The risk of abandoning all global water-related goals

© Solidarités International – Distribution of water and kits 6 months after hurricane Chido in Mayotte

A Second UN Water Conference in Late 2026

In December 2026, the second UN Water Conference of the 21st Century will take place in Abu Dhabi. This is a very important event, as nations have never before gathered at the United Nations to work together on issues related to inland waters. The first conference took place in January 2023 in New York. That first conference yielded positive results. National leaders realized that they all faced water challenges and concluded that there was a global crisis in this area. Furthermore, a taboo was broken. Thanks to several countries, including France, discussions were able to begin regarding the shortcomings of what has since been termed global water governance. And it was decided to hold a second UN Water Conference focusing on global goals, which had not been the priority in 2023. This new Conference is much better prepared than the first. In particular, all countries met in Dakar last January at the ministerial level to begin discussing together, following the thematic structure planned for the Conference itself. This intergovernmental meeting in Dakar showed that attitudes have shifted significantly since 2023: many countries are now calling for these UN Water Conferences to become a permanent fixture, a far greater number than in 2023. The hope is that water will be managed much more effectively on a global scale in the future.

© Solidarités International – Distribution of water by Solidarités International in Tawila – Darfur, Sudan

The December discussions will be organized around six major themes covering all key water-related issues. For each topic, countries will seek to drive progress. This will be the case for global water governance, which is one of the six major themes. We can hope that this will advance the cause. Several avenues are being explored.

But if we are not careful, it could also regress, as there is a subtle threat that few stakeholders are currently aware of. It is the risk of losing our bearings and having no global water goals left in five years!

To understand and assess this threat, it is helpful to first take stock of recent progress in global water governance.

 

A headless duck

When it came to water, the international community at the start of the 21st century was like a headless chicken: no shared vision of the issues, no common goals, little shared statistical data, and no collective memory. Many UN agencies were working on water issues but without any real coordination. Countries did not meet at the United Nations to discuss water. The only place where governments discussed water was at the diplomatic conferences organized by the host countries of the World Water Forums. These conferences were very useful—they helped, for example, to establish the human rights to safe drinking water and sanitation—but they were short-lived and did not allow for collective decision-making, as such decisions are made at the UN. Countries’ water-related goals were disparate, and their actions rarely addressed global needs. Oh, there was indeed a global goal for access to safe drinking water adopted in 2000, but it was not ambitious and was declared achieved in 2012—three years ahead of schedule—despite the billions of people who still had access only to contaminated water. Without a shared understanding of the issues at stake, without common goals, without a mechanism for tracking progress, and without a forum for regular diplomatic discussions, global water governance was virtually nonexistent compared to many other issues—such as health or food security—which had clear objectives, regular intergovernmental meetings, actionable decisions, and permanent UN structures.

 

Real Progress in Global Governance

The graph in Figure 1 schematically illustrates the progress made since 2000 and its relative importance in terms of governance. The vertical axis represents a subjective assessment of the quality of global governance relative to that of health or food issues.

Fig. 1: Recent and Expected Progress in “Global Water Governance”

Beyond the existence of the World Water Forums, the first major steps forward were the Millennium Development Goals, which included a target for safe drinking water in 2000 and another for sanitation in 2003. Then, in 2010, access to safe drinking water and sanitation was recognized as a human right. In and of itself, this recognition was very significant. However, for it to serve to improve the lives of the billions of people whose rights are being violated, a large-scale operational implementation program was needed. Such a program, the 2030 Agenda and its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), was adopted in 2015. This was an opportunity for all countries to decide, for the first time, that they wanted to ensure universal access to safe drinking water and quality sanitation at affordable prices, thereby largely meeting human rights requirements. Better yet, the 2030 Agenda adopted in 2015 includes some twenty ambitious global water-related goals aimed at addressing all major global water challenges within a clear overarching vision. These global goals thus address issues ranging from population access to pollution control, water resource sustainability, and water-related disasters (see Figure 2). With a clear overarching vision and goals addressing all major challenges, the duck found its way. In 2015, the world found a compass. Better yet, progress indicators were defined and developed, which within a few years provided a much more precise and objective understanding of the global situation regarding these issues. I would point out, for example, that until 2021, no one in the world had the slightest idea of the global proportion of wastewater flows that are treated before being discharged into the environment—a fact that was quite convenient for justifying inaction but did nothing to help us move forward.

