A host of challenges for the humanitarian sector.

© WHO In February 2025, before the ceasefire broke down, Palestinians displaced in southern Gaza were returning en masse to the north of the enclave.

In this editorial, I seek to name and understand the upheavals currently underway.

This article is neither exhaustive nor definitive. Its aim is to explore new situations in order to adapt the humanitarian response. It draws on numerous sources.
As we did before with our series of articles “humanitarian questions”, I invite you to join the debate by sending us your testimonies, analyses, and perspectives at contact@defishumanitaires.com

Challenges converging.
A change of era.

We are experiencing a decisive shift in the political and geopolitical era—some even call it civilizational. Whatever one thinks, populism is advancing globally in various forms, accompanying the collapse of the international order established after the Second World War.

This includes the rise and assertion of power by Russia, China, Turkey, and the Global South in all its diversity. As Giuliano da Empoli said, “Trump is not a historical accident or a fit of madness—we are tipping into a new world.” What is this new world, and what will be the role and place of humanitarian action within it?

BRICS meeting in Kazan, Russia, from 22 to 24 October 2024

Aid funding in decline!

The funding of international humanitarian aid is a reliable indicator of trends and the priorities of UN member states. And funding is collapsing—no one knows when or how it will stabilize. It’s easy and somewhat fair to blame the abrupt freeze on all aid by the Trump administration and the dismantling of USAID.

However, many European countries were ahead of the United States with massive budget cuts—in the UK, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and almost everywhere else to varying degrees, with the exception of the European Union.

Official Development Assistance (ODA), OECD

The reasons vary depending on whether we’re talking about humanitarian aid or development assistance, which fall under Official Development Assistance (ODA). Beyond doubts about aid effectiveness and the rising call for productive investments, the primary reason today is the priority placed on security in the face of the serious risk of the war in Ukraine spreading across Europe. The second reason lies in the state of public finances, national debt, and ongoing tariff wars. Defending one’s freedom, independence, and sovereignty has become a vital priority in the face of mounting threats.

With what consequences?

What will be the human and political consequences of dwindling humanitarian funding? According to OCHA, in 2025, 305.1 million people will require humanitarian aid, but only 189.5 million have been targeted across 72 countries to receive assistance estimated at $47.4 billion.

UNHCR Global Trends Report 2024, 9 October 2024.

However, in 2024, of a $49.6 billion budget, only $21.2 billion was raised—just 43% of the required amount! What will 2025 look like with ODA in free fall?

Among these at-risk populations were 122.6 million forcibly displaced people as of June 2024. Recall: 51.23 million in 2013, 89.27 million in 2021—and the numbers are expected to continue rising. Will we abandon internally displaced people and refugees? What will be the human, migratory, and political fallout from such disengagement?

For instance, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, insufficient funding forced the shutdown of a severe malnutrition treatment program for 220,000 children under 5.

UNICEF DRC Dubourthoumieu

2024 was the deadliest year for humanitarians, with 281 killed—63% in Gaza and the West Bank, mostly nationals. Will we now say to humanitarians: “Take the risks, you’re on your own”?

As a French citizen, I am personally convinced
that we must prepare for a possible expansion of the war in Ukraine in order to contain it—and thus secure peace. And if this does not prevent war from being imposed on us, then we must declare it, fight it, and win it.

What I fail to understand is this: in a world where military budgets total $2.4 trillion, and banking sector profits stand at $1.1 trillion, how is it not possible to find $47 billion to save lives, stabilize countries, and revive development and trade that benefit everyone?

Short-sighted selfishness will catch up with us—and cost even more!

Ukraine and the return of war.

Since February 24, 2022, the war in Ukraine has shattered the principle of inviolable borders and shown that war is once again a conceivable means of resolving conflict. It has killed and wounded hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians, displaced millions, and destroyed much of the country and its infrastructure—not to mention Russian losses. The war consumes enormous resources, yet they remain insufficient from Ukraine’s allies.

I’m not convinced we truly grasp the risks and consequences of a potential expansion of this conflict to other frontline countries in Europe—and possibly to us through a domino effect! Let’s be clear-eyed: Vladimir Putin has declared a long-term war against us, supported, tolerated, or ignored by many Global South nations. And if Donald Trump chooses to end U.S. support for Ukraine, the risk of war in Europe would only grow. European countries, however, are not yet prepared for such a scenario. Let’s hope it never comes to pass and that a ceasefire, then a settlement, brings this war to an end.

