The Sahel region, extensions Southward and New emerging Jihadist Fronts : A Deep Dive into the W-Arly-Pendjari Complex

Favored region for non-state armed groups since the early 2000s, the Central Sahel is the scene of an unprecedented security and humanitarian crisis. From Mali to Chad, through Burkina Faso, Niger, and Nigeria, the presence of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) has continued to grow since 2012. But while the affected states and the international community struggle to stabilize this critical region, new fronts are quietly emerging along the borders of coastal countries. In northern Benin, a unique area brings together environmental, economic, and security challenges, the combined effects of which have disastrous consequences for civilian populations: the W-Arly-Pendjari transboundary natural complex.

The Origins of the Crisis

Just as NATO’s intervention in Libya was drawing to a close in October 2011, a war broke out in northern Mali in the first month of the new year over the independence of Azawad[1]. Faced with the Tuareg rebellion as well as the jihadist movement Ansar Dine, the Malian army failed to quell the insurgency and ultimately lost control of this strategic portion of territory. Initially in Tuareg hands, the major cities of Azawad quickly fell under Islamic law thanks to crucial support from AQIM. The destruction of mausoleums, the radical enforcement of Sharia law, and the amputation of limbs as acts of retaliation… the non-state armed groups’ ambition to expand toward Timbuktu resulted in particularly brutal methods against civilians, thereby prompting international forces—notably French ones—to intervene in the conflict in 2013.

While these military operations succeeded in neutralizing several of AQIM’s Arab leaders, they nevertheless paved the way for a new Tuareg and Fulani leader whose community affiliation is of fundamental importance. In 2017, Iyad Ag Ghali succeeded in uniting and merging Ansar Dine, AQIM, and two other jihadist groups: JNIM (Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin) was born. Through its new trans-ethnic character and a moderation of its radical application of Sharia law, it was thus able to expand its recruitment base—particularly within the Fulani and Bambara communities—and began a gradual expansion into the rest of the central Sahel.

© UNNEWS – Violence Spreading Southward: The Government of Togo and the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC) have destroyed 2,000 illegally trafficked weapons

Although Islamist fighters have been venturing beyond Mali’s borders for years, the country remains the epicenter of the crisis and is regularly subjected to attacks with disastrous consequences for both civilians and the central government. On April 25, 2026, the JNIM and separatists from the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) jointly targeted strategic locations in Bamako, Kati, Gao, Mopti, Sévaré, and Kidal, leading to the tragic death of Defense Minister Sadio Camara and the occupation of several northern cities, including Kidal—a key city for the Malian state, located on the border with Algeria.

A push southward justified by the rejection of foreign interference

Naturally, JNIM’s territorial expansion primarily serves strategic interests. It involves controlling new trade routes to supply the movement, expanding the recruitment pool, and establishing safe havens where fighters can withdraw from the front lines to rest and receive medical care.

However, its initial incursions into Burkina Faso and Niger are justified in an entirely different way by its command. Marked by the struggle against Western influence, they are thus presented as a means of attacking the French military presence deployed in the three countries.

Launched in 2013, Operation Serval aimed to halt the advance of jihadists toward the Malian capital and restore state sovereignty over the entire country. Although successful, it was extended by Operation Barkhane in July 2014. This time, the operation also expanded into Niger, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mauritania. But after nine years of French political and military engagement in Mali, the weakening of the Malian president led to a military coup, a call by the junta to the Russian Wagner Group, and a demand for the withdrawal of French and European troops, followed by that of MINUSMA (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali) in 2020. This was followed by coups in Burkina Faso in 2022 and then in Niger in 2023. Bolstered by their anti-Western stance, these new regimes proclaimed their determination to finally secure their triple border—the focal point of the Sahel crisis.

