Who wants peace prepares for war

Interview with General (2S) Grégoire de Saint-Quentin

Exercice international Saber Junction-2018

Alain Boinet : A year ago, in a previous interview (Geopolitics of Defence), you pointed out that beyond the strategic break represented by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it was the questioning of borders that was the main event. A year later, it is the President of the United States, Donald Trump, who is turning the table on the alliance with Europe and threatening to abandon Ukraine. What are the origins and consequences of this new strategic situation?

Grégoire de Saint-Quentin : I think the observation we made a year ago is still entirely valid. The annexation of territories by force, prohibited by the international regulatory mechanisms put in place in 1945, is back more than ever. The election of Donald Trump has had no containment effect, but rather risks amplifying the phenomenon, since the United States, with its political and military power, has until now been the keystone of this regulatory system. By putting pressure on Canada to become the 51st member of the European Union, or on Denmark to bring Greenland under American sovereignty, or even when he seems to have come to terms with Ukraine’s loss of sovereignty over part of its territory in the search for a peace agreement, Donald Trump is ushering his country and the world into a completely new geopolitical era.

This brutal change is an extremely strong signal to all regimes with expansionist ambitions, starting with Russia, which has always historically been built on the military subjugation of its neighbours. Witness the Kremlin’s current slogan: ‘Russia’s borders know no bounds’. The most visible and dramatic consequence of this new strategic order is the primacy of the law of the strongest and the return of wars of annexation in Europe, Africa and tomorrow perhaps in Asia.

Europe, having favoured the peace dividend, seems to have been taken completely by surprise by the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and now by the reversal of Donald Trump’s United States. What lessons should we draw from this?

Europe is seeing all its strategic choices of the last thirty years called into question at a delicate moment in its history. It built its model by delegating its security to the United States and developing its economy on massive flows of Russian oil and gas at attractive prices. For the reasons we have just outlined, this system is no longer working at a time when Europe is reaching a peak in debt as a result of previous crises. Our margins for manoeuvre are narrow at a time when we have to make a major budgetary effort to adapt the military resources of the Member States.

Europe is therefore at a key moment in its history, because it really must rethink itself in a much more autonomous way than before. It was founded in a world of cooperation and now finds itself brutally thrust into a world of power relations with protean threats, both military and internal, with the weakening of its dominant political model, that of parliamentary democracy. What’s more, it is imperative to restore economic growth at a time when the main promises in this area are held out by the technological revolution (AI), an area in which the Americans and the Chinese are largely dominant. Lastly, Donald Trump’s all-out tax policy is penalising the entire global economy and, at least for the time being, damaging Europe’s economic prospects.

A year ago, the minimum defence budget was set at 2% of GDP. Today, Donald Trump is talking about 5%. In 2017, France’s defence budget was €32 billion, in 2025 it will be €50.5 billion, in 2030 it will be €67 billion, and the Minister of Defence, Sébastien Lecornu, is working on scenarios for increasing the size of the military, which could reach almost €100 billion. What does this mean in practical terms for the armed forces in terms of equipment and manpower, and how long will it take?

École Spéciale Militaire parade in 2023 © Ministère des Armées

It is difficult to give an exhaustive answer in the format of this interview on the number and quality of equipment at the end of the military programming law (LPM) in 2030, especially as the national strategic review, which is to draw up the broad outlines, is still underway. However, we can clearly see the capability efforts we are going to have to make:

What the war in Ukraine and, more broadly, the return of strategic competition between the major powers reveal is that equipment that was of little use in asymmetrical conflicts has become indispensable: space capabilities, particularly for observation and broadband communications, control of the seabed, electronic warfare, in-depth fire, ground-to-air defence against all types of aircraft, including drones, and conversely, capabilities for destroying the adversary’s systems of the same type.
We are also witnessing the same technological transformation in the conduct of military operations as in economic value chains. Force systems are gradually being reorganised around the processing of data by artificial intelligence. This change has a considerable multiplier effect on the efficiency of military capabilities. It opens up truly unprecedented prospects for the way in which we fight, and therefore large areas of vulnerability for those who fall behind. This is why the Ministry of the Armed Forces recently created an agency specifically dedicated to these issues.
Finally, these high-intensity conflicts are characterised by a high level of attrition. So we need more conventional equipment: armour, aircraft and ships. We also need to be able to count on a greater number of human resources who are sufficiently qualified to serve weapons systems that have become digital. The contribution of reservists will play a crucial role.

