Interview with the general (2S) Grégoire de Saint-Quentin

Introduction Défis Humanitaires: War is back in Europe with the Russian attack in Ukraine. The Sahel has entered a period of great turbulence. The world is fragmenting, becoming more unpredictable and more dangerous. Grégoire de Saint Quentin, who has held major military responsibilities as an army general and whom we thank for this interview, answers questions from Défis Humanitaires, which invites you to discover his analysis of the links between geopolitics, conflict, defense and humanitarianism. Enjoy the interview, and watch the short video at the end.

Alain Boinet
General, on February 26, at an international conference in support of Ukraine at the Elysée Palace, French President Emmanuel Macron declared: “We will do everything necessary to ensure that Russia cannot win this war”. He also sketched out the prospect of Western, and therefore French, troops intervening in Ukraine, assuming what he described as “strategic ambiguity”. In your opinion, how should we understand the statements made by the President of the Republic, who is the head of France’s armed forces?

Grégoire de Saint-Quentin
First of all, as you mentioned, this statement was made at the end of an international conference where all the countries and organizations supporting Ukraine held lengthy discussions on the nature of the military support to be provided. At the time, Russia was campaigning for Vladimir Putin’s re-election, and the narrative of his victory was extremely offensive, while Western aid was struggling to materialize on the Ukrainian side. The primary aim of the conference was to reaffirm the full support of all players for Ukraine, as long as the Russian regime wished to persevere in its war of aggression.

With regard to the deployment of Western troops, you are also right to point out in your question that the President of the Republic in France is the head of the armed forces. This means that he decides on the deployment of forces, with the Armed Forces Chief of Staff (CEMA) then responsible for implementing his operational decisions. Under article 35 of the Constitution, the parliamentary vote remains the final arbiter, and takes place in the weeks that follow.

His questioning of the appropriateness of deploying ground troops, however natural it may be given his position as the institutional cornerstone of our defense system, was not so obvious to our Western partners, whose decision-making processes on the commitment of forces are different from ours. The ensuing debate provided a clearer picture of what would be perceived as “escalatory” by each of the different parties.

AB
Does Russia’s attack on Ukraine on February 24, 2022 constitute a strategic breakthrough, and what are its consequences and implications in the current geopolitical context? What does this mean for you in military terms, for example?

GSQ
It’s much more than just a military issue. The deliberate, unmotivated attack on a neighboring country by a permanent member of the Security Council, the guarantor of international order, is a major event. It has led to a rupture in international relations, and to a transformation whose scope we are not yet in a position to measure. Nevertheless, we can identify two initial consequences.

Firstly, this conflict confirms the primacy of the balance of power in all its crudeness: I impose my will because I am the strongest. It was clear that international regulatory mechanisms had been weakening for several years, but now they have been shattered, and Russia is paving the way for military adventurism the world over.

The second consequence is just as worrying, as it stems from the desire of authoritarian states, particularly Russia, to polarize antagonisms. By declaring war on the “collective West” and assuming leadership of a “global South”, the Russian head of state is seeking to extend and generalize chaos through his representation of international power relations. Today, no one yet knows when the international system will regain its stability, or what the foundations of that stability might be.

AB
In 1991, at the time of the break-up of the USSR, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, France had 160,000 troops at its disposal to deal with a possible war. Today, according to Pierre Schill, Chief of Staff of the French Army, we can mobilize 20,000 men. Is this enough in this context? How do you see the years ahead? What specific military consequences does this entail?

GSQ
There is a return to potential confrontations between powers, with a level of violence and weapons sophistication that is not what we have seen for 30 years: for peacemaking or humanitarian reasons, we intervened in so-called asymmetrical conflicts, most often intra-state, where the level of weapons use and lethality were much lower than what we are seeing in Ukraine. High-intensity, resource-intensive combat is waged in all areas of confrontation (land, air, sea, space, cyber). It’s hardly surprising, then, that the current situation is prompting European countries to rethink the question of their security and the funds they need to allocate to it.

In this much more demanding context, the operational contract set for the French army aims to be able to mobilize and project 20,000 men capable of fighting the toughest battles as part of a coalition. This is very little indeed compared with the situation during the Cold War, and we can legitimately wonder about losses and the renewal of human and material resources if the conflict were to last. Nevertheless, it is important to understand that, whatever the nature of the threat to our interests, it is difficult to envisage operations being carried out within a strictly national framework. We would act in coalition, within a NATO or other framework. What’s more, unlike in Ukraine, we are not currently threatened by an invasion of one of our neighbors, which would require much larger volumes of forces to hold an entire front.

 

AB
Journalist Jean-Dominique Merchet says that “the French army is a bonsai version of the American army”, because France has the full range of equipment, just like the Americans, but on a smaller scale. What do you think about this? Will the new military programming law make it possible to scale up?

GSQ
I understand that such a comparison can be made, but I’d like to add a few nuances.

There are two points in common between France and the United States that are not sufficiently reflected in this expression.