 

Fig. 2: The 2030 Agenda includes targets directly related to water (blue arrows) in many of the SDGs

And then countries finally began to come together at the UN, holding a first Conference on Water in All Its Aspects in January 2023, followed by a second one in December 2026. Since the UN serves as the secretariat for these conferences, the debates are recorded and accessible, decisions are implemented and at least partially monitored, and progress reports are produced regularly. At the same time, UN-Water has grown in strength, and a UN Water Strategy has emerged, which has greatly improved internal coordination among UN agencies. Today, the duck knows much better where it needs to go and whether it is getting there.

However, progress is far too slow. Setting goals such as universal access to truly safe drinking water, halving the volume of untreated wastewater discharged, and ensuring the sustainability of water resources helps guide policy. But the results achieved in relation to these goals are woefully inadequate. Défis Humanitaires published two of my articles[1] detailing this shortfall in drinking water and sanitation in its March 22, 2025, issue. Subsequent updates to global statistics have confirmed the trends described in these articles.

 

Further Progress Expected at Abu Dhabi 2026

However, there is still work to be done to achieve a level of global governance comparable to that in the fields of health or food. By virtue of its very existence, the December 2026 Conference will already represent further progress, as for the first time, nations will come together to assess their woefully inadequate progress toward global water-related goals. The need is enormous, as there is a gaping gap between the goals and the sum of the results of national policies. Could this discussion finally trigger the corrective measures and the political acceleration process that is absolutely necessary? Will this enable all sectors to be mobilized toward achieving the water goals by engaging the Ministers of Finance, Agriculture, Energy, Industry, and Cities? Will this Conference help us understand and acknowledge that if the goals are not being met, it is simply because many national policies today do not aim to achieve them, and that ambitious goals are not achieved by chance? Many of us hope so.

 

The Risk of Losing Everything by 2030

When we look at all the progress made since 2000, it becomes clear that the coherent and balanced vision, the ambitious goals, and the statistical indicators established in 2015 represent a fantastic collective treasure. These are, of course, global public goods, but in reality they are much more than that. Because they are shared by all, they are what enable the duck—pardon me, the international community—to know where it needs to go, where it is heading, and whether it is actually getting there.

© Solidarités International – Distributions of kits and construction/rehabilitation of waterholes on the Al Mokha base in Yemen

This treasure is largely invisible because, with the exception of international donors, most water sector actors refer to the SDGs only symbolically and do not incorporate the SDG targets into their concrete objectives and operational activities. Even at the national level, many countries enthusiastically endorsed the SDGs in 2015 but have never sought to adapt their national policies to ensure their contributions to achieving these shared goals.

This treasure, created in 2015, holds great political value, and I am proud to have been able to make a modest contribution to it. But it is fragile, as it will disappear in 2030. It is, in fact, tied to the 2030 Agenda, which, as its name suggests, will come to an end in late 2030. The value of this collective treasure is currently greatly underestimated in international reports and debates. It is only when it disappears in 2030 that this value will become apparent to everyone.

So, of course, those familiar with the inertia of large UN structures are confident that a new global 2030–2045 agenda will be adopted and assume that this new agenda will include goals for water. This is indeed a possibility, as negotiations on post-2030 global goals will begin in July 2027. But will they succeed in the current geopolitical context? And if they do succeed, how ambitious will the water-related goals be? Will they ensure continuity of efforts by maintaining the same goals? No one knows, of course.