© Salomée Languille – Map “Presence and withdrawal of French and UN forces in the center Sahel from 2013 to 2023 (made on May 2026)

But the JNIM, far from being content to consolidate its foothold in Niger and Burkina Faso, is continuing its advance southward and has recently begun establishing a presence in the countries of the Gulf of Guinea. Having been present in northern Benin for several years, it is strengthening its presence there in 2021 and 2022, to the detriment of its rival, EIGS, whose foothold there remains marginal as of 2025.

At the same time, this series of coups d’état sent shockwaves through West Africa. To express its disapproval, ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) then imposed various sanctions against the coup governments. In particular, it ordered the closure of every border shared by its member states with the three countries. Engaging in a full-blown standoff, the coup governments responded by signing the “Liptako-Gourma Charter,” which formalized their secession and established the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) in September 2022.

Meeting between Patrice Talon (President of Benin) and Omar Alieu Touray (President of the ECOWAS Commission) on October 28, 2022: Close Cooperation Between Benin and ECOWAS

The W-Arly Pendjari Natural Complex: A Hotbed of Risks and Vulnerabilities

Coupled with the advance of the Sahara Desert, which depletes the soil, erodes vegetation cover, and forces populations—including fighters from non-state armed groups—to move further and further south, the territorial expansion of JNIM now affects a crucial area: a natural complex listed as a UNESCO World Heritage Site since 1996, straddling the borders of Niger, Burkina Faso, and Benin. At the intersection of major security and environmental challenges, this tri-border region combines numerous factors of vulnerability for civilian populations due to its very assets.

© Apolline Bessière – Map “The triple South-Sahelian border : an area of political and enconomical instability suffering from a growing insecurity” (2026)

Against a backdrop of worsening drought and desertification, the Central Sahel region is grappling with significant climate change. Among the Sahelian populations suffering from water stress, land degradation, and the resulting displacement, certain communities in the tri-border area are particularly hard hit. From sedentary farmers to nomadic herders, particularly the Fulani, livelihoods are shrinking considerably and exacerbating an already severe precariousness. A true oasis in the middle of the desert, the WAP complex thus concentrates precious and contested resources. Farmland, pastures, water, timber, game… so many sources of contention that fuel violent inter-community conflicts among populations already living in precarious conditions.

The closure of transhumance corridors, the numerous restrictions, and the displacement of civilians into buffer zones—or Controlled Occupation Zones (COZs)—outside the park, imposed by public authorities, have in fact greatly fueled these rivalries over resource sharing. By further intensifying pressure on these resources within small, densely populated areas, this approach to securing the park paradoxically encourages local populations to carry out illegal incursions into the complex in order to meet their growing needs.

Located far from urban centers and health, administrative, and educational infrastructure, the marginal areas that make up the WAP also place the communities living there on the periphery of national economies and vital services. This chronic vulnerability leaves them particularly exposed to abuse, exploitation, extortion, sexual violence, child labor, and forced marriage.

Livestock farmers and their herds in Arly National Park in South-East Burkina Faso

But this context of economic instability is also compounded by significant security challenges. Covering an area of 94,000 km², the WAP’s remarkable vegetation stands out in the heart of such an arid region. Nevertheless, this distinctive feature has drawn the keen interest of non-state armed groups for reasons other than its unusual greenery. Dotted with trees, the complex provides forest cover that allows fighters to hide more easily and significantly hinders surveillance and state control. By limiting access to the all-terrain vehicles of forest rangers and the army, as well as the use of drones, this area has consequently become a preferred deployment base for jihadists from JNIM and ISSP, who frequently target civilians through acts of physical violence or extortion. Furthermore, due to recent tensions between ECOWAS and the AES, security cooperation mechanisms in this border area have been significantly weakened. Thus, much like the Wagadou Forest between Mali and Mauritania, the WAP has gradually become a rear base for non-state armed groups.

View from Pendjari National Park of the Atakora Mountains in North Benin

In regions marked by extreme poverty, unemployment, a lack of education, and limited opportunities for social mobility, widespread frustration arises toward the central government and its inability to meet the needs of the population and protect them from violence. This precarious situation thus provides fertile ground for forced recruitment by non-state armed groups, which present themselves as alternatives to states deemed failing and in the face of growing needs.

