Between political transition, identity-based tensions, and geopolitical and climate shocks: Bangladesh’s complex equation

© Thierry Liebaut – Urgency distribution in Dhaka, Bangladesh

Caught between the traumatic legacy of 1971, the political upheaval of 2024, and new global shocks, Bangladesh is walking a tightrope. As the country establishes itself as an economic player in the Global South, NGOs must navigate an increasingly rigid administrative environment and emerging identity-based tensions. The story of a 24-year commitment with Solinfo, where humanitarian agility is challenged by the complexity of a “laboratory country.”

 

Solinfo in Bangladesh: 24 Years After the Initial Vision

My early morning arrival in Dhaka this year was nothing like the three previous ones. After the familiar shock of the heat, even at 5:30 a.m., I was greeted by an unusual calm: an almost empty airport, as if suspended in time. The immigration process, surprisingly smooth, confirmed this strange impression.

I could have seen it as a symbolic sign of calm following the tension of the recent elections… But above all, it was the result of the sudden disruption to air traffic caused by the outbreak of the conflict in the Middle East.

How could I not think, that morning, of all my predecessors who learned before me to love this country, which is not easily approached. For the NGO Solinfo, which sent me here, has a special history with Bangladesh. It was even here, in Dhaka, that Solinfo’s story began, 24 years ago.

Since 2002, this original idea of training disadvantaged young adults in office software to help them find employment has remained unchanged: Solinfo continues to run a network of vocational training centers to give a chance to those who have the least—young adults, the most disadvantaged among the disadvantaged, girls and boys together, from all communities and religions.

© Thierry Liebaut – Bangladesh, Solinfo centers – Kadam Mubarak, Chittagong

Twenty-four years later, building on that initial momentum, Solinfo has grown into a small NGO operating in several countries, running emergency aid and development programs. In Bangladesh, Solinfo has remained true to this original commitment, as well as to the local team, led from the very beginning by Sultana Afroage, our country director.

This long history creates a special bond—between the teams in France and those in Bangladesh, between successive country directors, and, more broadly, with a country that remains largely unknown to many French people.

Humanitarian work thus holds this kind of surprise: sending you to countries that mean nothing, or very little, to you. For many French people, Bangladesh is one of those countries. It is not part of our collective imagination and appears in our media only when the monsoon season highlights its vulnerability to the effects of global warming.

© Thierry Liebaut – Dhaka, Bangladesh

Yet, in many ways, this country is emblematic of the fractures in the contemporary world. Poor, landlocked between powerful neighbors, and a global powerhouse of the textile industry, it faces considerable demographic, climatic, political, and economic challenges. It must tackle these in an increasingly unstable international environment, marked by growing geopolitical and identity-based tensions.

This country, which was also an early testing ground for emergency aid and development, has just weathered events whose implications remain uncertain, particularly for the NGOs operating there.

 

The Legacy of 1971: Between Resilience and Democratic Fragility

Bangladesh was born in blood in 1971, following a particularly deadly war of independence against Pakistan. This war of independence was accompanied by mass killings of civilians, targeted eliminations of intellectuals, and the systematic use of rape as a weapon of social destruction. Hundreds of thousands of people were killed, and millions fled to India.

For many historians and legal scholars, these events constitute the first genocide since World War II. This foundational trauma continues to shape the country’s political life today, marked by coups and political violence.

 

From Sheikh Hasina’s Stability to the Break in 2024

As leader of the Awami League, Sheikh Hasina came to power in 1996. For nearly three decades, until her downfall in 2024, she shaped modern Bangladesh by embodying a form of stability in a country marked by decades of chaos.

Under her leadership, Bangladesh is opening up and striving to firmly establish the principles that guided its founding: institutional pluralism, a form of secularism, and a generally peaceful coexistence between the Muslim majority and religious minorities.

But it is elsewhere that the change is most visible: in the streets and factories, young women are now working everywhere. Girls’ widespread access to education and their integration into the textile industry have profoundly transformed society, offering millions of them their first income and a form of autonomy.

