Armenia at a Crossroads in Its Destiny

May and June 2026: two months that cement Armenia’s ties with the European Union

© The Smithsonian for Folklife and Cultural Heritage – Crowd of protesters in the Place of Republic in Yerevan, during the Velvet Revolution in 2018

An analysis. With this article by Arthur Robert, we offer a detailed look at the recent diplomatic events of early May with France and the European Union, Russian reactions, and the June 7 legislative elections won by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.

In May 2026, within a forty-eight-hour window, Yerevan hosted the 8th summit of the European Political Community (EPC), inaugurated the first-ever bilateral EU-Armenia summit, signed a strategic partnership with France, and concluded a connectivity partnership with the European Commission.

The sequence of May 4–5, 2026 was both the culmination of an Armenian repositioning begun in 2018 and a strong political signal, one month ahead of the June 7 legislative elections in which the country’s positioning toward Europe and Russia was a central theme. This sequence allowed Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to reinforce the geostrategic shift he had initiated, consisting of moving away from Russia’s orbit and deepening relations with the EU.

For Brussels and Paris, the stake was to consolidate a foothold in the Caucasus, at a time when Georgia is drifting away and Russia is militarily absorbed by Ukraine. Kaja Kallas, Vice-President of the European Commission and High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, recalled during the summit that “Armenia would decide for itself.”

Thus, the victory of Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party in the June 7, 2026 legislative elections sealed the rapprochement between Armenia and the European Union. Civil Contract won with nearly 50% of the vote, while the parties favoring closer ties with Russia — Armenia Strong, led by Samvel Karapetyan, and the Armenia Alliance, led by Robert Kocharyan — obtained 23% and 10% of the vote, respectively. While the outgoing Prime Minister’s party, in power since 2018, retained an absolute majority, it lost seven seats compared to the 2021 legislative elections, depriving it of the two-thirds majority that would have allowed it to pursue the constitutional revision demanded by Azerbaijan.

© Department of Foreign Affairs and International Development, Archives Direction (geographic division) – November 2014

 

The European Political Community (EPC) Summit: a symbolically charged first outside the EU

The 8th EPC summit, the first held outside the EU, brought together on May 4, 2026 in Yerevan more than forty heads of state and government, including Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, under the motto “Building the Future: Unity and Stability in Europe.” Four major themes emerged from the summit:

  • Democratic resilience, with the idea that Armenian democracy must be protected from “external interference and disinformation,” a direct consequence of Russian hybrid warfare;
  • Trans-Caucasian and trans-Caspian connectivity, in the current context of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) and the Middle Corridor, of which Armenia now aspires to be a branch via the future TRIPP route;
  • Economic and energy security, with reduced dependence on fossil fuels and the rise of renewables and nuclear power;
  • Defense and strategic autonomy, driven by the Ukrainian context.
© Alain Boinet – City of Meghri, in the district of Syunik, South of Armenia near borders with Iran, Azerbaidjan and Nakhitchevan. It’s the spot within the Latchin corridor through which should go the TRIPP road and a railway.

The choice of Yerevan for this first EPC summit outside the EU marks political recognition of Armenia’s trajectory, begun in 2017 with the signing of a Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement between the EU and Armenia, which entered into force in 2021. After the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023, Yerevan’s pivot westward continued with the announcement in April 2024 of an EU Resilience and Growth Plan for Armenia, endowed with €270 million over the 2024–2027 period.

 

The first EU-Armenia summit: a further step toward accession

On May 5, 2026, following the EPC, António Costa, President of the European Council, and Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, co-chaired with Nikol Pashinyan the first bilateral EU-Armenia summit, marked by the signing of a joint declaration reaffirming the EU’s commitment “to supporting Armenia’s sovereignty, resilience and reform agenda,” with both parties committing to “expand their long-term strategic cooperation.”

Armenia’s path continued with the adoption of the law “On Launching the Process of Armenia’s Accession to the EU” by the National Assembly in March 2025, which makes EU candidacy a legally binding orientation for the Armenian executive. Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan indicated in October 2025 that a formal application could be submitted the following year. Subsequently, a strategic agenda for the EU-Armenia partnership was adopted in December 2025.

© Armenian governement gallery – Opening ceremony of the EPC in May 2026

Two partnerships were sealed during the summit:

  • The EU-Armenia Connectivity Partnership, covering energy, transport and digital sectors;
  • The allocation of €30 million under the European Peace Facility (EPF) for Armenia’s armed forces. This amount combines a first tranche of €10 million (signed in 2024) and a second of €20 million adopted in January 2026.

