Security and humanitarian aid: Lessons from the field with INSO

INSO South deputy safety advisor, Wilfreud Mbouyavo using a sattelite phone near an INSO car

The question of the safety of humanitarian workers (or members of UN field teams) has been part of the history of modern humanitarian aid since its inception. It goes hand in hand with the questions of “how far to go” and “how to act while managing what risks” that are consubstantial with this commitment, at least when it comes to intervening in areas of armed conflict (or natural disasters with banditry and looting). As Alain Boinet pointed out in an article published in Droit et pratique de l’action humanitaire in October 2019, as well as in Défis Humanitaires: “If humanitarian action is a duty that comes under the ethics of conviction (according to the opposition between the ethics of responsibility and the ethics of conviction theorised by the philosopher Max Weber), its implementation in contexts of insecurity generates multiple risks, particularly for humanitarian staff, for whom organisations must assume responsibility“.

There was a time when humanitarians were held in relative esteem as representatives of a form of neutrality and independence that helped everyone. This esteem was far from absolute, but it offered some protection to the teams. Then there was a period when being a humanitarian didn’t offer much protection. Finally, there was a time when humanitarian staff were specifically targeted (attacks, murders, hostage-taking, etc.).

It is the consequences of this deterioration that the United Nations Security Council has sought to address once again, as part of its ongoing concern over the last ten years, by passing Resolution 2730 on 24 May, calling on States to respect and protect humanitarian and United Nations personnel in accordance with their obligations under international law. This resolution, adopted by 14 votes with one abstention (Russia), was presented by Switzerland and co-sponsored by 97 Member States. It should be recalled that, already, Security Council Resolution 2175 of 29 August 2014 reported “(…) an increase in acts of violence perpetrated (…) against national and international staff of humanitarian organisations (…)”. Resolution 2286 of 3 May 2016 also stressed that “(…) humanitarian workers (…) are increasingly the targets of acts of violence (…) violence against the wounded and sick, medical personnel and humanitarian workers“.

What are the obligations under international law that underlie these various United Nations resolutions? As Alain Boinet points out in his article, “they are the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1997 and 2005, as well as the rules of customary international humanitarian law which oblige the parties to an armed conflict to respect and ensure respect for IHL, which provides for the protection of the wounded and sick, medical personnel and humanitarian workers: Rule 31 of customary IHL stipulates that humanitarian relief personnel must be respected and protected. Rule 55 establishes the principle of freedom of movement for humanitarian relief workers“.

Emergency multi-sector assistance project for communities made vulnerable by displacement, armed conflict and epidemics in North Kivu, DRC, April 2024. ©Guerchom Ndebo

To find out more about the determinants and issues at stake in this situation addressed by the UN Security Council, we need to talk to INSO (International NGO Safety Organisation), an NGO founded in 2011 and based in The Hague in the Netherlands, which acts as a ‘platform’ dedicated to coordinating and advising on safety issues for humanitarian organisations working in high-risk contexts. INSO works in 17 countries for 1,202 NGOs and employs 1,307 people in the field:

On 24 May, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 2730 calling on states to respect and protect humanitarian and UN personnel. How did INSO welcome this initiative, and what does it mean to you ?

INSO: INSO welcomes Resolution 2730 as an essential reminder to conflict actors of their obligations to ensure the protection of humanitarian workers. The clauses calling for concrete actions to assess the risks to humanitarians and create relevant recommendations through regular reporting and solid evidence are highly welcome. This is recognition that the data generated by field-based platforms such as INSO is essential for NGO security and access.

From January 2023 to May 2024, INSO documented 1,944 incidents affecting humanitarians, including 57 killed, 208 injured and 185 abducted. What is your analysis of the trend in the number of incidents involving humanitarians ?