Yet even if full-scale war isn’t certain, it’s entirely possible. Some experts believe it has already begun—through cyberattacks, propaganda, disinformation, rearmament, and a mobilization of public will. How will humanitarian actors respond to this threat? What could they do if war comes to Europe? What would happen to humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, and independence in such a scenario?

And what about Europe?

Among the world’s top three humanitarian donors, along with the U.S. and Germany (which has slashed much of its aid budget), the European Union remains. At the recent European Humanitarian Forum (EHF) on May 19–20 in Brussels, the European Commission appeared to reassure humanitarian actors—yet never addressed the “elephant in the room”: shrinking budgets.

The agenda was technically sound: ongoing crises, cooperation, coordination, humanitarian diplomacy, the nexus, national actors, climate impact. But it deliberately avoided tackling the decline in ODA and its consequences for humanitarian work. Business as usual! Nevertheless, voices such as VOICE on these issues, UNRWA on Gaza, and informal hallway conversations raised the alarm.

Ursula von der Leyen confirmed the DG ECHO humanitarian budget of €2.5 billion, including the emergency aid reserve (€580 million), in line with the 2021–2027 Multiannual Financial Framework (€11.569 trillion).

This framework is truly strategic, and discussions are beginning for the 2028–2035 cycle.

Here lies the decisive issue! Given the budgetary constraints of EU member states, will the Commission’s budget be sufficient—and how will it be allocated?

Former EU Humanitarian Commissioner Janez Lenarčič rightly emphasized the need for assertive humanitarian diplomacy to preserve humanitarian space, which must now address the question of funding—without which, access to at-risk populations is impossible.

The current Commissioner, Hadja Lahbib, set out a roadmap: We must focus on two areas: first, increase funding, broaden the donor base, and work more efficiently. Second, we must reduce humanitarian needs, often caused by conflict and climate crises.

UNRIC. During the session on the Middle East, attended by Hadja Lahbib, European Commissioner, and Philippe Lazzarini, Director of UNRWA, at the European Humanitarian Forum on 20 May 2025 in Brussels.

I fully support this—but we must reframe the European humanitarian issue within the broader challenges the EU faces: internal cohesion, the war in Ukraine and its potential expansion, trade wars with the U.S. and China, and weak, naïve governance amid a world reverting to jungle law. The Europe of nation-states cannot avoid a political aggiornamento (renewal) if it wishes to defend its very existence and role.

The UN in turmoil.

Donald Trump’s early decisions confirmed the decline of globalization and multilateralism, shaking the UN—which is being forced to adapt. Payment delays by the U.S., China, and others threaten a potential $1.1 billion deficit by year-end.

To mark the UN’s 80th anniversary, António Guterres launched the H80—or UN80—initiative in March 2025 to urgently reform the organization amid falling funding.

The UN must now cut costs, consolidate its agencies into four clusters—peace and security, humanitarian affairs, sustainable development, and human rights—reduce its workforce by 20%, and relocate to more affordable cities. This real austerity drive will have operational consequences yet to be fully grasped.

OCHA is contributing with its “Humanitarian Reset” led by Tom Fletcher, launched March 10 and based on a 10-point reform. In brief: prioritizing national actors, context-specific adaptation, prioritization planning, integrated reforms, joint advocacy, bold efficiency measures, field redeployment for emergencies, resource and service pooling, simplified clusters, and a more strategic, high-performing “integrated planning framework.”

Necessity dictates—but what are the consequences for aid and for national and international humanitarian actors who must prepare for these shocks?

While we now know OCHA’s “humanitarian reset,” what about NGOs in their diversity and coordination mechanisms? How will they come through this ordeal?

Humanitarian strengths and weaknesses.

Let’s begin with a brief—too brief—introspection of the humanitarian sector, which we too rarely undertake. But now is the time to dig deeper, both in its flaws and strengths, to reshape humanitarian action for this new world.

Humanitarians often see themselves as belonging to the “good” side, judging others from a perceived moral high ground. They also tend to see nations, empires, or ethnic communities through the lens of NGOs—a grave mistake.

