Humanitarian Aid: The End of the Golden Age, Major Uncertainties… Solutions?

© UN News – Ximena Borrazás Maryna sits in a destroyed school classroom in Kherson where she used to teach Ukrainian literature.

Perhaps never before has the modern humanitarian movement—born of “Dunantism” and later of the “no-borders” movement—faced such a vast, brutal, rapid, and radical upheaval of the world—and of “its” world. With the emergence of global threats, interlinked crises feeding off one another, and a proliferation of unavoidable challenges, this is a decisive moment for humanitarian organizations, as their future role—or their disappearance as obsolete and ill-suited structures—is partly at stake here.

Before exploring the determining factors, the challenges, and possible responses, we must start with the needs. The needs of people in distress, and the resources hoped for to meet them, along with some key figures.

Current Situation

According to the United Nations, 239 million people “are expected to” need aid in 2026, but available resources will—at best—allow for the rescue of only one in three… Humanitarian aid has thus entered an era of “reprioritizing” needs and, above all, “selective sorting” of potential aid recipients. In this context, the United Nations launched a $23 billion funding appeal in December 2025 to assist… 87 million people in 2026. The goal is to provide vital aid to the most vulnerable, and this $23 billion represents approximately 1% of what the world spends on defense.

However, Tom Fletcher, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, emphasized during a press conference in Geneva on March 11, 2026, that this humanitarian appeal remains two-thirds underfunded…

At the same time, as Alain Boinet, founder of Défis Humanitaires, points out in a recent editorial, the world’s population of 8 billion will reach 10 billion in 25 years, and Africa’s population will have doubled. The demographic time bomb is ticking, while on January 20, 2025, the U.S. administration suspended all programs of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), before abolishing the agency, whose mission was taken over by the U.S. Department of State, which lacks the necessary experience. This cut in U.S. funding has had, and will continue to have, a devastating impact on countless essential programs—whether in health, epidemic prevention, or food security. USAID funding accounted for more than 40% of global humanitarian aid in 2024, supported projects in 158 countries, and provided up to 50% of total humanitarian aid for some of them… Even though some “life-saving aid” programs may have been exempted from funding suspensions, the volume of aid is in no way comparable to the previous situation; moreover, the new conditions imposed by the State Department—which we will return to—restrict access to the U.S. “funding window.” Moreover, the U.S. decision is merely the brutal, indiscriminate, and extreme manifestation of a trend toward reduced humanitarian funding, particularly in the West, a trend that began well before January 20, 2025.

Finally, the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz following the war in Iran—due to the skyrocketing logistics and transportation costs for humanitarian organizations (as Tom Fletcher warned last March) and the resulting blockade of fertilizer components—could have catastrophic consequences, just as the planting season is about to begin in many parts of the world. Models from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) predict a collapse in grain yields of up to 50% in major African regions for the upcoming season. The World Food Programme (WFP) estimates that this fertilizer crisis is likely to expose an additional 45 million people to acute food insecurity, or even localized famines in already fragile areas (the Sahel, Somalia, Sudan, etc.). Time is running out: May 15 is considered the latest date by which fertilizer can be delivered in time. After that, the 2026 season will be partially lost. Alexander De Croo, Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), estimated on April 23 that the effects of the blockade linked to the war in Iran would also “push another 30 million people back into poverty.”

Thus, caught between a sharp rise in both humanitarian needs and aid costs, yet a reordering of priorities in the response amid a global crisis of financial resources, humanitarian aid is caught in a tragic “scissors effect.”

One blade of the scissors is the shift in priorities for Western countries when it comes to budgetary trade-offs. High-intensity warfare has returned to our continent and threatens to spread to the Middle East and erupt in Asia. The time has come for rearmament. The use of force is unchecked in international relations; empires are back; threats are growing and converging. As in the Persian Gulf, where the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz is pushing China and Asian countries into a corner—beyond the risk of uncontrollable regional spread—and plunging an already-struggling global economy… by the war in Ukraine, where the conflict—reignited on the Russian side by rising oil prices that finance its war—could spill over, leading to a direct NATO-Russia confrontation. During a hearing at the National Assembly to present the draft update to the 2024-30 Military Programming Law, the Chief of the General Staff, General Fabien Mandon, stated, “The persistence of a Russian threat on our continent, involving open warfare, remains my primary concern in terms of military preparedness.” In this context, the need to make up for the decline in military resources resulting from the illusion of “peace dividends” is, at the very least, legitimate, if not essential. The tide has turned, and humanitarian aid no longer occupies the forefront of concerns, whether among the general public or among decision-makers.

