A host of challenges for the humanitarian sector.

© WHO In February 2025, before the ceasefire broke down, Palestinians displaced in southern Gaza were returning en masse to the north of the enclave.

In this editorial, I seek to name and understand the upheavals currently underway.

This article is neither exhaustive nor definitive. Its aim is to explore new situations in order to adapt the humanitarian response. It draws on numerous sources.
As we did before with our series of articles “humanitarian questions”, I invite you to join the debate by sending us your testimonies, analyses, and perspectives at contact@defishumanitaires.com

Challenges converging.
A change of era.

We are experiencing a decisive shift in the political and geopolitical era—some even call it civilizational. Whatever one thinks, populism is advancing globally in various forms, accompanying the collapse of the international order established after the Second World War.

This includes the rise and assertion of power by Russia, China, Turkey, and the Global South in all its diversity. As Giuliano da Empoli said, “Trump is not a historical accident or a fit of madness—we are tipping into a new world.” What is this new world, and what will be the role and place of humanitarian action within it?

BRICS meeting in Kazan, Russia, from 22 to 24 October 2024

Aid funding in decline!

The funding of international humanitarian aid is a reliable indicator of trends and the priorities of UN member states. And funding is collapsing—no one knows when or how it will stabilize. It’s easy and somewhat fair to blame the abrupt freeze on all aid by the Trump administration and the dismantling of USAID.

However, many European countries were ahead of the United States with massive budget cuts—in the UK, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and almost everywhere else to varying degrees, with the exception of the European Union.

Official Development Assistance (ODA), OECD

The reasons vary depending on whether we’re talking about humanitarian aid or development assistance, which fall under Official Development Assistance (ODA). Beyond doubts about aid effectiveness and the rising call for productive investments, the primary reason today is the priority placed on security in the face of the serious risk of the war in Ukraine spreading across Europe. The second reason lies in the state of public finances, national debt, and ongoing tariff wars. Defending one’s freedom, independence, and sovereignty has become a vital priority in the face of mounting threats.

With what consequences?

What will be the human and political consequences of dwindling humanitarian funding? According to OCHA, in 2025, 305.1 million people will require humanitarian aid, but only 189.5 million have been targeted across 72 countries to receive assistance estimated at $47.4 billion.

UNHCR Global Trends Report 2024, 9 October 2024.

However, in 2024, of a $49.6 billion budget, only $21.2 billion was raised—just 43% of the required amount! What will 2025 look like with ODA in free fall?

Among these at-risk populations were 122.6 million forcibly displaced people as of June 2024. Recall: 51.23 million in 2013, 89.27 million in 2021—and the numbers are expected to continue rising. Will we abandon internally displaced people and refugees? What will be the human, migratory, and political fallout from such disengagement?

For instance, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, insufficient funding forced the shutdown of a severe malnutrition treatment program for 220,000 children under 5.

UNICEF DRC Dubourthoumieu

2024 was the deadliest year for humanitarians, with 281 killed—63% in Gaza and the West Bank, mostly nationals. Will we now say to humanitarians: “Take the risks, you’re on your own”?

As a French citizen, I am personally convinced
that we must prepare for a possible expansion of the war in Ukraine in order to contain it—and thus secure peace. And if this does not prevent war from being imposed on us, then we must declare it, fight it, and win it.

What I fail to understand is this: in a world where military budgets total $2.4 trillion, and banking sector profits stand at $1.1 trillion, how is it not possible to find $47 billion to save lives, stabilize countries, and revive development and trade that benefit everyone?

Short-sighted selfishness will catch up with us—and cost even more!

Ukraine and the return of war.

Since February 24, 2022, the war in Ukraine has shattered the principle of inviolable borders and shown that war is once again a conceivable means of resolving conflict. It has killed and wounded hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians, displaced millions, and destroyed much of the country and its infrastructure—not to mention Russian losses. The war consumes enormous resources, yet they remain insufficient from Ukraine’s allies.