Humanitarians view the world as one global humanity, which is true—but without sufficiently recognizing its diversity, which is both a richness and a source of differences.

Above all, humanitarian action is an existential act to aid any person or population in peril. This cross-border solidarity is more relevant than ever. Humanitarianism isn’t the answer to everything—but without it, what would be the daily fate of those in danger? Every day, around 550,000 humanitarians work to assist 190 million people—men, women, and children—who actively contribute to mutual aid as fellow human beings.

The greatest frustration and limitation of humanitarian work is the inability to help everyone in urgent need. Obstacles abound—from access denial to falling funding.

Crises abound—in the DRC, the Sahel, Yemen, Ukraine, Sudan, Haiti, and Gaza, the latter being the horrifying emblem of the unthinkable becoming routine.

Why did pediatrician Alaa Al-Najjar lose nine of her ten children—Yahya, Rakan, Eve, Jubran, Raslan, Rifan, Sidine, Louqman, and 7-month-old Sidra—in a single airstrike on May 24 in Khan Younis? Only her husband and one child survived. Why?

With its pogrom on October 7, 2023, and the abduction of 251 hostages, Hamas triggered a spiral of endless violence with Israel. As of April 30, 2025: 52,400 deaths (including combatants), 118,014 wounded. By the end of 2024, 87% of housing was damaged or destroyed, over 80% of businesses lost, and two-thirds of roads unusable! As if that weren’t enough, a full humanitarian blockade was imposed on March 2, 2025. Famine is now weaponized—violating international law.

To calm international outrage and limit aid diversion by Hamas or gangs, Israel bypassed competent humanitarian organizations in favor of an ad hoc body: the Humanitarian Foundation for Gaza. Its first distributions ended in chaos, death, and injury.

These ongoing destructions and the blockade seem aimed at the deportation of all or part of Gaza’s population. What do we call that? Is a political solution still possible? Let’s hope the upcoming meeting on Palestine at the UN General Assembly in New York (June 17–20), co-organized by France and Saudi Arabia, will answer that.

In conclusion.

As we publish issue 100 of the Défis Humanitaires online journal, current events reaffirm its value to the humanitarian community and its partners by:

  • Promoting humanitarian action

  • Analyzing the cause-effect link between geopolitics and humanitarianism

  • Documenting the major challenges ahead

Défis Humanitaires is read each month in dozens of countries by thousands of people whom we warmly greet here, with a wish to be useful to their work.

But we also need their support and participation to do more and better. To that end, we invite you to:

  • Fill out the journal’s feedback questionnaire

  • Share your thoughts on the journal

  • Support the journal with a donation via HelloAsso

Thank you for your attention, your loyalty, and your support.

Alain Boinet

I invite you to read the articles published in this issue:

How can we move from “panacea” to real operational reality?

©UN PHOTO / Marco Dormino , Haiti, A rescuer holds the hand of a survivor of a school collapse.

We often talk about “localizing” aid as an ideal solution for bringing funding closer to the communities concerned, and giving them back control over their future. But in reality, this ambition comes up against a cumbersome and costly chain of accountability: from citizens to states, from states to donors, from donors to international NGOs, and finally at the very end to local organizations, which are often fragile and poorly structured.

At the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit, the Grand Bargain initiative set a clear goal: to ensure that at least 25% of humanitarian aid is allocated as directly as possible to local actors by 2020. The idea was to reduce intermediate costs and improve aid effectiveness.

©WHsummit World Humanitarian Summit May 2016 Istanbul Turkey

Standards such as the Sphere Handbook also stress the importance of centering decisions on affected communities, and of strengthening both local involvement and accountability. In practice, however, they remain unclear as to how to proceed, how to simplify procedures and how to empower local players.

As for the Core Humanitarian Standard, it too calls for support for local capacities and accountability to communities, while acknowledging that such good intentions all too often come up against the complex realities on the ground.

I’ve seen it all with my own eyes.

In 2000, in the Gnagna region of Burkina Faso, I joined a team where half-yearly reports and training workshops sometimes took longer than the intervention itself. Meanwhile, our village partners had no accounting system in place, and no staff trained in monitoring and evaluation.

