Humanitarian and geopolitics overview.

Meeting of heads of state and government in London to support Volodymyr Zelenky after his altercation with Donald Trump on February 28 at the White House © European Union, 2025

With this issue 100 of the online magazine Défis Humanitaires, we want to celebrate with our readers this milestone of good editorial hope. Since February 2018, we have been seeking to promote humanitarianism in its geopolitical environment, noting that humanity is at once one and diverse, universal and multiple, with its peoples and their countries.

This is all the more true given that 300 million human beings are in danger for want of help, and 2 billion men, women and children are living in destitution and uncertainty. Yet humanitarian aid, which has already begun to decline, is in danger of falling even further. The future looks more uncertain and dangerous than ever.

Understanding and anticipating events is a prerequisite for effective action. Humanitarian action is a positive response to cruel events. To understand where we are today and where we’re going, let’s take a brief look at the 4 periods that have marked humanitarianism since the 1980s, and draw some useful lessons from them.

Humanitarianism where we come from, 1980-1989.

Contemporary humanitarianism emerged in the 1980s, during the Cold War, when the world was divided into two antagonistic blocs, East and West, the USSR and the USA, and their allies in NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The real wars were fought on the periphery, in what was then known as the Third World. This is where contemporary humanitarianism was born, and where it based its legitimacy and development on field action, often crossing borders without visas to reach populations in danger. At the time, I was involved in this adventure of solidarity in Afghanistan, which also applied to Cambodia and Ethiopia. We created a new model that became a benchmark.

Distribution of briquettes in Kamianka, December 27, 2024. Solidarités International

A world disappears, 1989-2001.

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the disappearance of the USSR in 1989-1991, after a brief period of euphoria and universal peace, ushered in a new era with the first Gulf War and UN Resolution 688 to protect the Kurds of Iraq. Then the break-up of the former Yugoslavia and the war in Bosnia, and the genocide in Rwanda established humanitarian action as an essential international policy, leading to the creation in 1992 of DG ECHO, the European Union’s and the Commission’s humanitarian instrument. Faced with urgent and far-reaching needs, the humanitarian community expanded rapidly, particularly NGOs, which established themselves as a major player in crises.

The turning point of September 11, 2001.

The next turning point came on September 11, 2001, with the destruction of the World Trade Center in New York by the terrorist organization Al Qaeda. We remember George W. Bush’s doctrine of pre-emptive war against terrorism, and the UN Resolution authorizing the United States to intervene in Afghanistan, where it remained for 20 years, with the inglorious end that we know. We remember the American intervention in Iraq to “democratize the Middle East”, which was based on false allegations and had dramatic consequences.

The humanitarian dynamic will grow out of necessity, and will soon be stimulated by the Arab Spring, which will degenerate into civil war in Syria. We remember the Serval operation in Mali in January 2013, against jihadist groups, then in Burkina Faso and Niger. During this period, humanitarian action emerged as one of the essential components of any solution, along with its other security, diplomatic and political aspects. It was at this time that the concept of the Humanitarian-Development Nexus was born and flourished, to which the word peace was soon added.

BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia, in October 2024, attended by the UN Secretary-General. The world is reshaping itself! ©Agency brics-russia2024.

Sequel or change of era?

In an article entitled “From geopolitics to humanitarianism” published in Défis Humanitaires on July 24, 2019, I posed the question of whether this period was a continuation of what had gone before or whether, on the contrary, it heralded a new geopolitical and humanitarian cycle. A question all the more necessary given that Donald Trump had been elected in 2016, Vladimir Putin had been re-elected in 2018 as had Erdogan, the Turkish president, and Xi Jinping had been elected president for life of the People’s Republic of China in the same year.

To this question we now have the answer, which is the main focus of this editorial for the 100th issue of Humanitarian Challenges.

From Putin to Trump, or the great leap into the unknown!

The tipping point begins with Russia’s attack on Ukraine on February 24, 2022, and is confirmed with the election of Donald Trump, who takes office on January 22, 2025. Throughout the Cold War and beyond, war had been frozen in Europe. For more than 3 years, the war in Ukraine has meant that borders have been called into question, and the countries of the European continent, which had been slumbering, are rearming because of the threat of a possible extension of a conflict with the Baltic States and Poland, with the risk of a domino effect with NATO member countries.

This is the moment chosen by Donald Trump to propose that Canada become the 51st state of the USA, to invite Greenland to come under his control, to regain control of the Panama Canal and to seek to impose peace on Ukraine with Vladimir Putin’s Russia, while threatening that country and its allies in Europe with abandonment if they do not comply within a week!

