Armenia at a Crossroads in Its Destiny

May and June 2026: two months that cement Armenia’s ties with the European Union

© The Smithsonian for Folklife and Cultural Heritage – Crowd of protesters in the Place of Republic in Yerevan, during the Velvet Revolution in 2018

An analysis. With this article by Arthur Robert, we offer a detailed look at the recent diplomatic events of early May with France and the European Union, Russian reactions, and the June 7 legislative elections won by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.

In May 2026, within a forty-eight-hour window, Yerevan hosted the 8th summit of the European Political Community (EPC), inaugurated the first-ever bilateral EU-Armenia summit, signed a strategic partnership with France, and concluded a connectivity partnership with the European Commission.

The sequence of May 4–5, 2026 was both the culmination of an Armenian repositioning begun in 2018 and a strong political signal, one month ahead of the June 7 legislative elections in which the country’s positioning toward Europe and Russia was a central theme. This sequence allowed Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to reinforce the geostrategic shift he had initiated, consisting of moving away from Russia’s orbit and deepening relations with the EU.

For Brussels and Paris, the stake was to consolidate a foothold in the Caucasus, at a time when Georgia is drifting away and Russia is militarily absorbed by Ukraine. Kaja Kallas, Vice-President of the European Commission and High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, recalled during the summit that “Armenia would decide for itself.”

Thus, the victory of Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party in the June 7, 2026 legislative elections sealed the rapprochement between Armenia and the European Union. Civil Contract won with nearly 50% of the vote, while the parties favoring closer ties with Russia — Armenia Strong, led by Samvel Karapetyan, and the Armenia Alliance, led by Robert Kocharyan — obtained 23% and 10% of the vote, respectively. While the outgoing Prime Minister’s party, in power since 2018, retained an absolute majority, it lost seven seats compared to the 2021 legislative elections, depriving it of the two-thirds majority that would have allowed it to pursue the constitutional revision demanded by Azerbaijan.

© Department of Foreign Affairs and International Development, Archives Direction (geographic division) – November 2014

The European Political Community (EPC) Summit: a symbolically charged first outside the EU

The 8th EPC summit, the first held outside the EU, brought together on May 4, 2026 in Yerevan more than forty heads of state and government, including Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, under the motto “Building the Future: Unity and Stability in Europe.” Four major themes emerged from the summit:

Democratic resilience, with the idea that Armenian democracy must be protected from “external interference and disinformation,” a direct consequence of Russian hybrid warfare;
Trans-Caucasian and trans-Caspian connectivity, in the current context of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) and the Middle Corridor, of which Armenia now aspires to be a branch via the future TRIPP route;
Economic and energy security, with reduced dependence on fossil fuels and the rise of renewables and nuclear power;
Defense and strategic autonomy, driven by the Ukrainian context.

© Alain Boinet – City of Meghri, in the district of Syunik, South of Armenia near borders with Iran, Azerbaidjan and Nakhitchevan. It’s the spot within the Latchin corridor through which should go the TRIPP road and a railway.

The choice of Yerevan for this first EPC summit outside the EU marks political recognition of Armenia’s trajectory, begun in 2017 with the signing of a Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement between the EU and Armenia, which entered into force in 2021. After the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023, Yerevan’s pivot westward continued with the announcement in April 2024 of an EU Resilience and Growth Plan for Armenia, endowed with €270 million over the 2024–2027 period.

The first EU-Armenia summit: a further step toward accession

On May 5, 2026, following the EPC, António Costa, President of the European Council, and Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, co-chaired with Nikol Pashinyan the first bilateral EU-Armenia summit, marked by the signing of a joint declaration reaffirming the EU’s commitment “to supporting Armenia’s sovereignty, resilience and reform agenda,” with both parties committing to “expand their long-term strategic cooperation.”

Armenia’s path continued with the adoption of the law “On Launching the Process of Armenia’s Accession to the EU” by the National Assembly in March 2025, which makes EU candidacy a legally binding orientation for the Armenian executive. Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan indicated in October 2025 that a formal application could be submitted the following year. Subsequently, a strategic agenda for the EU-Armenia partnership was adopted in December 2025.