Vital needs that continue to grow: a heavy humanitarian toll

Amid intensifying climate change and jihadist activity in the region, the needs of the populations in the WAP complex continue to grow, even as humanitarian responses face challenges related to field accessibility and a drastic decline in public funding.

The country-specific monitoring and figures published online by Solidarités International in May 2026 speak volumes and powerfully illustrate the scale of the crisis in the countries of the Central Sahel over the past few years. Particularly shaken by violence and the recent coup, Burkina Faso has been reaching dramatic record highs for several months, with nearly 2.1 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 5.9 million people in need of humanitarian aid of all kinds. In Niger, the NGO counts nearly 2.2 million people facing food insecurity, and UNHCR reports 460,000 internally displaced persons as of October 2025. In both countries, frequent breakdowns at water distribution points are forcing civilians to consume contaminated water that makes them sick; there is also limited access to education due to displacement, widespread rationing of meals, and often very precarious living conditions following displacement.

© UNHCR Insa Wawa Diatta – Burkinabé refugees in Côte d’Ivoire

But while these countries have traditionally been prioritized by humanitarian organizations because they have been at the heart of the crisis from the outset, the crisis is also beginning to affect regions in northern Benin. Indeed, many internally displaced persons and asylum seekers are increasingly seeking refuge in the south, far from the combat zones. Furthermore, as of September 30, 2025, there were already 27,294 IDPs and 27,854 refugees. While nearly 280,000 people are at risk of facing an acute food and livelihood crisis, nearly 50% of households are adopting survival strategies that put them in danger: reducing the number of meals, depriving adults to feed children, consuming contaminated water… In fact, more than half of households in northern Benin rely on unsafe water sources, due to often unreliable water points and the long distances they must travel to reach them—journeys that are sometimes very dangerous for the young women and girls who are generally responsible for fetching water.

With the spread and intensification of activities by non-state armed groups toward the south, as well as the growing number of displaced persons—particularly in northern Benin—these already considerable needs are expected to continue to worsen significantly. Faced with these risks and multiple vulnerability factors, humanitarian action is therefore compelled to devise hybrid, innovative responses capable of addressing sustainable natural resource management, economic development assistance, and the fight against insecurity—interrelated issues that feed into one another.

© UNHCR Abdoulatif Halidou – Displaced families arrive in Gao, Mali, after being forced to flee their homes due to violence

Humanitarian Operations Severely Hampered but Crucial

In the Central Sahel, humanitarian actors are forced to operate in increasingly complex environments. Indeed, access to the field and to populations is regularly made difficult or even impossible by the occupation of certain areas by non-state armed groups. Government-led security operations can also sometimes hinder these interventions, particularly when collaboration with local administrations is slow to materialize. This is especially the case when authorities tighten access policies. In November 2025, for example, Niger’s Ministry of the Interior suspended the activities of humanitarian NGOs and both national and international development organizations because they had not yet published their financial statements for the previous year. While Niger’s humanitarian landscape remains robust, this move dealt a severe blow to solidarity in the country: as of January 7, 2026, OCHA reported that 1,809 NGOs were authorized to continue their activities out of the 4,122 originally present in the country.

Furthermore, recent tensions between the AES countries and the coastal nations—which remain members of ECOWAS—have led to a partial paralysis of land traffic, beyond the scope of broader cooperation mechanisms. In July 2023, ECOWAS had in fact ordered the closure of the border between Benin and Niger in response to the coup that overthrew President Mohamed Bazoum. But while President Patrice Talon did reopen his side of the border upon the announcement of the end of sanctions in February 2024, General Abdourahamane Tiani—Niger’s president since his military coup—still refuses to follow suit. Although the reopening of the Tasmiya-Kamba corridor on February 9, 2026—in Kebbi State in northwestern Nigeria—now allows for a connection between the two countries, the essential transport routes at the northern tip of Benin passing through Malanville remain inoperative, much to the chagrin of merchants in the region.