I’m not convinced we truly grasp the risks and consequences of a potential expansion of this conflict to other frontline countries in Europe—and possibly to us through a domino effect! Let’s be clear-eyed: Vladimir Putin has declared a long-term war against us, supported, tolerated, or ignored by many Global South nations. And if Donald Trump chooses to end U.S. support for Ukraine, the risk of war in Europe would only grow. European countries, however, are not yet prepared for such a scenario. Let’s hope it never comes to pass and that a ceasefire, then a settlement, brings this war to an end.

Yet even if full-scale war isn’t certain, it’s entirely possible. Some experts believe it has already begun—through cyberattacks, propaganda, disinformation, rearmament, and a mobilization of public will. How will humanitarian actors respond to this threat? What could they do if war comes to Europe? What would happen to humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, and independence in such a scenario?

And what about Europe?

Among the world’s top three humanitarian donors, along with the U.S. and Germany (which has slashed much of its aid budget), the European Union remains. At the recent European Humanitarian Forum (EHF) on May 19–20 in Brussels, the European Commission appeared to reassure humanitarian actors—yet never addressed the “elephant in the room”: shrinking budgets.

The agenda was technically sound: ongoing crises, cooperation, coordination, humanitarian diplomacy, the nexus, national actors, climate impact. But it deliberately avoided tackling the decline in ODA and its consequences for humanitarian work. Business as usual! Nevertheless, voices such as VOICE on these issues, UNRWA on Gaza, and informal hallway conversations raised the alarm.

Ursula von der Leyen confirmed the DG ECHO humanitarian budget of €2.5 billion, including the emergency aid reserve (€580 million), in line with the 2021–2027 Multiannual Financial Framework (€11.569 trillion).

This framework is truly strategic, and discussions are beginning for the 2028–2035 cycle.

Here lies the decisive issue! Given the budgetary constraints of EU member states, will the Commission’s budget be sufficient—and how will it be allocated?

Former EU Humanitarian Commissioner Janez Lenarčič rightly emphasized the need for assertive humanitarian diplomacy to preserve humanitarian space, which must now address the question of funding—without which, access to at-risk populations is impossible.

The current Commissioner, Hadja Lahbib, set out a roadmap: We must focus on two areas: first, increase funding, broaden the donor base, and work more efficiently. Second, we must reduce humanitarian needs, often caused by conflict and climate crises.

UNRIC. During the session on the Middle East, attended by Hadja Lahbib, European Commissioner, and Philippe Lazzarini, Director of UNRWA, at the European Humanitarian Forum on 20 May 2025 in Brussels.

I fully support this—but we must reframe the European humanitarian issue within the broader challenges the EU faces: internal cohesion, the war in Ukraine and its potential expansion, trade wars with the U.S. and China, and weak, naïve governance amid a world reverting to jungle law. The Europe of nation-states cannot avoid a political aggiornamento (renewal) if it wishes to defend its very existence and role.

The UN in turmoil.

Donald Trump’s early decisions confirmed the decline of globalization and multilateralism, shaking the UN—which is being forced to adapt. Payment delays by the U.S., China, and others threaten a potential $1.1 billion deficit by year-end.

To mark the UN’s 80th anniversary, António Guterres launched the H80—or UN80—initiative in March 2025 to urgently reform the organization amid falling funding.

The UN must now cut costs, consolidate its agencies into four clusters—peace and security, humanitarian affairs, sustainable development, and human rights—reduce its workforce by 20%, and relocate to more affordable cities. This real austerity drive will have operational consequences yet to be fully grasped.

OCHA is contributing with its “Humanitarian Reset” led by Tom Fletcher, launched March 10 and based on a 10-point reform. In brief: prioritizing national actors, context-specific adaptation, prioritization planning, integrated reforms, joint advocacy, bold efficiency measures, field redeployment for emergencies, resource and service pooling, simplified clusters, and a more strategic, high-performing “integrated planning framework.”

Necessity dictates—but what are the consequences for aid and for national and international humanitarian actors who must prepare for these shocks?

While we now know OCHA’s “humanitarian reset,” what about NGOs in their diversity and coordination mechanisms? How will they come through this ordeal?

Humanitarian strengths and weaknesses.