Vladimir Putin & Donald Trump in Helsinki July 2018. (Image Credit Kremlin.ru via Wikimedia Commons)

The turning point that history will remember is here, and it’s here to stay. Possible challenges to borders, geopolitical deregulation, the law of survival of the fittest, the race for access to natural resources, the risk of confrontation that could spiral out of control, the weakening of the UN and paralysis of the Security Council.

And what can we say about the undermining of the Climate Agreement, the struggle for control of space, information conceived as a battlefield – the list is long, foreshadowing this change of era.
In this poisonous climate, the guarantee of freedom and independence for some countries, and of power and neo-empire for others, is leading to an exponential increase in defense budgets.

In the latest “Eurobarometer” survey, 66% of people rank protecting people as their top priority. The economy and industry came next (36%), followed by energy resources (27%).

The need for security has just led countries such as Poland, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia to decide on March 18, in a joint declaration, to withdraw from the Ottawa Treaty banning anti-personnel mines, ratified by 164 states!

As in previous periods, this will have a major impact on the humanitarian sector!

What about humanitarian aid?

Not only are humanitarian needs still with us, but they are set to increase, both because of the vulnerabilities that are flourishing (conflict, poverty, climate, water resources, demographics in Africa) and because of the drastic decline in resources.

The Trump administration’s dislocation of USAID and freeze on funded programs has caused, despite exemptions, a veritable cataclysm in humanitarian and development aid. All the more so as this shock was preceded by a sharp drop in official development assistance from many European Union and OECD member countries.

The main trend seems to be as follows: a rapid decline in funding, restricted or even inaccessible general access to populations in danger, with a retreat from International Humanitarian Law, more violence against civilians considered as protagonists and stakes in wars, politicization and criticism of humanitarian aid.

Mothers with their children wait at the MSF clinic in the Zamzam camp, 15 km from El Fasher, North Darfur. MSF

Let’s face it, this is a historic step backwards for humanitarian action. Although we started from scratch almost 50 years ago, we’ve been making progress ever since, but for the first time we’re taking a step backwards at a time when we were already struggling to meet the vital needs of populations in danger. The head of a humanitarian NGO recently told me that for his organization, this was a 10-year step backwards! The majority of humanitarian NGOs are having to reluctantly and urgently lay off some of their staff. The UN and its agencies are planning to regroup into 4 large entities, and even to relocate to cut costs.

If the humanitarian aid budget almost doubled between 2012 and 2021, it then briefly stagnated, and now it has been falling since 2023, and will increase and accelerate in 2025. What will happen next? Will there be a reaction, a halt, a stabilization at the very least, or, on the contrary, will the downward slide continue, and to what extent?

And yet, if the shock is conducive to the search for an alternative model, we don’t see a replacement solution on the scale. In any case, we need to acquire more influence and, ultimately, more audacity and imagination to invent the future.

A new mobilization in these changing times.

For the sake of completeness, we need to add to the geopolitics of conflicts, those of more numerous catastrophes and the risk of major epidemics.

How can we act in the face of rising extremes when civilian populations are seen as war targets and treated as enemies to be annihilated? This is the case in Gaza with the use of the weapon of hunger against an entire population; it’s the case in Ukraine with the systematic bombing of towns and villages and civilian infrastructures; it’s the case in the civil war in Sudan. This is the dehumanization of total war, in the face of which humanitarian aid must do everything in its power to fulfill its mission in spite of everything!

I can also see the growing debate between the national priority of security and international aid in its various forms. One is not incompatible with the other. I believe that we can be proud of our own identity, while believing that others can also be proud of their own nationality, while feeling concerned by the misfortune of others by providing them, as partners, with aid, skills, tools and knowledge useful for their development, and also learning from them. A country grows by making these choices of effective and respectful solidarity. This in no way prevents us from promoting the interests of our own people.

This is also why I believe that the ideological and partisan politicization of humanitarian aid will lead to its weakening. Let’s not fall into this trap. Humanitarian aid is indisputable when it is carried out within the framework of its principles of humanity, impartiality, independence and neutrality.
At a time when security is becoming a priority for public opinion and their countries, human security must be associated with it, all the more so as the insecurity of populations fleeing war, disaster and epidemics destabilizes their neighbors from near and far, through a domino effect that will eventually impact us too if we do nothing.

More concretely, there are deadlines that are as much at stake. This is the case in France, with the Finance Bill for 2025 and 2026. Political leaders must, at the very least, stabilize humanitarian and development budgets, or even revitalize them in the spirit of the recent Presidential Council for International Partnerships. Similarly, the 4th European Humanitarian Forum on May 19 and 20 in Brussels should be an opportunity to strengthen DG ECHO’s humanitarian aid, rather than diluting and weakening it. Finally, the Conference on Financing for Development in Seville next June could be the occasion for a new impetus, as well as a demanding “aggiornamento” (updating) to improve efficiency for populations and optimize private initiative for all.

