“The World to Come as Seen by the CIA”

Éditions des Équateurs, Robert, Diane; United States, Office of the Director of National Intelligence; United States, Central Intelligence Agency

What perspectives can humanitarians draw from the CIA’s latest forward-looking report?

On May 28, the French translation of the latest CIA report intended for the U.S. administration was published in France by Éditions Équateurs Documents. The report, published under the title “The World to Come as Seen by the CIA – Analyses, Facts, and Figures”, offers humanitarians—always alert and seeking foresight regarding tectonic shifts, crisis arcs, fault lines, and the major trends of “concrete geopolitics” that condition our actions—an opportunity to examine their own perspectives, drawing from the data and interpretations of the main U.S. intelligence agency, which in Europe often carries a negative image.

Before delving into the most significant analyses of the report, it is important to highlight two major “biases”:

The report is conceived, written, and structured solely from the perspective of U.S. interests and “extreme and critical” threats to them. It is likely that a similar report produced by French intelligence, while pointing out the same unavoidable phenomena, would highlight others, create a partially different threat hierarchy, and perhaps provide a more nuanced or complex vision.
The report is designed for the current U.S. administration—i.e., the Trump administration. Between the lines, one can detect a vision aligned with, and anticipating, the ideological assumptions and worldview of that administration. Similarly, the absence of a mention of a phenomenon (climate change, for example, as we will return to) is itself indicative of the threat posed by the refusal of the world’s leading power to address that issue.

With that said, the presentation of global perspectives by the world’s leading power cannot leave one indifferent; above all, it cannot “leave the world indifferent,” since U.S. perceptions, in turn, shape the world.

Structurally, the French edition comprises three distinct parts: the report titled Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, the transcript of a U.S. Senate hearing on current global threats, and finally a section Analysis, Facts, and Figures concerning nine countries/states selected, presumably, as significant.

Let us examine, in a non-exhaustive way, the report’s most decisive analyses regarding “extreme and critical” threats to U.S. interests and attempt to discern their consequences or factors for humanitarians in their present and future work.

The first threat cited in the report as affecting U.S. interests (a priority confirmed in the Senate hearing) is organized crime and drug cartels responsible for the massive influx of drugs into the U.S. (notably fentanyl, which has caused widespread deaths), human trafficking, and illegal immigration. While a serious and real threat, this priority is largely influenced by the ideological focus of the current U.S. administration on immigration and related crime (drug inflow, prostitution, and migrant influx often viewed as inseparable). For humanitarians, this political orientation toward border closure and deportation suggests the need to implement or expand programs for the Caminentes (“those who journey”): migrants stranded in Central America or forcibly returned without resources or shelter. The coming years may see a growing population of men, women, and children left with nothing, either there or here, who will require assistance—from daily survival to education.

A persistent threat emphasized by the report is the continuation or increase of terrorism risk. In Asia and the Middle East (except Yemen), ISIS is identified as the primary actor capable of resurging—even without territory—taking advantage of any regional or local instability (e.g., in Syria), expanding as in Somalia or West Africa where it rivals Al-Qaeda networks, and inspiring local initiatives in Europe or Russia. ISIS-Khorasan in Central Asia is described as particularly aggressive, seeking to exploit “high-vulnerability travel routes.” In West Africa and the Sahel-Saharan belt, regional Al-Qaeda affiliates will increasingly destabilize states like Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger (and further toward the Gulf of Guinea), with growing attacks on urban centers and diminishing government control. The report highlights the coordination between active Al-Qaeda affiliates in Yemen (AQAP) and Somalia (Shabab) with the Houthis, facilitating access to more sophisticated weapons and possible coordination to strike Western interests and commercial traffic. For humanitarians, already aware of this threat, the report reinforces the need to anticipate risks along local or cross-border routes, isolated settlements, and logistics chains. Western-origin humanitarians will increasingly be threatened and targeted where these organizations expand, and access to the most remote populations may be risky, contested, or blocked.