 

The France-Armenia strategic partnership: a “singular relationship” institutionalized

French President Emmanuel Macron played a key role in this sequence, which cemented the strength of the France-Armenia friendship, just as the French Senate and National Assembly played a driving role in the maturation of this partnership, through:

  • The activism of the France-Armenia friendship group;
  • The Senate resolution of November 25, 2020 on the “need to recognize the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh”;
  • The Senate resolution of November 15, 2023 condemning Azerbaijan and calling for European sanctions.

Welcomed by large crowds expressing sympathy in the streets of the capital, Emmanuel Macron spoke of a “singular relationship” and Armenia’s “European vocation,” and signed with Nikol Pashinyan the declaration on the French-Armenian strategic partnership, complemented by a series of contracts carried out by French companies.

© Armenian government – Signing of France-Armenia agreemets on May the 5th 2026

In the field of defense, the partnership establishes Paris as one of Armenia’s main arms suppliers and extends cooperation begun in 2023, including:

  • Continuation of orders signed in October 2023: three Thales GM200 radars, 50 Arquus Bastion armored vehicles, as well as a letter of intent for MBDA Mistral surface-to-air missiles;
  • Continuation of deliveries of the 36 CAESAR howitzers ordered in June 2024. The first units were presented in Armenia in May 2026 ahead of the May 28 military parade.

In the economic field, Vinci and Razel-Bec signed a declaration of intent to participate in the construction of the Bargushat tunnel, a key piece of infrastructure for connecting with the Georgian port of Poti and the south of the country. In civil nuclear power, France (Framatome) positioned itself among other competitors for the construction of the future small modular reactor (SMR) intended to replace Metsamor. In the aerospace sector, FlyOne Armenia ordered two Airbus A321neo aircraft, while Armenia’s Ministry of Defense acquired six Airbus H145 military helicopters.

© Olivier Decottignies – Signing of defense agreements on the 22nd and 23rd of February 2024 in Yerevan between defense ministers Sébastien Lecornu and Souren Papikian

 

Armenia’s geopolitical repositioning as a central issue in the legislative elections

As the timing of the EU-Armenia summit illustrates, the rapprochement with Europe, along with the exit from Russia’s orbit, were central themes of Armenia’s June 2026 legislative elections.

Civil Contract took a position breaking with the historic relationship of vassalage between Armenia and Russia — a classic feature of the relationship Russia seeks with former Soviet states, according to political scientist Taline Papazian. The Prime Minister championed a doctrine of “real Armenia,” consisting of refocusing the state on its internationally recognized borders and renouncing any claim to Nagorno-Karabakh, and promised the adoption of a new Constitution presented as a “Fourth Republic.”

This campaign took place against a backdrop of tensions with the religious establishment, since since June 2025 Nikol Pashinyan has publicly called for the departure of Catholicos Karekin II, head of the Armenian Apostolic Church, whom he accuses of having broken his vow of celibacy. In February 2026, the Armenian prosecutor’s office launched proceedings against the Catholicos.

The confrontation with the Church became a central dividing line with the opposition, which largely positioned itself as the defender of the clergy. It is in this context that Samvel Karapetyan, a Russian-Armenian billionaire and founder of the “Armenia Strong” alliance (23% in the June 2026 elections), entered politics. In June 2025 he had pledged to “defend” the Church, before being arrested for “calling for the seizure of power” and placed under house arrest. Ineligible due to his Russian and Cypriot citizenship, he handed leadership of the party list to his nephew Narek Karapetyan, who is himself under investigation for concealing Russian citizenship. The alliance promised to revise the Constitution to allow Samvel Karapetyan to become Prime Minister. Documents published by the investigative outlet The Insider allege past ties between him and Russia’s FSB, which his camp has denied, calling it a fabrication.

© Wikimedia Commons – A CSTO Summit in Yntymak Ordo Residence , Bishkek, in November 2025

The other opposition forces shared this pro-Russian orientation while differing in profile and degree. The “Armenia Alliance” (10% in the June 2026 elections), led by former President Robert Kocharyan, advocated for remaining in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization — a military alliance created and led by Moscow in 2002, grouping six former Soviet republics). The “Armenia Alliance” also seeks closer ties with Moscow and rejects any constitutional concession to Azerbaijan, which part of the opposition views as a betrayal.