To justify maintaining this closure, the coup leaders—backed by a segment of the Nigerien population—accuse the Beninese government of facilitating the deployment of foreign forces in the region and suspect it of hosting a French military base, with the aim of facilitating an incursion into Nigerien territory. Against a backdrop of opposition to foreign interference, these disputes between neighbors have disastrous consequences for both the local economy and the work of NGOs. Although Patrice Talon authorized the UN to establish a humanitarian corridor to Niger in 2023, roadblocks and armed checkpoints remain on the Nigerien side. Logistical routes dedicated to the delivery of humanitarian aid are thus directly impacted.

Dugout canoes used by local communities on the Niger River to bypass the Benin-Niger border, which was closed following ECOWAS sanctions

In addition to these challenges regarding access to the field, humanitarian efforts in the Central Sahel are being hampered by a funding crisis, just like aid organizations around the world. Already in 2021 and 2022, less than 25% of the financial needs outlined in the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) for the region were met. With the end of USAID funding and the decline in Official Development Assistance (ODA), these figures are certainly not likely to improve.

Perseverance, Resilience, and Innovation in a Crisis Context

Despite the many obstacles facing humanitarian actors in the Central Sahel, numerous NGOs and organizations manage to operate in these turbulent contexts to deliver vital aid tailored to the needs of the local populations. Operating in Benin, Niger, and Burkina Faso, the UN deploys its extensive network through the International Organization for Migration (IOM), UNICEF, the World Food Programme (WFP), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the World Health Organization (WHO).

Red Cross Response in Gao Following the Al-Qaeda Attack on the Coordination of Azawad Movements on January 18, 2017

But beyond traditional UN agencies, more specific and local initiatives deserve special attention. Dedicated to ecosystem conservation, the network of organizations known as the Maison des Tortues has launched a program that perfectly addresses the complex challenges faced by residents of the tri-border region. At the intersection of environmental conservation and socio-economic development, the “W-Arly-Pendjari Complex Transboundary Biosphere Reserve” or “RBT-WAP” project aims to support the development of profitable and sustainable economic activities among local communities, such as the production and processing of certain crops. From sesame to honey, including soybeans and mung beans, the goal is to teach sustainable techniques and entrepreneurial management to disadvantaged populations, in order to strengthen their resilience in the face of climate risks and environmental instability. Consequently, this NGO’s work helps ensure food security in the region, promotes diversification of income sources, and reduces pressure on the natural resources available to the WAP complex.

On a smaller scale, international cooperation is also bearing fruit. Active on every continent, the French Development Agency (AFD) has launched a program focused on this extraordinary complex, running from January 2023 to December 2027. The “Enhanced Regional Cooperation around the WAP Ecological Complex” or “PASOA” project has been allocated a substantial budget of 47 million euros, of which 2 million were invested by the French Global Environment Facility. Following a similar approach to the previous initiative, this large-scale project implements socio-economic development and local consultation initiatives to benefit communities living near W Park in Benin. By also supporting the work of the NGO West African Savannas Foundation (FSOA), this program aims to reduce the long-term vulnerability of these rural households.

But beyond this unique cross-border area, humanitarian aid extends to the rest of the three countries involved. This is the case for Solidarités International, which has missions in each of them. Active since 2018 in Burkina Faso through three field offices and in Niger, where its three missions and its coordination office near Tillabéri were able to reopen in 2020, the NGO’s work is organized around three areas of intervention. The first is Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene (WASH): building and rehabilitating water points, distributing hygiene kits, installing latrine-shower blocks for communities, promoting good hygiene practices, treating water, distributing vouchers to purchase water, and reducing risks associated with water collection, particularly for women. The second focuses on the construction of emergency shelters through the distribution of kits and support for reconstruction in the event of flood damage. Finally, the third consists of providing livelihood support (SAME). This involves food distributions, support for income-generating activities, the provision of agricultural inputs, and the delivery of vocational training.

