Humanitarian Deadlock in Northeastern Syria ?

Residents of the Sahlat al Banat camp lining up in front of the tent. © Juliette Elie

Under the already heavy sun of a September morning, about fifty people wait among the dusty tents of the Sahlat al Banat camp in northeastern Syria. As the vehicle arrives, a murmur rises in front of the tent: everyone pleads their case, hoping to be registered on the list of one hundred medical consultations scheduled for the coming days.

Since 2018, more than 2,000 families have taken refuge on the outskirts of the vast landfill site of Raqqa. From the towns of Deir ez-Zor or Maadan, they fled successive offensives that put an end to several years of Islamic State control. Over time, shelters have multiplied: as far as the eye can see, sheets of fabric, blankets, and tarpaulins—sometimes marked with the UNHCR logo—bear witness to the gradual withdrawal of humanitarian aid. A heavy odor hangs over the camp, a mix of waste and burning plastic that clings to the air and to the clothes. Here, children sort through mountains of garbage, searching for pieces of metal they can sell for a few cents. For many, it is the only means of survival.

Naji Al Matrood, teacher with the NGO Solinfo. © Juliette Elie

For several years now, we at SOLINFO have been running psychosocial support workshops for about a hundred children every month. For an hour or two, they can escape their daily lives and simply be children again—no longer worrying about how many scraps of metal they collected or how many Syrian pounds they managed to earn. Under this tent, teacher Naji Al Matrood constantly imagines new ways to capture the children’s attention and restore to them the lightness of their age.

My role as a doctor and the association’s medical coordinator strengthens this support by providing both medical care and preventive action, including hygiene awareness sessions and the distribution of kits containing essential items: toothbrush, toothpaste, soap, nail clippers, and disinfectant solution.

These moments spent with the children also reveal the daily lives of the men and women living in an extremely degraded environment. The dust and the smell permeate everything. The children often arrive barefoot, their clothes dirty or torn. The most common diseases tell their own story: scabies, diarrhea, and malnutrition are almost constant.

We conducted a nutritional survey of one hundred children in the camp, and the results are alarming: more than half show signs of undernutrition—53%, one third of them severely malnourished and two thirds moderately. In concrete terms, this means that most of the children examined are not growing normally: their weight is insufficient for their height or age, which can lead to bone fragility, developmental delays, edema, and greater vulnerability to infections. These data confirm the seriousness of the situation and illustrate the lack of sustainable nutritional programs in the region.

Children of the Sahlat al Banat camp © Juliette Elie

Dangerous Budget Cuts for Relief Efforts

These figures are not an exception; they reflect a broader reality—the humanitarian deadlock in northeastern Syria. Since early 2025, budget restrictions decided by Washington have led to the suspension of many USAID-funded programs. In practice, numerous international NGOs have seen their funding cut by 40%, forcing them to reduce staff and scale down their projects in the region.

On the ground, the consequences are visible: many NGOs have withdrawn, projects have been halted, and staff remain in limbo. Local NGOs are trying to compensate for the absence of international actors, but they lack the logistical and financial means that previously gave strength to the humanitarian apparatus. This paradigm shift now highlights the responsibility of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), which finds itself alone in front of camps it can neither manage nor close.

In this fragmented humanitarian landscape, Damascus is gradually regaining control, starting with the administrative level: from now on, all UN agencies must submit their project proposals to the Syrian government before any field action. At the same time, international NGOs wishing to collaborate with the United Nations must register with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, an obligatory step to obtain legal authorization to operate. This ministry imposes long, redundant, and sometimes arbitrary procedures.

Local NGOs, for their part, are subject to a similar process: they must obtain registration with the Ministry of Social Affairs, which reviews their statutes and funding sources. This supervision allows the government to filter and channel aid toward the areas it deems a priority.

Despite these constraints, the Health Authority Office (HAO)—the AANES’s health body—tries to maintain a parallel coordination system. Acting as a “Ministry of Health,” it manages hospitals, primary health centers, and coordinates humanitarian activities of both international and local NGOs to best respond to the population’s needs.

Beyond the humanitarian emergency, northeastern Syria has for several months been awaiting negotiations between the new government led by Ahmed Al Charaa and the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria. In early October, several meetings took place, driven by U.S. efforts to maintain a fragile balance between their Kurdish allies and a Syrian regime seeking regional normalization.