Judicial affairs fueled the polarization among the protagonists. In addition to Samvel Karapetyan, Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan, leader of the 2024 protest movement against territorial concessions to Azerbaijan, remained in pre-trial detention over an alleged coup plot. Armenia’s Investigative Committee reported 59 criminal cases for electoral fraud, mainly targeting people close to the opposition. Those concerned see this as judicial instrumentalization against their candidates, while the government invokes the rule of law and the fight against foreign interference.

The geopolitical divisions of the Armenian election were accompanied by a large-scale Russian interference operation reportedly involving Russia’s three main intelligence services (the SVR, FSB and GRU). This operation took the form of a disinformation campaign using methods well known to European authorities, such as Doppelganger or Storm-1516. The campaign notably aimed to tarnish the reputation of Nikol Pashinyan, code-named “Boroda” (meaning “beard”), and was reportedly accompanied by efforts by Russian services to gather information that could compromise Pashinyan. Finally, Russia is said to have devised a plan to transfer 100,000 Armenians from Russia in order to influence the vote, in addition to its support for the “Armenia Strong” alliance.

 

A minor regional revolution that challenges Russia

The months of May and June 2026 brought Armenia’s estrangement from Russia, begun in 2018, to its peak. Abandoned by its historic partner during the two successive phases of conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (or Artsakh) with Azerbaijan (2021–2022 and 2023), Armenia has frozen its participation in the CSTO since February 2024. Following an agreement, Russia withdrew its border guards from Yerevan airport in July 2024, where they had been stationed since 1992. Nikol Pashinyan spoke of a “point of no return” in December 2024, and in March 2025 Yerevan notified Moscow of its refusal to fund the CSTO’s 2024 budget.

© Wikimedia Commons – Vladimir Putin with Armenian Prime minister Nikol Pachinian in Kremlin (April 2026)

Russia reacted strongly to Armenia’s distancing from the CSTO, and reacted even more forcefully to the May-June 2026 sequence, viewing Volodymyr Zelensky’s participation in the EU summit in Yerevan in particular as a betrayal.

The day after the European summits in Yerevan, Russian diplomacy denounced a “rapprochement” with Brussels intended, according to Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova, to draw Armenia into an “irreversible involvement in the EU’s anti-Russian line.” Meeting at the EAEU summit in Astana on May 28, 2026, the Moscow-led bloc deemed that Armenia’s EU candidacy posed “serious risks” to its economic security, and mandated a review of a possible suspension of Armenia by December.

Armenia was also subjected to a series of economic restrictions by Russia, its main economic partner (around 37% of Armenian exports go to Russia, while nearly 30% of imports come from there). Most of these restrictions were justified by Russia on sanitary grounds, but their timing leaves little doubt as to Russia’s intent to punish Armenia for its geopolitical trajectory.

As early as April 2026, Russia banned the Armenian cognac brand Proshyan on its territory, a week after a meeting between Vladimir Putin and Nikol Pashinyan. On May 29, Vladimir Putin compared Yerevan’s trajectory to the “Ukrainian scenario” and brandished the trade weapon, stating that Russia would be “forced to limit its economic activities in Armenia” if the country moved closer to the EU. The following day, Moscow recalled its ambassador to Armenia for “consultations on measures taken” against Armenia over its “rapprochement with the European Union, undermining cooperation within the EAEU.”

As the elections approached, these restrictions intensified. On May 22, the Russian agency Rosselkhoznadzor (responsible for veterinary and sanitary surveillance and control of goods entering Russia) temporarily restricted imports of floral products from Armenia. For similar reasons, Russia blocked tens of millions of bottles of Jermuk mineral water — a popular Armenian brand in Russia — at the end of May.

© Armenian government – Armenian Prime minister arménien, Nikol Pachinian, voting during the June 2026 elections

Starting May 30, 2026, Rosselkhoznadzor also imposed “temporary restrictions” on imports of tomatoes, cucumbers, peppers and strawberries from Armenia. On June 2, these restrictions were extended to several fruits, and on June 3 to Armenian eggplants, potatoes, and dried fruits. Finally, on June 12, Russia blocked the import of all quarantine-subject products from Armenia, as well as their transit through its territory to member states of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).