Sébastien Lecornu recently declared that “France could be defeated without being invaded”, and that “The main risk for a nuclear power is to see its nuclear deterrent bypassed from below”. From a strategic point of view, how can we decipher these statements by the Minister of Defense?

France is very fortunate to have a deterrent force that it has patiently built up, at the cost of considerable effort, in complete autonomy. It is not dependent on anyone for its maintenance or employment. It is our life insurance against all those who would threaten the very existence of our nation. Having established that it is indispensable, it cannot respond to every threat, because some would not justify the President of the Republic launching a nuclear escalation process. I therefore believe that these are the threats to which the Minister for the Armed Forces is referring when he says that they can hurt us without taking us beyond the threshold of the use of our deterrent.

Volodymyr Zelensky and Sébastien Lecornu in Kiev © Compte X de Volodymyr Zelensky

It is therefore to counter these threats that we must have a military and security tool at the cutting edge of technology. To take an example – totally imaginary – if swarms of drones were to strike simultaneously at several places of power in Paris, it would certainly be a very serious blow to our country’s security, but nuclear weapons would not be of much use to us in this specific case, even if we had identified with certainty who was behind this terrorist attack. You can also imagine combining several kinetic attacks of this type with large-scale hybrid attacks such as cyber actions or large-scale disinformation operations on social networks. Today’s societies and technologies are evolving in ways that make it unnecessary to conquer a country in order to destabilise it and eventually break it up. We need to be aware of this and guard against it.

If the United States were to withdraw from NATO or from the defence of Europe, what would be the defence architecture for those countries in Europe that retain sovereignty over their defence? Is the European pillar of NATO the solution or rather an ad hoc coalition of leading countries?

First of all, since the inauguration of the President of the United States, there have been no declarations in favour of a pure and simple withdrawal from NATO, and personally I don’t believe in it. NATO is a military alliance and in the world we live in, being able to count on allies is an asset, even for the United States. On the other hand, it is quite possible that the Americans will say to the Europeans in an even clearer way than hitherto: ‘the defence of Europe is your problem, put the resources into it because we are saving ours for a potential confrontation with China’. We will then have to manage with minimal investment from the Americans, but within the tried and tested framework of cooperation that has existed since 1949. There will certainly be things to adapt, but it won’t be a leap into the unknown.

In the event of the United States withdrawing its nuclear umbrella in Europe, the French President has said that he is open to discussions on extending the protection of French nuclear weapons. The idea may seem simple, but putting it into practice would be tricky. Is it feasible?

Without going into detail, the current American nuclear umbrella in Europe is neither designed nor organised in the same way as the French deterrent for strictly national use. It would take a great deal of effort in terms of doctrine and adaptation, as well as consultation between European allies, to put in place the equivalent without American resources. But we are not there yet.

Coming back to the war in Ukraine, how do you assess the balance of power on the battlefield?

The balance of power is still in Russia’s favour for the simple reasons of its size, its resources and the support it manages to mobilise from outside. I’m thinking in particular of the reinforcements in equipment and men that have come from North Korea. Having said that, I think that the resilience and dignity of the Ukrainians deserve to be highlighted, even though American support is slipping away without being fully compensated for by European efforts.

Experimental leadership courses continue at the National Army Academy © Ukrainian Ministry of Defense

A ceasefire is on the agenda in Ukraine, but how can it be guaranteed? Maps are even circulating showing the presence of French and British troops. But Vladimir Putin doesn’t want that. What are the possible scenarios for guaranteeing a ceasefire, if not a peace agreement?

Russia knows very well that if Western troops are stationed on Ukrainian territory, this will considerably complicate its plans to destabilise the part of Ukraine that it does not already control. It would certainly require major concessions in other respects for it to finally accept this scenario. Unless the United States resolves to impose it by also committing itself to providing security guarantees for the ceasefire. I suppose that these are the issues that are at the heart of the intense negotiations taking place at the moment.