Let’s begin with a brief—too brief—introspection of the humanitarian sector, which we too rarely undertake. But now is the time to dig deeper, both in its flaws and strengths, to reshape humanitarian action for this new world.

Humanitarians often see themselves as belonging to the “good” side, judging others from a perceived moral high ground. They also tend to see nations, empires, or ethnic communities through the lens of NGOs—a grave mistake.

Humanitarians view the world as one global humanity, which is true—but without sufficiently recognizing its diversity, which is both a richness and a source of differences.

Above all, humanitarian action is an existential act to aid any person or population in peril. This cross-border solidarity is more relevant than ever. Humanitarianism isn’t the answer to everything—but without it, what would be the daily fate of those in danger? Every day, around 550,000 humanitarians work to assist 190 million people—men, women, and children—who actively contribute to mutual aid as fellow human beings.

The greatest frustration and limitation of humanitarian work is the inability to help everyone in urgent need. Obstacles abound—from access denial to falling funding.

Crises abound—in the DRC, the Sahel, Yemen, Ukraine, Sudan, Haiti, and Gaza, the latter being the horrifying emblem of the unthinkable becoming routine.

Why did pediatrician Alaa Al-Najjar lose nine of her ten children—Yahya, Rakan, Eve, Jubran, Raslan, Rifan, Sidine, Louqman, and 7-month-old Sidra—in a single airstrike on May 24 in Khan Younis? Only her husband and one child survived. Why?

With its pogrom on October 7, 2023, and the abduction of 251 hostages, Hamas triggered a spiral of endless violence with Israel. As of April 30, 2025: 52,400 deaths (including combatants), 118,014 wounded. By the end of 2024, 87% of housing was damaged or destroyed, over 80% of businesses lost, and two-thirds of roads unusable! As if that weren’t enough, a full humanitarian blockade was imposed on March 2, 2025. Famine is now weaponized—violating international law.

To calm international outrage and limit aid diversion by Hamas or gangs, Israel bypassed competent humanitarian organizations in favor of an ad hoc body: the Humanitarian Foundation for Gaza. Its first distributions ended in chaos, death, and injury.

These ongoing destructions and the blockade seem aimed at the deportation of all or part of Gaza’s population. What do we call that? Is a political solution still possible? Let’s hope the upcoming meeting on Palestine at the UN General Assembly in New York (June 17–20), co-organized by France and Saudi Arabia, will answer that.

In conclusion.

As we publish issue 100 of the Défis Humanitaires online journal, current events reaffirm its value to the humanitarian community and its partners by:

  • Promoting humanitarian action

  • Analyzing the cause-effect link between geopolitics and humanitarianism

  • Documenting the major challenges ahead

Défis Humanitaires is read each month in dozens of countries by thousands of people whom we warmly greet here, with a wish to be useful to their work.

But we also need their support and participation to do more and better. To that end, we invite you to:

  • Fill out the journal’s feedback questionnaire

  • Share your thoughts on the journal

  • Support the journal with a donation via HelloAsso

Thank you for your attention, your loyalty, and your support.

Alain Boinet

I invite you to read the articles published in this issue:

Syria: humanitarian aid in the face of a bloodless country and an uncertain future

Photo of PUI during a visit to Syria in January 2025

December 2024. The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, after fourteen years of war, marks a major turning point for Syria. Power collapsed in a matter of days under the assault of rebel forces led by the Hayat Tahrir al-Cham (HTC) group, leaving the way open for an uncertain political transition. The establishment of an interim government, led by Ahmad al-Sharaa (Abu Mohammed al-Joulani), and the adoption of a provisional constitution in March 2025 are seen as steps forward, but they are not enough to meet the country’s immediate challenges: political instability, community and sectarian tensions, a lasting humanitarian crisis and large-scale reconstruction.

Syrians celebrated the end of the regime, but woke up a month later to an unchanged reality: a country in ruins, with no resources, and an uncertain future,’ observes Charlotte Baudoin, of the NGO Première Urgence Internationale.