INSO: Every incident is worrying, and it is always worrying that our colleagues are exposed to this type of incident; any violation of IHL is unacceptable, but it is worth noting that in recent years, the number and annual rate of serious impacts on NGOs around the world have often been stable or declining; the drivers of this trend are due to a number of factors both internal and external to NGOs. However, changes in conflict patterns in Afghanistan and Syria have been important factors. In addition, although important to our perception of risk, incidents involving NGOs represent a relatively small proportion of all reported incidents in the field, ranging from 0.9% to 1.5% of all recorded incidents in any given year.

At the same time, crime accounts for the majority of incidents involving NGOs. The fact that the overwhelming majority of serious incidents involving NGOs are motivated by some perception of wealth rather than targeting because of the activity or profile of NGOs is consistent with this trend.

Nevertheless, despite a steady annual decline in deaths of NGO workers in particular, it is possible that, as we continue to interrogate the 2023 data, we will see a temporary reversal of the downward trend in serious incidents. This is because crises have erupted rapidly in places such as Sudan and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, contributing directly to the increase in the number of deaths of NGO workers.

Distribution of water to people affected by the conflict in the Gaza Strip, OPT, April 2024. ©Solidarités International.

The national staff of humanitarian organisations are paying the heaviest price for the insecurity on the ground. Can you at INSO corroborate this fact ?

INSO: There is a clear demand for a global analysis for NGO headquarters staff so that they can better support their teams in the field, including national staff. To this end, INSO produces dozens of reports tailored to the needs of humanitarian leaders and managers, who make up a network of around 140 NGOs and donors at global level (headquarters) – 1,200 NGOs in the field.

In fact, national or local colleagues are the most likely to suffer a serious incident. If we look at the reasons for this, we see that the percentage of incidents involving national staff is almost identical to the percentage of national staff in the overall NGO population, which in both cases is over 90%. This is the most reliable determinant of the composition of victims of serious incidents, along with other factors that contribute to NGO risk, ranging from risk tolerance to sub-national dynamics. This highlights the importance of field-based platforms for understanding and managing risk for NGOs, as it is difficult to understand risk when you are not close to partners.

Among the data, it is worth mentioning that it is the national staff of international NGOs that are most affected rather than the staff of national NGOs. This is linked to the fact that national staff of international NGOs represent the largest group of humanitarian workers in the field. Nevertheless, INSO works tirelessly to understand the internal and external nuances that can amplify risk, to ensure that analysis, advice, training, crisis management and emergency support are guided by the needs and profiles of our partners.

INSO staff discuss the context with members of the local community. Credit: C. Di Roma/INSO

What characterises the evolution of security for humanitarian personnel ?

INSO: Security risk management for NGOs has improved dramatically with the introduction of field-based platforms to help NGOs make informed decisions. With this development, we have seen NGOs share information at unprecedented levels; by having a platform, NGOs understand and contribute to collective security. In addition, while localisation continues to drive humanitarian strategies, the field approach to analysis and advice has enabled national NGOs to access the support systems traditionally available to their larger international counterparts.

And over the last ten years ?

INSO: NGOs have seen an unprecedented growth in on-the-ground support for their risk management efforts, and have exploited it well. What’s more, these efforts are increasingly inclusive; for example, more than 40% of INSO’s 1,200 or so partners are national NGOs.

The establishment of reliable mechanisms for collecting and sharing data at local level, stimulated by the Saving Lives Together framework, is at the heart of this evolution. The task ahead is to support and intensify relevant initiatives at an operational level. Through platforms on the ground, NGOs are demonstrating their willingness to support collective security through the sharing of information and views, in contrast to some of the rhetoric currently being propagated around the challenges of risk management.

Solidarités International team clearing burnt areas in South Sudan, 2016. © Solidarités International

What is your perception, at INSO, of the measures taken by humanitarian organisations to mitigate and manage security risks for their staff in the field? What is working ?

INSO: We work with NGOs on a daily, weekly and monthly basis in all our field offices. Through these engagements in safety roundtables, training and site reviews, we see how important information sharing is. At our round tables, where NGOs feel comfortable sharing what has worked and what hasn’t, we learn and our NGO partners learn. Safety risk management is a constantly evolving process and regular and open communication ensures that we can keep up with this evolution.