© Thierry Liebaut – Villager community in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh

In half a century, Bangladesh has been transformed. From a state bled dry at the dawn of independence, it has become a major economic player in the Global South.

Yet, as power consolidated, it inevitably closed in on itself. Accusations of authoritarian drift multiplied, political space shrank, and a growing segment of the population began to feel excluded from the system.

 

2024–2026: A Youth in Search of Change

The student uprising that erupted in 2024 was the culmination of frustration that had been building for years among a large, educated, and connected youth population—one confronted with unemployment, political gridlock, corruption, and a sense of injustice.

The violent crackdown hastened the regime’s collapse, marked by Sheikh Hasina’s flight to India and the beginning of a transitional period led by Nobel Peace Prize laureate Muhammad Yunus. Under his leadership, the interim authorities drafted a constitutional reform plan to strengthen democratic safeguards.

But alongside this democratic protest, another dynamic gained strength: the rise of a more structured political Islam. This movement asserted itself not only through religious discourse but also as a moral alternative to a system deemed corrupt. In certain segments of society, particularly among young people, political Islam appeared to embody order, integrity, and social justice.

Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami thus hoped to capture the protest vote stemming from the student uprising. However, despite an intense campaign, this dynamic did not translate into a significant breakthrough for the party in the February 2026 elections, which were won by a wide margin by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP).

Despite its electoral failure and the choice of a more traditional alternation with the BNP, the Islamist party retains real influence by shifting the public debate toward identity-based and conservative themes.

More than ever, Bangladesh is torn between two conflicting visions of its society and its future.

 

The Local Context: A Barometer of Intercommunal Tensions

It was against this backdrop, just after the elections, that my plane landed in Dhaka on March 8. This political context quickly faded into the background as I interacted with the young people in our centers in Dhaka, Chittagong, and Cox’s Bazar. In our training rooms, it is not concepts or geopolitical balances that are discussed, but individual life paths—always fragile.

These young adults, soon to leave the school system, come to Solinfo’s 10 centers seeking something concrete: access to work, a place in an economy that is rapidly transforming—though not always for them. Above all, they come seeking a means to make a living: an income, a start in life.

This opportunity is even more crucial for young women. Access to employment allows them to exercise a certain degree of freedom in a country where the weight of tradition—regardless of religion—often bears more heavily on their future than on that of boys. Aged 17 to 20, most of our female students envision themselves in very modern jobs and life choices.

One of them, a student at one of our training centers housed in an orphanage, asked me: “I’m torn between joining the civil service, working at a data processing center, or doing freelance digital marketing…”. None of these choices would be possible without the openness and opportunities offered by our centers.

By establishing our centers at the heart of the communities with which we partner, we have the opportunity to observe a wide variety of situations: Buddhist, Hindu, and Muslim communities, as well as private and public centers. This presence gives us a very concrete glimpse into the reality of the country.

© Thierry Liebaut – Solinfo visit in a hindouist center in Chittagong

It has also allowed us to gauge the fear that has spread during this period of transition, often resulting in communities turning inward.

We were thus forced to close one of our centers, located within the Damma Oejaya Buddhist temple, in the heart of a very isolated community of 81 families from the Rakhine ethnic group, originally from Burma. Despite the importance of this education for their children, the community rejected our principle of religious coexistence and chose to withdraw into itself.

This decision was difficult to accept, but it reflects the very real fear of intercommunal violence that marked the transition period.

This episode served as a wake-up call for us. For the first time, we clearly perceived the risks that could threaten our presence. The possibility of Jamaat-e-Islami coming to power cast doubt on the very principles that underpin our centers: the mixing of genders, religions, and communities.

During this period, our country director regularly reported pressure regarding the wearing of the veil. The director of a cultural center in Dhaka also told me a year ago: “In two months, 90% of the women working here started wearing the veil to avoid problems on public transportation.”

