals are no longer really the framework of reference for development actors. The bright colors of the 17 small numbered squares have certainly faded. International standards are no longer held in high regard either. In Sudan as in Lebanon, international humanitarian law is violated every day with complete impunity. This impunity is not without consequences, as it undermines the credibility and legitimacy of the system of solidarity and cooperation, as evidenced first and foremost by the decline in ODA investment.
Yet numerous initiatives are underway to establish new rules of the game for cooperation—that is, in fact, new dynamics of power distribution around development. What does ODA represent, to whom and for what purpose does it serve, and what effort does it measure? Who implements it? In all the current initiatives and proposals, no one is seriously suggesting a complete halt to cooperation, even in its most limited form. Rather, it must simply adapt to a harsher international environment.
For DAC members, the scale of the defense capability shortfall is such that addressing it has become a political and budgetary priority that leaves no room for development—in Europe, of course, but not only there. The Asian region is arming itself just as rapidly. Yet, as the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Schill, recently noted in Grand Continent, the boundaries between the civilian and military spheres have become so blurred that it is difficult to distinguish war from peace, with the contours of conflict becoming so indistinct that peace itself would seem to be the continuation of war by other means. Thus, whether through influence and information, the projection of values, or trade terms, development cooperation can no longer be treated as a sphere of public policy sheltered from the world’s turmoil.
Understanding the political nature of international cooperation does not mean that it must renounce its fundamental values—democracy, the rule of law, peace, human rights, gender equality, and freedom. On the contrary, these values are our defining hallmark, and they must not be abandoned in exchange for a bag of rare earths or simply out of intellectual laziness. The goal is to anchor and sharpen these principles in a more complex and competitive environment and use their value to build resilience against future shocks.
Cyprien Fabre.
Cyprien Fabre is the head of the « crises and fragilities » unit at the OECD. After several years of humanitarian missions with Solidarités, he joins ECHO, the humanitarian department of the European Commission in 2003, and holds several positions in crisis contexts. He joins the OECD in 2016 to analyze the engagement of DAC members in fragile or crisis-affected countries. He has also written a series of “policy into action” guides then ”Lives in crises” in order to help translate political and financial commitments of donors into effective programming in crises. He graduated from the Faculty of Law of Aix-Marseille.
Discover other articles from this edition :
- Storm warning – Alain Boinet
- Interview with Maria Groenewald, VOICE Director : a plea in favour of European humanitarian aid
- The Sahel region, extensions Southward and New emerging Jihadist Fronts : A Deep Dive into the W-Arly-Pendjari Complex – Salomée Languille
- Donating as an Antiviral: Philanthropy Put to the Test in an Increasingly Brutal World – Antoine Vaccaro
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