We know that NGOs are fully committed to the ‘Stay and Deliver’ principle. Our data shows that only a very small percentage of individual serious incidents result in NGOs losing access or withdrawing permanently. This suggests that NGOs understand the risks they face and feel they have the capacity and support on the ground to deal with these risks.

Nevertheless, through meetings with key informants, regular engagement and surveys, INSO has found that the rapid onset of a crisis can change NGOs’ perceptions of risk, their presence and their strategies, over a relatively short period of time. This is probably because NGOs balance the duty of care with the need to stay and deliver. In such cases, they take into account humanitarian needs, resilience, programme criticality and conflict sensitivity, while questioning their tolerance of risk.

The traditional components of security risk management, based on humanitarian principles and acceptance, remain the most useful tools for mitigating risk. As the contexts, and the world, in which we work change in unforeseen ways, best practice in risk mitigation has proved its worth.

INSO teams near Goma, DRC, discuss with their partners. Credit: O. Acland/INSO

What is your view on safety training ?

INSO: NGOs understand that capacity building and training are key elements of security risk management, and essential to fulfilling their duty of care obligations. For example, in 2023, INSO trained around 7,600 humanitarians through courses including security management, crisis management, humanitarian access and negotiation, personal security and first aid. NGOs are seeking to increase their internal capacity to analyse risks, plan and implement both preventive and mitigating measures. This includes their national staff, who account for 92% of INSO training participants, and a growing contingent of female participants, who represent around one in five learners.

From this volume of engagement, the INSO training team has strengthened its understanding of a number of best practices. Firstly, effective training must be accessible. This can range from solutions such as on-the-job training, to using technology to deliver online training. Secondly, adaptation based on solid learning engineering is essential to meet the diverse needs of humanitarians. For example, self-paced e-learning courses may be best for widely promoting the fundamentals of security management, while training based on realistic scenarios and including exposure to stress may be more effective for equipping field staff with vital knowledge and skills.

Finally, the most useful training for humanitarians is that designed by humanitarians, with a critical eye to contextualisation, based on data-driven information, and offering evidence-based content and methods.

In conclusion, how do you see the future security environment for humanitarian workers ?

INSO: Field platforms and support structures will continue to shape the ability of NGOs to address risks and access challenges. At the same time, NGOs will face bureaucratic and administrative hurdles that can lead to mission failure, even if they often do not represent explicit threats to physical security. Also in the short to medium term, NGOs will face multiple rapidly emerging crises requiring a review of programme resilience and duty of care. This will also require all stakeholders in the sector to leverage field operational support systems and collective security to ensure that risk management resources are optimised. In addition, among a number of potential emerging threats, as Resolution 2730 demonstrates, misinformation will be a significant challenge for NGOs in the future. Ultimately, the security of humanitarians will be ensured by operational partners, their needs and the support they can receive on the ground.

Many thanks to INSO for this precise insight into a decisive subject, and we remind you that, for more information on the subjects of this interview or INSO in general, readers can contact you at global.analysis@ngosafety.org.

Pierre Brunet

Writer and humanitarian

Pierre Brunet is a novelist and a member of the Board of Directors of the NGO SOLIDARITES INTERNATIONAL. He became involved in humanitarian work in Rwanda in 1994, then in Bosnia in 1995, and has since returned to the field (Afghanistan in 2003, the Calais Jungle in 2016, migrant camps in Greece and Macedonia in 2016, Iraq and north-eastern Syria in 2019, Ukraine in 2023). Pierre Brunet’s novels are published by Calmann-Lévy: “Barnum” in 2006, “JAB” in 2008, “Fenicia” in 2014 and “Le triangle d’incertitude” in 2017. A former journalist, Pierre Brunet regularly publishes analytical articles, opinion pieces and columns.