We’ll be back in touch with you in early June with issue 101 of Défis Humanitaires.

Défis Humanitaires, with you.

One hundred editions since February 2018, 152 different authors of articles and interviews whom I’d like to thank here for their contribution, a growing increase in the number of readers, in France of course but also in order in the USA, Burkina Faso, Canada, Belgium, Mali, Switzerland, Senegal, the UK and Cameroon for the first 10. The most widely-read articles focus on humanitarian thinking, the humanitarian-development Nexus, funding and salaries, demographics and philanthropy.

In this chaotic and dangerous international context, Défis Humanitaires, a free and independent magazine, is more topical than ever, and we have many projects to propose to you. I therefore invite you to answer the questionnaire enclosed in this issue, which will be very useful to us, as well as to testify “A vos plumes” for Défis Humanitaires. We’ll be publishing these testimonials in our next issue in June.

Finally, with issue 100, Défis Humanitaires aims to evolve into an information medium with greater visibility and smoother navigation. To achieve this, your support (donate) will be decisive to better inform, alert and mobilize. This has never been as useful as it is today. If we don’t act, we’ll go backwards!

I’d like to thank you personally for your support and for this mutual commitment, which strengthens humanitarianism.

Alain Boinet.

I invite you to read these interviews and articles published in the edition :

Who wants peace prepares for war

Interview with General (2S) Grégoire de Saint-Quentin

Exercice international Saber Junction-2018
  • Alain Boinet : A year ago, in a previous interview (Geopolitics of Defence), you pointed out that beyond the strategic break represented by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it was the questioning of borders that was the main event. A year later, it is the President of the United States, Donald Trump, who is turning the table on the alliance with Europe and threatening to abandon Ukraine. What are the origins and consequences of this new strategic situation?

Grégoire de Saint-Quentin : I think the observation we made a year ago is still entirely valid. The annexation of territories by force, prohibited by the international regulatory mechanisms put in place in 1945, is back more than ever. The election of Donald Trump has had no containment effect, but rather risks amplifying the phenomenon, since the United States, with its political and military power, has until now been the keystone of this regulatory system. By putting pressure on Canada to become the 51st member of the European Union, or on Denmark to bring Greenland under American sovereignty, or even when he seems to have come to terms with Ukraine’s loss of sovereignty over part of its territory in the search for a peace agreement, Donald Trump is ushering his country and the world into a completely new geopolitical era.

This brutal change is an extremely strong signal to all regimes with expansionist ambitions, starting with Russia, which has always historically been built on the military subjugation of its neighbours. Witness the Kremlin’s current slogan: ‘Russia’s borders know no bounds’. The most visible and dramatic consequence of this new strategic order is the primacy of the law of the strongest and the return of wars of annexation in Europe, Africa and tomorrow perhaps in Asia.

  • Europe, having favoured the peace dividend, seems to have been taken completely by surprise by the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and now by the reversal of Donald Trump’s United States. What lessons should we draw from this?

Europe is seeing all its strategic choices of the last thirty years called into question at a delicate moment in its history. It built its model by delegating its security to the United States and developing its economy on massive flows of Russian oil and gas at attractive prices. For the reasons we have just outlined, this system is no longer working at a time when Europe is reaching a peak in debt as a result of previous crises. Our margins for manoeuvre are narrow at a time when we have to make a major budgetary effort to adapt the military resources of the Member States.

Europe is therefore at a key moment in its history, because it really must rethink itself in a much more autonomous way than before. It was founded in a world of cooperation and now finds itself brutally thrust into a world of power relations with protean threats, both military and internal, with the weakening of its dominant political model, that of parliamentary democracy. What’s more, it is imperative to restore economic growth at a time when the main promises in this area are held out by the technological revolution (AI), an area in which the Americans and the Chinese are largely dominant. Lastly, Donald Trump’s all-out tax policy is penalising the entire global economy and, at least for the time being, damaging Europe’s economic prospects.