On June 15, Kaja Kallas indicated that the EU was preparing a large-scale economic aid plan for Armenia to help it cope with Russian retaliatory measures.

 

An unprecedented partnership in the Caucasus

The French and EU-Armenian partnerships could, in the medium term, become the prototype for a European security policy in the eastern neighborhood.

Georgia’s trajectory offers, by contrast, a counter-example of a failed shift. After obtaining EU candidate status in December 2023, Georgia abruptly backtracked under the effect of its domestic politics. As early as May 2024, the pro-Russian Georgian Dream party pushed through a “foreign agents” law modeled on the Russian one, deemed by Brussels incompatible with democratic standards. The October 2024 legislative elections, won by Georgian Dream in a vote marred by irregularities, sealed the rupture. In November 2024, just hours after the European Parliament adopted a resolution rejecting the election results due to irregularities, Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze announced the suspension of EU accession negotiations until the end of 2028, accusing the EU of blackmail. Moreover, deliveries to Armenia were interrupted: of the 50 Bastion armored vehicles promised by France, only 26 had been delivered, due to transit difficulties through Georgia since the end of 2024.

 

Despite recent progress, a situation that remains fragile

While Armenia in June 2026 no longer appears to be a “disappointed ally” of Moscow but rather a distinct strategic partner with robust ties to Europe, the new Armenian situation remains fragile.

First, while normalization between Azerbaijan and Armenia appears to be continuing, its longevity cannot be predicted. The tripartite protocol of August 2025, signed in the presence of Donald Trump, Pashinyan, and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, creates unprecedented conditions for peace. But Baku is conditioning the formal signing of the treaty on the revision of the Armenian Constitution to remove all reference to Nagorno-Karabakh, which could reignite tensions in a context of clear Azerbaijani military superiority. Yet neither the EU nor France is in a position to provide Armenia with security guarantees comparable to those long offered by Russia, which still maintains a base in the country housing 4,000 soldiers.

© The White House – Donald Trump, Nikol Pachinian and Ilham Aliev in Washington on the 8th of August 2025 during the signing of the TRIPP (Trump Route Initiative for International Peace and Prosperity)

Second, Russia’s economic and political retaliatory measures are expected to have a significant impact on the Armenian economy.

Finally, the June 2026 legislative elections showed that parties advocating closer ties with Russia remain very popular. In the long term, Armenia’s deep historical ties with Russia and the reality of its geographic position will likely compel Armenia to normalize its relations with Russia.

As Taline Papazian sums it up, Armenia faces the complex challenge of “transforming an imposed rupture into a coherent political project, capable of reconciling sovereignty, democratic stability, and openness to its regional and European environment.”

Arthur Robert.


Arthur Robert is an analyst within the sectors of geopolitics and economy. He works for public institutions as well as the private sector while being a teaching assistant.


Discover other articles from this edition :

Interview with Maria Groenewald, VOICE Director

A plea in favour of European humanitarian aid

© EPA/Ahmed Jallanzo, The Conversation – A Liberian burial team during the world’s biggest Ebola outbreak in the DRC in 2014 : an outbreak of Ebola has just been announced in the DRC

Alain Boinet. Could you tell us a bit about your background and VOICE?

Maria Groenewald. First of all, thank you very much for the invitation. For 34 years, VOICE has been the leading advocacy network for humanitarian action in Brussels. Nearly 90 organizations from 18 European countries are currently members, and the network continues to grow; we hope to welcome new members at our Annual General Assembly in June. For me, this is a sign that our collective work for humanitarian action is more important than ever. Together, we will continue to be the main voice of international NGOs in Brussels to promote humanitarian action and its principles.

 

Alain Boinet. We thank you for this interview and for introducing VOICE. We are all witnessing the decline in humanitarian funding among European Union countries and members of the OECD—the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, which brings together the world’s most developed nations. How do you interpret this worrying decline for humanitarian action? What are the consequences for VOICE’s 90 member organizations, and where do ECHO and the European Commission stand in terms of funding for this year, 2026?

Maria Groenewald. This is a very worrying development. We are seeing several Member States turning their backs on their commitment to international solidarity, citing domestic issues and the need to prioritize defense spending, even though humanitarian aid accounts for only a very small portion of public spending. At the EU level, humanitarian aid accounts for about 1% of the European budget. Yet political discourse increasingly tends to pit humanitarian funding against other budgetary priorities.