Site INSO : International NGO Safety Organisation (INSO) | Analysis & Advice for Humanitarians

Geopolitics of defense

Interview with the general (2S) Grégoire de Saint-Quentin

Introduction Défis Humanitaires: War is back in Europe with the Russian attack in Ukraine. The Sahel has entered a period of great turbulence. The world is fragmenting, becoming more unpredictable and more dangerous. Grégoire de Saint Quentin, who has held major military responsibilities as an army general and whom we thank for this interview, answers questions from Défis Humanitaires, which invites you to discover his analysis of the links between geopolitics, conflict, defense and humanitarianism. Enjoy the interview, and watch the short video at the end.

Alain Boinet
General, on February 26, at an international conference in support of Ukraine at the Elysée Palace, French President Emmanuel Macron declared: “We will do everything necessary to ensure that Russia cannot win this war”. He also sketched out the prospect of Western, and therefore French, troops intervening in Ukraine, assuming what he described as “strategic ambiguity”. In your opinion, how should we understand the statements made by the President of the Republic, who is the head of France’s armed forces?

Grégoire de Saint-Quentin
First of all, as you mentioned, this statement was made at the end of an international conference where all the countries and organizations supporting Ukraine held lengthy discussions on the nature of the military support to be provided. At the time, Russia was campaigning for Vladimir Putin’s re-election, and the narrative of his victory was extremely offensive, while Western aid was struggling to materialize on the Ukrainian side. The primary aim of the conference was to reaffirm the full support of all players for Ukraine, as long as the Russian regime wished to persevere in its war of aggression.

With regard to the deployment of Western troops, you are also right to point out in your question that the President of the Republic in France is the head of the armed forces. This means that he decides on the deployment of forces, with the Armed Forces Chief of Staff (CEMA) then responsible for implementing his operational decisions. Under article 35 of the Constitution, the parliamentary vote remains the final arbiter, and takes place in the weeks that follow.

His questioning of the appropriateness of deploying ground troops, however natural it may be given his position as the institutional cornerstone of our defense system, was not so obvious to our Western partners, whose decision-making processes on the commitment of forces are different from ours. The ensuing debate provided a clearer picture of what would be perceived as “escalatory” by each of the different parties.

*Ukrainian artillerymen of the Joint Forces Task Force using the CAESAR supplied by France – 2022 – © Ministry of Defence of Ukraine*

AB
Does Russia’s attack on Ukraine on February 24, 2022 constitute a strategic breakthrough, and what are its consequences and implications in the current geopolitical context? What does this mean for you in military terms, for example?

GSQ
It’s much more than just a military issue. The deliberate, unmotivated attack on a neighboring country by a permanent member of the Security Council, the guarantor of international order, is a major event. It has led to a rupture in international relations, and to a transformation whose scope we are not yet in a position to measure. Nevertheless, we can identify two initial consequences.

Firstly, this conflict confirms the primacy of the balance of power in all its crudeness: I impose my will because I am the strongest. It was clear that international regulatory mechanisms had been weakening for several years, but now they have been shattered, and Russia is paving the way for military adventurism the world over.

The second consequence is just as worrying, as it stems from the desire of authoritarian states, particularly Russia, to polarize antagonisms. By declaring war on the “collective West” and assuming leadership of a “global South”, the Russian head of state is seeking to extend and generalize chaos through his representation of international power relations. Today, no one yet knows when the international system will regain its stability, or what the foundations of that stability might be.

AB
In 1991, at the time of the break-up of the USSR, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, France had 160,000 troops at its disposal to deal with a possible war. Today, according to Pierre Schill, Chief of Staff of the French Army, we can mobilize 20,000 men. Is this enough in this context? How do you see the years ahead? What specific military consequences does this entail?

GSQ
There is a return to potential confrontations between powers, with a level of violence and weapons sophistication that is not what we have seen for 30 years: for peacemaking or humanitarian reasons, we intervened in so-called asymmetrical conflicts, most often intra-state, where the level of weapons use and lethality were much lower than what we are seeing in Ukraine. High-intensity, resource-intensive combat is waged in all areas of confrontation (land, air, sea, space, cyber). It’s hardly surprising, then, that the current situation is prompting European countries to rethink the question of their security and the funds they need to allocate to it.