©OCHA – Trends in OCHA funding recorded by the Financial Tracking Service from 2016 to April 2026

Risks

In this coming world of “global violence,” will humanitarian organizations be able to find their place and their role? These organizations, structured, standardized, and “managed” like businesses (they have a “methodology” for everything…), sometimes plagued by a risk aversion fueled by the constraints imposed by donors, will they rediscover a culture of boldness, adaptability to unprecedented circumstances and contexts, and improvisation (almost a dirty word today…), and do so in very difficult, complex, and highly insecure contexts, thereby remaining indispensable? It is possible; it is not certain…

More specifically, high-intensity conflicts mean dangerous, denied, or contested humanitarian access, as well as the disruption or breakdown of supply chains, logistics, and communication systems (such as the Internet and satellite networks). How many humanitarian organizations have undertaken a fundamental review of their operational models, strategies, and modus operandi in order to adapt? There is a strong temptation to believe that the storm will pass, that everything can continue as is, and that the usual resources will always be available.

Another growing risk is the politicization of humanitarian aid. This risk has two aspects, one coming from the outside and one arising from within:

Abroad, humanitarian aid—which has always been somewhat political—is becoming, in an unchecked surge, increasingly politicized and manipulated by policymakers and donors. The best example of this is the conditions set by the U.S. Department of State, whose website features a statement signed by Secretary of State Marco Rubio: “Foreign aid programs that align with the administration’s policies (and serve U.S. interests) will be administered by the Department of State, where they will be implemented with greater accountability, strategy, and efficiency.” The definition of “serving U.S. interests” is left to the discretion of the U.S. administration. Furthermore, at the end of the text, it states, “…we will prioritize trade over aid, opportunity over dependency, and investment over assistance”… The politicization of aid is also becoming a commercial endeavor from which returns and profitability are expected… While the U.S. stance is openly acknowledged, it would be naive to think it stands alone. When China, the Gulf states, or other sovereign wealth funds (and, in its own way, Europe…) finance humanitarian aid, they never forget—and will forget even less tomorrow than today—their interests and political agendas.

Internally, over the past decade or so, we have seen a growing politicization of humanitarian organizations themselves. Without always realizing it, these organizations are shaped and driven by ideologies that often lead them to seek to impose a progressive Western vision through their actions. The paradox is that, while their rhetoric speaks of “decolonizing humanitarian aid,” its practical application often amounts to a form of “neo-colonialism 3.0” driven by the certainty of being right. Moreover, the idea that “humanitarian work is political and must play a political role” is becoming increasingly widespread. Beyond that, in the context of certain conflicts, we have witnessed a “geopolitical politicization” of humanitarian aid, which has not always upheld the principles it professes—independence, impartiality, and neutrality—by effectively “taking sides” in both action and rhetoric, sometimes without nuance, for one “camp” and against the other. The problem, however, is that the general public “sees” the political and ideological excesses of NGOs and might conclude that, at heart, businesses are more reliable, less politicized, and less partisan. Ultimately, there is a risk of the humanitarian system committing “suicide” through a loss of credibility. The humanitarian sector must ask itself the fundamental question: “Do we want to save people/populations, or do we want to save/change the world and defend ideological ‘causes’?”

The ambition to save or change the world is, in part, driven by the desire to “do it all”—from lifesaving to development, from emergency response to the fight against climate change and gender policy… And all this while actively engaging in what is called “localization of aid”—that is, while concretely committing… to disengaging… The intentions are admirable, but are they realistic? He who grasps at too much loses everything…

Finally, shouldn’t the emergence and spread, at breakneck speed, of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in the humanitarian sector—as everywhere else—give us pause for thought? AI is an extraordinary tool, and we must take advantage of the opportunities it offers to increase our efficiency tenfold, particularly when it comes to tedious, time-consuming tasks (compliance, data and inventory management and analysis, purchasing procedures, etc.). But it is a tool that can potentially be shut down or interrupted—or even manipulated. And it is a tool that, by virtue of its “training,” has biases; notably, it is designed to overwhelmingly favor the “probable” over the “improbable.” Yet the improbable (and the unprecedented!) remains possible… and sometimes occurs. Have we considered the degree of dependence we can—or cannot—accept on this tool? Have we considered the risks, in the near future, of delegating too many decisions to AI? Will the director of operations for a humanitarian NGO be an AI the day after tomorrow? Keeping the human element in humanitarian decision-making must be an imperative that the urgency of action cannot override.