In 2004, with MSF in Sudan, at the height of the Darfur emergency, the administrative procedures of the HAC, UN, donors and NGOs could delay an intervention by several weeks or even months. In the meantime, IDPs were dying of dehydration, or creating their own emergency response to immediately meet the vital needs of their neighbors, with an invisible chain of solidarity.

©Doctors Without Borders, Darfur North Sudan

2005, with the 9ᵉ EDF in Côte d’Ivoire, each disbursement for the emergency program passed from Brussels to the local delegation, then to the State (CONFED), then to the international NGO, then to an umbrella organization, before finally reaching the farmers’ groups. The result? Six months of waiting and dozens of pages of reports and audits for each tranche of funding, totally sidestepping the constraints of the seasonal crop calendar.

Still in 2020 in Mali, an EU resilience program Despite a solid method, the multiplication of reports and bridging mechanisms (clusters, donors, consortium), and despite the establishment of a unified monitoring platform, cumbersome procedures have further slowed down each phase of implementation, and the State is absent from the appropriation and continuity of achievements.

These few examples are only a sample of a much wider experience. They simply show that localization is not just a matter of funding percentages: it’s above all a delicate balance between administrative simplification, shared monitoring tools and strengthening local skills.

Vaccination of livestock ©Hamada (Wandey) AG AHMED

For localization to become a sustainable reality, it is urgent to :
1. Alleviate accountability requirements Harmonize and mutualize expectations between donors, clusters and partners to free up valuable time for field work.
2. Invest genuinely in local capabilities Not just in money, but also in know-how, management and tools, right from the project design stage.
3. Test and deploy innovative technological solutions Blockchain, digital money transfers, collaborative platforms: all levers to fluidify flows and guarantee greater transparency.
4. Building trust The true measure of localization is the ability of local players and communities to make their own decisions, to manage funds themselves, and to be accountable and transparent.
5. Ensuring sustainability Any action can only endure if it is part of a framework of local ownership: either via a structured community system, or through a state mechanism capable of absorbing and sustaining the gains made. Any action that does not come under the heading of “life saving” must be designed to guarantee this prerequisite of ownership. This means, of course, that the time required to prepare and formulate a proposal needs to be extended, with specific funding and dedicated resources that go beyond a simple “proposal writer”.

Rethinking every link in the design and accountability chain, from the taxpayer to the village cell, is the only way to move localization from a mere slogan to a concrete, sustainable transformation driven by the players themselves.

Hamada AG AHMED

 

Hamada AG AHMED

Expert in Humanitarian/Development Programs and Contextual Analyst.

AG AHMED Hamada (aka “Wandey”) is a French-Malian expert in humanitarian management, contextual analysis and development program coordination. He holds a Master’s degree in Humanitarian Management and Development Action from the University of Paris 12 (UPEC) and a diploma from the Bioforce Institute in Lyon, and has over twenty years’ experience in emergency aid, resilience and local capacity building, both in the field and at the headquarters of leading international organizations.

After initial missions in Central Africa and the Sahel with several international organizations, he successively held strategic positions as Head of Mission, notably for the French Red Cross, before taking up the position of Head of the West Africa Desk, where he oversaw humanitarian and development operations in several Sahelian countries. He led the implementation of integrated programs combining health, nutrition, food security, climate change adaptation and early recovery.

He served as Crisis Analytics Team Leader at Mercy Corps, leading a humanitarian analysis and operational research unit covering the central Sahel (including Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso). In this role, he coordinated the production of strategic analytical reports, based on mixed methodologies, to inform humanitarian responses in complex and unstable environments.

In 2019, he joins Groupe URD in Mali as coordinator of the KEY program, funded by the European Development Fund, where he supports Malian authorities and technical partners on strategic planning, results-based management and capacity building with a strong focus on practice analysis and operational agility.

A committed analyst, he is interested in the structural dynamics and weak signals affecting vulnerable populations. He has led several prospective studies, the most recent of which focuses on the forgotten human and environmental heritage of Lake Faguibine, in collaboration with AFD. He advocates an integrated approach combining local knowledge, foresight tools and scientific data to strengthen resilience and territorial governance in fragile areas.

Articles by Hamada Ag Ahmed previously published in Défis Humanitaires :

The resilience of populations and the importance of (very localised) governance in the Sahel.

Tomatoes put to the test