But the risk of failing to reach consensus on a post-2030 agenda—or of adopting a post-2030 agenda that is different and less ambitious than the 2030 Agenda—is inherently significant. Indeed, we must remember that the consensual adoption in 2015 by representatives of the entire global population of ambitious goals designed to address humanity’s greatest challenges was a historic event. This had never happened before in history. The likelihood of such an event recurring is inherently low. But obstacles have also accumulated, and the risk of a lack of consensus or reduced ambitions has become very high. There are many factors that could contribute to failure: a major country that disparages multilateralism has declared that the SDGs are contrary to its policies and interests[2]; national policymakers are not truly interested in the SDGs, preferring to communicate their progress rather than what remains to be done to achieve ambitious medium- or long-term goals; thinkers and decision-makers in 2030 will, as usual, want to do things differently from their predecessors in order to gain personal visibility without concern for maintaining continuity in goals, indicators, and actions; the many purists who see flaws in the content of the current SDG targets will want to rewrite them with the aim of improving them, without realizing that calling for a rewrite is the surest way to end up with nothing at all, since the historic consensus reached in 2015 is highly unlikely to be replicated in 2020, given the current context of severely weakened multilateralism. This could lead to a convergence of interests that ultimately results in the 2030–2045 agenda either not existing at all or being significantly scaled back, with goals and indicators that differ from those in place today.

© Solidarités International – Women gathering water in Darfur, Sudan

For water, this would be a disaster, as the only global water goals currently exist within the SDG framework. Without continuity in vision, goals, and indicators, global water governance would be back to square one. This would represent a major setback (see Figure 1).

 

The insurance policy offered by the French Water Partnership

Since nothing is certain regarding the post-2030 global agenda, there is a real risk of losing the collective asset described above by the end of 2030. The French Water Partnership (PFE), which brings together French stakeholders of all kinds interested in international water issues—and which some call the French National Water Team—is deeply concerned about this potential disaster. Therefore, while fighting for the adoption of a new, ambitious post-2030 agenda that retains at least the same twenty specific water-related goals and their indicators, the French Water Partnership has devised a precautionary measure to safeguard global goals without subjecting them to a game of Russian roulette in these highly uncertain post-2030 negotiations. It recommends that the United Nations General Assembly adopt a resolution on water as early as 2027, through which it would establish global goals modeled on the existing goals without any modification and without linking them to a broader global agenda with a fixed timeframe. This is the approach taken in many areas—such as biodiversity, climate, disasters, and health—where goals were established outside the 2030 Agenda but integrated into the SDGs. The same 2027 resolution would also decide to continue statistical monitoring of water-related SDG indicators. Why 2027?

Because this could be a logical follow-up to the December 2026 Conference, provided that countries recognize the risk of losing their goals and indicators and their responsibility to secure them before the major negotiations on the post-2030 goals. Why the same goals as the SDG targets? Because opening negotiations on the content of new goals risks taking years to reach a conclusion or resulting in less ambitious goals.

I had the honor of presenting this proposal on behalf of the PFE last January in Dakar to all the governments gathered to prepare for the UN Water Conference in Abu Dhabi this December.

Given the worsening water-related challenges around the world, this Conference will only be a success if it leads to progress and prevents any setbacks. Let us therefore hope that this Conference will enable States to recognize both the significant gap between the cumulative results of their national water policies and their global objectives, and their collective responsibility to intensify their efforts toward these objectives while ensuring that these objectives remain on track even after the Conference concludes.

 

Gérard Payen.

 

[1] Eau potable : que nous apprennent les statistiques mondiales au-delà des rapports officiels ?, G.Payen, Défis Humanitaires n°86 of March 6th, 2024 ; Eau potable et assainissement : Atteindre les objectifs, dans quels délais ?, G. Payen, PCM n°919 of December 2024

[2] The United States have announced their withdrawal from the UNESCO in July 2025 for 2 official reasons among which one was The UNESCO is working to promote divisive social and cultural causes and places undue emphasis on the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, a globalist and ideological agenda for international development that runs counter to our “America First” foreign policy“.