On 30 March, Ahmad al-Sharaa, the interim president, announced a new Syrian transitional government composed mainly of his loyalists but including 4 ministers from minorities, a Christian, a Druze, an Alawite and a Kurd among its 23 members. The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (editor’s note: autonomous Syrian Kurdish authority) declared that this government did not reflect the diversity and plurality of the country and that it was therefore not concerned by the government’s decisions! It should also be remembered that Ahmad al-Sharaa has full legislative, executive and judicial powers, and that he chairs the ‘National Security Council’, considered by some to be the country’s real government. The future will tell whether the promise of a representative, unitary government that respects minorities has been kept or not. That is the challenge after 14 years of war.

In this context, humanitarian action is more necessary than ever, but its new framework for intervention is still unclear. Some had hoped that the end of the regime would facilitate access to relief supplies. However, as Thomas Janny of the NGO Solidarités International points out, guaranteed access has not yet been achieved and humanitarian space remains restricted.

To analyse the humanitarian challenges ahead, this article draws on two complementary accounts. Thomas Janny, Regional Director for the Middle East at Solidarités International, and Olivier Routeau, Director of Operations and Charlotte Baudoin, Country Director for Syria at the NGO Première Urgence Internationale (PUI). Before the fall of the regime, Solidarités International was working in rebel-controlled areas (in the north-east and north-west of the country), while Première Urgence Internationale was working in regime-controlled areas, in 10 of the country’s 14 governorates.

Between the reorganisation of the humanitarian sector, reduced funding and strong political and geopolitical tensions, post-Assad Syria raises many questions about the future of aid and the conditions under which it is delivered.

A Blitzkrieg with uncertain consequences

The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime was as sudden as it was unexpected, a veritable Blitzkrieg, as Thomas Janny puts it. In the space of ten days, HTS forces, supported by numerous other militias, took control of the capital, causing the total collapse of a regime that had held out for fourteen years with the support of Iran and Shiite militias, as well as Russia. This rapid changeover left the country without a functional state structure, with an improvised transitional government and an administration in ruins.

Interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa is seeking to stabilise the situation, notably by adopting an interim constitution in March 2025. This constitution guarantees certain fundamental freedoms, notably in terms of expression and women’s rights, but it maintains a powerful executive with few checks and balances. Although there have been declarations aimed at establishing a democratic framework, the foundations remain extremely fragile,’ explains Olivier Routeau of Première Urgence Internationale. The absence of solid structures and the lack of resources are complicating the establishment of a stable state, while the population sees few concrete improvements in their daily lives.

Nor has the collapse of the regime put an end to the violence. In the first few weeks, clashes broke out on the Syrian coast, particularly in Tartous and Latakia, historic bastions of the Alawite community. This violence, which caused more than 1,300 deaths (many of them civilians), rekindled the community and religious tensions that had characterised the Syrian conflict. There is a real danger of widespread reprisals against the Alawites, who are seen as Assad’s historical supporters,’ warns Charlotte Baudoin, from PUI. Many are fleeing to Lebanon, while the new authorities are struggling to impose their control over the security forces, who are implicated in these abuses.

At the same time, Syria remains a battleground for geopolitical rivalries. Turkey, sponsor of the new government, is concerned about the maintenance of Kurdish power in the north-east, and has stepped up its air strikes, targeting areas under the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces (FDS). Israel, for its part, has stepped up its strikes on Syrian military sites. The fall of Assad has not put an end to foreign interests in Syria; on the contrary, it has redistributed the cards,’ analyses Thomas Janny. We might even say that Turkey has replaced Iran in Syria.

In this chaotic context, the reconstruction of the country seems out of reach in the short term. At the Brussels summit on 19 March, international donors pledged $6.5 billion, a limited amount compared with the $400 billion needed for reconstruction. In addition, US sanctions remain in place, hampering the necessary investment and slowing down any attempt at economic recovery. The European Union has lifted some restrictions, notably on the energy sector, but their impact remains limited. Without the lifting of US sanctions, Syrian recovery is impossible’, notes Olivier Routeau.

For the NGOs working on the ground, this transition period represents a major challenge. The end of the regime has turned the organisation of humanitarian aid upside down, raising new questions about access to populations and cooperation with the new authorities. While Syria has immense needs in terms of aid and reconstruction, humanitarian aid workers have to deal with an unstable environment and a future that is still uncertain.