  • A year ago, the minimum defence budget was set at 2% of GDP. Today, Donald Trump is talking about 5%. In 2017, France’s defence budget was €32 billion, in 2025 it will be €50.5 billion, in 2030 it will be €67 billion, and the Minister of Defence, Sébastien Lecornu, is working on scenarios for increasing the size of the military, which could reach almost €100 billion. What does this mean in practical terms for the armed forces in terms of equipment and manpower, and how long will it take?
École Spéciale Militaire parade in 2023 © Ministère des Armées

It is difficult to give an exhaustive answer in the format of this interview on the number and quality of equipment at the end of the military programming law (LPM) in 2030, especially as the national strategic review, which is to draw up the broad outlines, is still underway. However, we can clearly see the capability efforts we are going to have to make:

  • What the war in Ukraine and, more broadly, the return of strategic competition between the major powers reveal is that equipment that was of little use in asymmetrical conflicts has become indispensable: space capabilities, particularly for observation and broadband communications, control of the seabed, electronic warfare, in-depth fire, ground-to-air defence against all types of aircraft, including drones, and conversely, capabilities for destroying the adversary’s systems of the same type.
  • We are also witnessing the same technological transformation in the conduct of military operations as in economic value chains. Force systems are gradually being reorganised around the processing of data by artificial intelligence. This change has a considerable multiplier effect on the efficiency of military capabilities. It opens up truly unprecedented prospects for the way in which we fight, and therefore large areas of vulnerability for those who fall behind. This is why the Ministry of the Armed Forces recently created an agency specifically dedicated to these issues.
  • Finally, these high-intensity conflicts are characterised by a high level of attrition. So we need more conventional equipment: armour, aircraft and ships. We also need to be able to count on a greater number of human resources who are sufficiently qualified to serve weapons systems that have become digital. The contribution of reservists will play a crucial role.

 

  • Sébastien Lecornu recently declared that “France could be defeated without being invaded”, and that “The main risk for a nuclear power is to see its nuclear deterrent bypassed from below”. From a strategic point of view, how can we decipher these statements by the Minister of Defense?

France is very fortunate to have a deterrent force that it has patiently built up, at the cost of considerable effort, in complete autonomy. It is not dependent on anyone for its maintenance or employment. It is our life insurance against all those who would threaten the very existence of our nation. Having established that it is indispensable, it cannot respond to every threat, because some would not justify the President of the Republic launching a nuclear escalation process. I therefore believe that these are the threats to which the Minister for the Armed Forces is referring when he says that they can hurt us without taking us beyond the threshold of the use of our deterrent.

Volodymyr Zelensky and Sébastien Lecornu in Kiev © Compte X de Volodymyr Zelensky

It is therefore to counter these threats that we must have a military and security tool at the cutting edge of technology. To take an example – totally imaginary – if swarms of drones were to strike simultaneously at several places of power in Paris, it would certainly be a very serious blow to our country’s security, but nuclear weapons would not be of much use to us in this specific case, even if we had identified with certainty who was behind this terrorist attack. You can also imagine combining several kinetic attacks of this type with large-scale hybrid attacks such as cyber actions or large-scale disinformation operations on social networks. Today’s societies and technologies are evolving in ways that make it unnecessary to conquer a country in order to destabilise it and eventually break it up. We need to be aware of this and guard against it.

  • If the United States were to withdraw from NATO or from the defence of Europe, what would be the defence architecture for those countries in Europe that retain sovereignty over their defence? Is the European pillar of NATO the solution or rather an ad hoc coalition of leading countries?

First of all, since the inauguration of the President of the United States, there have been no declarations in favour of a pure and simple withdrawal from NATO, and personally I don’t believe in it. NATO is a military alliance and in the world we live in, being able to count on allies is an asset, even for the United States. On the other hand, it is quite possible that the Americans will say to the Europeans in an even clearer way than hitherto: ‘the defence of Europe is your problem, put the resources into it because we are saving ours for a potential confrontation with China’. We will then have to manage with minimal investment from the Americans, but within the tried and tested framework of cooperation that has existed since 1949. There will certainly be things to adapt, but it won’t be a leap into the unknown.

  • In the event of the United States withdrawing its nuclear umbrella in Europe, the French President has said that he is open to discussions on extending the protection of French nuclear weapons. The idea may seem simple, but putting it into practice would be tricky. Is it feasible?

Without going into detail, the current American nuclear umbrella in Europe is neither designed nor organised in the same way as the French deterrent for strictly national use. It would take a great deal of effort in terms of doctrine and adaptation, as well as consultation between European allies, to put in place the equivalent without American resources. But we are not there yet.

  • Coming back to the war in Ukraine, how do you assess the balance of power on the battlefield?

The balance of power is still in Russia’s favour for the simple reasons of its size, its resources and the support it manages to mobilise from outside. I’m thinking in particular of the reinforcements in equipment and men that have come from North Korea. Having said that, I think that the resilience and dignity of the Ukrainians deserve to be highlighted, even though American support is slipping away without being fully compensated for by European efforts.