Gérard Payen

Gérard Payen has been working for over 40 years to address water-related issues in countries around the world. As Water Advisor to the United Nations Secretary-General (member of UNSGAB) from 2004 to 2015, he contributed to the recognition of the human rights to safe drinking water and sanitation, as well as to the adoption of numerous water-related Sustainable Development Goals. Today, he continues to work toward mobilizing the international community for better management of water-related issues, which requires more ambitious public policies. As Vice President of the French Water Partnership, he also advises United Nations agencies that produce global water statistics. Impressed by the number of misconceptions about the nature of water-related issues—misconceptions that hinder public authorities in their decision-making—he published a book in 2013 to debunk these myths.

 


Discover the other articles of this edition :

Security and humanitarian aid: Lessons from the field with INSO

INSO South deputy safety advisor, Wilfreud Mbouyavo using a sattelite phone near an INSO car

The question of the safety of humanitarian workers (or members of UN field teams) has been part of the history of modern humanitarian aid since its inception. It goes hand in hand with the questions of “how far to go” and “how to act while managing what risks” that are consubstantial with this commitment, at least when it comes to intervening in areas of armed conflict (or natural disasters with banditry and looting). As Alain Boinet pointed out in an article published in Droit et pratique de l’action humanitaire in October 2019, as well as in Défis Humanitaires: “If humanitarian action is a duty that comes under the ethics of conviction (according to the opposition between the ethics of responsibility and the ethics of conviction theorised by the philosopher Max Weber), its implementation in contexts of insecurity generates multiple risks, particularly for humanitarian staff, for whom organisations must assume responsibility“.

There was a time when humanitarians were held in relative esteem as representatives of a form of neutrality and independence that helped everyone. This esteem was far from absolute, but it offered some protection to the teams. Then there was a period when being a humanitarian didn’t offer much protection. Finally, there was a time when humanitarian staff were specifically targeted (attacks, murders, hostage-taking, etc.).

It is the consequences of this deterioration that the United Nations Security Council has sought to address once again, as part of its ongoing concern over the last ten years, by passing Resolution 2730 on 24 May, calling on States to respect and protect humanitarian and United Nations personnel in accordance with their obligations under international law. This resolution, adopted by 14 votes with one abstention (Russia), was presented by Switzerland and co-sponsored by 97 Member States. It should be recalled that, already, Security Council Resolution 2175 of 29 August 2014 reported “(…) an increase in acts of violence perpetrated (…) against national and international staff of humanitarian organisations (…)”. Resolution 2286 of 3 May 2016 also stressed that “(…) humanitarian workers (…) are increasingly the targets of acts of violence (…) violence against the wounded and sick, medical personnel and humanitarian workers“.

What are the obligations under international law that underlie these various United Nations resolutions? As Alain Boinet points out in his article, “they are the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1997 and 2005, as well as the rules of customary international humanitarian law which oblige the parties to an armed conflict to respect and ensure respect for IHL, which provides for the protection of the wounded and sick, medical personnel and humanitarian workers: Rule 31 of customary IHL stipulates that humanitarian relief personnel must be respected and protected. Rule 55 establishes the principle of freedom of movement for humanitarian relief workers“.

Emergency multi-sector assistance project for communities made vulnerable by displacement, armed conflict and epidemics in North Kivu, DRC, April 2024. ©Guerchom Ndebo

To find out more about the determinants and issues at stake in this situation addressed by the UN Security Council, we need to talk to INSO (International NGO Safety Organisation), an NGO founded in 2011 and based in The Hague in the Netherlands, which acts as a ‘platform’ dedicated to coordinating and advising on safety issues for humanitarian organisations working in high-risk contexts. INSO works in 17 countries for 1,202 NGOs and employs 1,307 people in the field:

On 24 May, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 2730 calling on states to respect and protect humanitarian and UN personnel. How did INSO welcome this initiative, and what does it mean to you ?

INSO: INSO welcomes Resolution 2730 as an essential reminder to conflict actors of their obligations to ensure the protection of humanitarian workers. The clauses calling for concrete actions to assess the risks to humanitarians and create relevant recommendations through regular reporting and solid evidence are highly welcome. This is recognition that the data generated by field-based platforms such as INSO is essential for NGO security and access.

From January 2023 to May 2024, INSO documented 1,944 incidents affecting humanitarians, including 57 killed, 208 injured and 185 abducted. What is your analysis of the trend in the number of incidents involving humanitarians ?