© Our World in Data – Graph on the share that foreign aid represents of the national income

The reduction in funding for humanitarian action is a political choice, not an inevitability. It is important to remember that humanitarian funding is minimal and represents a small portion of national budgets compared to spending categories such as defense. The reduction in humanitarian funding has serious consequences for the millions of people facing humanitarian crises. For example, a study published in The Lancet demonstrated that if the current trend of declining official development assistance persists, the number of additional deaths will reach 9.4 million among children under the age of 5. Lives are truly at stake.

© Maria Groenewald – La Directrice de VOICE s’exprime devant la Comission du Développement (DEVE) du Parlement européenne en avril 2026

Despite this challenging context, there are still some positive signs. DG ECHO’s initial budget for 2026 was €1.9 billion, and so far, the European Commission has managed to maintain a stable level of humanitarian funding over the years, with funding sometimes even increasing thanks to the mobilization of additional funds. Thus, the European Commission remains a major supporter of international humanitarian action and the principles upon which it is founded.

The real challenge for European humanitarian funding lies in the negotiations for the next Multiannual Financial Framework, which will determine the overall budget allocated to humanitarian aid from 2028 to 2034.

 

Alain Boinet. Like funding, international humanitarian law is on the decline—and with it the humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality, and independence, which face a risk of politicization by certain states and other actors. What is VOICE’s perception, position, and perspective on this issue? Today, how do you interpret the European Commission’s stance on the risk of politicization?

Maria Groenewald. It is true that we are facing a difficult situation due to a lack of funding, but also because humanitarian action is increasingly being challenged, politicized, and exploited.

For VOICE, it is very important to return to humanitarian principles. Why? Humanitarian principles are not abstract values: they are operational tools that enable access to populations during humanitarian crises and ensure the protection of vulnerable populations and humanitarian workers. The European Commission must maintain a clear policy framework—one in which humanitarian action is guided by needs and these principles. The European Union’s leadership must be defined by its ability to defend humanitarian action against any politicization and instrumentalization.

To date, the European Commission—and DG ECHO in particular—has repeatedly reaffirmed its commitment to humanitarian principles and respect for international humanitarian law. Several ECHO-funded initiatives are currently underway and are aligned with these principles. We also hope that this will be emphasized in the Commission’s new strategy, to be published in late May: “The European Commission’s Communication on Humanitarian Aid.” However, more needs to be done at the level of European institutions, beyond ECHO. We are therefore very pleased that the publication of a “Staff Working Document” on humanitarian diplomacy, accompanying the Communication, is planned. The EU must use this strategy to position itself as a leading, consistent, and credible actor in the field of international humanitarian law and the fight against impunity, including when violations occur in politically sensitive contexts.

© Belgian Presidency of the Council of the European Union / Julien Nizet – Maciej Popowski, Director-General of ECHO, at the European Humanitarian Forum

Beyond reaffirming legal commitments, EU leadership requires political coherence and clear public stances, as well as the use of all the EU’s political, diplomatic, and normative tools to combat impunity, hold those responsible for violations of international humanitarian law accountable, and promote respect for that law.

 

Alain Boinet. Could you remind us exactly what the EU’s multiannual financial framework entails, what the stakes are, and where we stand in its preparation?

Maria Groenewald. The multiannual financial framework (MFF) sets the European Union’s long-term budget. The one currently under negotiation will cover the period 2028–2034. The key issue for us concerns the funding allocated to humanitarian action in this budget and the European Union’s future capacity to respond to both protracted and sudden crises: that is the crux of the matter.

Last summer, the European Commission published its proposal for the MFF 2028–2034, officially launching a phase of negotiations among the various stakeholders (the Commission, Member States, the European Parliament, etc.). This Commission proposal includes a budget of 200.3 billion euros for a new instrument called the “Global Europe Instrument,” which is intended to bring together all of the European Union’s international work.

© Maria Groenewald – VOICE Director Maria Groenewald at the high level round-table oVOICE-Global Focus in Cctober 2025, in Copenhaguen

This is already a positive sign for global solidarity. A portion of this instrument will be allocated to humanitarian action. The key request for us is that this amount for humanitarian action be enshrined in the regulations of the “Global Europe Instrument,” so that it remains fixed for the next seven years. This amount must be allocated to humanitarian action as a minimum, ensuring that the European Union retains the ability to increase it should unexpected crises arise. Then, of course, we are once again talking about principles. It is important that the European Union maintains humanitarian action and funding mechanisms that reflect humanitarian principles, while strengthening governance and transparency mechanisms in the allocation process. This has a significant impact on the general public’s perception of humanitarian action. It is also important that transparency be high.