© Armenian governement gallery – Opening ceremony of the EPC in May 2026

Two partnerships were sealed during the summit:

The EU-Armenia Connectivity Partnership, covering energy, transport and digital sectors;
The allocation of €30 million under the European Peace Facility (EPF) for Armenia’s armed forces. This amount combines a first tranche of €10 million (signed in 2024) and a second of €20 million adopted in January 2026.

The France-Armenia strategic partnership: a “singular relationship” institutionalized

French President Emmanuel Macron played a key role in this sequence, which cemented the strength of the France-Armenia friendship, just as the French Senate and National Assembly played a driving role in the maturation of this partnership, through:

The activism of the France-Armenia friendship group;
The Senate resolution of November 25, 2020 on the “need to recognize the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh”;
The Senate resolution of November 15, 2023 condemning Azerbaijan and calling for European sanctions.

Welcomed by large crowds expressing sympathy in the streets of the capital, Emmanuel Macron spoke of a “singular relationship” and Armenia’s “European vocation,” and signed with Nikol Pashinyan the declaration on the French-Armenian strategic partnership, complemented by a series of contracts carried out by French companies.

© Armenian government – Signing of France-Armenia agreemets on May the 5th 2026

In the field of defense, the partnership establishes Paris as one of Armenia’s main arms suppliers and extends cooperation begun in 2023, including:

Continuation of orders signed in October 2023: three Thales GM200 radars, 50 Arquus Bastion armored vehicles, as well as a letter of intent for MBDA Mistral surface-to-air missiles;
Continuation of deliveries of the 36 CAESAR howitzers ordered in June 2024. The first units were presented in Armenia in May 2026 ahead of the May 28 military parade.

In the economic field, Vinci and Razel-Bec signed a declaration of intent to participate in the construction of the Bargushat tunnel, a key piece of infrastructure for connecting with the Georgian port of Poti and the south of the country. In civil nuclear power, France (Framatome) positioned itself among other competitors for the construction of the future small modular reactor (SMR) intended to replace Metsamor. In the aerospace sector, FlyOne Armenia ordered two Airbus A321neo aircraft, while Armenia’s Ministry of Defense acquired six Airbus H145 military helicopters.

© Olivier Decottignies – Signing of defense agreements on the 22nd and 23rd of February 2024 in Yerevan between defense ministers Sébastien Lecornu and Souren Papikian

Armenia’s geopolitical repositioning as a central issue in the legislative elections

As the timing of the EU-Armenia summit illustrates, the rapprochement with Europe, along with the exit from Russia’s orbit, were central themes of Armenia’s June 2026 legislative elections.

Civil Contract took a position breaking with the historic relationship of vassalage between Armenia and Russia — a classic feature of the relationship Russia seeks with former Soviet states, according to political scientist Taline Papazian. The Prime Minister championed a doctrine of “real Armenia,” consisting of refocusing the state on its internationally recognized borders and renouncing any claim to Nagorno-Karabakh, and promised the adoption of a new Constitution presented as a “Fourth Republic.”

This campaign took place against a backdrop of tensions with the religious establishment, since since June 2025 Nikol Pashinyan has publicly called for the departure of Catholicos Karekin II, head of the Armenian Apostolic Church, whom he accuses of having broken his vow of celibacy. In February 2026, the Armenian prosecutor’s office launched proceedings against the Catholicos.

The confrontation with the Church became a central dividing line with the opposition, which largely positioned itself as the defender of the clergy. It is in this context that Samvel Karapetyan, a Russian-Armenian billionaire and founder of the “Armenia Strong” alliance (23% in the June 2026 elections), entered politics. In June 2025 he had pledged to “defend” the Church, before being arrested for “calling for the seizure of power” and placed under house arrest. Ineligible due to his Russian and Cypriot citizenship, he handed leadership of the party list to his nephew Narek Karapetyan, who is himself under investigation for concealing Russian citizenship. The alliance promised to revise the Constitution to allow Samvel Karapetyan to become Prime Minister. Documents published by the investigative outlet The Insider allege past ties between him and Russia’s FSB, which his camp has denied, calling it a fabrication.