Opening pipes to the water network in a camp in northern Syria © Solidarités International

Minorities in Syria: between fragile integration and persistent tensions

The rapid fall of the Assad regime has reshuffled the cards of power in Syria, but it has not put an end to community divisions. While the transitional government claims to want to build an inclusive nation, religious and ethnic tensions are a reality that the new government must resolve. Minorities, historically caught up in the conflict, now find themselves in an uncertain position, between fears of reprisals and promises of integration.

The Alawites, long seen as the mainstay of the Assad regime, are now the most vulnerable. In Tartous and Latakia, atrocities targeted the community from the very first days of the transition, killing more than 1,300 people. The government has condemned the violence, but probably does not have the means to prosecute these crimes,’ observes Charlotte Baudoin of Première Urgence Internationale. Weakened by years of war and impunity, the Syrian judicial system seems incapable of fulfilling its role for the time being.

The Kurds, for their part, gained political recognition with the agreement of 10 March, which provides for the integration of the FDS into the national army. This agreement, which enshrines the place of the Kurds in the new Syria, is nevertheless fragile. Tensions persist between Kurdish units, former jihadists and pro-Turkish mercenaries. It will be difficult to unify these forces under a single structure,’ stresses Charlotte Baudoin. Moreover, this agreement has not prevented Turkey from continuing its strikes in north-eastern Syria, a sign that Damascus’ recognition of the Kurds does not mean an end to the bombing and fighting, which could resume at any time.

For the Druze, the transition raises as many hopes as concerns. Their religious leader, Hikmat al-Hajri, has publicly criticised the new government’s constitutional declaration as being too centralised and unrepresentative of Syria’s diversity. The question of autonomy, granted to them under Assad as part of the ‘Alliance of Minorities’, remains unresolved. In a country where community balances are still unstable, the challenge will be to guarantee a system where each group finds its place without stirring up resentment.

This situation makes access for humanitarian aid particularly delicate. For Solidarités International, which has been operating in areas that were not held by the Assad regime, since the beginning of its work, the displacement of populations and the new humanitarian needs represent a major challenge. During the HTS offensive towards Damascus, our teams on the ground witnessed massive displacements of Kurdish populations towards the north-east, where they had to put in place an emergency response in just a few days’, explains Thomas Janny. PUI, which was initially present in the government zone, is also emphasising the need for reconstruction to include all minorities in order to avoid further fractures.

United Nations (UN). (2025). Humanitarian Response Priorities: January – March 2025 – Syrian Arab Republic. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) [2]
Uncertain humanitarian access

Humanitarian needs in Syria

  • 16.5 million people require humanitarian aid.
  • 14.56 million people are food insecure, of whom 9.1 million are classified as acutely food insecure (including 1.3 million in a severe situation).
  • 8 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) since 2011.
  • 823,302 people newly displaced in 2024, of whom 522,600 returned in December alone.
  • Nearly 6.5 million people have fled Syria since the start of the civil war, including: more than 3 million to Turkey, around 784,000 to Lebanon, more than 705,000 to Germany, and almost 650,000 to Jordan.

Figures from the OCHA 2025 report on humanitarian needs in Syria[1].

Humanitarian aid budget in 2024

  • In 2024, the United Nations has estimated the aid budget required at 4.07 billion dollars.
  • At the end of the year, only 1.46 billion dollars (or 35.9%) had been raised.

Humanitarian Action 2024 figures[2]

The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime has opened up new prospects for humanitarian action in Syria. NGOs have been able to access previously unreachable areas from their respective zones of operation before the overthrow of the regime.

However, this opening has been accompanied by new administrative and logistical constraints. As the legal framework is not yet well defined, the potential implementation of new programmes remains compromised for the time being. According to Thomas Janny, the authorities are still hesitant about the relationship they wish to maintain with international NGOs (INGOs) and the freedom they will be granted. In addition, the security situation remains unstable: bombardments persist in certain regions of the north-east, and further atrocities cannot be ruled out. The humanitarian situation has continued to deteriorate,’ notes Charlotte Baudoin, ’Israeli air strikes have intensified, while ongoing hostilities in the north and south, as well as recent instability and the deteriorating situation in coastal areas, have worsened humanitarian conditions and increased protection concerns.