The “Global Europe Instrument” must remain predictable, transparent, and needs-based to prevent it from being exploited or politicized. As negotiations continue in the coming months, VOICE will remain engaged on this issue. We have published several public documents and analyses to highlight what is at stake and ensure that the European Union remains the principled and significant donor it is today.

 

Alain Boinet. With VOICE, you recently met with Tom Fletcher, the UN Coordinator for Humanitarian Emergencies. We are familiar with the “Humanitarian Reset”—that is, the humanitarian reform triggered by declining funding. What are your thoughts on this “Humanitarian Reset”?

© Maria Groenewald – Meeting between VOICE President Pauline Chetcuti, VOICE Director Maria Groenewald, and Tom Fletcher, UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordination (2025, Brussels)

Maria Groenewald. I think we all agree that reform of the humanitarian sector is necessary. We call for a more inclusive and accountable reform process, one that is informed by the operational experience of all humanitarian actors. There is a genuine complementarity in the roles of the various actors that make up the system, including international, national, and local NGOs. Everyone who is part of this humanitarian system must also be part of the reform process. This process must, of course, remain transparent to the entire humanitarian community. It is therefore important to speak of an inclusive reform and not just a “reset” of United Nations agencies.

This also raises the question of which sectors and crises risk being overlooked during prioritization discussions. While prioritization is an unfortunate necessity to ensure that the humanitarian funds remaining after drastic budget cuts go to the populations most at risk, this must not come at the expense of the quality of aid and its ability to meet the needs expressed by affected communities.

We therefore call for special attention to be paid to forgotten crises, as well as to sectors that are already frequently underfunded today, such as Protection, Mental Health and Psychosocial Support, the response to and prevention of gender-based violence, education in emergency settings, and Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights… Furthermore, it is essential to support reform processes based on diversity, the complementarity of actors, and the various funding instruments to continue responding to crises as effectively as possible.

Thirdly, my final point is, of course, the issue of localization. Supporting the localization agenda is very important for our members and for international NGOs that have been working in partnership with local and national NGOs for many years. Like us, the ‘Reset’ promotes a humanitarian system that is “as local as possible, and as international as necessary.” But concrete progress in this direction remains limited. For example, OCHA’s approach to providing greater support to national and local NGOs through “Country-based pooled funds” (CBPFs) is, in principle, a step in the right direction. In practice, we are still far from the mark, and the figures do not yet show tangible progress, largely due to the fact that accessing funds remains complex, further progress is needed in terms of governance, and the U.S. requirements applied to the funds they have allocated to the CBPFs. For our part, we have therefore begun more in-depth work on localization and have hired a new colleague who is focusing on this issue. We are launching a new working group at VOICE, to which national and Southern networks will be invited to participate and collaborate on this initiative, thanks to support from DG ECHO.

 

Alain Boinet. How would you assess the consequences of the decline in humanitarian funding for the localization and implementation of the nexus—that is, the process of transitioning from emergency response to rehabilitation, reconstruction, and development? What impact might this funding decline have on these essential processes?

Maria Groenewald. With the decline in humanitarian funding, the coordination between humanitarian, development, and peace efforts is more important than ever to prevent a further worsening of humanitarian needs. There are many good examples that show this so-called nexus works well in responding to crises that are lasting longer and longer, breaking the cycle of suffering, addressing immediate needs, and finding long-term solutions. We must not forget what we have learned and what works, but we must also find ways to enable development actors to step in.

It is very important to remain engaged with development actors in fragile contexts. These are not contexts where we, as humanitarian workers, are able to respond alone; we need this cooperation with development actors. Several NGOs have provided positive examples of how to work with a nexus approach while respecting humanitarian principles, because we are at a time when fragility is worsening in several regions of the world: in the Sahel, the Middle East, from the Horn of Africa to Asia.

©FAO/Aissata Lam – Women receiving their cash transfer in Mauritania, in Monguel (Wilaya of Gorgol)

There is an OECD study in which, of the 177 contexts assessed for fragility, 61 were identified as having a high or extreme level of fragility. These contexts account for 25% of the world’s population, which means we must remain committed to them. These communities face worsening crises, conflicts, forced displacement, climate shocks, weakened institutions, and shrinking civic space… This is directly linked to the increase in global humanitarian needs and the growing level of fragility in many contexts around the world.