© Wikimedia Commons – A CSTO Summit in Yntymak Ordo Residence , Bishkek, in November 2025

The other opposition forces shared this pro-Russian orientation while differing in profile and degree. The “Armenia Alliance” (10% in the June 2026 elections), led by former President Robert Kocharyan, advocated for remaining in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization — a military alliance created and led by Moscow in 2002, grouping six former Soviet republics). The “Armenia Alliance” also seeks closer ties with Moscow and rejects any constitutional concession to Azerbaijan, which part of the opposition views as a betrayal.

Judicial affairs fueled the polarization among the protagonists. In addition to Samvel Karapetyan, Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan, leader of the 2024 protest movement against territorial concessions to Azerbaijan, remained in pre-trial detention over an alleged coup plot. Armenia’s Investigative Committee reported 59 criminal cases for electoral fraud, mainly targeting people close to the opposition. Those concerned see this as judicial instrumentalization against their candidates, while the government invokes the rule of law and the fight against foreign interference.

The geopolitical divisions of the Armenian election were accompanied by a large-scale Russian interference operation reportedly involving Russia’s three main intelligence services (the SVR, FSB and GRU). This operation took the form of a disinformation campaign using methods well known to European authorities, such as Doppelganger or Storm-1516. The campaign notably aimed to tarnish the reputation of Nikol Pashinyan, code-named “Boroda” (meaning “beard”), and was reportedly accompanied by efforts by Russian services to gather information that could compromise Pashinyan. Finally, Russia is said to have devised a plan to transfer 100,000 Armenians from Russia in order to influence the vote, in addition to its support for the “Armenia Strong” alliance.

A minor regional revolution that challenges Russia

The months of May and June 2026 brought Armenia’s estrangement from Russia, begun in 2018, to its peak. Abandoned by its historic partner during the two successive phases of conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (or Artsakh) with Azerbaijan (2021–2022 and 2023), Armenia has frozen its participation in the CSTO since February 2024. Following an agreement, Russia withdrew its border guards from Yerevan airport in July 2024, where they had been stationed since 1992. Nikol Pashinyan spoke of a “point of no return” in December 2024, and in March 2025 Yerevan notified Moscow of its refusal to fund the CSTO’s 2024 budget.

© Wikimedia Commons – Vladimir Putin with Armenian Prime minister Nikol Pachinian in Kremlin (April 2026)

Russia reacted strongly to Armenia’s distancing from the CSTO, and reacted even more forcefully to the May-June 2026 sequence, viewing Volodymyr Zelensky’s participation in the EU summit in Yerevan in particular as a betrayal.

The day after the European summits in Yerevan, Russian diplomacy denounced a “rapprochement” with Brussels intended, according to Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova, to draw Armenia into an “irreversible involvement in the EU’s anti-Russian line.” Meeting at the EAEU summit in Astana on May 28, 2026, the Moscow-led bloc deemed that Armenia’s EU candidacy posed “serious risks” to its economic security, and mandated a review of a possible suspension of Armenia by December.

Armenia was also subjected to a series of economic restrictions by Russia, its main economic partner (around 37% of Armenian exports go to Russia, while nearly 30% of imports come from there). Most of these restrictions were justified by Russia on sanitary grounds, but their timing leaves little doubt as to Russia’s intent to punish Armenia for its geopolitical trajectory.

As early as April 2026, Russia banned the Armenian cognac brand Proshyan on its territory, a week after a meeting between Vladimir Putin and Nikol Pashinyan. On May 29, Vladimir Putin compared Yerevan’s trajectory to the “Ukrainian scenario” and brandished the trade weapon, stating that Russia would be “forced to limit its economic activities in Armenia” if the country moved closer to the EU. The following day, Moscow recalled its ambassador to Armenia for “consultations on measures taken” against Armenia over its “rapprochement with the European Union, undermining cooperation within the EAEU.”

