Syria: humanitarian aid in the face of a bloodless country and an uncertain future

Photo of PUI during a visit to Syria in January 2025

December 2024. The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, after fourteen years of war, marks a major turning point for Syria. Power collapsed in a matter of days under the assault of rebel forces led by the Hayat Tahrir al-Cham (HTC) group, leaving the way open for an uncertain political transition. The establishment of an interim government, led by Ahmad al-Sharaa (Abu Mohammed al-Joulani), and the adoption of a provisional constitution in March 2025 are seen as steps forward, but they are not enough to meet the country’s immediate challenges: political instability, community and sectarian tensions, a lasting humanitarian crisis and large-scale reconstruction.

Syrians celebrated the end of the regime, but woke up a month later to an unchanged reality: a country in ruins, with no resources, and an uncertain future,’ observes Charlotte Baudoin, of the NGO Première Urgence Internationale.

On 30 March, Ahmad al-Sharaa, the interim president, announced a new Syrian transitional government composed mainly of his loyalists but including 4 ministers from minorities, a Christian, a Druze, an Alawite and a Kurd among its 23 members. The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (editor’s note: autonomous Syrian Kurdish authority) declared that this government did not reflect the diversity and plurality of the country and that it was therefore not concerned by the government’s decisions! It should also be remembered that Ahmad al-Sharaa has full legislative, executive and judicial powers, and that he chairs the ‘National Security Council’, considered by some to be the country’s real government. The future will tell whether the promise of a representative, unitary government that respects minorities has been kept or not. That is the challenge after 14 years of war.

In this context, humanitarian action is more necessary than ever, but its new framework for intervention is still unclear. Some had hoped that the end of the regime would facilitate access to relief supplies. However, as Thomas Janny of the NGO Solidarités International points out, guaranteed access has not yet been achieved and humanitarian space remains restricted.

To analyse the humanitarian challenges ahead, this article draws on two complementary accounts. Thomas Janny, Regional Director for the Middle East at Solidarités International, and Olivier Routeau, Director of Operations and Charlotte Baudoin, Country Director for Syria at the NGO Première Urgence Internationale (PUI). Before the fall of the regime, Solidarités International was working in rebel-controlled areas (in the north-east and north-west of the country), while Première Urgence Internationale was working in regime-controlled areas, in 10 of the country’s 14 governorates.

Between the reorganisation of the humanitarian sector, reduced funding and strong political and geopolitical tensions, post-Assad Syria raises many questions about the future of aid and the conditions under which it is delivered.

A Blitzkrieg with uncertain consequences

The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime was as sudden as it was unexpected, a veritable Blitzkrieg, as Thomas Janny puts it. In the space of ten days, HTS forces, supported by numerous other militias, took control of the capital, causing the total collapse of a regime that had held out for fourteen years with the support of Iran and Shiite militias, as well as Russia. This rapid changeover left the country without a functional state structure, with an improvised transitional government and an administration in ruins.

Interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa is seeking to stabilise the situation, notably by adopting an interim constitution in March 2025. This constitution guarantees certain fundamental freedoms, notably in terms of expression and women’s rights, but it maintains a powerful executive with few checks and balances. Although there have been declarations aimed at establishing a democratic framework, the foundations remain extremely fragile,’ explains Olivier Routeau of Première Urgence Internationale. The absence of solid structures and the lack of resources are complicating the establishment of a stable state, while the population sees few concrete improvements in their daily lives.

Nor has the collapse of the regime put an end to the violence. In the first few weeks, clashes broke out on the Syrian coast, particularly in Tartous and Latakia, historic bastions of the Alawite community. This violence, which caused more than 1,300 deaths (many of them civilians), rekindled the community and religious tensions that had characterised the Syrian conflict. There is a real danger of widespread reprisals against the Alawites, who are seen as Assad’s historical supporters,’ warns Charlotte Baudoin, from PUI. Many are fleeing to Lebanon, while the new authorities are struggling to impose their control over the security forces, who are implicated in these abuses.

At the same time, Syria remains a battleground for geopolitical rivalries. Turkey, sponsor of the new government, is concerned about the maintenance of Kurdish power in the north-east, and has stepped up its air strikes, targeting areas under the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces (FDS). Israel, for its part, has stepped up its strikes on Syrian military sites. The fall of Assad has not put an end to foreign interests in Syria; on the contrary, it has redistributed the cards,’ analyses Thomas Janny. We might even say that Turkey has replaced Iran in Syria.