China is presented as a source of both regional (expansionist policy in the South China Sea, de facto annexation of islands and islets, military encirclement and harassment of Taiwan) and global threats. U.S. analysts anticipate a coherent “galaxy” of major risks from China’s deliberately aggressive actions: disruption of supply routes and logistics chains used by Western countries, threats to critical infrastructure (energy, security, health, transportation, banking networks, etc.), and information, communication, and internet systems; covert use of AI to manipulate data and open-source information (similarly cited for Russia); and data exfiltration from Western internal or external networks. Humanitarians, who position emergency stocks abroad and ship supplies worldwide, must consider the vulnerability of their logistics chains. Likewise, humanitarian organizations increasingly produce and rely on borderless digital information—data, communications, mapping. To what extent are our systems immune to intrusion, exfiltration, or manipulation?

The Chinese threat is compounded by Russia, which poses risks to Western satellite networks and related communications systems. Humanitarians must question their increasing dependence on vulnerable satellite links. Notably, the report does not mention the risk of Russia cutting undersea internet cables, despite NATO taking it seriously—perhaps intentionally downplaying Russian culpability.

SCO Summit, Shanghai 2025 ©X_Narendramodi

Regarding Ukraine, U.S. analysts do not foresee an imminent collapse along the contact line. Their assessment can be summarized: “The longer the war continues in Ukraine, the more Ukraine will lose.” The report notes Russia’s current military advantage and capacity to continue its campaign longer than Kyiv. Compared to the French former Chief of Staff’s caution that victory favors the adversary who can endure slightly longer, the CIA report highlights the growing risk of large-scale conflict between NATO allies and Russia, including potential nuclear weapons use. While the humanitarian role in a nuclear conflict is theoretical, humanitarians must consider what their role—or absence thereof—would be in a high-intensity, widespread European conflict, where operational procedures, safety guidelines, and logistics could collapse. The potential scale of displacement and humanitarian need would far exceed current capacities, placing humanitarian organizations among the first victims of high-intensity war in the West.

In the Middle East, written before recent Israeli-U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear and military installations, the report lists expected critical threats: attacks on Israel and U.S. facilities, blockages of energy, trade, and logistics routes by Iran or its proxy in Yemen (Houthis). Regarding Syria, the report underscores volatility after Bashar al-Assad’s fall and the risk of ISIS resurgence. For humanitarians, vigilant in the region, this is a reminder: worsening political and military volatility, attacks on minorities (Alawites, Druze), interventions affecting Rojava, or renewed Turkish action would jeopardize access to isolated or displaced populations.

As noted, what a report omits can be as telling as what it includes: climate change. During the Senate hearing, Tulsi Gabbard, Director of National Intelligence, was directly questioned about its absence. Her response—that the report focuses on the most extreme and critical national security threats—implies to humanitarians that the U.S. is unlikely to fund adaptation or resilience programs for vulnerable populations. Consequently, humanitarian needs related to climate change may exceed expectations and capacities. By contrast, French think tanks, such as Institut Montaigne, acknowledge climate’s centrality to policy planning by 2040.

The final section covers nine countries, revealing symbolic and strategic choices. Notably, Denmark, Greenland (separately treated), and Canada are included. Two cases stand out: Syria—marked as “head of state: vacant,” highlighting U.S. ambiguity regarding figures like Ahmed al-Charaa/Al Joulani—and Turkey, whose dossier underscores the massive refugee intake, highlighting the complex humanitarian challenge of new arrivals, return policies, or mass movements toward Europe.

Conclusion

High-intensity Russia-NATO conflict where humanitarian actors would have limited role; growing instability in the Middle East, West Africa, the Sahel-Saharan belt, and Central Asia; threats to supply chains; ongoing risks to information and communication systems; possible data manipulation; U.S. disregard of climate-related humanitarian impacts; and massive unmet humanitarian needs. While the CIA report may be oriented, sometimes simplistic or unnuanced, one fact is clear: humanitarians face pervasive danger and must act—or reinvent themselves—to remain relevant.