As the elections approached, these restrictions intensified. On May 22, the Russian agency Rosselkhoznadzor (responsible for veterinary and sanitary surveillance and control of goods entering Russia) temporarily restricted imports of floral products from Armenia. For similar reasons, Russia blocked tens of millions of bottles of Jermuk mineral water — a popular Armenian brand in Russia — at the end of May.

© Armenian government – Armenian Prime minister arménien, Nikol Pachinian, voting during the June 2026 elections

Starting May 30, 2026, Rosselkhoznadzor also imposed “temporary restrictions” on imports of tomatoes, cucumbers, peppers and strawberries from Armenia. On June 2, these restrictions were extended to several fruits, and on June 3 to Armenian eggplants, potatoes, and dried fruits. Finally, on June 12, Russia blocked the import of all quarantine-subject products from Armenia, as well as their transit through its territory to member states of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).

On June 15, Kaja Kallas indicated that the EU was preparing a large-scale economic aid plan for Armenia to help it cope with Russian retaliatory measures.

An unprecedented partnership in the Caucasus

The French and EU-Armenian partnerships could, in the medium term, become the prototype for a European security policy in the eastern neighborhood.

Georgia’s trajectory offers, by contrast, a counter-example of a failed shift. After obtaining EU candidate status in December 2023, Georgia abruptly backtracked under the effect of its domestic politics. As early as May 2024, the pro-Russian Georgian Dream party pushed through a “foreign agents” law modeled on the Russian one, deemed by Brussels incompatible with democratic standards. The October 2024 legislative elections, won by Georgian Dream in a vote marred by irregularities, sealed the rupture. In November 2024, just hours after the European Parliament adopted a resolution rejecting the election results due to irregularities, Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze announced the suspension of EU accession negotiations until the end of 2028, accusing the EU of blackmail. Moreover, deliveries to Armenia were interrupted: of the 50 Bastion armored vehicles promised by France, only 26 had been delivered, due to transit difficulties through Georgia since the end of 2024.

Despite recent progress, a situation that remains fragile

While Armenia in June 2026 no longer appears to be a “disappointed ally” of Moscow but rather a distinct strategic partner with robust ties to Europe, the new Armenian situation remains fragile.

First, while normalization between Azerbaijan and Armenia appears to be continuing, its longevity cannot be predicted. The tripartite protocol of August 2025, signed in the presence of Donald Trump, Pashinyan, and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, creates unprecedented conditions for peace. But Baku is conditioning the formal signing of the treaty on the revision of the Armenian Constitution to remove all reference to Nagorno-Karabakh, which could reignite tensions in a context of clear Azerbaijani military superiority. Yet neither the EU nor France is in a position to provide Armenia with security guarantees comparable to those long offered by Russia, which still maintains a base in the country housing 4,000 soldiers.

© The White House – Donald Trump, Nikol Pachinian and Ilham Aliev in Washington on the 8th of August 2025 during the signing of the TRIPP (Trump Route Initiative for International Peace and Prosperity)

Second, Russia’s economic and political retaliatory measures are expected to have a significant impact on the Armenian economy.

Finally, the June 2026 legislative elections showed that parties advocating closer ties with Russia remain very popular. In the long term, Armenia’s deep historical ties with Russia and the reality of its geographic position will likely compel Armenia to normalize its relations with Russia.

As Taline Papazian sums it up, Armenia faces the complex challenge of “transforming an imposed rupture into a coherent political project, capable of reconciling sovereignty, democratic stability, and openness to its regional and European environment.”

Arthur Robert.

Arthur Robert is an analyst within the sectors of geopolitics and economy. He works for public institutions as well as the private sector while being a teaching assistant.

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The eye in the loophole

Diary of Armenia

Things seen, words heard

An opinion column by Patrice Franceschi

Editor’s introduction. Armenia is threatened with a military invasion despite ongoing negotiations which do nothing to hide the constant aggression of President IIlham Aliyev’s Azerbaijan. Armenia is proposing a peace and cooperation agreement that this region of the South Caucasus needs. We are publishing this article by Patrice Franceschi, who is preparing a forthcoming book on Armenia from which he has just returned, and who has written here for our readers.