In this chaotic context, the reconstruction of the country seems out of reach in the short term. At the Brussels summit on 19 March, international donors pledged $6.5 billion, a limited amount compared with the $400 billion needed for reconstruction. In addition, US sanctions remain in place, hampering the necessary investment and slowing down any attempt at economic recovery. The European Union has lifted some restrictions, notably on the energy sector, but their impact remains limited. Without the lifting of US sanctions, Syrian recovery is impossible’, notes Olivier Routeau.

For the NGOs working on the ground, this transition period represents a major challenge. The end of the regime has turned the organisation of humanitarian aid upside down, raising new questions about access to populations and cooperation with the new authorities. While Syria has immense needs in terms of aid and reconstruction, humanitarian aid workers have to deal with an unstable environment and a future that is still uncertain.

Opening pipes to the water network in a camp in northern Syria © Solidarités International

Minorities in Syria: between fragile integration and persistent tensions

The rapid fall of the Assad regime has reshuffled the cards of power in Syria, but it has not put an end to community divisions. While the transitional government claims to want to build an inclusive nation, religious and ethnic tensions are a reality that the new government must resolve. Minorities, historically caught up in the conflict, now find themselves in an uncertain position, between fears of reprisals and promises of integration.

The Alawites, long seen as the mainstay of the Assad regime, are now the most vulnerable. In Tartous and Latakia, atrocities targeted the community from the very first days of the transition, killing more than 1,300 people. The government has condemned the violence, but probably does not have the means to prosecute these crimes,’ observes Charlotte Baudoin of Première Urgence Internationale. Weakened by years of war and impunity, the Syrian judicial system seems incapable of fulfilling its role for the time being.

The Kurds, for their part, gained political recognition with the agreement of 10 March, which provides for the integration of the FDS into the national army. This agreement, which enshrines the place of the Kurds in the new Syria, is nevertheless fragile. Tensions persist between Kurdish units, former jihadists and pro-Turkish mercenaries. It will be difficult to unify these forces under a single structure,’ stresses Charlotte Baudoin. Moreover, this agreement has not prevented Turkey from continuing its strikes in north-eastern Syria, a sign that Damascus’ recognition of the Kurds does not mean an end to the bombing and fighting, which could resume at any time.

For the Druze, the transition raises as many hopes as concerns. Their religious leader, Hikmat al-Hajri, has publicly criticised the new government’s constitutional declaration as being too centralised and unrepresentative of Syria’s diversity. The question of autonomy, granted to them under Assad as part of the ‘Alliance of Minorities’, remains unresolved. In a country where community balances are still unstable, the challenge will be to guarantee a system where each group finds its place without stirring up resentment.

This situation makes access for humanitarian aid particularly delicate. For Solidarités International, which has been operating in areas that were not held by the Assad regime, since the beginning of its work, the displacement of populations and the new humanitarian needs represent a major challenge. During the HTS offensive towards Damascus, our teams on the ground witnessed massive displacements of Kurdish populations towards the north-east, where they had to put in place an emergency response in just a few days’, explains Thomas Janny. PUI, which was initially present in the government zone, is also emphasising the need for reconstruction to include all minorities in order to avoid further fractures.

United Nations (UN). (2025). Humanitarian Response Priorities: January – March 2025 – Syrian Arab Republic. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) [2]

Uncertain humanitarian access

Humanitarian needs in Syria

16.5 million people require humanitarian aid.
14.56 million people are food insecure, of whom 9.1 million are classified as acutely food insecure (including 1.3 million in a severe situation).
8 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) since 2011.
823,302 people newly displaced in 2024, of whom 522,600 returned in December alone.
Nearly 6.5 million people have fled Syria since the start of the civil war, including: more than 3 million to Turkey, around 784,000 to Lebanon, more than 705,000 to Germany, and almost 650,000 to Jordan.

Figures from the OCHA 2025 report on humanitarian needs in Syria[1].

Humanitarian aid budget in 2024

In 2024, the United Nations has estimated the aid budget required at 4.07 billion dollars.
At the end of the year, only 1.46 billion dollars (or 35.9%) had been raised.

Humanitarian Action 2024 figures[2]

The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime has opened up new prospects for humanitarian action in Syria. NGOs have been able to access previously unreachable areas from their respective zones of operation before the overthrow of the regime.