©PAM/Afghanistan – The World Food Programme has 239 trucks, including those in the earthquake-stricken province of Ghor.

Possible solutions?

Let’s try to outline a few imperfect and partial approaches as responses to these challenges.

Return to fundamental principles. This may be the most essential step. Independence, impartiality, and neutrality—not merely as proclamations, but as concrete, daily demonstrations on the ground, stripped of any biased interpretation, preconceived ideology, complacency, or prejudice.

Accepting that we can no longer consider ourselves “untouchable.” Humanitarians, because they strive to “do good,” often feel it is unacceptable to be asked to explain themselves or be held accountable for certain aspects of their methods, their choices, or their messaging. All the more so if it is established authorities who take the liberty of questioning them or challenging their actions, their stance, or, once again, their complacency. Must independence mean immunity by divine right?

Refocus on our core missions: emergency response and post-emergency recovery. Stop trying to tackle everything and do it all. Saving lives and communities—that is what still makes us indispensable, and it is our sole “cause.” Of course, post-emergency work must also strengthen communities’ resilience to future shocks. And of course, the fate of the planet and climate change are issues and problems of overwhelming importance. But the comprehensive and decisive response to these goes beyond our mandate, our mission—the one for which people still believe in us, and whose impact depends on us.

Rethinking our supply chains and logistics. Not changing everything, but examining their vulnerabilities, imagining scenarios of disruption and unavailability. Consider alternative solutions, calculate their costs, and model them. And contemplate what cannot be modeled—a “logistics of the improbable, of the unprecedented”? Do the same with our communication tools (satellites, the internet). Do not abandon what works today—and even optimize it—but be prepared to do without it if necessary. Use digital tools and AI, for example, for distributing digital cash, mapping needs and beneficiaries, or collecting personalized information, but be able to quickly revert to a more “rustic” approach to decision-making and operations if necessary. Honesty compels us to acknowledge that, in many fields, numerous humanitarian teams demonstrate this resilience every day. All the more reason to continue cultivating it as our most valuable asset. This “wide gap” between mastering the most advanced tools and mastering the absence of them will be decisive for the future.

©Hulo – Shared Air Transport: Operational Support from the European Union for the Implementation of the Humanitarian Air Bridge

We must increasingly pool resources and tools—logistics, procurement, data, HR, and more—among humanitarian organizations, and innovate even further. When resources are in free fall, needs and costs are skyrocketing, and opportunities for efficiency gains are scarce, can we afford to hesitate in using them? The UN, a complex, cumbersome machine whose operations are far from streamlined, is attempting to set an example by launching a movement to “integrate” its agencies under the “New Humanitarian Pact.”

We must continue to develop, through coordination among humanitarian organizations, advocacy efforts directed at policymakers and donors—not focused on an illusory “We want things to go back to the way they were,” because that will not happen. In a sense, the humanitarian sector has been the spoiled child of a prosperous and peaceful Western society—a wonderful interlude that has now come to an end. Advocate for and defend a simple demand: “Do everything possible to meet humanitarian needs,” by demonstrating the impact of humanitarian action and its leverage in preventing future disasters—disasters far more severe and costly in terms of human lives and financial resources than the aid itself. In this effort, diversify the types of donors (something most NGOs have already undertaken), turning resolutely, following the example of the UN itself, toward civil society, businesses, and the general public; Tom Fletcher recently highlighted the launch of a global public campaign to bridge the remaining gap in UN aid funding for 2026… Antoine Vaccaro, President of Force for Good, spoke in a recent article in Défis Humanitaires about “Philanthropy in a Time of Chaos,” emphasizing that generosity has not disappeared but has evolved, and that humanitarian NGOs, now also immersed in a “war economy,” must learn to navigate and relearn how to mobilize by answering the question, “What have we made possible with our financial commitment to your cause?”…

Are these approaches revolutionary or magical? Is the outcome guaranteed? No. But they are clear-eyed, realistic, and indispensable. Perhaps unprecedented situations will give rise to other unprecedented approaches.

A conclusion in the form of a question: can the humanitarian sector afford the luxury of waiting for the return of the golden age? Most humanitarian organizations, which have begun adapting to the “great uncertainty” engulfing the world, have already started to answer.