INSO: Every incident is worrying, and it is always worrying that our colleagues are exposed to this type of incident; any violation of IHL is unacceptable, but it is worth noting that in recent years, the number and annual rate of serious impacts on NGOs around the world have often been stable or declining; the drivers of this trend are due to a number of factors both internal and external to NGOs. However, changes in conflict patterns in Afghanistan and Syria have been important factors. In addition, although important to our perception of risk, incidents involving NGOs represent a relatively small proportion of all reported incidents in the field, ranging from 0.9% to 1.5% of all recorded incidents in any given year.

At the same time, crime accounts for the majority of incidents involving NGOs. The fact that the overwhelming majority of serious incidents involving NGOs are motivated by some perception of wealth rather than targeting because of the activity or profile of NGOs is consistent with this trend.

Nevertheless, despite a steady annual decline in deaths of NGO workers in particular, it is possible that, as we continue to interrogate the 2023 data, we will see a temporary reversal of the downward trend in serious incidents. This is because crises have erupted rapidly in places such as Sudan and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, contributing directly to the increase in the number of deaths of NGO workers.

Distribution of water to people affected by the conflict in the Gaza Strip, OPT, April 2024. ©Solidarités International.

The national staff of humanitarian organisations are paying the heaviest price for the insecurity on the ground. Can you at INSO corroborate this fact ?

INSO: There is a clear demand for a global analysis for NGO headquarters staff so that they can better support their teams in the field, including national staff. To this end, INSO produces dozens of reports tailored to the needs of humanitarian leaders and managers, who make up a network of around 140 NGOs and donors at global level (headquarters) – 1,200 NGOs in the field.

In fact, national or local colleagues are the most likely to suffer a serious incident. If we look at the reasons for this, we see that the percentage of incidents involving national staff is almost identical to the percentage of national staff in the overall NGO population, which in both cases is over 90%. This is the most reliable determinant of the composition of victims of serious incidents, along with other factors that contribute to NGO risk, ranging from risk tolerance to sub-national dynamics. This highlights the importance of field-based platforms for understanding and managing risk for NGOs, as it is difficult to understand risk when you are not close to partners.

Among the data, it is worth mentioning that it is the national staff of international NGOs that are most affected rather than the staff of national NGOs. This is linked to the fact that national staff of international NGOs represent the largest group of humanitarian workers in the field. Nevertheless, INSO works tirelessly to understand the internal and external nuances that can amplify risk, to ensure that analysis, advice, training, crisis management and emergency support are guided by the needs and profiles of our partners.

INSO staff discuss the context with members of the local community. Credit: C. Di Roma/INSO

What characterises the evolution of security for humanitarian personnel ?

INSO: Security risk management for NGOs has improved dramatically with the introduction of field-based platforms to help NGOs make informed decisions. With this development, we have seen NGOs share information at unprecedented levels; by having a platform, NGOs understand and contribute to collective security. In addition, while localisation continues to drive humanitarian strategies, the field approach to analysis and advice has enabled national NGOs to access the support systems traditionally available to their larger international counterparts.

And over the last ten years ?

INSO: NGOs have seen an unprecedented growth in on-the-ground support for their risk management efforts, and have exploited it well. What’s more, these efforts are increasingly inclusive; for example, more than 40% of INSO’s 1,200 or so partners are national NGOs.

The establishment of reliable mechanisms for collecting and sharing data at local level, stimulated by the Saving Lives Together framework, is at the heart of this evolution. The task ahead is to support and intensify relevant initiatives at an operational level. Through platforms on the ground, NGOs are demonstrating their willingness to support collective security through the sharing of information and views, in contrast to some of the rhetoric currently being propagated around the challenges of risk management.

Solidarités International team clearing burnt areas in South Sudan, 2016. © Solidarités International

What is your perception, at INSO, of the measures taken by humanitarian organisations to mitigate and manage security risks for their staff in the field? What is working ?