Experimental leadership courses continue at the National Army Academy © Ukrainian Ministry of Defense
  • A ceasefire is on the agenda in Ukraine, but how can it be guaranteed? Maps are even circulating showing the presence of French and British troops. But Vladimir Putin doesn’t want that. What are the possible scenarios for guaranteeing a ceasefire, if not a peace agreement?

Russia knows very well that if Western troops are stationed on Ukrainian territory, this will considerably complicate its plans to destabilise the part of Ukraine that it does not already control. It would certainly require major concessions in other respects for it to finally accept this scenario. Unless the United States resolves to impose it by also committing itself to providing security guarantees for the ceasefire. I suppose that these are the issues that are at the heart of the intense negotiations taking place at the moment.

  • Recent polls show (Odoxa) that 3 out of 4 French people are ready to support a rearmament effort and another (Opinion Way) that 50% of 18 to 30 year olds are ready to join the army in the event of a conflict threatening our country. What do you think of public opinion on this subject?

The French are perfectly aware of what is at stake and they certainly remember General de Gaulle’s quote: ‘Defence is the first duty of a state and it cannot fail to fulfil it without destroying itself’. Young French people are much more aware of security issues than previous generations, and what’s more, they are interested in these subjects because they make sense. I find this survey rather reassuring, even if we can also wonder about the attitude of the 50% who will not want to answer the country’s call. This is the point that needs to be worked on without delay, because if Ukraine is still standing after three years of war, it is largely due to the maintenance of its national cohesion.

  • How will the world be restructured, with the return of neo-empires, nation-states and ad hoc coalitions in a context where the West is divided between the United States and Europe?

There is no doubt that there is an imperial reflex in the world today, not to say an imperialist reflex. However, this does not mean that all is lost for those who do not suffer from this pruritus. We have entered a period of great change, and the cards can be reshuffled very quickly. There will be room for pragmatic countries that are confident in their talents and have rid themselves of the shackles that restrict energies. To achieve this, however, we must be prepared to change our agenda and accept the balance of power.

Reduced aid to war-torn Gaza © UNRWA
  • More than 50,000 people have died in Gaza, most of them civilians, and many infrastructures have been targeted and destroyed (hospitals, drinking water stations, electricity stations). First-aid workers, humanitarian aid workers and journalists have been killed. The same is true of Ukraine. Several European countries have just broken their international commitments on the use of anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions, which they are going to use again. What will become of the Geneva Conventions and international humanitarian law, and will wars consider civilians on the opposing side to be the enemy in the same way as combatants?

We have just lived through a period of several decades of intra-state conflicts in which the conquest of the population to obtain its support, willingly or by force, was the very aim of the conflict. Remember the Somali militias who divided the country into feudal fiefdoms, organising the predation of the population and humanitarian aid.

Unfortunately, the people are always the first victims of war. This is true across the ages, because they are also a means of weakening the will of the adversary. The systematic destruction of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, which is in no way a military objective, is being carried out with the aim of weakening public resistance and getting the government to capitulate.

This is a crime under international treaties, but it does not mean that the law of armed conflict and international humanitarian law are disappearing, even if some have decided to disregard them. I’m not convinced that impunity is definitely the rule, and respect for the law is also what differentiates the different protagonists in a conflict.

  • How would you like to conclude?

Firstly, by thanking you for opening up the columns of your hundredth issue to me.

Secondly, I would like to remind you that in these times of great change, humanitarians, like the military, are practitioners who are used to dealing with the reality of conflict. Their advice will be invaluable in building the world of tomorrow.

 

 

Grégoire de Saint-Quentin
Army General (2S)

Grégoire de Saint-Quentin is 63 years old. A graduate of the Ecole Spéciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr, he completed a full course of military studies, leaving in 2020 with the rank of General (2S).

His military career was marked by special forces and joint operations. During the first part of his career, he was involved in numerous operational missions, most often as joint commander. He then commanded the 1st Marine Infantry Parachute Regiment from 2004 to 2006. An auditor of the Institut des Hautes Etudes de la Défense Nationale in 2009, he was appointed general in 2011 and successively commanded the French elements in Senegal, Operation Serval, special operations and finally all joint operations from 2016 to 2020.

In September 2020, he used his operational experience to develop high-tech intelligence and defence capabilities, in particular as Senior Vice President of Preligens.

Since September 2024, he has been Chairman of the ADIT group’s risk management company GEOS. Grégoire de Saint Quentin is Grand Officer of the Légion d’Honneur and Grand Officer of the Ordre National du Mérite.

I invite you to read these interviews and articles published in the edition :