However, this opening has been accompanied by new administrative and logistical constraints. As the legal framework is not yet well defined, the potential implementation of new programmes remains compromised for the time being. According to Thomas Janny, the authorities are still hesitant about the relationship they wish to maintain with international NGOs (INGOs) and the freedom they will be granted. In addition, the security situation remains unstable: bombardments persist in certain regions of the north-east, and further atrocities cannot be ruled out. The humanitarian situation has continued to deteriorate,’ notes Charlotte Baudoin, ’Israeli air strikes have intensified, while ongoing hostilities in the north and south, as well as recent instability and the deteriorating situation in coastal areas, have worsened humanitarian conditions and increased protection concerns.

Another major challenge is the gradual return of refugees, estimated at 125,000 since the fall of the regime. According to the United Nations, nearly 6.5 million people have fled Syria since the start of the civil war, with a further 8 million internally displaced. These returns raise questions about access to basic services for people who return to their villages in ruins after years of exile, and about the capacity of NGOs to respond to new needs. In a context where funding is uncertain and infrastructures are still fragile, humanitarian organisations must find sustainable solutions to support this transition.

The humanitarian sector absolutely must succeed in this first phase of emergency response, to enable Syria to move on to the next stage, that of reconstruction’, explains Olivier Routeau.

International support and financial uncertainties: a delicate balance

The role of the international community is now crucial to Syria’s recovery. Since the fall of the regime, several governments and multilateral organisations have announced plans to support reconstruction, emphasising the need for inclusive development and political stabilisation. The European Union, for example, has reaffirmed its commitment to a peaceful and sustainable transition, while institutions such as the World Bank are beginning to consider recovery projects.

This international support is essential to rehabilitate destroyed infrastructure, support basic services and encourage the return of displaced persons and refugees. Olivier Routeau stresses that without a strong commitment from international donors, local capacities will remain too limited to meet the immense humanitarian and reconstruction needs. This support should enable us to move away from an emergency approach and lay the foundations for more sustainable aid.

However, this dynamic has been disrupted by a reorganisation of humanitarian funding. The sudden freezing of American funds, which via the USAID agency amounted to a total annual budget of 42.8 billion dollars (42% of global humanitarian aid), has created major uncertainty for NGOs on the ground. American aid to Syria represented around a quarter of donations to the humanitarian response plan in 2024, i.e. 377.7 million dollars [3]. The suspension of funding has forced many organisations to drastically reduce their operations or even withdraw from certain areas.

Faced with these restrictions, humanitarian actors are having to reassess their funding strategies, and are looking to diversify their sources. However, this decision by the new Trump administration is part of a more general trend of reduced funding for international aid. Cuts in the Official Development Assistance (ODA) budgets of several European countries, including France, are giving rise to great concern and imposing a very short-term approach.

In this uncertain context, coordination between humanitarian and development aid is essential. We must avoid a humanitarian vacuum that would leave millions of Syrians without support at a critical time’, insists Olivier Routeau. Finally, the lifting of the remaining sanctions appears to be a necessary condition to facilitate economic recovery and enable humanitarian actors to work more effectively on the ground.

An unpredictable future, an essential commitment

As Syria enters a new phase in its history, the humanitarian challenges are immense. While the fall of the regime has opened up certain prospects, it has also left a devastated country, where humanitarian emergencies go hand in hand with the need for reconstruction.

International support will be crucial if another disaster is to be avoided. But with funding falling and instability on the ground, NGOs are struggling to adapt. The lifting of the remaining sanctions, better humanitarian coordination and appropriate funding will be essential to support Syria in the long term, if it is to stabilise and not fall back into conflict.

[1] Syrian Arab Republic Humanitarian Response Plan 2024 | Financial Tracking Service

[2] United Nations (UN). (2025). Humanitarian Response Priorities: January – March 2025 – Syrian Arab Republic. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

[3] Humanitarian action, Syrian Arab Republic, 2024. Financials | Humanitarian Action

India Hauteville

India Hauteville holds a first Masters degree in International Politics from Sciences Po Bordeaux and is currently studying for a Masters degree in Integration and Change in the Mediterranean and Middle East at Sciences Po Grenoble. She is currently assistant to the founder of Solidarités International, Mr. Alain Boinet.