In this much more demanding context, the operational contract set for the French army aims to be able to mobilize and project 20,000 men capable of fighting the toughest battles as part of a coalition. This is very little indeed compared with the situation during the Cold War, and we can legitimately wonder about losses and the renewal of human and material resources if the conflict were to last. Nevertheless, it is important to understand that, whatever the nature of the threat to our interests, it is difficult to envisage operations being carried out within a strictly national framework. We would act in coalition, within a NATO or other framework. What’s more, unlike in Ukraine, we are not currently threatened by an invasion of one of our neighbors, which would require much larger volumes of forces to hold an entire front.

*Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman meets with the NATO-Russia Council in Brussels, Belgium, January 12, 2022 – © NATO*

AB
Journalist Jean-Dominique Merchet says that “the French army is a bonsai version of the American army”, because France has the full range of equipment, just like the Americans, but on a smaller scale. What do you think about this? Will the new military programming law make it possible to scale up?

GSQ
I understand that such a comparison can be made, but I’d like to add a few nuances.

There are two points in common between France and the United States that are not sufficiently reflected in this expression.

Like its great ally, France has succeeded in developing a vigorous defense industry, at the cutting edge of technology, underpinning sovereign capabilities at the top end of the spectrum that few other countries possess, such as state-of-the-art fighter aircraft and nuclear submarines. This performance is the result not only of ongoing investment by the French government and industry, but also of the tremendous feedback received from our armed forces. Today, a critical mass of equipment is necessary, but not sufficient. We need the know-how and systems to combine them for maximum operational advantage. Artificial intelligence will make a major contribution to this, but nothing is possible without the proven feedback from “real life” that comes with years of operational experience.

The second thing we have in common with the US is that we are the only two NATO countries to have an independent nuclear deterrent, both in terms of how it is implemented and how it is used. This is a particular responsibility for our country, but it is also a major asset in the current context.

It’s important to understand that if our conventional capabilities seem “bonsai”, it’s also because the armed forces budget pays the price of our independence through the maintenance of deterrence. This is not the case with our European neighbors, particularly the Germans. As for the British, who are also a nuclear power, they have just decided to increase their defense spending to 2.5% of GDP, whereas the commonly accepted NATO standard is 2%.

So we need to take a good look at what’s happening around us. If Ukraine had remained a nuclear-armed state in 1991, war would probably not be ravaging its territory today. Nuclear weapons are the ultimate guarantee against existential risk.

At the same time, Russia, the country with the most nuclear warheads in the world, is severely challenged on the Ukrainian front, and is only able to control the situation thanks to the asymmetry of human and material resources with its adversary. Deterrence must be complemented by robust conventional means adapted to new threats.

For example, for the first time in its history, Israel has just been hit by a massive attack of munitions, guided or not, fired from a state, Iran, which has no borders with it. With the widespread “droning” of warfare, which we are seeing in all recent conflicts, there is no reason to think that this type of action cannot be reproduced in other conflicts.

AB
General Syrsky, Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, declared on April 13 that: “the situation has worsened considerably, mainly due to the significant intensification of Russian military actions. Ukraine’s allies are currently unable to provide the necessary military support.” What are the risks of this imbalance for Ukraine and its NATO allies, including France?

*President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Commander Oleksandr Syrskyi – Ukraine – 2023 – © President of Ukraine*

GSQ
The risk for Ukraine is to back down and allow the Russian regime to seize the Oblasts it has decided, following bogus referendums, should be attached to the Russian Federation.

For us in the West, when we say that we must not let Russia win, it’s because we must stand up to the law of the strongest, and that Ukraine’s failure will be presented to the world as that of those who supported it, and therefore as the bankruptcy of our political systems based on individual freedom, which is abhorred by authoritarian states.