© Solidarités International – Distribution of hygiene kits and shelters in July–August 2023 in the Tillabéri region (Niger)

Due to “growing humanitarian needs”—for reasons highlighted in this article—as mentioned on its website, it is important to note that Solidarités International launched its first mission in northern Benin in 2023. Located in Natitingou, in the vulnerable Atacora department, the mission responds to the spread of the Sahelian crisis southward, as the NGO notes: “In northern Benin, the structurally vulnerable departments of Atacora and Alibori have been facing an intensification of attacks by non-state armed groups from the Sahel region since 2021.”

Its work here is based on four strategic priorities tailored to the specific needs of communities in northern Benin. First, the aim is to provide support to newly displaced populations by distributing multisectoral kits within 72 hours of learning of the displacement. Non-food items, hygiene supplies, food… nearly 1,365 kits have been distributed so far, in addition to targeted cash transfers. The second priority is to identify victims of violence in order to offer them psychosocial support—an approach that is particularly relevant in cases of violence against women. Common to all three countries, the third component involves managing water and sanitation through the rehabilitation of boreholes, the distribution of filters, and general support for local water governance. Finally, the NGO is also working to strengthen the resilience of local communities by supporting income-generating activities.

Alongside its partners, including Première Urgence Internationale (PUI), Action Against Hunger (ACF), the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), Humanity and Inclusion (HI), and Solidarité Développement Inclusif (SOLIDEV), Solidarités International works to mitigate the consequences of the Sahel crisis on communities living in the tri-border region. But far from merely containing chronic precarity, these initiatives stand out as remarkable case studies in a context where states are increasingly prioritizing fiscal balance and defense spending at the expense of other budgets, including those dedicated to humanitarian action and development. By tackling the very roots of socio-economic instability in the Central Sahel, these organizations strengthen the autonomy of communities caught between non-state armed groups and authorities struggling to respond to these crises. In the face of the consequences of poverty and violence, humanitarian actors work alongside local stakeholders and populations to meet essential needs and promote sustainable development solutions. Security, resilience, and solidarity are all facets of one and the same response for the future of these populations.

Salomée Languille.

[1] The term “Azawad” refers to a vast area in northern Mali, between Bamako and the Saharan regions, for which Tuareg rebel groups are demanding independence.

Salomée Languille

Specialized in geopolitical and environmental risk management and co-founder of the Laboratory of Geopolitical Studies for Memory (LEGEM), Salomée is currently finishing a Master’s degree at the French Institute of Geopolitics (IFG). Directed by Alican Tayla, she wrote a thesis in 2025 about the Western Sahara conflict, for which she spend a month doing research in Rabat. Under Alain Boinet’s mentorship, she is now undertaking a 6-month internship at Défis Humanitaires, during which she carries on several missions such as crisis watch, research and communication – particularly regarding the edition and publication of the review.

Discover other articles from this edition :

Humanitarian aid lost, disoriented, misguided—what twists and turns lie ahead, what future awaits?

Forum Espace Humanitaire 30 janvier 2026 Science Po Saint-Germain-en Laye. ©Stanislas Bonnet TGH.

The Forum Espace Humanitaire (FEH) brought together on 30 January 2026 at Science Po Saint-Germain-en-Laye around fifty humanitarian NGO leaders around the question “Lost in transition? Historical, civic and future-oriented perspectives on a humanitarian sector in danger”.

Having taken part in this Forum, as in the previous ones for more than 10 years, and given the gravity of the current situation for the humanitarian sector, it seems useful to share with our readers information and reflection on it while respecting the rule adopted by the FEH consisting in speaking freely without the speakers and their remarks being publicly quoted.