INSO: We work with NGOs on a daily, weekly and monthly basis in all our field offices. Through these engagements in safety roundtables, training and site reviews, we see how important information sharing is. At our round tables, where NGOs feel comfortable sharing what has worked and what hasn’t, we learn and our NGO partners learn. Safety risk management is a constantly evolving process and regular and open communication ensures that we can keep up with this evolution.

We know that NGOs are fully committed to the ‘Stay and Deliver’ principle. Our data shows that only a very small percentage of individual serious incidents result in NGOs losing access or withdrawing permanently. This suggests that NGOs understand the risks they face and feel they have the capacity and support on the ground to deal with these risks.

Nevertheless, through meetings with key informants, regular engagement and surveys, INSO has found that the rapid onset of a crisis can change NGOs’ perceptions of risk, their presence and their strategies, over a relatively short period of time. This is probably because NGOs balance the duty of care with the need to stay and deliver. In such cases, they take into account humanitarian needs, resilience, programme criticality and conflict sensitivity, while questioning their tolerance of risk.

The traditional components of security risk management, based on humanitarian principles and acceptance, remain the most useful tools for mitigating risk. As the contexts, and the world, in which we work change in unforeseen ways, best practice in risk mitigation has proved its worth.

INSO teams near Goma, DRC, discuss with their partners. Credit: O. Acland/INSO

What is your view on safety training ?

INSO: NGOs understand that capacity building and training are key elements of security risk management, and essential to fulfilling their duty of care obligations. For example, in 2023, INSO trained around 7,600 humanitarians through courses including security management, crisis management, humanitarian access and negotiation, personal security and first aid. NGOs are seeking to increase their internal capacity to analyse risks, plan and implement both preventive and mitigating measures. This includes their national staff, who account for 92% of INSO training participants, and a growing contingent of female participants, who represent around one in five learners.

From this volume of engagement, the INSO training team has strengthened its understanding of a number of best practices. Firstly, effective training must be accessible. This can range from solutions such as on-the-job training, to using technology to deliver online training. Secondly, adaptation based on solid learning engineering is essential to meet the diverse needs of humanitarians. For example, self-paced e-learning courses may be best for widely promoting the fundamentals of security management, while training based on realistic scenarios and including exposure to stress may be more effective for equipping field staff with vital knowledge and skills.

Finally, the most useful training for humanitarians is that designed by humanitarians, with a critical eye to contextualisation, based on data-driven information, and offering evidence-based content and methods.

In conclusion, how do you see the future security environment for humanitarian workers ?

INSO: Field platforms and support structures will continue to shape the ability of NGOs to address risks and access challenges. At the same time, NGOs will face bureaucratic and administrative hurdles that can lead to mission failure, even if they often do not represent explicit threats to physical security. Also in the short to medium term, NGOs will face multiple rapidly emerging crises requiring a review of programme resilience and duty of care. This will also require all stakeholders in the sector to leverage field operational support systems and collective security to ensure that risk management resources are optimised. In addition, among a number of potential emerging threats, as Resolution 2730 demonstrates, misinformation will be a significant challenge for NGOs in the future. Ultimately, the security of humanitarians will be ensured by operational partners, their needs and the support they can receive on the ground.

Many thanks to INSO for this precise insight into a decisive subject, and we remind you that, for more information on the subjects of this interview or INSO in general, readers can contact you at global.analysis@ngosafety.org.

 

Pierre Brunet

Writer and humanitarian

Pierre Brunet is a novelist and a member of the Board of Directors of the NGO SOLIDARITES INTERNATIONAL. He became involved in humanitarian work in Rwanda in 1994, then in Bosnia in 1995, and has since returned to the field (Afghanistan in 2003, the Calais Jungle in 2016, migrant camps in Greece and Macedonia in 2016, Iraq and north-eastern Syria in 2019, Ukraine in 2023). Pierre Brunet’s novels are published by Calmann-Lévy: “Barnum” in 2006, “JAB” in 2008, “Fenicia” in 2014 and “Le triangle d’incertitude” in 2017. A former journalist, Pierre Brunet regularly publishes analytical articles, opinion pieces and columns.

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