Pierre Brunet

Writer and Humanitarian

Pierre Brunet is a novelist and member of the Board of Directors of the NGO SOLIDARITES INTERNATIONAL. He became involved in humanitarian work in Rwanda in 1994, then in Bosnia in 1995, and has since returned to the field (Afghanistan in 2003, the Calais jungle in 2016, migrant camps in Greece and Macedonia in 2016, Iraq and north-eastern Syria in 2019, Ukraine in 2023). . Pierre Brunet’s novels are published by Calmann-Lévy: Barnum in 2006, JAB in 2008, Fenicia in 2014 and Le triangle d’incertitude in 2017. A former journalist, Pierre Brunet regularly publishes analytical articles, opinion pieces and columns.

I invite you to read these interviews and articles published in the edition :

A host of challenges for the humanitarian sector.

© WHO In February 2025, before the ceasefire broke down, Palestinians displaced in southern Gaza were returning en masse to the north of the enclave.

In this editorial, I seek to name and understand the upheavals currently underway.

This article is neither exhaustive nor definitive. Its aim is to explore new situations in order to adapt the humanitarian response. It draws on numerous sources.
As we did before with our series of articles “humanitarian questions”, I invite you to join the debate by sending us your testimonies, analyses, and perspectives at contact@defishumanitaires.com

Challenges converging.
A change of era.

We are experiencing a decisive shift in the political and geopolitical era—some even call it civilizational. Whatever one thinks, populism is advancing globally in various forms, accompanying the collapse of the international order established after the Second World War.

This includes the rise and assertion of power by Russia, China, Turkey, and the Global South in all its diversity. As Giuliano da Empoli said, “Trump is not a historical accident or a fit of madness—we are tipping into a new world.” What is this new world, and what will be the role and place of humanitarian action within it?

BRICS meeting in Kazan, Russia, from 22 to 24 October 2024

Aid funding in decline!

The funding of international humanitarian aid is a reliable indicator of trends and the priorities of UN member states. And funding is collapsing—no one knows when or how it will stabilize. It’s easy and somewhat fair to blame the abrupt freeze on all aid by the Trump administration and the dismantling of USAID.

However, many European countries were ahead of the United States with massive budget cuts—in the UK, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and almost everywhere else to varying degrees, with the exception of the European Union.

Official Development Assistance (ODA), OECD

The reasons vary depending on whether we’re talking about humanitarian aid or development assistance, which fall under Official Development Assistance (ODA). Beyond doubts about aid effectiveness and the rising call for productive investments, the primary reason today is the priority placed on security in the face of the serious risk of the war in Ukraine spreading across Europe. The second reason lies in the state of public finances, national debt, and ongoing tariff wars. Defending one’s freedom, independence, and sovereignty has become a vital priority in the face of mounting threats.

With what consequences?

What will be the human and political consequences of dwindling humanitarian funding? According to OCHA, in 2025, 305.1 million people will require humanitarian aid, but only 189.5 million have been targeted across 72 countries to receive assistance estimated at $47.4 billion.

UNHCR Global Trends Report 2024, 9 October 2024.

However, in 2024, of a $49.6 billion budget, only $21.2 billion was raised—just 43% of the required amount! What will 2025 look like with ODA in free fall?

Among these at-risk populations were 122.6 million forcibly displaced people as of June 2024. Recall: 51.23 million in 2013, 89.27 million in 2021—and the numbers are expected to continue rising. Will we abandon internally displaced people and refugees? What will be the human, migratory, and political fallout from such disengagement?

For instance, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, insufficient funding forced the shutdown of a severe malnutrition treatment program for 220,000 children under 5.

2024 was the deadliest year for humanitarians, with 281 killed—63% in Gaza and the West Bank, mostly nationals. Will we now say to humanitarians: “Take the risks, you’re on your own”?