This is why it is important for the European Union to work on this new humanitarian strategy. A document drafted by the Directorates-General for ECHO and INTPA (International Partnerships) will also be published under the title “Integrated Approach to Fragility.” It is a positive step that the Commission has entrusted this joint mission to the two Commissioners for Humanitarian Aid and Development, to ensure an integrated approach. We look forward to reading the outcome.

© Nikola Krtolica – Hulo team at the Liege airport for a flight of the EU humanitarian air bridge, observing the loading in direction of Afghanistan

Alain Boinet. Conversely, could the decline in funding also have positive consequences, particularly in terms of cost-sharing among humanitarian organizations, innovation, and even operational coordination?

Maria Groenewald. It’s clear that the reduction in funding is putting a certain amount of pressure on the sector and pushing it to move forward with reforms we’ve been discussing for over a decade. The World Humanitarian Summit took place in 2016, and many reforms—such as the “Reset” we’re discussing now—are not new ideas. They emerged a long time ago, and the current situation is forcing us to implement them more seriously. At the same time, we must not stop reminding donors that cutting funding for humanitarian action is a choice, and that increasing the state budget again to meet real needs can also be a choice.

Today, there is often talk of the needs of 87 million people that the United Nations is trying to address. Yet we know that the actual number is much higher. Not long ago, estimates put the number of people in humanitarian crisis situations at 350 million. This is an unimaginable figure—twice the combined population of Germany, France, and Belgium. How can member states see these needs and fail to act? It is possible to halt this trend and take our responsibilities seriously within the G7 and other forums. What will become of these people who remain without aid? This will not be without consequences, neither for them nor for the countries bordering displaced populations and refugees. Ultimately, there will be repercussions for us.

 

Alain Boinet. 64% of the public in G7 member countries believe that what is happening in the countries where these people are in danger will have repercussions in our peaceful and prosperous nations. Let us therefore examine public opinion regarding humanitarian aid and development through a recent study commissioned by the French government from IFOP (a research and polling institute) in anticipation of the G7 summit, scheduled to take place from June 15 to 17 in Evian, France. On average, it appears that 75% of the populations in these seven countries support funding for international solidarity, but 47% of them say they are poorly informed. Furthermore, 75% of these populations want to know how the funds are used, what their concrete results are, and what their purpose is, particularly for the G7 countries that provide official development assistance. Finally, 73% emphasize the need for oversight of how funds are used.

Don’t these figures suggest that humanitarian and development actors are not adequately informing the public? Isn’t this a key communication lever for strengthening ties with public opinion, both for humanitarian organizations and for the European Commission, ECHO, and Commissioner Hadja Lahbib?

© Ron Przysucha – Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken meets with Belgian Minister Hadja Lahbib in Bucharest, Romania, on November 30, 2022
© European Union/Denis Sassou Gueipeur, 2025 – Hadja Lahbib during an intervention in Chad within the frame of operations fighting against malnutrition in refugee camps

Maria Groenewald. This study really shocked me, and it’s very important that we have access to these figures. The fact that, on average, 75% of the population supports funding for international solidarity is a very positive sign that should not be underestimated. In our sector, we tend to focus on everything that’s going wrong and adopt a very pessimistic outlook—needs are rising, funding is falling… Let’s try to look at things a bit more optimistically. Seventy-five percent support is no small matter. But even though this support remains widespread, it has become more fragile amid multiple crises, polarization, and misinformation. These figures also reveal a strong expectation for transparency, concrete results, and more accessible explanations regarding humanitarian action.

The figure that shocked me the most is the 2%: this is the percentage of the public who know that the humanitarian budget accounts for less than 1% of their country’s total budget. 16% believe it is closer to 10 to 15%. I don’t think this has ever been this high. If politicians claim that funding for humanitarian aid and development must be cut “because we need to find ways to fund defense”—without providing any figures—the public may assume that “it must be a significant amount to be able to support other priorities now.” But that’s not true. But that’s not true. The money is available; the budget is very small. What’s missing is political will—and that’s the most worrying thing.