Nevertheless, during these nearly two years of transition, the country has continued to function, despite the security and institutional vacuum. And in fact, Solinfo has not faced any new constraints preventing us from carrying out our mission.

 

Solinfo: A Discreet but Well-Established Presence

Our position is undoubtedly also due to the very nature of our program. With ten training centers and approximately 300 young graduates each year—an equal number of girls and boys—Solinfo remains a modestly sized organization.

© Thierry Liebaut – Graduation ceremony, Solinfo Salimul center

Our funding model also contributes to this stability. It is based on a balance between Solinfo France’s own funds, a strong partnership with Terres des Hommes Alsace—which has been in place for six years and has been renewed for several more—and support from local businesses.

This last aspect is emblematic of our approach. Wherever possible, we seek to build local partnerships—whether private or institutional—capable of co-financing or even gradually taking over our programs.

In Dhaka, we can count on a network of companies that support our work through in-kind donations, mentoring, and opportunities offered to the beneficiaries of our centers.

Since Bangladesh is one of the world’s major hubs for the textile industry, many French and European companies are based there. Over the course of my discussions with these stakeholders, I have sensed, for the past two years, a growing concern about the emergence of a regime that would undermine women’s right to work. The director of a textile purchasing office for a major French retailer told me directly: “If women can no longer work, the whole country comes to a standstill.”

But the relief sparked by the election results ultimately proved short-lived within the business community.

 

Bangladesh on a Knife’s Edge

Bangladesh is constantly walking a tightrope. Caught between dependence on globalization and regional constraints, between economic openness and identity-based tensions, every external shock further destabilizes an already fragile balance.

India remains a key partner, but the relationship is ambivalent, now marked by the rise of Hindu nationalism. With Pakistan, ties remain deeply scarred by the trauma of 1971: while diplomatic relations exist, the memory of the genocide continues to permeate political life.

At the same time, the country must contend with the growing economic influence of China, which seeks to establish a foothold in the Bay of Bengal, and the increasingly unpredictable stance of the United States, the primary market for its exports.

Caught between these dynamics, Bangladesh finds itself at the center of an unstable strategic game, subject to competing influences and constant regional tensions.

 

A humanitarian laboratory under pressure

These vulnerabilities have made Bangladesh, for over 50 years, a major field of intervention for NGOs.

Born out of war and the massive displacement of populations in 1971, it was one of the first major theaters of modern humanitarian action. Cyclones, floods, food insecurity: over the decades, NGOs have tested responses there that have since spread elsewhere. Some of the world’s largest organizations were founded there. The country has not only received aid but has also helped to redefine its methods.

© Thierry Liebaut – Market in Chittagong

Compounding these structural tensions is a major humanitarian crisis: that of the Rohingya. Since 2017, nearly one million refugees have settled in the southeast of the country, around Cox’s Bazar. Their prolonged presence places considerable strain on resources, local balances, and relations with host communities.

It has also brought Bangladesh back to the forefront of the international humanitarian response, while highlighting the difficulty of managing a crisis that is likely to persist. It is within this complex situation that NGOs are operating today.

 

Humanitarian Agility Put to the Test by the Administrative “Wall”

Despite the emergence and recurrence of crises affecting the country, working in Bangladesh is becoming increasingly complex. As the country has developed and asserted itself, it has tightened the framework within which these organizations operate. The main challenge is no longer so much access to the field as the ability to navigate a dense administrative environment.

Bureaucracy has become the central point of friction. Nothing is impossible, but everything takes time. Humanitarian action—whether emergency or development—must now contend with this reality that imposes itself on a daily basis.

It requires a long-term commitment, building solid relationships of trust with local partners and authorities, and accepting that every project is as much an administrative exercise as it is fieldwork.

For a small organization like ours, whose strength and legitimacy rest on agility, Bangladesh presents a particularly demanding challenge.

Everywhere else, Solinfo prioritizes this agility: a lean, volunteer-based organization, entirely local teams, rapid decision-making, and rigorous yet streamlined management tools.