Like the Druze and Alawite communities, Kurdish representatives appear to be advocating for a federal modelguaranteeing administrative, cultural, and security autonomy. Damascus, on the other hand, favors the establishment of a centralized state and the integration of the various armed groups.

During my mission, clashes broke out in Aleppo’s Kurdish neighborhoods of Ashrafieh and Sheikh Maqsoud, opposing local units to pro-government factions. On October 8, a ceasefire was negotiated between the two parties, restoring a fragile calm to the city. These episodes reflect the fragility of coexistence between the regime and Kurdish forces and recall the community violence recently inflicted on the Druze and Alawites.

Even within Kurdish circles, opinions diverge. Some express cautious optimism, seeing a chance for recognition or even the promise of a federal state. Others, more disillusioned, fear renewed conflict, the disenchantment of a people exhausted by war. “Talks will never succeed as long as Damascus remains torn both internally and by its foreign sponsors,” says a local official in Qamishli.

Hope for Peace Above All

On the ground, this political stalemate is ever-present and translates into constant security fragility. Roads are closed or blocked by makeshift checkpoints; local partners tell rumors of attacks, kidnappings, and revenge killings—all of which contribute to the population’s sense of insecurity. The fear of the Islamic State still lingers in some villages where sporadic attacks occur.

Yet, we encountered no incidents during our mission. Movements took place without hindrance, and the region remains relatively stable. This observation reveals a fragile stability, where life continues despite everything.

Northeastern Syria today is a humanitarian gray zone, where neither war nor peace truly prevails. International attention has turned elsewhere, cameras have moved on, and displaced populations—now invisible—are rarely mentioned. Yet life here remains marked by extreme precariousness. In Raqqa, the national hospital still stands, supported almost entirely by NGOs. Care is provided free of charge, allowing the population to access a minimal level of healthcare.

Like many humanitarian actors in the region, we work exclusively with local NGOs—the only ones who truly know the realities on the ground. Mustapha, our country director, and Driss, our project manager, embody this quiet resistance and remain committed despite the uncertainty weighing on the current political situation.

I will return soon to continue this modest but essential work for those who have nothing left—except the hope of peace above all.

Juliette Elie.

 

Medical Consultations in Sahlat al Banat

Docteur Juliette ELIE : 

After earning a doctorate in medicine from Université Paris Diderot and a master’s degree in research on inflammation and inflammatory diseases, Dr. Juliette Elie works as an associate practitioner at Necker–Enfants Malades Hospital in Paris.

She currently serves as a volunteer humanitarian doctor within the NGO SOLINFO, chaired by Edouard Lagourgue, where she oversees medical projects, particularly in the fields of nutrition, community health, and support to displaced populations.

Her commitment reflects an approach that combines scientific rigor, field action, and support for local actors to sustainably strengthen health capacities in crisis zones

 

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How can we move from “panacea” to real operational reality?

©UN PHOTO / Marco Dormino , Haiti, A rescuer holds the hand of a survivor of a school collapse.

We often talk about “localizing” aid as an ideal solution for bringing funding closer to the communities concerned, and giving them back control over their future. But in reality, this ambition comes up against a cumbersome and costly chain of accountability: from citizens to states, from states to donors, from donors to international NGOs, and finally at the very end to local organizations, which are often fragile and poorly structured.

At the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit, the Grand Bargain initiative set a clear goal: to ensure that at least 25% of humanitarian aid is allocated as directly as possible to local actors by 2020. The idea was to reduce intermediate costs and improve aid effectiveness.

©WHsummit World Humanitarian Summit May 2016 Istanbul Turkey

Standards such as the Sphere Handbook also stress the importance of centering decisions on affected communities, and of strengthening both local involvement and accountability. In practice, however, they remain unclear as to how to proceed, how to simplify procedures and how to empower local players.

As for the Core Humanitarian Standard, it too calls for support for local capacities and accountability to communities, while acknowledging that such good intentions all too often come up against the complex realities on the ground.

I’ve seen it all with my own eyes.

In 2000, in the Gnagna region of Burkina Faso, I joined a team where half-yearly reports and training workshops sometimes took longer than the intervention itself. Meanwhile, our village partners had no accounting system in place, and no staff trained in monitoring and evaluation.