Like its great ally, France has succeeded in developing a vigorous defense industry, at the cutting edge of technology, underpinning sovereign capabilities at the top end of the spectrum that few other countries possess, such as state-of-the-art fighter aircraft and nuclear submarines. This performance is the result not only of ongoing investment by the French government and industry, but also of the tremendous feedback received from our armed forces. Today, a critical mass of equipment is necessary, but not sufficient. We need the know-how and systems to combine them for maximum operational advantage. Artificial intelligence will make a major contribution to this, but nothing is possible without the proven feedback from “real life” that comes with years of operational experience.

The second thing we have in common with the US is that we are the only two NATO countries to have an independent nuclear deterrent, both in terms of how it is implemented and how it is used. This is a particular responsibility for our country, but it is also a major asset in the current context.

It’s important to understand that if our conventional capabilities seem “bonsai”, it’s also because the armed forces budget pays the price of our independence through the maintenance of deterrence. This is not the case with our European neighbors, particularly the Germans. As for the British, who are also a nuclear power, they have just decided to increase their defense spending to 2.5% of GDP, whereas the commonly accepted NATO standard is 2%.

So we need to take a good look at what’s happening around us. If Ukraine had remained a nuclear-armed state in 1991, war would probably not be ravaging its territory today. Nuclear weapons are the ultimate guarantee against existential risk.

At the same time, Russia, the country with the most nuclear warheads in the world, is severely challenged on the Ukrainian front, and is only able to control the situation thanks to the asymmetry of human and material resources with its adversary. Deterrence must be complemented by robust conventional means adapted to new threats.

For example, for the first time in its history, Israel has just been hit by a massive attack of munitions, guided or not, fired from a state, Iran, which has no borders with it. With the widespread “droning” of warfare, which we are seeing in all recent conflicts, there is no reason to think that this type of action cannot be reproduced in other conflicts.

AB
General Syrsky, Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, declared on April 13 that: “the situation has worsened considerably, mainly due to the significant intensification of Russian military actions. Ukraine’s allies are currently unable to provide the necessary military support.” What are the risks of this imbalance for Ukraine and its NATO allies, including France?

GSQ
The risk for Ukraine is to back down and allow the Russian regime to seize the Oblasts it has decided, following bogus referendums, should be attached to the Russian Federation.

For us in the West, when we say that we must not let Russia win, it’s because we must stand up to the law of the strongest, and that Ukraine’s failure will be presented to the world as that of those who supported it, and therefore as the bankruptcy of our political systems based on individual freedom, which is abhorred by authoritarian states.

So, have we done everything in our power so far? I’m in no position to judge. What is certain is that Ukraine is now living on Western perfusion, but there are undoubtedly jolts in this support. At the moment, we’re at a low point which we can only hope will soon be filled by the recent American decisions to resume aid.

We must never forget that the law of the strongest has governed international relations for centuries, and that wars of aggression have ruined Europe several times over. We can only hope that the phenomenon of war, consubstantial with human nature, will be, if not curbed – let’s be realistic – at least limited. I therefore believe that Western countries are genuinely concerned that, after its success in Ukraine, Russia will not stop there, and that its bad example will end up setting a precedent.

AB
A recent poll shows that 65% of French people are in favor of reinstating military service, including 55% of 25-34 year-olds and 62% of 18-24 year-olds. Is this a surprise for you? How do you interpret this poll?

GSQ
Among the younger generation, there’s a growing interest in all meaningful areas of activity, and defense is one of them. Our young people are much more interested in security and defense issues than their elders. They understand perfectly well that they are entering a world that is going to change profoundly, and they want to understand the keys, if only to take control of their future.

Moreover, the military institution is one of the elements of stability in a changing world. To belong to it, even if only for a period of military service, is to capture what makes it so rich: an established framework, standards known and accepted by the whole community, and respect for commitment. The institution offers a degree of security at a time when the world is more uncertain than ever, and we should be pleased that this attractiveness translates into a willingness to serve. This is a considerable change from my generation, when the military profession was disparaged, and national service even more so. I find this survey quite encouraging.

AB
We can imagine that the war in Ukraine is one reason for this new awareness.

GSQ
These young people, and many of their parents, have known nothing but peace. The idea of war had disappeared from their consciousness and didn’t threaten their future. So, with the Ukraine, there is an extremely salutary realization that war is unfortunately an inescapable human reality, and that we need to understand what drives it in order to be able to limit it.

AB
In the Sahel, French troops had to leave Mali, Burkina Faso and then Niger, where they were replaced by the Russians – who are focusing on Libya, while the situation is deteriorating throughout the region, right up to the countries of the Gulf of Guinea. You have extensive experience of theaters of operation abroad. So, in your opinion, what are the reasons for these major changes? How far can they lead?

GSQ
The deterioration in the security situation in the Sahel, recently documented by the UN, is deeply regrettable, because it’s the people who are paying the highest price.