Recent polls show (Odoxa) that 3 out of 4 French people are ready to support a rearmament effort and another (Opinion Way) that 50% of 18 to 30 year olds are ready to join the army in the event of a conflict threatening our country. What do you think of public opinion on this subject?

The French are perfectly aware of what is at stake and they certainly remember General de Gaulle’s quote: ‘Defence is the first duty of a state and it cannot fail to fulfil it without destroying itself’. Young French people are much more aware of security issues than previous generations, and what’s more, they are interested in these subjects because they make sense. I find this survey rather reassuring, even if we can also wonder about the attitude of the 50% who will not want to answer the country’s call. This is the point that needs to be worked on without delay, because if Ukraine is still standing after three years of war, it is largely due to the maintenance of its national cohesion.

How will the world be restructured, with the return of neo-empires, nation-states and ad hoc coalitions in a context where the West is divided between the United States and Europe?

There is no doubt that there is an imperial reflex in the world today, not to say an imperialist reflex. However, this does not mean that all is lost for those who do not suffer from this pruritus. We have entered a period of great change, and the cards can be reshuffled very quickly. There will be room for pragmatic countries that are confident in their talents and have rid themselves of the shackles that restrict energies. To achieve this, however, we must be prepared to change our agenda and accept the balance of power.

More than 50,000 people have died in Gaza, most of them civilians, and many infrastructures have been targeted and destroyed (hospitals, drinking water stations, electricity stations). First-aid workers, humanitarian aid workers and journalists have been killed. The same is true of Ukraine. Several European countries have just broken their international commitments on the use of anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions, which they are going to use again. What will become of the Geneva Conventions and international humanitarian law, and will wars consider civilians on the opposing side to be the enemy in the same way as combatants?

We have just lived through a period of several decades of intra-state conflicts in which the conquest of the population to obtain its support, willingly or by force, was the very aim of the conflict. Remember the Somali militias who divided the country into feudal fiefdoms, organising the predation of the population and humanitarian aid.

Unfortunately, the people are always the first victims of war. This is true across the ages, because they are also a means of weakening the will of the adversary. The systematic destruction of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, which is in no way a military objective, is being carried out with the aim of weakening public resistance and getting the government to capitulate.

This is a crime under international treaties, but it does not mean that the law of armed conflict and international humanitarian law are disappearing, even if some have decided to disregard them. I’m not convinced that impunity is definitely the rule, and respect for the law is also what differentiates the different protagonists in a conflict.

How would you like to conclude?

Firstly, by thanking you for opening up the columns of your hundredth issue to me.

Secondly, I would like to remind you that in these times of great change, humanitarians, like the military, are practitioners who are used to dealing with the reality of conflict. Their advice will be invaluable in building the world of tomorrow.

Grégoire de Saint-Quentin
Army General (2S)

Grégoire de Saint-Quentin is 63 years old. A graduate of the Ecole Spéciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr, he completed a full course of military studies, leaving in 2020 with the rank of General (2S).

His military career was marked by special forces and joint operations. During the first part of his career, he was involved in numerous operational missions, most often as joint commander. He then commanded the 1st Marine Infantry Parachute Regiment from 2004 to 2006. An auditor of the Institut des Hautes Etudes de la Défense Nationale in 2009, he was appointed general in 2011 and successively commanded the French elements in Senegal, Operation Serval, special operations and finally all joint operations from 2016 to 2020.

In September 2020, he used his operational experience to develop high-tech intelligence and defence capabilities, in particular as Senior Vice President of Preligens.

Since September 2024, he has been Chairman of the ADIT group’s risk management company GEOS. Grégoire de Saint Quentin is Grand Officer of the Légion d’Honneur and Grand Officer of the Ordre National du Mérite.