So, have we done everything in our power so far? I’m in no position to judge. What is certain is that Ukraine is now living on Western perfusion, but there are undoubtedly jolts in this support. At the moment, we’re at a low point which we can only hope will soon be filled by the recent American decisions to resume aid.

We must never forget that the law of the strongest has governed international relations for centuries, and that wars of aggression have ruined Europe several times over. We can only hope that the phenomenon of war, consubstantial with human nature, will be, if not curbed – let’s be realistic – at least limited. I therefore believe that Western countries are genuinely concerned that, after its success in Ukraine, Russia will not stop there, and that its bad example will end up setting a precedent.

AB
A recent poll shows that 65% of French people are in favor of reinstating military service, including 55% of 25-34 year-olds and 62% of 18-24 year-olds. Is this a surprise for you? How do you interpret this poll?

GSQ
Among the younger generation, there’s a growing interest in all meaningful areas of activity, and defense is one of them. Our young people are much more interested in security and defense issues than their elders. They understand perfectly well that they are entering a world that is going to change profoundly, and they want to understand the keys, if only to take control of their future.

Moreover, the military institution is one of the elements of stability in a changing world. To belong to it, even if only for a period of military service, is to capture what makes it so rich: an established framework, standards known and accepted by the whole community, and respect for commitment. The institution offers a degree of security at a time when the world is more uncertain than ever, and we should be pleased that this attractiveness translates into a willingness to serve. This is a considerable change from my generation, when the military profession was disparaged, and national service even more so. I find this survey quite encouraging.

AB
We can imagine that the war in Ukraine is one reason for this new awareness.

GSQ
These young people, and many of their parents, have known nothing but peace. The idea of war had disappeared from their consciousness and didn’t threaten their future. So, with the Ukraine, there is an extremely salutary realization that war is unfortunately an inescapable human reality, and that we need to understand what drives it in order to be able to limit it.

*Participants in a Universal National Service session on July 13 in Strasbourg. (Photo Guillaume Krempp / Rue89 Strasbourg / cc)*

AB
In the Sahel, French troops had to leave Mali, Burkina Faso and then Niger, where they were replaced by the Russians – who are focusing on Libya, while the situation is deteriorating throughout the region, right up to the countries of the Gulf of Guinea. You have extensive experience of theaters of operation abroad. So, in your opinion, what are the reasons for these major changes? How far can they lead?

GSQ
The deterioration in the security situation in the Sahel, recently documented by the UN, is deeply regrettable, because it’s the people who are paying the highest price.

What I find even more worrying for the stability of the region is the repetition of the same political mechanics: military coup d’état, reversal of alliance in favor of Russia with the withdrawal of all European and American partners, followed by the gradual confiscation of public freedoms under the protection of the Wagner/Africa Corps praetorian guard. The radical nature of this process inevitably leads to isolation. This is illustrated by these countries’ threat to break abruptly with ECOWAS. Yet this has been the framework for regional dialogue and stability for over fifty years. It is with ever greater integration and coordination that the region’s armies will eventually defeat a threat as mobile as terrorist groups.

It’s perfectly understandable that people, especially young people, should aspire to change when their future is threatened by all kinds of instability. However, it is to be feared that, having chosen the “Russian model” based on political authoritarianism, the countries of the Alliance of Sahel States will not be able to meet the growing demand for security.

AB
The war will continue, because the jihadist groups are still fighting. It’s simply changing in nature, because they’re not fighting the war in the same way as the French forces on the ground. Can you imagine how this will evolve?

GSQ
You’re right to point out that Wagner, in support of local forces, doesn’t bother with the same principles as Western forces when they’re fighting. After years of fighting terrorism, everyone knows that the behavior of troops on the ground is key to influencing the legitimacy of terrorist groups. Any infringement of human rights on the part of regular forces and their supporters only reinforces this legitimacy in the eyes of the population.

We can therefore expect a chaotic situation for some time to come, as neither side will be able to win out irreversibly. For the immediate neighbors of this “grey zone”, this is certainly a concern, as its potential for external destabilization is not zero.