In 2004, with MSF in Sudan, at the height of the Darfur emergency, the administrative procedures of the HAC, UN, donors and NGOs could delay an intervention by several weeks or even months. In the meantime, IDPs were dying of dehydration, or creating their own emergency response to immediately meet the vital needs of their neighbors, with an invisible chain of solidarity.

©Doctors Without Borders, Darfur North Sudan

2005, with the 9ᵉ EDF in Côte d’Ivoire, each disbursement for the emergency program passed from Brussels to the local delegation, then to the State (CONFED), then to the international NGO, then to an umbrella organization, before finally reaching the farmers’ groups. The result? Six months of waiting and dozens of pages of reports and audits for each tranche of funding, totally sidestepping the constraints of the seasonal crop calendar.

Still in 2020 in Mali, an EU resilience program Despite a solid method, the multiplication of reports and bridging mechanisms (clusters, donors, consortium), and despite the establishment of a unified monitoring platform, cumbersome procedures have further slowed down each phase of implementation, and the State is absent from the appropriation and continuity of achievements.

These few examples are only a sample of a much wider experience. They simply show that localization is not just a matter of funding percentages: it’s above all a delicate balance between administrative simplification, shared monitoring tools and strengthening local skills.

Vaccination of livestock ©Hamada (Wandey) AG AHMED

For localization to become a sustainable reality, it is urgent to :
1. Alleviate accountability requirements Harmonize and mutualize expectations between donors, clusters and partners to free up valuable time for field work.
2. Invest genuinely in local capabilities Not just in money, but also in know-how, management and tools, right from the project design stage.
3. Test and deploy innovative technological solutions Blockchain, digital money transfers, collaborative platforms: all levers to fluidify flows and guarantee greater transparency.
4. Building trust The true measure of localization is the ability of local players and communities to make their own decisions, to manage funds themselves, and to be accountable and transparent.
5. Ensuring sustainability Any action can only endure if it is part of a framework of local ownership: either via a structured community system, or through a state mechanism capable of absorbing and sustaining the gains made. Any action that does not come under the heading of “life saving” must be designed to guarantee this prerequisite of ownership. This means, of course, that the time required to prepare and formulate a proposal needs to be extended, with specific funding and dedicated resources that go beyond a simple “proposal writer”.

Rethinking every link in the design and accountability chain, from the taxpayer to the village cell, is the only way to move localization from a mere slogan to a concrete, sustainable transformation driven by the players themselves.

Hamada AG AHMED

 

Hamada AG AHMED

Expert in Humanitarian/Development Programs and Contextual Analyst.

AG AHMED Hamada (aka “Wandey”) is a French-Malian expert in humanitarian management, contextual analysis and development program coordination. He holds a Master’s degree in Humanitarian Management and Development Action from the University of Paris 12 (UPEC) and a diploma from the Bioforce Institute in Lyon, and has over twenty years’ experience in emergency aid, resilience and local capacity building, both in the field and at the headquarters of leading international organizations.

After initial missions in Central Africa and the Sahel with several international organizations, he successively held strategic positions as Head of Mission, notably for the French Red Cross, before taking up the position of Head of the West Africa Desk, where he oversaw humanitarian and development operations in several Sahelian countries. He led the implementation of integrated programs combining health, nutrition, food security, climate change adaptation and early recovery.

He served as Crisis Analytics Team Leader at Mercy Corps, leading a humanitarian analysis and operational research unit covering the central Sahel (including Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso). In this role, he coordinated the production of strategic analytical reports, based on mixed methodologies, to inform humanitarian responses in complex and unstable environments.

In 2019, he joins Groupe URD in Mali as coordinator of the KEY program, funded by the European Development Fund, where he supports Malian authorities and technical partners on strategic planning, results-based management and capacity building with a strong focus on practice analysis and operational agility.

A committed analyst, he is interested in the structural dynamics and weak signals affecting vulnerable populations. He has led several prospective studies, the most recent of which focuses on the forgotten human and environmental heritage of Lake Faguibine, in collaboration with AFD. He advocates an integrated approach combining local knowledge, foresight tools and scientific data to strengthen resilience and territorial governance in fragile areas.

Articles by Hamada Ag Ahmed previously published in Défis Humanitaires :

The resilience of populations and the importance of (very localised) governance in the Sahel.

Tomatoes put to the test