I invite you to read these interviews and articles published in the edition :

The eye in the loophole

Diary of Armenia

Things seen, words heard

An opinion column by Patrice Franceschi

Editor’s introduction. Armenia is threatened with a military invasion despite ongoing negotiations which do nothing to hide the constant aggression of President IIlham Aliyev’s Azerbaijan. Armenia is proposing a peace and cooperation agreement that this region of the South Caucasus needs. We are publishing this article by Patrice Franceschi, who is preparing a forthcoming book on Armenia from which he has just returned, and who has written here for our readers.

Armenian military post in the Syunik region facing Azeri positions. Photo by P. Franceschi.

Bent in two, Hovic and I make our way along the trench that winds its way towards the Armenian army’s last redoubt on the Azeri front line running along the northern border of Syunik province. I know of no harsher region in Armenia than this frontier at the end of the world – and none poorer. But from here, you can almost touch the land of Nagorno-Karabakh that was lost nearly two years ago.

In this month of February, the winter is biting, the cold relentless, the snowstorms frequent; sometimes you can’t see two steps ahead. The mountains around us are a dizzying tangle of peaks, ravines and sharp ridges, with only the rarest groves of trees. Snow is everywhere on these mountains, mud everywhere in the trenches; slimy, nasty mud. We were wading. The sentries we passed, bundled up in fleece jackets, their helmets tucked into woollen chapkas, scanned the enemy positions whose defensive network seemed almost embedded in their own, so close was it. If it weren’t for the flags flying over each position, you’d get lost… The Azeri defence network also stretches from ridge to ridge over considerable distances, but seems much better fortified and more modern too. From where I’m standing, you’d think you were in a trench on the Somme in 1915.

Hovik and I made further progress. Then the last redoubt appeared in front of us, protected by wooden planks, tyres, sheet metal and sandbags. Very basic protection – like all the other posts, in fact. I point this out to my comrade, who approves with a shrug of the shoulders, before adding in a whisper: ‘What’s more, you can’t get any closer to the Azeris. Here, they’re less than thirty metres away. Attention…. ’ I straighten up and put my eye to the slit in the armour plate in front of me: on the other side, in the middle of the enemy’s fortification wall, I can clearly see a slit similar to mine – and behind it, the eye of a soldier watching me silently…

I’ll never forget that exchange of glances in the ‘Tartar Desert’ atmosphere that grips everything around us.

Back in a less exposed casemate, we take a moment to rest. The soldiers on guard duty were warming themselves around a wood-burning stove, shoulder to shoulder. One of them was boiling water on a gas stove to make coffee, while another was opening a bottle of vodka to pass the time. Comfort was basic, the iron beds overloaded with weapons, fatigues, tin cans and other belongings. The boredom is palpable, even in the air we breathe. I tell myself that it must be the same with the Azeris.

On the front line of this ‘phoney war’, forgotten by the rest of the world, all we do is wait.

Most of the soldiers around me belong to the ‘popular defence units’ responsible for relieving the army by manning hundreds of posts similar to the one we’re in now. They are between fifty and sixty years old, with one or two wars behind them, the rugged faces of peasants from another era, massive bodies, unfailing motivation, but outdated weaponry. Among them, a few women. And even a sixty-year-old grandmother playing Lara Kroft with her Kalashnikov, refusing to take off her heavy helmet – just in case…

The orders are simple,’ says the leader of this small, disparate troop, a veteran with shoulders wider than he is tall. When the Azeris attack, we have to hold out until the army arrives – that’s all.

– The army is far away, I say. And by the time it gets here…. You don’t even have a second line of defence.

Syunik mountain region in north-east Armenia. Photo by P. Franceschi.

The soldiers looked at each other without a word: ‘Well, we’ll hold out anyway,’ said one sergeant eventually. In the meantime, the Azeris keep provoking us. They shoot over our heads or at the shepherds if they get too close with their sheep; and when the wind blows towards us, they burn the vegetation to smoke us out. But we have orders not to shoot back

– That’s why we go round in circles,’ says a corporal. But when they insult us from their trenches, we certainly respond – and you don’t have to raise your voice much, given the distance…’ I ask.

I ask: ‘And what are their insults?

– Oh, it’s always the same. They say they’re going to come and slit our throats in our villages, that our wives and children will be killed, and so on and so forth.