Armenian military post in the Syunik region facing Azeri positions. Photo by P. Franceschi.

Bent in two, Hovic and I make our way along the trench that winds its way towards the Armenian army’s last redoubt on the Azeri front line running along the northern border of Syunik province. I know of no harsher region in Armenia than this frontier at the end of the world – and none poorer. But from here, you can almost touch the land of Nagorno-Karabakh that was lost nearly two years ago.

In this month of February, the winter is biting, the cold relentless, the snowstorms frequent; sometimes you can’t see two steps ahead. The mountains around us are a dizzying tangle of peaks, ravines and sharp ridges, with only the rarest groves of trees. Snow is everywhere on these mountains, mud everywhere in the trenches; slimy, nasty mud. We were wading. The sentries we passed, bundled up in fleece jackets, their helmets tucked into woollen chapkas, scanned the enemy positions whose defensive network seemed almost embedded in their own, so close was it. If it weren’t for the flags flying over each position, you’d get lost… The Azeri defence network also stretches from ridge to ridge over considerable distances, but seems much better fortified and more modern too. From where I’m standing, you’d think you were in a trench on the Somme in 1915.

Hovik and I made further progress. Then the last redoubt appeared in front of us, protected by wooden planks, tyres, sheet metal and sandbags. Very basic protection – like all the other posts, in fact. I point this out to my comrade, who approves with a shrug of the shoulders, before adding in a whisper: ‘What’s more, you can’t get any closer to the Azeris. Here, they’re less than thirty metres away. Attention…. ’ I straighten up and put my eye to the slit in the armour plate in front of me: on the other side, in the middle of the enemy’s fortification wall, I can clearly see a slit similar to mine – and behind it, the eye of a soldier watching me silently…

I’ll never forget that exchange of glances in the ‘Tartar Desert’ atmosphere that grips everything around us.

Back in a less exposed casemate, we take a moment to rest. The soldiers on guard duty were warming themselves around a wood-burning stove, shoulder to shoulder. One of them was boiling water on a gas stove to make coffee, while another was opening a bottle of vodka to pass the time. Comfort was basic, the iron beds overloaded with weapons, fatigues, tin cans and other belongings. The boredom is palpable, even in the air we breathe. I tell myself that it must be the same with the Azeris.

On the front line of this ‘phoney war’, forgotten by the rest of the world, all we do is wait.

Most of the soldiers around me belong to the ‘popular defence units’ responsible for relieving the army by manning hundreds of posts similar to the one we’re in now. They are between fifty and sixty years old, with one or two wars behind them, the rugged faces of peasants from another era, massive bodies, unfailing motivation, but outdated weaponry. Among them, a few women. And even a sixty-year-old grandmother playing Lara Kroft with her Kalashnikov, refusing to take off her heavy helmet – just in case…

The orders are simple,’ says the leader of this small, disparate troop, a veteran with shoulders wider than he is tall. When the Azeris attack, we have to hold out until the army arrives – that’s all.

– The army is far away, I say. And by the time it gets here…. You don’t even have a second line of defence.

Syunik mountain region in north-east Armenia. Photo by P. Franceschi.

The soldiers looked at each other without a word: ‘Well, we’ll hold out anyway,’ said one sergeant eventually. In the meantime, the Azeris keep provoking us. They shoot over our heads or at the shepherds if they get too close with their sheep; and when the wind blows towards us, they burn the vegetation to smoke us out. But we have orders not to shoot back

– That’s why we go round in circles,’ says a corporal. But when they insult us from their trenches, we certainly respond – and you don’t have to raise your voice much, given the distance…’ I ask.

I ask: ‘And what are their insults?

– Oh, it’s always the same. They say they’re going to come and slit our throats in our villages, that our wives and children will be killed, and so on and so forth.

One of the soldiers stands up, clearly overexcited. He’s a braggart. He says emphatically: ‘The last time they insulted us like that, I replied that I was going to go to Baku in person to slit Alyev’s throat; that really got on their nerves….’.