Particularly interested in the Syrian conflict, she is currently writing a thesis on the articulation between humanitarian principles and the realities on the ground in Syria, using the NGO Solidarités International as a case study.

I invite you to read these interviews and articles published in the edition :

The eye in the loophole

Diary of Armenia

Things seen, words heard

An opinion column by Patrice Franceschi

Editor’s introduction. Armenia is threatened with a military invasion despite ongoing negotiations which do nothing to hide the constant aggression of President IIlham Aliyev’s Azerbaijan. Armenia is proposing a peace and cooperation agreement that this region of the South Caucasus needs. We are publishing this article by Patrice Franceschi, who is preparing a forthcoming book on Armenia from which he has just returned, and who has written here for our readers.

Armenian military post in the Syunik region facing Azeri positions. Photo by P. Franceschi.

Bent in two, Hovic and I make our way along the trench that winds its way towards the Armenian army’s last redoubt on the Azeri front line running along the northern border of Syunik province. I know of no harsher region in Armenia than this frontier at the end of the world – and none poorer. But from here, you can almost touch the land of Nagorno-Karabakh that was lost nearly two years ago.

In this month of February, the winter is biting, the cold relentless, the snowstorms frequent; sometimes you can’t see two steps ahead. The mountains around us are a dizzying tangle of peaks, ravines and sharp ridges, with only the rarest groves of trees. Snow is everywhere on these mountains, mud everywhere in the trenches; slimy, nasty mud. We were wading. The sentries we passed, bundled up in fleece jackets, their helmets tucked into woollen chapkas, scanned the enemy positions whose defensive network seemed almost embedded in their own, so close was it. If it weren’t for the flags flying over each position, you’d get lost… The Azeri defence network also stretches from ridge to ridge over considerable distances, but seems much better fortified and more modern too. From where I’m standing, you’d think you were in a trench on the Somme in 1915.

Hovik and I made further progress. Then the last redoubt appeared in front of us, protected by wooden planks, tyres, sheet metal and sandbags. Very basic protection – like all the other posts, in fact. I point this out to my comrade, who approves with a shrug of the shoulders, before adding in a whisper: ‘What’s more, you can’t get any closer to the Azeris. Here, they’re less than thirty metres away. Attention…. ’ I straighten up and put my eye to the slit in the armour plate in front of me: on the other side, in the middle of the enemy’s fortification wall, I can clearly see a slit similar to mine – and behind it, the eye of a soldier watching me silently…

I’ll never forget that exchange of glances in the ‘Tartar Desert’ atmosphere that grips everything around us.

Back in a less exposed casemate, we take a moment to rest. The soldiers on guard duty were warming themselves around a wood-burning stove, shoulder to shoulder. One of them was boiling water on a gas stove to make coffee, while another was opening a bottle of vodka to pass the time. Comfort was basic, the iron beds overloaded with weapons, fatigues, tin cans and other belongings. The boredom is palpable, even in the air we breathe. I tell myself that it must be the same with the Azeris.

On the front line of this ‘phoney war’, forgotten by the rest of the world, all we do is wait.

Most of the soldiers around me belong to the ‘popular defence units’ responsible for relieving the army by manning hundreds of posts similar to the one we’re in now. They are between fifty and sixty years old, with one or two wars behind them, the rugged faces of peasants from another era, massive bodies, unfailing motivation, but outdated weaponry. Among them, a few women. And even a sixty-year-old grandmother playing Lara Kroft with her Kalashnikov, refusing to take off her heavy helmet – just in case…

The orders are simple,’ says the leader of this small, disparate troop, a veteran with shoulders wider than he is tall. When the Azeris attack, we have to hold out until the army arrives – that’s all.

– The army is far away, I say. And by the time it gets here…. You don’t even have a second line of defence.

Syunik mountain region in north-east Armenia. Photo by P. Franceschi.

The soldiers looked at each other without a word: ‘Well, we’ll hold out anyway,’ said one sergeant eventually. In the meantime, the Azeris keep provoking us. They shoot over our heads or at the shepherds if they get too close with their sheep; and when the wind blows towards us, they burn the vegetation to smoke us out. But we have orders not to shoot back

– That’s why we go round in circles,’ says a corporal. But when they insult us from their trenches, we certainly respond – and you don’t have to raise your voice much, given the distance…’ I ask.

I ask: ‘And what are their insults?

– Oh, it’s always the same. They say they’re going to come and slit our throats in our villages, that our wives and children will be killed, and so on and so forth.

One of the soldiers stands up, clearly overexcited. He’s a braggart. He says emphatically: ‘The last time they insulted us like that, I replied that I was going to go to Baku in person to slit Alyev’s throat; that really got on their nerves….’.

His comrades laugh and agree.

Armenian light armour on the Syunik front. Photo by P. Franceschi.

I laugh at these childish jokes, but I don’t think any less of them: my friends are in trouble. It’s true that they have a fierce yet serene determination to defend their land, but in Yerevan, where a third of Armenians live, it’s a different story. The capital’s gilded youth will flee at the first shot. And they’re not afraid to admit it. The only positive note in all this is the proliferation of ‘military-patriotic associations’ sprouting up all over the countryside to defend the country. The pattern is always the same: former soldiers set up associations in villages or small towns to train young people for war, they find funding here and there in the diaspora, and the young people flock to them. No doubt they now outnumber the official army, which is skeletally small – only 30,000 men, including 20,000 conscripts.

In the meantime, I ask the old peasant soldiers around me how they see the future. The same answer comes out of every mouth: sooner or later the Azeris will attack. When, why and how, they don’t really know. It’s part and parcel of being these people and that’s that.

In turn, they ask me how I, the foreign friend, see things. I tell them what I think: Alyev’s policy, in other words the ‘final state’ that he and his Turkish allies want, is for Armenia to disappear from the map because its geographical position makes it difficult for the Turks to achieve their expansionist aims. It’s as simple as that. But, to achieve this final state, there is no question of a new genocide. This is not 1915. We can’t afford anything. Ethnic cleansing as used in Nagorno-Karabakh is far more effective. It has proved its worth. And it does not provoke any disproportionate international reaction. It is therefore likely that in the relatively near future the Azeri army will attack Armenia on the pretext that the latter is denying it sovereignty over a corridor linking it to Turkey via Nakhichevan. This attack is certain to take place in Syunik, the narrowest part of the country – just a few dozen kilometres – to cut Armenia in two. The matter would be settled in 48 hours, given the size of the military gap. The Armenians would have no way of resisting effectively. Of course, the Azeris would leave a narrow passage free so that the population of Syunik – barely 75,000 – could flee to the rest of Armenia – and that would be that. It would be a repeat of what happened with Nagorno-Karabakh.

The author with Armenian soldiers in a pillbox. Photo by P. Franceschi.

This worst-case scenario is haunting the enlightened minds in Yerevan and the Western chancelleries, which refuse to delude themselves. For the latter, the only way to avoid the worst-case scenario is to let Alyev know that the political, economic and diplomatic cost of his action is still too high for him to embark on the adventure. In this respect, the Americans seem to have revised their position very recently, exerting unequivocal pressure on Baku – notably for the release of Armenian prisoners of war. France is not to be outdone and remains a reliable ally for Pachinian. There is a glimmer of hope there.

As for the peace treaty, the signing of which has just been announced, it is undoubtedly a Munich-style smoke and mirrors. Given the balance of power, Pachinian had no choice but to go before Alyev and sign whatever he wanted, but there is nothing in this treaty. There is even reason to fear that its content actually represents an opportunity for war for Alyev. Since the announcement of this treaty, provocations have redoubled in the trenches of the Syunik front line.

What tomorrow will bring, no one can say with any certainty. But as things stand, it’s best not to delude ourselves. And to remain vigilant. Considering once and for all that the pessimism of observation – necessary – must lead to the optimism of combat – even more necessary…

Patrice Franceschi.

Writer and political philosopher, winner of the 2015 Goncourt short story prize, Patrice Franceschi is also an aviator, sailor and parachutist. He has always divided his life between writing, adventure and commitment. He has led numerous expeditions around the world, on land, at sea and in the air. He also spent many years in the ranks of the Afghan resistance fighting the Soviet army and, since the start of the war in Syria, has been actively involved in the Kurdish revolution against the Islamic State and the regime in Damascus.
His novels, stories, poetry and essays are inseparable from a committed, free and tumultuous existence in which he tries to ‘exhaust the field of the possible’. He is also commander of the three-masted schooner La Boudeuse and a member of the marine writers’ group.

I invite you to read these interviews and articles published in the edition :

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