One of the soldiers stands up, clearly overexcited. He’s a braggart. He says emphatically: ‘The last time they insulted us like that, I replied that I was going to go to Baku in person to slit Alyev’s throat; that really got on their nerves….’.

His comrades laugh and agree.

Armenian light armour on the Syunik front. Photo by P. Franceschi.

I laugh at these childish jokes, but I don’t think any less of them: my friends are in trouble. It’s true that they have a fierce yet serene determination to defend their land, but in Yerevan, where a third of Armenians live, it’s a different story. The capital’s gilded youth will flee at the first shot. And they’re not afraid to admit it. The only positive note in all this is the proliferation of ‘military-patriotic associations’ sprouting up all over the countryside to defend the country. The pattern is always the same: former soldiers set up associations in villages or small towns to train young people for war, they find funding here and there in the diaspora, and the young people flock to them. No doubt they now outnumber the official army, which is skeletally small – only 30,000 men, including 20,000 conscripts.

In the meantime, I ask the old peasant soldiers around me how they see the future. The same answer comes out of every mouth: sooner or later the Azeris will attack. When, why and how, they don’t really know. It’s part and parcel of being these people and that’s that.

In turn, they ask me how I, the foreign friend, see things. I tell them what I think: Alyev’s policy, in other words the ‘final state’ that he and his Turkish allies want, is for Armenia to disappear from the map because its geographical position makes it difficult for the Turks to achieve their expansionist aims. It’s as simple as that. But, to achieve this final state, there is no question of a new genocide. This is not 1915. We can’t afford anything. Ethnic cleansing as used in Nagorno-Karabakh is far more effective. It has proved its worth. And it does not provoke any disproportionate international reaction. It is therefore likely that in the relatively near future the Azeri army will attack Armenia on the pretext that the latter is denying it sovereignty over a corridor linking it to Turkey via Nakhichevan. This attack is certain to take place in Syunik, the narrowest part of the country – just a few dozen kilometres – to cut Armenia in two. The matter would be settled in 48 hours, given the size of the military gap. The Armenians would have no way of resisting effectively. Of course, the Azeris would leave a narrow passage free so that the population of Syunik – barely 75,000 – could flee to the rest of Armenia – and that would be that. It would be a repeat of what happened with Nagorno-Karabakh.

The author with Armenian soldiers in a pillbox. Photo by P. Franceschi.

This worst-case scenario is haunting the enlightened minds in Yerevan and the Western chancelleries, which refuse to delude themselves. For the latter, the only way to avoid the worst-case scenario is to let Alyev know that the political, economic and diplomatic cost of his action is still too high for him to embark on the adventure. In this respect, the Americans seem to have revised their position very recently, exerting unequivocal pressure on Baku – notably for the release of Armenian prisoners of war. France is not to be outdone and remains a reliable ally for Pachinian. There is a glimmer of hope there.

As for the peace treaty, the signing of which has just been announced, it is undoubtedly a Munich-style smoke and mirrors. Given the balance of power, Pachinian had no choice but to go before Alyev and sign whatever he wanted, but there is nothing in this treaty. There is even reason to fear that its content actually represents an opportunity for war for Alyev. Since the announcement of this treaty, provocations have redoubled in the trenches of the Syunik front line.

What tomorrow will bring, no one can say with any certainty. But as things stand, it’s best not to delude ourselves. And to remain vigilant. Considering once and for all that the pessimism of observation – necessary – must lead to the optimism of combat – even more necessary…

Patrice Franceschi.

Writer and political philosopher, winner of the 2015 Goncourt short story prize, Patrice Franceschi is also an aviator, sailor and parachutist. He has always divided his life between writing, adventure and commitment. He has led numerous expeditions around the world, on land, at sea and in the air. He also spent many years in the ranks of the Afghan resistance fighting the Soviet army and, since the start of the war in Syria, has been actively involved in the Kurdish revolution against the Islamic State and the regime in Damascus.
His novels, stories, poetry and essays are inseparable from a committed, free and tumultuous existence in which he tries to ‘exhaust the field of the possible’. He is also commander of the three-masted schooner La Boudeuse and a member of the marine writers’ group.

I invite you to read these interviews and articles published in the edition :

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