As a French citizen, I am personally convinced
that we must prepare for a possible expansion of the war in Ukraine in order to contain it—and thus secure peace. And if this does not prevent war from being imposed on us, then we must declare it, fight it, and win it.

What I fail to understand is this: in a world where military budgets total $2.4 trillion, and banking sector profits stand at $1.1 trillion, how is it not possible to find $47 billion to save lives, stabilize countries, and revive development and trade that benefit everyone?

Short-sighted selfishness will catch up with us—and cost even more!

Ukraine and the return of war.

Since February 24, 2022, the war in Ukraine has shattered the principle of inviolable borders and shown that war is once again a conceivable means of resolving conflict. It has killed and wounded hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians, displaced millions, and destroyed much of the country and its infrastructure—not to mention Russian losses. The war consumes enormous resources, yet they remain insufficient from Ukraine’s allies.

I’m not convinced we truly grasp the risks and consequences of a potential expansion of this conflict to other frontline countries in Europe—and possibly to us through a domino effect! Let’s be clear-eyed: Vladimir Putin has declared a long-term war against us, supported, tolerated, or ignored by many Global South nations. And if Donald Trump chooses to end U.S. support for Ukraine, the risk of war in Europe would only grow. European countries, however, are not yet prepared for such a scenario. Let’s hope it never comes to pass and that a ceasefire, then a settlement, brings this war to an end.

Yet even if full-scale war isn’t certain, it’s entirely possible. Some experts believe it has already begun—through cyberattacks, propaganda, disinformation, rearmament, and a mobilization of public will. How will humanitarian actors respond to this threat? What could they do if war comes to Europe? What would happen to humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, and independence in such a scenario?

And what about Europe?

Among the world’s top three humanitarian donors, along with the U.S. and Germany (which has slashed much of its aid budget), the European Union remains. At the recent European Humanitarian Forum (EHF) on May 19–20 in Brussels, the European Commission appeared to reassure humanitarian actors—yet never addressed the “elephant in the room”: shrinking budgets.

The agenda was technically sound: ongoing crises, cooperation, coordination, humanitarian diplomacy, the nexus, national actors, climate impact. But it deliberately avoided tackling the decline in ODA and its consequences for humanitarian work. Business as usual! Nevertheless, voices such as VOICE on these issues, UNRWA on Gaza, and informal hallway conversations raised the alarm.

Ursula von der Leyen confirmed the DG ECHO humanitarian budget of €2.5 billion, including the emergency aid reserve (€580 million), in line with the 2021–2027 Multiannual Financial Framework (€11.569 trillion).

This framework is truly strategic, and discussions are beginning for the 2028–2035 cycle.

Here lies the decisive issue! Given the budgetary constraints of EU member states, will the Commission’s budget be sufficient—and how will it be allocated?

Former EU Humanitarian Commissioner Janez Lenarčič rightly emphasized the need for assertive humanitarian diplomacy to preserve humanitarian space, which must now address the question of funding—without which, access to at-risk populations is impossible.

The current Commissioner, Hadja Lahbib, set out a roadmap: We must focus on two areas: first, increase funding, broaden the donor base, and work more efficiently. Second, we must reduce humanitarian needs, often caused by conflict and climate crises.

UNRIC. During the session on the Middle East, attended by Hadja Lahbib, European Commissioner, and Philippe Lazzarini, Director of UNRWA, at the European Humanitarian Forum on 20 May 2025 in Brussels.

I fully support this—but we must reframe the European humanitarian issue within the broader challenges the EU faces: internal cohesion, the war in Ukraine and its potential expansion, trade wars with the U.S. and China, and weak, naïve governance amid a world reverting to jungle law. The Europe of nation-states cannot avoid a political aggiornamento (renewal) if it wishes to defend its very existence and role.

The UN in turmoil.

Donald Trump’s early decisions confirmed the decline of globalization and multilateralism, shaking the UN—which is being forced to adapt. Payment delays by the U.S., China, and others threaten a potential $1.1 billion deficit by year-end.