Another major challenge is the gradual return of refugees, estimated at 125,000 since the fall of the regime. According to the United Nations, nearly 6.5 million people have fled Syria since the start of the civil war, with a further 8 million internally displaced. These returns raise questions about access to basic services for people who return to their villages in ruins after years of exile, and about the capacity of NGOs to respond to new needs. In a context where funding is uncertain and infrastructures are still fragile, humanitarian organisations must find sustainable solutions to support this transition.

The humanitarian sector absolutely must succeed in this first phase of emergency response, to enable Syria to move on to the next stage, that of reconstruction’, explains Olivier Routeau.

Photo of PUI during a visit to Syria in January 2025

International support and financial uncertainties: a delicate balance

The role of the international community is now crucial to Syria’s recovery. Since the fall of the regime, several governments and multilateral organisations have announced plans to support reconstruction, emphasising the need for inclusive development and political stabilisation. The European Union, for example, has reaffirmed its commitment to a peaceful and sustainable transition, while institutions such as the World Bank are beginning to consider recovery projects.

This international support is essential to rehabilitate destroyed infrastructure, support basic services and encourage the return of displaced persons and refugees. Olivier Routeau stresses that without a strong commitment from international donors, local capacities will remain too limited to meet the immense humanitarian and reconstruction needs. This support should enable us to move away from an emergency approach and lay the foundations for more sustainable aid.

However, this dynamic has been disrupted by a reorganisation of humanitarian funding. The sudden freezing of American funds, which via the USAID agency amounted to a total annual budget of 42.8 billion dollars (42% of global humanitarian aid), has created major uncertainty for NGOs on the ground. American aid to Syria represented around a quarter of donations to the humanitarian response plan in 2024, i.e. 377.7 million dollars [3]. The suspension of funding has forced many organisations to drastically reduce their operations or even withdraw from certain areas.

Faced with these restrictions, humanitarian actors are having to reassess their funding strategies, and are looking to diversify their sources. However, this decision by the new Trump administration is part of a more general trend of reduced funding for international aid. Cuts in the Official Development Assistance (ODA) budgets of several European countries, including France, are giving rise to great concern and imposing a very short-term approach.

In this uncertain context, coordination between humanitarian and development aid is essential. We must avoid a humanitarian vacuum that would leave millions of Syrians without support at a critical time’, insists Olivier Routeau. Finally, the lifting of the remaining sanctions appears to be a necessary condition to facilitate economic recovery and enable humanitarian actors to work more effectively on the ground.

An unpredictable future, an essential commitment

As Syria enters a new phase in its history, the humanitarian challenges are immense. While the fall of the regime has opened up certain prospects, it has also left a devastated country, where humanitarian emergencies go hand in hand with the need for reconstruction.

International support will be crucial if another disaster is to be avoided. But with funding falling and instability on the ground, NGOs are struggling to adapt. The lifting of the remaining sanctions, better humanitarian coordination and appropriate funding will be essential to support Syria in the long term, if it is to stabilise and not fall back into conflict.

 

[1] Syrian Arab Republic Humanitarian Response Plan 2024 | Financial Tracking Service

[2] United Nations (UN). (2025). Humanitarian Response Priorities: January – March 2025 – Syrian Arab Republic. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

[3] Humanitarian action, Syrian Arab Republic, 2024. Financials | Humanitarian Action

 

India Hauteville

India Hauteville holds a first Masters degree in International Politics from Sciences Po Bordeaux and is currently studying for a Masters degree in Integration and Change in the Mediterranean and Middle East at Sciences Po Grenoble. She is currently assistant to the founder of Solidarités International, Mr. Alain Boinet.

Particularly interested in the Syrian conflict, she is currently writing a thesis on the articulation between humanitarian principles and the realities on the ground in Syria, using the NGO Solidarités International as a case study.

 

 

I invite you to read these interviews and articles published in the edition :