What I find even more worrying for the stability of the region is the repetition of the same political mechanics: military coup d’état, reversal of alliance in favor of Russia with the withdrawal of all European and American partners, followed by the gradual confiscation of public freedoms under the protection of the Wagner/Africa Corps praetorian guard. The radical nature of this process inevitably leads to isolation. This is illustrated by these countries’ threat to break abruptly with ECOWAS. Yet this has been the framework for regional dialogue and stability for over fifty years. It is with ever greater integration and coordination that the region’s armies will eventually defeat a threat as mobile as terrorist groups.

It’s perfectly understandable that people, especially young people, should aspire to change when their future is threatened by all kinds of instability. However, it is to be feared that, having chosen the “Russian model” based on political authoritarianism, the countries of the Alliance of Sahel States will not be able to meet the growing demand for security.

AB
The war will continue, because the jihadist groups are still fighting. It’s simply changing in nature, because they’re not fighting the war in the same way as the French forces on the ground. Can you imagine how this will evolve?

GSQ
You’re right to point out that Wagner, in support of local forces, doesn’t bother with the same principles as Western forces when they’re fighting. After years of fighting terrorism, everyone knows that the behavior of troops on the ground is key to influencing the legitimacy of terrorist groups. Any infringement of human rights on the part of regular forces and their supporters only reinforces this legitimacy in the eyes of the population.

We can therefore expect a chaotic situation for some time to come, as neither side will be able to win out irreversibly. For the immediate neighbors of this “grey zone”, this is certainly a concern, as its potential for external destabilization is not zero.

AB
War in Gaza, France’s decision to launch military cooperation with Armenia, the first NATO and EU country to do so, ongoing tensions around Taiwan and in the South China Sea. Can we view these different situations through the prism of a return to the old Empires, calling into question Western magisterial authority and aggravating the risks of conflict?

GSQ
I don’t think it’s what you call the Western magisterium that’s in question. It’s true that there was a period when NATO beat the USSR by a knockout in 1990, which meant that, for years, Westerners – and the United States in particular – dominated the international system. I don’t think that’s the case any more, not least because the West has made mistakes, and the issue today is elsewhere.

Borders are being called into question. What’s new is that a number of countries believe that no one will be able to prevent them from seizing what they covet by force. When you consider the number of unresolved border issues on every continent, you understand how destabilizing the Ukrainian conflict can be. Especially when Russia claims to be using it as an illustration of a doctrine to fight the West. This makes no sense whatsoever. Democracy, peace and the freedom of peoples to self-determination are not Western values; they are universal aspirations.

AB
Wars have dramatic humanitarian consequences for populations, at the risk of destabilizing neighboring countries with floods of refugees, provoking migratory movements, making political solutions difficult, and radicalizing the forces involved. As someone who has worked alongside humanitarian aid workers in the field – NGOs, the UN, the ICRC – how should humanitarian emergencies and respect for international humanitarian law be taken into account in contemporary and future conflicts? When we start a war, do we ask ourselves enough about the political and humanitarian consequences of the war in all their dimensions?

GSQ
You have to be extremely cautious before committing yourself to a war, and look for every possible way of avoiding it. You always know how you’re going to get into a war, but you never know how you’re going to get out, or when. So you need to weigh up your decision carefully before committing force. On the other hand, once the decision has been taken, you have to be resolute, determined and put all your resources into achieving your objectives quickly.

The humanitarian issue is taken into account at a very early stage in operational planning. The population, like all the factors contributing to the crisis, is carefully analyzed: what is its attitude, what are its needs, what consequences will the actions of the parties to the conflict have on it, and how can this aspect be managed? Humanitarian issues are fully integrated into the conduct of operations. We approach humanitarian aid actors to find out if and how they wish to collaborate. All this is a constant concern.

AB
How would you like to conclude this interview?

GSQ
There are never battles that are lost in advance, and there are never victories in battles that have not been fought. We need to have confidence in our abilities, in our democracies, to defend ourselves in an environment that some – particularly authoritarian regimes – are trying to make chaotic. We have what it takes to prevail, provided we apply the principles we have just outlined. We need to be resolute, tenacious and goal-oriented. You can’t be faint-hearted and you have to stick to what you believe in. When you can do that, it’s the first step towards a return to a stable situation.

 

3 questions 3 answers with Grégoire de Saint-Quentin (french)

 

Grégoire de Saint-Quentin
Army General (2S) of the French Armed Forces

Grégoire de Saint Quentin is 63 years old. A graduate of the Ecole Spéciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr, he completed a full course of military studies, leaving in 2020 with the rank of Army General (2S).

His military career was marked by special forces and joint operations. During the first part of his career, he was involved in numerous operational missions, most often as joint commander. From 2004 to 2006, he commanded the 1st Marine Infantry Parachute Regiment. After graduating from the Institut des Hautes Etudes de la Défense Nationale in 2009, he was appointed General in 2011 and successively commanded the French Elements in Senegal, Operation Serval, special operations and all joint operations from 2016 to 2020.

Since September 2020, he has been applying his operational experience to the development of high-tech intelligence and defense capabilities, in particular as Senior Vice President of Preligens.

Grégoire de Saint Quentin is Grand Officier de la Légion d’Honneur and Grand Officier de l’ordre National du Mérite.