If 75% of the population supports funding for humanitarian action, how can we better communicate about our work to capture the attention of the remaining 25%? Because that’s a number we can’t afford to ignore. That is precisely why VOICE launched a social media campaign called “Humanitarian Action Works,” to concretely demonstrate what humanitarian action enables—access to water, healthcare, food, protection…—and to highlight its real impact on people’s lives. These are not abstract issues. “Nexus,” “fragility”—these are abstract concepts. But what our members do has a truly concrete impact on the daily lives of people in humanitarian crises.

We’re also very pleased because the campaign has resonated in several European media and political circles, with articles in El País and The Brussels Times, as well as among Commissioner Hadja Lahbib and MEPs Barry Andrews and Leire Pajin. Today, this is a key communication challenge and an opportunity to talk about what we do in a more positive light.

We also need to find a way to better communicate with those who are misinformed—particularly by fake news—in order to build trust in the work that NGOs do. We also publish our magazine “VOICE out loud” twice a year, featuring articles by our members. A recent issue focused on communication about our work: “The Challenge of Humanitarian Communication: Bridging Principles and Public Perception.” We also conducted another interview with Commissioner Hadja Lahbib on the subject. We decided it was time for VOICE to express its position more firmly and openly. I also published my first opinion piece in “The Brussels Times” on effective humanitarian action and five misconceptions to combat as the European Union budget negotiations approach. We are therefore trying new ways to better communicate with the public, which, given the figures from this survey, is quite misinformed.

World Humanitarian Forum in May 2016 in Istanbul

Alain Boinet. What are the main issues at stake for the upcoming European Humanitarian Forum, scheduled for this spring? What are you looking forward to most this year?

Maria Groenewald. It is worth noting that the Commission has decided not to hold a European Humanitarian Forum this year. The next one will be in 2027. However, there are other key conferences taking place this year. First, VOICE has advocated with DG ECHO for a partners’ dialogue. It is therefore organizing a “Partners’ Dialogue” on June 15. During this “Partners’ Dialogue,” we will host a session dedicated to cash assistance, which is an important aspect whose benefits—both in terms of efficiency and for dignified access to aid—must not be overlooked. Overall, we find ourselves in a situation where what we have learned regarding efficiency, the importance of certain issues, protection, education in emergencies, or gender, risks being overlooked at the international level. It is important that these various issues and priorities remain high on the donors’ agenda, so that we do not forget everything we have learned over the past 30 years in the sector.

At the same time, DG ECHO has been working on supply chain issues for the past year and a half with its partners—the United Nations, international NGOs, private sector partners, and others. How can we work together more effectively and organize supply chains in the humanitarian sector to achieve cost savings while also increasing efficiency? Next week, there will be a meeting in Rome on this issue. Work on innovative financing is also an important topic that could help identify new ways to implement interventions effectively, while respecting humanitarian principles.

 

Alain Boinet. How would you like to conclude this interview?

Maria Groenewald. There is no need to choose between funding for humanitarian aid and funding for other important issues. It’s not an either/or situation. We can defend ourselves while still showing solidarity. It’s 2027; we’ve traveled to the moon, developed artificial intelligence… We can do it all: show solidarity, send our children to public schools that work, maintain a functioning healthcare system, and take care of others. Since you mention Ebola, I read an interesting article yesterday in The Guardian about Ebola in the DRC. The author says: “If your neighbor’s house is on fire, don’t expect us to stand by and watch with our arms crossed.” I believe we live in an interconnected world and that we are all neighbors, including the 350 million people living in the midst of humanitarian crises.


Maria Groenewald

 

With over 15 years of experience in the NGO sector, Maria Groenewald has developed strong advocacy and project management skills in both the humanitarian and development fields. After studying political science, communication science and sociology in Germany and France, Maria started her career working for Johanniter International Assistance, where she gained extensive field experience in Africa. Maria then joined Plan International Germany, where she held various positions for more than ten years, including Head of Humanitarian and Development Programs in Asia.

In the four years prior to joining VOICE, Maria was based in Brussels as Senior Resource Mobilization Manager at Plan International Germany with a focus on funding and relations with DG ECHO and DG DEVCO (now DG INTPA).

Specialized in humanitarian and development programming, nexus, activity development, resource mobilization, programming related to children’s rights, humanitarian partnership (in particular with DG ECHO) and the Grand Bargain, Maria joined the VOICE secretariat team in February 2021 as Program Coordinator. She became Acting Director in July 2021, before being appointed as the new VOICE Director in November 2021.


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