In Bangladesh, we have to deal with extremely stringent administrative requirements: ten-year permits, five-year plans, annual approvals, and semi-annual authorizations for the use of funds… Each step involves highly complex approval processes.

Like many of my colleagues, I’ve lost count of the hours spent in the waiting rooms of various government agencies trying to speed up the process of getting that crucial stamp that will unlock our operations.

Without the expertise and experience of our local team, this administrative framework would be unsustainable for an NGO of our size. In fact, in recent years, it has contributed to the withdrawal of certain organizations that were far larger than ours.

 

Conclusion: Beyond Programs, the Imperative of Human Connection

Bangladesh has taken a step forward, but nothing is settled. The coming months will be decisive, both for confirming the country’s political trajectory and for clarifying the space within which NGOs can continue to operate.

Selfishly, humanitarian actors hope for a loosening of the administrative constraints that govern their work. But beyond these constraints, the key challenge remains that of peaceful coexistence among communities, which remains fragile following recent tensions.

These balances must now be rebuilt against the backdrop of a severely deteriorated global economy. For Solinfo, another major shift is already underway: the emergence of artificial intelligence, which directly threatens low-value-added jobs—the cornerstone of the Bangladeshi economic model and the employment prospects of our beneficiaries.

Bangladesh is moving forward, under multiple pressures, but driven by a resilience that is its strength. Paradoxically, the length of our presence in this country gives us the ability to adapt. It also imposes a form of loyalty upon us: loyalty to our history, but above all to our teams.

In development aid, we often speak of the need to avoid creating dependency and to hand the baton to local actors. This is essential. But the work we do also creates bonds. And these bonds matter. Because behind the programs are men and women who remind us that in “humanitarian,” “human” comes first.

As heirs to this history that began here in 2002, the successive teams leading Solinfo carry on both the programs and the bonds. Here, as in Syria, Iraq, Côte d’Ivoire, or Mozambique, we seek to strengthen local community organizations’ capacity to respond to young people’s aspirations for the future.

 

Gérard Payen.

 


Thierry Liebaut

An entrepreneur and travel enthusiast, Thierry joined Solinfo as an active member and was later elected secretary general. At Solinfo, he has found a way to combine work at headquarters with fieldwork, as part of a team dedicated to small-scale humanitarian projects, working directly with local partners and Solinfo’s beneficiaries. In the past, he has contributed to numerous humanitarian programs in Iraq, Lebanon, and Africa.

He oversees Solinfo’s programs in Bangladesh and Mozambique.

 

 

 


Solinfo

© Thierry Liebaut

Solinfo is an international aid NGO based in Paris, chaired by Edouard Lagourgue, and run entirely by volunteers and experts.

Since 2002, we have been working with local partners in crisis-stricken countries to help young people survive, rebuild their lives, and shape the future of their region.

Our beneficiaries come from vulnerable groups, often located in neglected areas where humanitarian aid is scarce or nonexistent.

Our approach: building North–South partnerships to strengthen the resilience of the most vulnerable

To operate as closely as possible to the realities of the countries where we work, Solinfo relies on local structures and teams and supports them with financial, technical, and human resources.

Our initiatives are thus designed with and for the communities, respecting their culture and humanitarian law, in order to strengthen their capacities and autonomy.

>> To learn more about Solinfo


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The risk of abandoning all global water-related goals

© Solidarités International – Distribution of water and kits 6 months after hurricane Chido in Mayotte

A Second UN Water Conference in Late 2026

In December 2026, the second UN Water Conference of the 21st Century will take place in Abu Dhabi. This is a very important event, as nations have never before gathered at the United Nations to work together on issues related to inland waters. The first conference took place in January 2023 in New York. That first conference yielded positive results. National leaders realized that they all faced water challenges and concluded that there was a global crisis in this area. Furthermore, a taboo was broken. Thanks to several countries, including France, discussions were able to begin regarding the shortcomings of what has since been termed global water governance. And it was decided to hold a second UN Water Conference focusing on global goals, which had not been the priority in 2023. This new Conference is much better prepared than the first. In particular, all countries met in Dakar last January at the ministerial level to begin discussing together, following the thematic structure planned for the Conference itself. This intergovernmental meeting in Dakar showed that attitudes have shifted significantly since 2023: many countries are now calling for these UN Water Conferences to become a permanent fixture, a far greater number than in 2023. The hope is that water will be managed much more effectively on a global scale in the future.