Pierre Brunet

Pierre Brunet is a novelist and a member of the Board of Directors of the NGO SOLIDARITES INTERNATIONAL. He became involved in humanitarian work in Rwanda in 1994, then in 1995 in Bosnia, and has since returned to the field (Afghanistan in 2003, Calais jungle in 2016, migrant camps in Greece and Macedonia in 2016, Iraq and Northeast Syria in 2019, Ukraine in 2023). Pierre Brunet’s novels are published by Calmann-Lévy: “Barnum” in 2006, “JAB” in 2008, “Fenicia” in 2014 and “Le triangle d’incertitude” in 2017. A former journalist, Pierre Brunet regularly publishes analytical and opinion articles, or columns.

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“The World to Come as Seen by the CIA”

Éditions des Équateurs, Robert, Diane; United States, Office of the Director of National Intelligence; United States, Central Intelligence Agency

What perspectives can humanitarians draw from the CIA’s latest forward-looking report?

On May 28, the French translation of the latest CIA report intended for the U.S. administration was published in France by Éditions Équateurs Documents. The report, published under the title “The World to Come as Seen by the CIA – Analyses, Facts, and Figures”, offers humanitarians—always alert and seeking foresight regarding tectonic shifts, crisis arcs, fault lines, and the major trends of “concrete geopolitics” that condition our actions—an opportunity to examine their own perspectives, drawing from the data and interpretations of the main U.S. intelligence agency, which in Europe often carries a negative image.

Before delving into the most significant analyses of the report, it is important to highlight two major “biases”:

The report is conceived, written, and structured solely from the perspective of U.S. interests and “extreme and critical” threats to them. It is likely that a similar report produced by French intelligence, while pointing out the same unavoidable phenomena, would highlight others, create a partially different threat hierarchy, and perhaps provide a more nuanced or complex vision.
The report is designed for the current U.S. administration—i.e., the Trump administration. Between the lines, one can detect a vision aligned with, and anticipating, the ideological assumptions and worldview of that administration. Similarly, the absence of a mention of a phenomenon (climate change, for example, as we will return to) is itself indicative of the threat posed by the refusal of the world’s leading power to address that issue.

With that said, the presentation of global perspectives by the world’s leading power cannot leave one indifferent; above all, it cannot “leave the world indifferent,” since U.S. perceptions, in turn, shape the world.

Structurally, the French edition comprises three distinct parts: the report titled Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, the transcript of a U.S. Senate hearing on current global threats, and finally a section Analysis, Facts, and Figures concerning nine countries/states selected, presumably, as significant.

Let us examine, in a non-exhaustive way, the report’s most decisive analyses regarding “extreme and critical” threats to U.S. interests and attempt to discern their consequences or factors for humanitarians in their present and future work.

The first threat cited in the report as affecting U.S. interests (a priority confirmed in the Senate hearing) is organized crime and drug cartels responsible for the massive influx of drugs into the U.S. (notably fentanyl, which has caused widespread deaths), human trafficking, and illegal immigration. While a serious and real threat, this priority is largely influenced by the ideological focus of the current U.S. administration on immigration and related crime (drug inflow, prostitution, and migrant influx often viewed as inseparable). For humanitarians, this political orientation toward border closure and deportation suggests the need to implement or expand programs for the Caminentes (“those who journey”): migrants stranded in Central America or forcibly returned without resources or shelter. The coming years may see a growing population of men, women, and children left with nothing, either there or here, who will require assistance—from daily survival to education.

A persistent threat emphasized by the report is the continuation or increase of terrorism risk. In Asia and the Middle East (except Yemen), ISIS is identified as the primary actor capable of resurging—even without territory—taking advantage of any regional or local instability (e.g., in Syria), expanding as in Somalia or West Africa where it rivals Al-Qaeda networks, and inspiring local initiatives in Europe or Russia. ISIS-Khorasan in Central Asia is described as particularly aggressive, seeking to exploit “high-vulnerability travel routes.” In West Africa and the Sahel-Saharan belt, regional Al-Qaeda affiliates will increasingly destabilize states like Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger (and further toward the Gulf of Guinea), with growing attacks on urban centers and diminishing government control. The report highlights the coordination between active Al-Qaeda affiliates in Yemen (AQAP) and Somalia (Shabab) with the Houthis, facilitating access to more sophisticated weapons and possible coordination to strike Western interests and commercial traffic. For humanitarians, already aware of this threat, the report reinforces the need to anticipate risks along local or cross-border routes, isolated settlements, and logistics chains. Western-origin humanitarians will increasingly be threatened and targeted where these organizations expand, and access to the most remote populations may be risky, contested, or blocked.