Regarding the title chosen by the organizers “Lost in transition”, several translations into French are possible: Lost in the period of transition, or also disoriented, even adrift, which convey well that the humanitarian sector has entered a critical phase of its history.

In Davos, Mark Carney, the Prime Minister of Canada, declared “We are in the middle of a rupture, not in the middle of a transition” and I believe this is right. However, humanitarians must take on their transition within the geopolitical rupture of the world order and its multiple consequences, including the fall in public funding!

In this editorial, I propose first to present the 10 main questions that I retained from this Forum. This is not a report, and this overview is not exhaustive of the subject or of the debates that took place.

Then, I invite you to return to three areas of “rupture” currently under way: the multifaceted geopolitical shock, the shock to humanitarian funding, to access for aid and to international humanitarian law and, as a consequence, the ongoing project for the evolution of our review Défis Humanitaires.

A – The 10 key questions of the Forum: summary, analysis, commentary.

1. Lost, disoriented, adrift? We are moving from a period of triumphant right of interference (1991 UN Resolution 688 on Iraq and the protection of the Kurdish population), from the multiplication of Western interventions (Somalia, Iraq, Serbia, Afghanistan) and those of multiple so-called UN peace operations (Iraq, Bosnia, DRC) to a questioning of the rules established since 1945 and to a brutal fall in the funding of humanitarian and development aid. The invasion of Ukraine by Russia and the second election of Donald Trump are the two determining causes. Faced with this “geopolitical tsunami” and the retreat of NGO capacities of more than a decade, doing nothing or “keeping a low profile” would be one of the riskiest options! If humanitarian history over the long term has always been punctuated by crises, this one is equivalent to a tsunami.

historical coverage coordinated humanitarian plan 2018-2026 ©Financial Tracking Service

2.The “humanitarian ship in the eye of the cyclone” with devastating winds changing direction, to take up the image of one speaker. To save all or part of the ship and the crew, it will be necessary to adapt to winds, currents and waves while maintaining the final course of saving lives. “The goal is the path.” I repeat, doing nothing, “keeping a low profile” while waiting for it to pass is certainly a serious risk to avoid. Thus, for example, such NGO will lose 50% of its budget in 3 years! If NGOs financed entirely or almost entirely by individuals escape the fall in their funding, they do not escape the upheaval of the ecosystem. On the very day of the FEH, the UN Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, was alerting Member States to a risk of “imminent financial collapse”! It is the entire multilateral system that is at risk and which is de facto already being challenged by Donald Trump’s “Peace Council”. However, the humanitarian needs of 300 million human beings are still there and guide the mission of humanitarian organizations, which must adapt, reform or revolutionize themselves depending on their respective situations and choices.

The mixed Solidarités International-Veolia team around an Aquaforce 2000 in Ukraine. ©Fondation Veolia

3. Commitment and efficiency. The consensus on humanitarian aid responding to the vital needs of populations in danger once again does not prevent the debate between the priority of commitment and values and the priority of the efficiency of aid. This debate often brings out the distinction between advocacy actors and those of aid action in the field. But, frankly, the only response that seems to me to be valid is indeed that of effective commitment that optimizes every euro to save lives. Everything lies in the dynamic balance between the two approaches, between the purpose and the means of achieving it. It appears clearly that organizations that primarily prioritize action and those that mainly carry advocacy do not give the same priority to the two terms of the equation. But is advocacy not at the service of aid, and do these not need to plead their cause ?

4. Humanitarian action and civil society. Usually, the support of civil society is expressed through donations, volunteering and support for the major causes carried by humanitarian organizations. Some consider that associative freedoms are receding and are threatened, while others emphasize the weakness of the narrative of associations. What is certain is that public opinion evolves according to the environment and that today issues of security, defense, social model, national cohesion and international security particularly concern it. Just as states governed by the rule of law, in France and in Europe in particular, must face growing threats, they will have to strengthen their governance, their power and their unity in order to exist, mobilize and resist. Let us not be mistaken, the nation-state is not an NGO. Humanitarians must also rethink their place, their legitimacy and their communication in a changing, disrupted and risky environment.