© Solidarités International – Distribution of water by Solidarités International in Tawila – Darfur, Sudan

The December discussions will be organized around six major themes covering all key water-related issues. For each topic, countries will seek to drive progress. This will be the case for global water governance, which is one of the six major themes. We can hope that this will advance the cause. Several avenues are being explored.

But if we are not careful, it could also regress, as there is a subtle threat that few stakeholders are currently aware of. It is the risk of losing our bearings and having no global water goals left in five years!

To understand and assess this threat, it is helpful to first take stock of recent progress in global water governance.

 

A headless duck

When it came to water, the international community at the start of the 21st century was like a headless chicken: no shared vision of the issues, no common goals, little shared statistical data, and no collective memory. Many UN agencies were working on water issues but without any real coordination. Countries did not meet at the United Nations to discuss water. The only place where governments discussed water was at the diplomatic conferences organized by the host countries of the World Water Forums. These conferences were very useful—they helped, for example, to establish the human rights to safe drinking water and sanitation—but they were short-lived and did not allow for collective decision-making, as such decisions are made at the UN. Countries’ water-related goals were disparate, and their actions rarely addressed global needs. Oh, there was indeed a global goal for access to safe drinking water adopted in 2000, but it was not ambitious and was declared achieved in 2012—three years ahead of schedule—despite the billions of people who still had access only to contaminated water. Without a shared understanding of the issues at stake, without common goals, without a mechanism for tracking progress, and without a forum for regular diplomatic discussions, global water governance was virtually nonexistent compared to many other issues—such as health or food security—which had clear objectives, regular intergovernmental meetings, actionable decisions, and permanent UN structures.

 

Real Progress in Global Governance

The graph in Figure 1 schematically illustrates the progress made since 2000 and its relative importance in terms of governance. The vertical axis represents a subjective assessment of the quality of global governance relative to that of health or food issues.

Fig. 1: Recent and Expected Progress in “Global Water Governance”

Beyond the existence of the World Water Forums, the first major steps forward were the Millennium Development Goals, which included a target for safe drinking water in 2000 and another for sanitation in 2003. Then, in 2010, access to safe drinking water and sanitation was recognized as a human right. In and of itself, this recognition was very significant. However, for it to serve to improve the lives of the billions of people whose rights are being violated, a large-scale operational implementation program was needed. Such a program, the 2030 Agenda and its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), was adopted in 2015. This was an opportunity for all countries to decide, for the first time, that they wanted to ensure universal access to safe drinking water and quality sanitation at affordable prices, thereby largely meeting human rights requirements. Better yet, the 2030 Agenda adopted in 2015 includes some twenty ambitious global water-related goals aimed at addressing all major global water challenges within a clear overarching vision. These global goals thus address issues ranging from population access to pollution control, water resource sustainability, and water-related disasters (see Figure 2). With a clear overarching vision and goals addressing all major challenges, the duck found its way. In 2015, the world found a compass. Better yet, progress indicators were defined and developed, which within a few years provided a much more precise and objective understanding of the global situation regarding these issues. I would point out, for example, that until 2021, no one in the world had the slightest idea of the global proportion of wastewater flows that are treated before being discharged into the environment—a fact that was quite convenient for justifying inaction but did nothing to help us move forward.