To mark the UN’s 80th anniversary, António Guterres launched the H80—or UN80—initiative in March 2025 to urgently reform the organization amid falling funding.

The UN must now cut costs, consolidate its agencies into four clusters—peace and security, humanitarian affairs, sustainable development, and human rights—reduce its workforce by 20%, and relocate to more affordable cities. This real austerity drive will have operational consequences yet to be fully grasped.

OCHA is contributing with its “Humanitarian Reset” led by Tom Fletcher, launched March 10 and based on a 10-point reform. In brief: prioritizing national actors, context-specific adaptation, prioritization planning, integrated reforms, joint advocacy, bold efficiency measures, field redeployment for emergencies, resource and service pooling, simplified clusters, and a more strategic, high-performing “integrated planning framework.”

Necessity dictates—but what are the consequences for aid and for national and international humanitarian actors who must prepare for these shocks?

While we now know OCHA’s “humanitarian reset,” what about NGOs in their diversity and coordination mechanisms? How will they come through this ordeal?

Humanitarian strengths and weaknesses.

Let’s begin with a brief—too brief—introspection of the humanitarian sector, which we too rarely undertake. But now is the time to dig deeper, both in its flaws and strengths, to reshape humanitarian action for this new world.

Humanitarians often see themselves as belonging to the “good” side, judging others from a perceived moral high ground. They also tend to see nations, empires, or ethnic communities through the lens of NGOs—a grave mistake.

Humanitarians view the world as one global humanity, which is true—but without sufficiently recognizing its diversity, which is both a richness and a source of differences.

Above all, humanitarian action is an existential act to aid any person or population in peril. This cross-border solidarity is more relevant than ever. Humanitarianism isn’t the answer to everything—but without it, what would be the daily fate of those in danger? Every day, around 550,000 humanitarians work to assist 190 million people—men, women, and children—who actively contribute to mutual aid as fellow human beings.

The greatest frustration and limitation of humanitarian work is the inability to help everyone in urgent need. Obstacles abound—from access denial to falling funding.

Crises abound—in the DRC, the Sahel, Yemen, Ukraine, Sudan, Haiti, and Gaza, the latter being the horrifying emblem of the unthinkable becoming routine.

Why did pediatrician Alaa Al-Najjar lose nine of her ten children—Yahya, Rakan, Eve, Jubran, Raslan, Rifan, Sidine, Louqman, and 7-month-old Sidra—in a single airstrike on May 24 in Khan Younis? Only her husband and one child survived. Why?

With its pogrom on October 7, 2023, and the abduction of 251 hostages, Hamas triggered a spiral of endless violence with Israel. As of April 30, 2025: 52,400 deaths (including combatants), 118,014 wounded. By the end of 2024, 87% of housing was damaged or destroyed, over 80% of businesses lost, and two-thirds of roads unusable! As if that weren’t enough, a full humanitarian blockade was imposed on March 2, 2025. Famine is now weaponized—violating international law.

To calm international outrage and limit aid diversion by Hamas or gangs, Israel bypassed competent humanitarian organizations in favor of an ad hoc body: the Humanitarian Foundation for Gaza. Its first distributions ended in chaos, death, and injury.

These ongoing destructions and the blockade seem aimed at the deportation of all or part of Gaza’s population. What do we call that? Is a political solution still possible? Let’s hope the upcoming meeting on Palestine at the UN General Assembly in New York (June 17–20), co-organized by France and Saudi Arabia, will answer that.

In conclusion.

As we publish issue 100 of the Défis Humanitaires online journal, current events reaffirm its value to the humanitarian community and its partners by:

Promoting humanitarian action
Analyzing the cause-effect link between geopolitics and humanitarianism
Documenting the major challenges ahead

Défis Humanitaires is read each month in dozens of countries by thousands of people whom we warmly greet here, with a wish to be useful to their work.

But we also need their support and participation to do more and better. To that end, we invite you to: