The Triple Nexus put to the test in the field: humanitarian-development-peace.

In this article, Sonia Rahal, Deputy Director for the Sahel and Lake Chad based in Dakar for the humanitarian NGO Solidarités International, explains the position she presented during the National Humanitarian Conference of December 17 in Paris during the roundtable entitled “Humanitarian Nexus – Development – Peace”.  This round table brought together representatives of the OECD, AFD, UNHCR, the European Commission (EPLO), the NGO ENDA in Mali and Solidarités International.

Let us recall here that if the double nexus was put forward during the 1st World Humanitarian Summit in May 2016 in Geneva, the triple nexus adds the specific question of peace and therefore security and the military and provokes many debates as this article shows.

A concept in vogue but which hides longstanding debates, the nexus is above all a response to an observation. The observation that people in crisis situations do not experience compartmentalized realities but have both conjunctural needs for humanitarian assistance and structural needs for development.

Protracted crises have become the norm

This observation is all the more relevant in fragile or protracted crisis contexts characterized by episodic violence, multiple displacements and climatic or health disasters. Today, protracted crises are the norm: two-thirds of humanitarian aid is thus intended for long-term crises with an average duration of 7 years (Hechenberg, Sadanand, 2017)1. One of the main challenges faced by humanitarian aid actors in protracted crises is that humanitarian action alone cannot meet all the needs of populations. In the absence of sufficient development efforts in these fragile contexts, humanitarians have often had to stretch their mandates and sometimes go beyond their initial expertise to fill gaps.

The Nexus and Reform

The Nexus is also part of a broader debate on UN reform. The World Humanitarian Summit in 2016 thus urges to transcend the gap between humanitarian and development and to integrate peace actors. This New Way Of Working advocates a vision where humanitarian, development and peace actors work together towards collective results, based on their comparative advantages and according to the specificity of the context.

Goundam, Tombouctou, Mali. The NGO Solidarités International is present in Mali since 2012 and work as closely as possible to the population. / ©Solidarités International

The divisive issue of the “Peace” pillar

For many NGOs, particularly multi-mandate NGOs, development integration is necessary, and the question is not whether to link humanitarian and development efforts, but rather when and how. On the other hand, the humanitarian community has great reservations when it comes to integrating the third pillar of peace in view of the triple nexus, the definition and operationalization of which are subject to debate. This third pillar is thus approached very differently depending on the actors: while for states and the military, the peace pillar is perceived under the security prism as involving politico-military measures, communities and civil society see it as an absence of violence and a form of social peace. It is difficult to envisage synergies between humanitarian, development and peace actors when the definition remains unclear.

The risk of compromising humanitarian principles

Although many NGOs have incorporated the “do no harm” principle, conflict-sensitive approaches, or social cohesion projects, few consider themselves to have a peacebuilding mandate. The fear that humanitarian principles will dissolve into the triple nexus in favor of a political agenda of security and stabilization is not unfounded.

For instance, in Mali, where the debate over the triple nexus has been heated, NGOs point to constant pressure from the military and politicians to abandon all forms of independence. We have thus seen donors asking for needs assessments to be conducted by military forces or demanding more information in project reports, or a diplomatic representation calling on NGOs to support a military contingent in order to promote its acceptance by the populations. This mixing of genres is extremely detrimental to humanitarian action and the security of humanitarian workers and civilian populations. Let us recall that in Mali, there were 55 kidnappings of humanitarian workers in 2020 by non-state armed groups. This is indicative of a climate of suspicion towards humanitarian workers.

Goundam, région de Tombouctou, Mali / ©Solidarités International

The humanitarian principles of neutrality, independence and impartiality are not only a theoretical and ideological framework. They guide our policies and procedures; they also reflect commitments made by States such as the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid adopted by the European Union. Above all, respect for humanitarian principles guarantees our humanitarian access by allowing us to be perceived as a neutral, independent and impartial actor and to negotiate access to populations in often highly volatile contexts.

Recommendations

Ensuring a distinction between the mandates of the different actors:

It is crucial to distinguish between military operations and humanitarian and civil operations in order to guarantee humanitarian space and humanitarian principles. Humanitarian assistance should not be used to further a political or security agenda and should be deployed solely on the basis of the needs of the population.

This does not preclude dialogue between humanitarian and military actors: civil-military coordination must be strengthened when there is significant absenteeism or an inadequate level of representation. These interactions between civil and military actors are fundamental in humanitarian emergencies, each in its own role and responsibilities. It is also necessary to strengthen training to ensure that military actors are aware of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and humanitarian principles.

We must also be very careful about civil-military activities of the armed forces that aim to gain acceptance from the population, such as the Quick Impact Project (QIP), which can be confused with the actions of humanitarians. NGOs advocate for these activities to be infrastructure projects rather than food or medicine distributions, to avoid duplication of aid and confusion of roles. Finally, military forces must always communicate upstream about these activities, which is not always the case.

Barkhane military operation, Mali.

Adapting financing mechanisms and instruments:

Protracted crises have exacerbated humanitarian needs and sometimes negatively impacted development gains. We face large-scale needs in contexts where infrastructure and public services are weak or absent. In the Sahel, where 24 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance, humanitarian response plans are less than 50% funded. Therefore, funding instruments and mechanisms need to be adapted to operate in fragile contexts and we need multi-year and flexible funding. Donors also need to be able to translate the ambition of the double nexus into practice. Although there have been initiatives in this direction (European Commission with ECHO, DEVCO and the framework contracts, crisis modification for USAID’s US funding), there is a need for strengthened and concerted dialogue between humanitarian and development donors who still very often work in silos and for more flexible funding instruments and mechanisms. At the same time, it is necessary to ensure that development and humanitarian aid budgets remain separate and independent to avoid politicization of humanitarian assistance.

Ensure the participation of civil society:

Local civil societies play a key role in responding to humanitarian and development needs by working towards the goal of “Leaving no one behind”. The risk of centralizing decision making through the approach suggested by the United Nations in the New Way Of Working (NWOW) through joint objectives is that it may not reflect the voice of the people in a top-down approach. Any nexus approach must therefore include the participation of civil society and local actors in all phases of the project cycle from project design to implementation and monitoring. Working with local actors who are present before, during, and after the crisis increases the likelihood that short and long-term objectives will be achieved.

The Nexus debate has the merit of bringing humanitarian, development and military actors together to reflect on the challenges of aid and peace in protracted crises. It also reaffirms the need for development actors to engage in these fragile contexts and for funding mechanisms and instruments to adapt to the realities on the ground. Finally, in a growing context of politicization of aid, it is fundamental to recall that respect for humanitarian principles is a precondition for all humanitarian action, and to work towards this end.

Sonial Rahal

Deputy Director of Operations for the Sahel and Lake Chad for Solidarités International

  1. Namitha Sadanand and Estefanie Hechenberg, Sphere Standards in Protracted Crises, A case study of DRC and Haiti, 2017

Who is Sonia Rahal?

Sonia Rahal joined the NGO Solidarités International in January 2020 as Director of the regional office in Dakar. From 2015 to 2020, she carried out numerous humanitarian missions with the NGO Save the Children in various contexts such as the Sahel, the Syrian crisis in Lebanon and the Ebola crisis in West Africa.

Before joining the humanitarian sector, she worked for several years in development in West Africa, in the microfinance sector. She holds a Master’s degree from the University of Paris V in Development Law and Politics and a Bachelor’s degree in Economics and Politics from the University of Montreal.

Humanitarian aid: insecurity data

The Annual Report of the Aid Worker Security Database was published in the days following the assassination of 7 members of the NGO ACTED, as well as the president of Kouré Park, on August 9, 2020. This assassination in Niger was later claimed by the Islamic State in the Great Sahara (EIGS), the regional branch of Daech. It strongly affected the international humanitarian community and particularly French NGOs.

In this context, the President of the French Republic, Emmanuel Macron, recalled in his speech to the UN General Assembly on 22 September that since the creation of a World Humanitarian Day by the United Nations in 2003, 5,000 humanitarians had been victims of attacks and 1,800 had been assassinated. He added: “This is why, together with French NGOs and our international partners, we are building an initiative to ensure the effectiveness of international law, the protection of humanitarian personnel and the fight against impunity.

These issues of protection, impunity and obstacles to humanitarian aid caused by anti-terrorist laws will be on the agenda of the next National Humanitarian Conference (CNH) which will take place in mid-December in Paris and which Défis Humanitaires will cover for you. To put the insecurity figures in perspective, we invite you to read the article “What protection for humanitarians? ».


Source: Data from the Aid Worker Security Report 2020 (AWSR).

Défis Humanitaires has produced the graphs and tables presented below based on AWSR 2020 figures.

Other sources on security:

Scope of the AWSR study:

  • The data are from 1997 to 2019;
  • The year 2020 is up to 6 September 2020.

Number of humanitarian workers

  • The number of aid workers in the field has grown significantly in recent years. In 2019, there were approximately 569,600 aid workers, an increase of more than 320% since 1997. (Source: UN info – https://news.un.org/fr/story/2019/08/1049851).

Number of victims

  • In relative terms, the rate of aggression against humanitarians remains relatively stable, i.e. there are approximately 40 to 60 victims per 100,000 humanitarians per year. As a reminder, in Secourir Sans Périr (Secourir sans Périr, Paris, CNRS Editions, March 2016, 251 p., p. 115), M. NEUMAN and F. WEISSMAN state that “the number of victims (…) remains remarkably stable in relative terms: the rate of workers killed, injured or kidnapped fluctuates between 40 and 60 per 100,000 per year between 1997 and 2012”.

 

  • Over the period 1997 – 2019, there was a general increase in security incidents against humanitarians. The year 2019 is the year with the highest number of incidents recorded against humanitarians (since 1997). A total of 483 aid workers were killed, kidnapped or injured in 277 separate attacks.

It should be noted that in 2019, medical personnel were particularly targeted by the attackers (42% of the humanitarian aid workers killed).

 

Number of national humanitarian workers

  • It is the national humanitarians who are the most exposed (attention: take into account the fact that there are more of them in the field than expatriates in an average ratio of about 1 to 10).

Number of expatriate humanitarian workers

Number of humanitarian victims per country

The whole table, here: Table 5

  • Over the period 1997 – 2019, the 10 most “dangerous” countries are: Afghanistan, South Sudan, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, DRC, Pakistan, CAR and Iraq. These 10 countries account for 74% of the total number of victims over the period studied.

The whole table, here: Table 6

  • If we focus on the last 5 years, i.e. 2015 – 2020, the 10 countries where the most humanitarian aid workers have been attacked are: South Sudan, Syria, Afghanistan, DRC, Somalia, DRC, Mali, Nigeria and Yemen (83% of all victims).

Location of incidents

  • The majority of attacks against humanitarians take place on the road, during displacement (over the period 1997 – 2019).

Figures for 2020 as of 6 September

As of 6 September 2020, the AWSD has counted 204 victims for the year 2020, including 75 dead, 69 injured and 60 kidnapped.

More specifically, 190 victims were national workers (67 dead, 68 injured and 55 kidnapped).

Of the 14 international aid workers attacked, 8 died (Acted), 1 was injured and 5 were kidnapped.