5. Politicization and humanitarian principles. Some think that politicization is the necessary response to political attacks, while others consider that humanitarian principles (neutrality, impartiality, independence) constitute the best posture in all cases. What nevertheless seems certain is that the exacerbation of both political and geopolitical cleavages will directly affect humanitarian organizations. It is a dilemma and a matter of conscience. For my part, I believe that the response is twofold. On the one hand, we have a greater need for political and geopolitical analysis capacities. On the other hand, we must be and remain humanitarians. The choice is simple. Faced with a political injunction, responding with a political position will identify us as a political actor and will reduce our credibility and the humanitarian space that must bring people together broadly and place itself above partisan choices. Humanitarian action is neither right nor left and must bring together as widely as possible. This is exactly what we do in crisis areas where we act in the name of the impartiality of aid. Making a political choice is of course possible for any humanitarian, but then within a political organization. I believe that the principles of the Red Cross of Henri Dunant are more relevant than ever.

6. Decolonization, de-Westernization of aid. If aid is no one’s privilege and if proximity to affected people is the primary link of mutual aid, it is also true that funding and international aid organizations come essentially from the developed world, Western for the most part. Incidentally, humanitarians consider that their action is a duty of humanity outside of any intention to colonize anyone. These few lines will not put an end to this debate. However, I suggest two attitudes in the face of this question. The first, which has always fundamentally been mine, is to consider that where we act, outside France, we are not at home but at their home. Let us add that if universalism considers without distinction the humanity of each person, it must simultaneously respect the natural diversity of humankind, cultures, languages, religions, ways of life, ethnicities, in particular minorities, the sovereignty of these populations over their lands, which is a strong response to any attempt at colonization. Like everyone, I know that the history of humanity is more complex, that confrontation between the planet’s co-tenants is regular, but these existential reference points exist as useful and just markers. The second reflection is to consider that if the history of colonization in its diversity is also universal in time and space, we must today consider this question in the light of the ruptures under way and the risks of vassalization, including our own.

Mark Carney at the World Economic Forum ©World Economic Forum

7. Humanitarian action and geopolitics. This subject was not on the Forum’s agenda, but I raise it because I believe it is decisive. Let us return to the formula we can take up “act local, think global”, that is, the relationship between macro and micro. We humanitarians would need to understand well the major role that wars and United Nations operations have played for decades in the existence and development of humanitarian organizations, both through public funding and through private support largely fueled by the media. This observation in no way calls into question the validity of their action to save lives, but it allows us to understand that the fall in humanitarian funding from ODA coming from Member States of the European Union with governments of the right as well as of the left, even before Donald Trump’s decisions, is indeed of a geopolitical nature. The priorities of States, at least in Europe, are today more oriented towards the defense of freedom, independence, sovereignty and therefore towards security, but also towards safeguarding our social model. As Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada, rightly says: “When the rules no longer protect you, you must protect yourselves.”

©WFP/Sayed Asif Mahmud A – A UN vehicle crosses a destroyed city in Ukraine

8. Humanitarian action, war and Ukraine. This question was also not on the FEH agenda and I add it as a continuation of the geopolitics linked to it. Apart from disasters and major pandemics, humanitarian action is mainly due to the consequences of war, most often in poor countries where populations quickly fall into precariousness and threat to their very lives. Think of Sudan, the DRC or Yemen today. Certainly, one cannot address all subjects in a single Forum. But let us not forget the reality that challenges us. According to the ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross), the number of conflicts continues to increase: there were nearly 130 in 2024, twice as many as 15 years ago. Among these conflicts, around twenty have lasted for more than two decades. Thus, at the time I write these lines, more than 204 million people live in a conflict zone. Needs are increasing, resources are decreasing, what are we doing to provide aid and to influence the concerned decision-makers who are currently retreating? Back to the reality of the urgency of crises.