AB
War in Gaza, France’s decision to launch military cooperation with Armenia, the first NATO and EU country to do so, ongoing tensions around Taiwan and in the South China Sea. Can we view these different situations through the prism of a return to the old Empires, calling into question Western magisterial authority and aggravating the risks of conflict?

GSQ
I don’t think it’s what you call the Western magisterium that’s in question. It’s true that there was a period when NATO beat the USSR by a knockout in 1990, which meant that, for years, Westerners – and the United States in particular – dominated the international system. I don’t think that’s the case any more, not least because the West has made mistakes, and the issue today is elsewhere.

Borders are being called into question. What’s new is that a number of countries believe that no one will be able to prevent them from seizing what they covet by force. When you consider the number of unresolved border issues on every continent, you understand how destabilizing the Ukrainian conflict can be. Especially when Russia claims to be using it as an illustration of a doctrine to fight the West. This makes no sense whatsoever. Democracy, peace and the freedom of peoples to self-determination are not Western values; they are universal aspirations.

*100,000 Armenians were forcibly expelled from their ancestral homeland of Nagorno-Karabakh or Artsakh by the Azerbaijani army on September 19 and 20, 2023.*

AB
Wars have dramatic humanitarian consequences for populations, at the risk of destabilizing neighboring countries with floods of refugees, provoking migratory movements, making political solutions difficult, and radicalizing the forces involved. As someone who has worked alongside humanitarian aid workers in the field – NGOs, the UN, the ICRC – how should humanitarian emergencies and respect for international humanitarian law be taken into account in contemporary and future conflicts? When we start a war, do we ask ourselves enough about the political and humanitarian consequences of the war in all their dimensions?

GSQ
You have to be extremely cautious before committing yourself to a war, and look for every possible way of avoiding it. You always know how you’re going to get into a war, but you never know how you’re going to get out, or when. So you need to weigh up your decision carefully before committing force. On the other hand, once the decision has been taken, you have to be resolute, determined and put all your resources into achieving your objectives quickly.

The humanitarian issue is taken into account at a very early stage in operational planning. The population, like all the factors contributing to the crisis, is carefully analyzed: what is its attitude, what are its needs, what consequences will the actions of the parties to the conflict have on it, and how can this aspect be managed? Humanitarian issues are fully integrated into the conduct of operations. We approach humanitarian aid actors to find out if and how they wish to collaborate. All this is a constant concern.

AB
How would you like to conclude this interview?

GSQ
There are never battles that are lost in advance, and there are never victories in battles that have not been fought. We need to have confidence in our abilities, in our democracies, to defend ourselves in an environment that some – particularly authoritarian regimes – are trying to make chaotic. We have what it takes to prevail, provided we apply the principles we have just outlined. We need to be resolute, tenacious and goal-oriented. You can’t be faint-hearted and you have to stick to what you believe in. When you can do that, it’s the first step towards a return to a stable situation.

3 questions 3 answers with Grégoire de Saint-Quentin (french)

Grégoire de Saint-Quentin
Army General (2S) of the French Armed Forces

Grégoire de Saint Quentin is 63 years old. A graduate of the Ecole Spéciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr, he completed a full course of military studies, leaving in 2020 with the rank of Army General (2S).

His military career was marked by special forces and joint operations. During the first part of his career, he was involved in numerous operational missions, most often as joint commander. From 2004 to 2006, he commanded the 1st Marine Infantry Parachute Regiment. After graduating from the Institut des Hautes Etudes de la Défense Nationale in 2009, he was appointed General in 2011 and successively commanded the French Elements in Senegal, Operation Serval, special operations and all joint operations from 2016 to 2020.

Since September 2020, he has been applying his operational experience to the development of high-tech intelligence and defense capabilities, in particular as Senior Vice President of Preligens.

Grégoire de Saint Quentin is Grand Officier de la Légion d’Honneur and Grand Officier de l’ordre National du Mérite.