 

Fig. 2: The 2030 Agenda includes targets directly related to water (blue arrows) in many of the SDGs

And then countries finally began to come together at the UN, holding a first Conference on Water in All Its Aspects in January 2023, followed by a second one in December 2026. Since the UN serves as the secretariat for these conferences, the debates are recorded and accessible, decisions are implemented and at least partially monitored, and progress reports are produced regularly. At the same time, UN-Water has grown in strength, and a UN Water Strategy has emerged, which has greatly improved internal coordination among UN agencies. Today, the duck knows much better where it needs to go and whether it is getting there.

However, progress is far too slow. Setting goals such as universal access to truly safe drinking water, halving the volume of untreated wastewater discharged, and ensuring the sustainability of water resources helps guide policy. But the results achieved in relation to these goals are woefully inadequate. Défis Humanitaires published two of my articles[1] detailing this shortfall in drinking water and sanitation in its March 22, 2025, issue. Subsequent updates to global statistics have confirmed the trends described in these articles.

 

Further Progress Expected at Abu Dhabi 2026

However, there is still work to be done to achieve a level of global governance comparable to that in the fields of health or food. By virtue of its very existence, the December 2026 Conference will already represent further progress, as for the first time, nations will come together to assess their woefully inadequate progress toward global water-related goals. The need is enormous, as there is a gaping gap between the goals and the sum of the results of national policies. Could this discussion finally trigger the corrective measures and the political acceleration process that is absolutely necessary? Will this enable all sectors to be mobilized toward achieving the water goals by engaging the Ministers of Finance, Agriculture, Energy, Industry, and Cities? Will this Conference help us understand and acknowledge that if the goals are not being met, it is simply because many national policies today do not aim to achieve them, and that ambitious goals are not achieved by chance? Many of us hope so.

 

The Risk of Losing Everything by 2030

When we look at all the progress made since 2000, it becomes clear that the coherent and balanced vision, the ambitious goals, and the statistical indicators established in 2015 represent a fantastic collective treasure. These are, of course, global public goods, but in reality they are much more than that. Because they are shared by all, they are what enable the duck—pardon me, the international community—to know where it needs to go, where it is heading, and whether it is actually getting there.

© Solidarités International – Distributions of kits and construction/rehabilitation of waterholes on the Al Mokha base in Yemen

This treasure is largely invisible because, with the exception of international donors, most water sector actors refer to the SDGs only symbolically and do not incorporate the SDG targets into their concrete objectives and operational activities. Even at the national level, many countries enthusiastically endorsed the SDGs in 2015 but have never sought to adapt their national policies to ensure their contributions to achieving these shared goals.

This treasure, created in 2015, holds great political value, and I am proud to have been able to make a modest contribution to it. But it is fragile, as it will disappear in 2030. It is, in fact, tied to the 2030 Agenda, which, as its name suggests, will come to an end in late 2030. The value of this collective treasure is currently greatly underestimated in international reports and debates. It is only when it disappears in 2030 that this value will become apparent to everyone.

So, of course, those familiar with the inertia of large UN structures are confident that a new global 2030–2045 agenda will be adopted and assume that this new agenda will include goals for water. This is indeed a possibility, as negotiations on post-2030 global goals will begin in July 2027. But will they succeed in the current geopolitical context? And if they do succeed, how ambitious will the water-related goals be? Will they ensure continuity of efforts by maintaining the same goals? No one knows, of course.

But the risk of failing to reach consensus on a post-2030 agenda—or of adopting a post-2030 agenda that is different and less ambitious than the 2030 Agenda—is inherently significant. Indeed, we must remember that the consensual adoption in 2015 by representatives of the entire global population of ambitious goals designed to address humanity’s greatest challenges was a historic event. This had never happened before in history. The likelihood of such an event recurring is inherently low. But obstacles have also accumulated, and the risk of a lack of consensus or reduced ambitions has become very high. There are many factors that could contribute to failure: a major country that disparages multilateralism has declared that the SDGs are contrary to its policies and interests[2]; national policymakers are not truly interested in the SDGs, preferring to communicate their progress rather than what remains to be done to achieve ambitious medium- or long-term goals; thinkers and decision-makers in 2030 will, as usual, want to do things differently from their predecessors in order to gain personal visibility without concern for maintaining continuity in goals, indicators, and actions; the many purists who see flaws in the content of the current SDG targets will want to rewrite them with the aim of improving them, without realizing that calling for a rewrite is the surest way to end up with nothing at all, since the historic consensus reached in 2015 is highly unlikely to be replicated in 2020, given the current context of severely weakened multilateralism. This could lead to a convergence of interests that ultimately results in the 2030–2045 agenda either not existing at all or being significantly scaled back, with goals and indicators that differ from those in place today.