9. Degradation of debates. Quite rightly, one of the speakers highlighted the general degradation of debates, of analysis, of nuance. I will add the growing phenomenon of disinformation, propaganda, so-called alternative truth. We must keep this clearly in mind and ourselves practice discernment, foresight, projection and ensure benevolence among ourselves, which does not prevent either debates or disagreements. This is precisely one of the axes of reflection of the revamped Défis Humanitaires project.

10. Entirely provisional conclusion. The environment is changing radically and yet humanitarian action is more necessary than ever in a more populated world that is entering a period of strategic conflictuality that will affect many countries and populations, as in the time of the “Cold War”. We must cross the desert as well as the storm and renew ourselves to carry out the humanitarian mission, here and elsewhere, on the “Land of Men” dear to the humanist Antoine de Saint-Exupéry.

B- Focus sur la logique des ruptures en cours et le que faire.

Two major events alone summarize the rupture and are at the center of the geopolitical cyclone that is shaking and recomposing our world.

The military invasion by Russia – a member of the UN Security Council – of Ukraine, if it is a failure for everyone, signifies that a dispute can now once again be settled by the force of arms. Ukraine will enter on 22 February 2026 its 5th year of this war in Europe, which could perhaps spread to other territories of this continent without the support of the United States being certain. War is also a humanitarian issue because of its human and material consequences. Are humanitarians ready for a possible extension of war territories?

Trump at the World Economic Forum – ©White House

The second election of Donald Trump in the United States has since January 2025 caused a vast and profound earthquake in that country and throughout the world. The code of international relations under the aegis of the UN is now replaced by the law of the strongest “deal”. In the space of a decree, Donald Trump has annihilated humanitarian and development aid through the more or less equal law of trade and exchanges. To better understand, one must read the new “National Security Strategy of the United States”. Without prejudging what follows, I recall this sentence of Pierre Hassner, historian of international relations, who declared during the invasion of Iraq by the United States in March 2003 that “the complexity of the world will take its revenge”!

The abrupt and strong fall in humanitarian and development funding is of course the signal of a change of era and of priorities. Let us recall that if the weight of the United States as the world’s leading funder has a major impact, this trend is just as much the result of the Member States of the European Union and the OECD. The only good news to date is the confirmation of the humanitarian budget of the European Commission with ECHO for a 2026 budget of 1.9 billion euros and 415 million of reserve funds for emergencies. In Davos, Commissioner Hadja Lahbib advocated “new alliances” towards companies, investors, innovation actors in order to ensure new financing models. The avenues are numerous provided one has conviction and will. The main stake now lies in the next budget of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) of the European Union for the period 2028-2034. It is up to us to act!

Rising to the Humanitarian Challenges.

These ruptures will trigger many others in chain, according to the domino effect, with global consequences for humanitarian and development aid as well as for the 17 Sustainable Development Goals 2015-2030.

In this context, Défis Humanitaires has launched a project of adaptation, evolution, even change, so that its monthly online review better responds to the ruptures under way, to humanitarian imperatives and to the expectations of readers. This project is carried by its Committee of Experts, by its readers and by the ongoing debates.

This project, to which we invite you to associate yourselves, integrates the following evolutions:

A new media-press-type layout to gain impact.
Quick search functionalities for articles by author and by theme.
The publication of “briefs” on current affairs.
An evolution of the editorial line.
A strengthening of our editorial team to achieve this.

In this new issue of Défis Humanitaires, you will discover articles on the crisis in Syria, on a new innovative tool the Solis bot, an analysis of humanitarian funding of Official Development Assistance, reader testimonials and this editorial.

If these articles are useful to you, if you enjoy reading our independent and free review, you can give it the means to do better and more by making a donation today (faireundon) deductible by two thirds (66%) of your taxes thanks to the tax receipt that we will send you.

I warmly thank you for your support, which supports our volunteer work to better inform you. Thank you.

Alain Boinet.

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