China is presented as a source of both regional (expansionist policy in the South China Sea, de facto annexation of islands and islets, military encirclement and harassment of Taiwan) and global threats. U.S. analysts anticipate a coherent “galaxy” of major risks from China’s deliberately aggressive actions: disruption of supply routes and logistics chains used by Western countries, threats to critical infrastructure (energy, security, health, transportation, banking networks, etc.), and information, communication, and internet systems; covert use of AI to manipulate data and open-source information (similarly cited for Russia); and data exfiltration from Western internal or external networks. Humanitarians, who position emergency stocks abroad and ship supplies worldwide, must consider the vulnerability of their logistics chains. Likewise, humanitarian organizations increasingly produce and rely on borderless digital information—data, communications, mapping. To what extent are our systems immune to intrusion, exfiltration, or manipulation?

The Chinese threat is compounded by Russia, which poses risks to Western satellite networks and related communications systems. Humanitarians must question their increasing dependence on vulnerable satellite links. Notably, the report does not mention the risk of Russia cutting undersea internet cables, despite NATO taking it seriously—perhaps intentionally downplaying Russian culpability.

SCO Summit, Shanghai 2025 ©X_Narendramodi

Regarding Ukraine, U.S. analysts do not foresee an imminent collapse along the contact line. Their assessment can be summarized: “The longer the war continues in Ukraine, the more Ukraine will lose.” The report notes Russia’s current military advantage and capacity to continue its campaign longer than Kyiv. Compared to the French former Chief of Staff’s caution that victory favors the adversary who can endure slightly longer, the CIA report highlights the growing risk of large-scale conflict between NATO allies and Russia, including potential nuclear weapons use. While the humanitarian role in a nuclear conflict is theoretical, humanitarians must consider what their role—or absence thereof—would be in a high-intensity, widespread European conflict, where operational procedures, safety guidelines, and logistics could collapse. The potential scale of displacement and humanitarian need would far exceed current capacities, placing humanitarian organizations among the first victims of high-intensity war in the West.

In the Middle East, written before recent Israeli-U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear and military installations, the report lists expected critical threats: attacks on Israel and U.S. facilities, blockages of energy, trade, and logistics routes by Iran or its proxy in Yemen (Houthis). Regarding Syria, the report underscores volatility after Bashar al-Assad’s fall and the risk of ISIS resurgence. For humanitarians, vigilant in the region, this is a reminder: worsening political and military volatility, attacks on minorities (Alawites, Druze), interventions affecting Rojava, or renewed Turkish action would jeopardize access to isolated or displaced populations.

As noted, what a report omits can be as telling as what it includes: climate change. During the Senate hearing, Tulsi Gabbard, Director of National Intelligence, was directly questioned about its absence. Her response—that the report focuses on the most extreme and critical national security threats—implies to humanitarians that the U.S. is unlikely to fund adaptation or resilience programs for vulnerable populations. Consequently, humanitarian needs related to climate change may exceed expectations and capacities. By contrast, French think tanks, such as Institut Montaigne, acknowledge climate’s centrality to policy planning by 2040.

The final section covers nine countries, revealing symbolic and strategic choices. Notably, Denmark, Greenland (separately treated), and Canada are included. Two cases stand out: Syria—marked as “head of state: vacant,” highlighting U.S. ambiguity regarding figures like Ahmed al-Charaa/Al Joulani—and Turkey, whose dossier underscores the massive refugee intake, highlighting the complex humanitarian challenge of new arrivals, return policies, or mass movements toward Europe.

Conclusion

High-intensity Russia-NATO conflict where humanitarian actors would have limited role; growing instability in the Middle East, West Africa, the Sahel-Saharan belt, and Central Asia; threats to supply chains; ongoing risks to information and communication systems; possible data manipulation; U.S. disregard of climate-related humanitarian impacts; and massive unmet humanitarian needs. While the CIA report may be oriented, sometimes simplistic or unnuanced, one fact is clear: humanitarians face pervasive danger and must act—or reinvent themselves—to remain relevant.

Pierre Brunet

Writer and Humanitarian

Pierre Brunet is a novelist and member of the Board of Directors of the NGO SOLIDARITES INTERNATIONAL. He became involved in humanitarian work in Rwanda in 1994, then in Bosnia in 1995, and has since returned to the field (Afghanistan in 2003, the Calais jungle in 2016, migrant camps in Greece and Macedonia in 2016, Iraq and north-eastern Syria in 2019, Ukraine in 2023). . Pierre Brunet’s novels are published by Calmann-Lévy: Barnum in 2006, JAB in 2008, Fenicia in 2014 and Le triangle d’incertitude in 2017. A former journalist, Pierre Brunet regularly publishes analytical articles, opinion pieces and columns.

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