His comrades laugh and agree.

Armenian light armour on the Syunik front. Photo by P. Franceschi.

I laugh at these childish jokes, but I don’t think any less of them: my friends are in trouble. It’s true that they have a fierce yet serene determination to defend their land, but in Yerevan, where a third of Armenians live, it’s a different story. The capital’s gilded youth will flee at the first shot. And they’re not afraid to admit it. The only positive note in all this is the proliferation of ‘military-patriotic associations’ sprouting up all over the countryside to defend the country. The pattern is always the same: former soldiers set up associations in villages or small towns to train young people for war, they find funding here and there in the diaspora, and the young people flock to them. No doubt they now outnumber the official army, which is skeletally small – only 30,000 men, including 20,000 conscripts.

In the meantime, I ask the old peasant soldiers around me how they see the future. The same answer comes out of every mouth: sooner or later the Azeris will attack. When, why and how, they don’t really know. It’s part and parcel of being these people and that’s that.

In turn, they ask me how I, the foreign friend, see things. I tell them what I think: Alyev’s policy, in other words the ‘final state’ that he and his Turkish allies want, is for Armenia to disappear from the map because its geographical position makes it difficult for the Turks to achieve their expansionist aims. It’s as simple as that. But, to achieve this final state, there is no question of a new genocide. This is not 1915. We can’t afford anything. Ethnic cleansing as used in Nagorno-Karabakh is far more effective. It has proved its worth. And it does not provoke any disproportionate international reaction. It is therefore likely that in the relatively near future the Azeri army will attack Armenia on the pretext that the latter is denying it sovereignty over a corridor linking it to Turkey via Nakhichevan. This attack is certain to take place in Syunik, the narrowest part of the country – just a few dozen kilometres – to cut Armenia in two. The matter would be settled in 48 hours, given the size of the military gap. The Armenians would have no way of resisting effectively. Of course, the Azeris would leave a narrow passage free so that the population of Syunik – barely 75,000 – could flee to the rest of Armenia – and that would be that. It would be a repeat of what happened with Nagorno-Karabakh.

The author with Armenian soldiers in a pillbox. Photo by P. Franceschi.

This worst-case scenario is haunting the enlightened minds in Yerevan and the Western chancelleries, which refuse to delude themselves. For the latter, the only way to avoid the worst-case scenario is to let Alyev know that the political, economic and diplomatic cost of his action is still too high for him to embark on the adventure. In this respect, the Americans seem to have revised their position very recently, exerting unequivocal pressure on Baku – notably for the release of Armenian prisoners of war. France is not to be outdone and remains a reliable ally for Pachinian. There is a glimmer of hope there.

As for the peace treaty, the signing of which has just been announced, it is undoubtedly a Munich-style smoke and mirrors. Given the balance of power, Pachinian had no choice but to go before Alyev and sign whatever he wanted, but there is nothing in this treaty. There is even reason to fear that its content actually represents an opportunity for war for Alyev. Since the announcement of this treaty, provocations have redoubled in the trenches of the Syunik front line.

What tomorrow will bring, no one can say with any certainty. But as things stand, it’s best not to delude ourselves. And to remain vigilant. Considering once and for all that the pessimism of observation – necessary – must lead to the optimism of combat – even more necessary…

Patrice Franceschi.

Writer and political philosopher, winner of the 2015 Goncourt short story prize, Patrice Franceschi is also an aviator, sailor and parachutist. He has always divided his life between writing, adventure and commitment. He has led numerous expeditions around the world, on land, at sea and in the air. He also spent many years in the ranks of the Afghan resistance fighting the Soviet army and, since the start of the war in Syria, has been actively involved in the Kurdish revolution against the Islamic State and the regime in Damascus.
His novels, stories, poetry and essays are inseparable from a committed, free and tumultuous existence in which he tries to ‘exhaust the field of the possible’. He is also commander of the three-masted schooner La Boudeuse and a member of the marine writers’ group.

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