© Solidarités International – Women gathering water in Darfur, Sudan

For water, this would be a disaster, as the only global water goals currently exist within the SDG framework. Without continuity in vision, goals, and indicators, global water governance would be back to square one. This would represent a major setback (see Figure 1).

 

The insurance policy offered by the French Water Partnership

Since nothing is certain regarding the post-2030 global agenda, there is a real risk of losing the collective asset described above by the end of 2030. The French Water Partnership (PFE), which brings together French stakeholders of all kinds interested in international water issues—and which some call the French National Water Team—is deeply concerned about this potential disaster. Therefore, while fighting for the adoption of a new, ambitious post-2030 agenda that retains at least the same twenty specific water-related goals and their indicators, the French Water Partnership has devised a precautionary measure to safeguard global goals without subjecting them to a game of Russian roulette in these highly uncertain post-2030 negotiations. It recommends that the United Nations General Assembly adopt a resolution on water as early as 2027, through which it would establish global goals modeled on the existing goals without any modification and without linking them to a broader global agenda with a fixed timeframe. This is the approach taken in many areas—such as biodiversity, climate, disasters, and health—where goals were established outside the 2030 Agenda but integrated into the SDGs. The same 2027 resolution would also decide to continue statistical monitoring of water-related SDG indicators. Why 2027?

Because this could be a logical follow-up to the December 2026 Conference, provided that countries recognize the risk of losing their goals and indicators and their responsibility to secure them before the major negotiations on the post-2030 goals. Why the same goals as the SDG targets? Because opening negotiations on the content of new goals risks taking years to reach a conclusion or resulting in less ambitious goals.

I had the honor of presenting this proposal on behalf of the PFE last January in Dakar to all the governments gathered to prepare for the UN Water Conference in Abu Dhabi this December.

Given the worsening water-related challenges around the world, this Conference will only be a success if it leads to progress and prevents any setbacks. Let us therefore hope that this Conference will enable States to recognize both the significant gap between the cumulative results of their national water policies and their global objectives, and their collective responsibility to intensify their efforts toward these objectives while ensuring that these objectives remain on track even after the Conference concludes.

 

Gérard Payen.

 

[1] Eau potable : que nous apprennent les statistiques mondiales au-delà des rapports officiels ?, G.Payen, Défis Humanitaires n°86 of March 6th, 2024 ; Eau potable et assainissement : Atteindre les objectifs, dans quels délais ?, G. Payen, PCM n°919 of December 2024

[2] The United States have announced their withdrawal from the UNESCO in July 2025 for 2 official reasons among which one was The UNESCO is working to promote divisive social and cultural causes and places undue emphasis on the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, a globalist and ideological agenda for international development that runs counter to our “America First” foreign policy“.


Gérard Payen

Gérard Payen has been working for over 40 years to address water-related issues in countries around the world. As Water Advisor to the United Nations Secretary-General (member of UNSGAB) from 2004 to 2015, he contributed to the recognition of the human rights to safe drinking water and sanitation, as well as to the adoption of numerous water-related Sustainable Development Goals. Today, he continues to work toward mobilizing the international community for better management of water-related issues, which requires more ambitious public policies. As Vice President of the French Water Partnership, he also advises United Nations agencies that produce global water statistics. Impressed by the number of misconceptions about the nature of water-related issues—misconceptions that hinder public authorities in their decision-making—he published a book in 2013 to debunk these myths.

 


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