Tag: crisis

Who wants peace prepares for war

Interview with General (2S) Grégoire de Saint-Quentin

Exercice international Saber Junction-2018
  • Alain Boinet : A year ago, in a previous interview (Geopolitics of Defence), you pointed out that beyond the strategic break represented by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it was the questioning of borders that was the main event. A year later, it is the President of the United States, Donald Trump, who is turning the table on the alliance with Europe and threatening to abandon Ukraine. What are the origins and consequences of this new strategic situation?

Grégoire de Saint-Quentin : I think the observation we made a year ago is still entirely valid. The annexation of territories by force, prohibited by the international regulatory mechanisms put in place in 1945, is back more than ever. The election of Donald Trump has had no containment effect, but rather risks amplifying the phenomenon, since the United States, with its political and military power, has until now been the keystone of this regulatory system. By putting pressure on Canada to become the 51st member of the European Union, or on Denmark to bring Greenland under American sovereignty, or even when he seems to have come to terms with Ukraine’s loss of sovereignty over part of its territory in the search for a peace agreement, Donald Trump is ushering his country and the world into a completely new geopolitical era.

This brutal change is an extremely strong signal to all regimes with expansionist ambitions, starting with Russia, which has always historically been built on the military subjugation of its neighbours. Witness the Kremlin’s current slogan: ‘Russia’s borders know no bounds’. The most visible and dramatic consequence of this new strategic order is the primacy of the law of the strongest and the return of wars of annexation in Europe, Africa and tomorrow perhaps in Asia.

  • Europe, having favoured the peace dividend, seems to have been taken completely by surprise by the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and now by the reversal of Donald Trump’s United States. What lessons should we draw from this?

Europe is seeing all its strategic choices of the last thirty years called into question at a delicate moment in its history. It built its model by delegating its security to the United States and developing its economy on massive flows of Russian oil and gas at attractive prices. For the reasons we have just outlined, this system is no longer working at a time when Europe is reaching a peak in debt as a result of previous crises. Our margins for manoeuvre are narrow at a time when we have to make a major budgetary effort to adapt the military resources of the Member States.

Europe is therefore at a key moment in its history, because it really must rethink itself in a much more autonomous way than before. It was founded in a world of cooperation and now finds itself brutally thrust into a world of power relations with protean threats, both military and internal, with the weakening of its dominant political model, that of parliamentary democracy. What’s more, it is imperative to restore economic growth at a time when the main promises in this area are held out by the technological revolution (AI), an area in which the Americans and the Chinese are largely dominant. Lastly, Donald Trump’s all-out tax policy is penalising the entire global economy and, at least for the time being, damaging Europe’s economic prospects.

  • A year ago, the minimum defence budget was set at 2% of GDP. Today, Donald Trump is talking about 5%. In 2017, France’s defence budget was €32 billion, in 2025 it will be €50.5 billion, in 2030 it will be €67 billion, and the Minister of Defence, Sébastien Lecornu, is working on scenarios for increasing the size of the military, which could reach almost €100 billion. What does this mean in practical terms for the armed forces in terms of equipment and manpower, and how long will it take?
École Spéciale Militaire parade in 2023 © Ministère des Armées

It is difficult to give an exhaustive answer in the format of this interview on the number and quality of equipment at the end of the military programming law (LPM) in 2030, especially as the national strategic review, which is to draw up the broad outlines, is still underway. However, we can clearly see the capability efforts we are going to have to make:

  • What the war in Ukraine and, more broadly, the return of strategic competition between the major powers reveal is that equipment that was of little use in asymmetrical conflicts has become indispensable: space capabilities, particularly for observation and broadband communications, control of the seabed, electronic warfare, in-depth fire, ground-to-air defence against all types of aircraft, including drones, and conversely, capabilities for destroying the adversary’s systems of the same type.
  • We are also witnessing the same technological transformation in the conduct of military operations as in economic value chains. Force systems are gradually being reorganised around the processing of data by artificial intelligence. This change has a considerable multiplier effect on the efficiency of military capabilities. It opens up truly unprecedented prospects for the way in which we fight, and therefore large areas of vulnerability for those who fall behind. This is why the Ministry of the Armed Forces recently created an agency specifically dedicated to these issues.
  • Finally, these high-intensity conflicts are characterised by a high level of attrition. So we need more conventional equipment: armour, aircraft and ships. We also need to be able to count on a greater number of human resources who are sufficiently qualified to serve weapons systems that have become digital. The contribution of reservists will play a crucial role.

 

  • Sébastien Lecornu recently declared that “France could be defeated without being invaded”, and that “The main risk for a nuclear power is to see its nuclear deterrent bypassed from below”. From a strategic point of view, how can we decipher these statements by the Minister of Defense?

France is very fortunate to have a deterrent force that it has patiently built up, at the cost of considerable effort, in complete autonomy. It is not dependent on anyone for its maintenance or employment. It is our life insurance against all those who would threaten the very existence of our nation. Having established that it is indispensable, it cannot respond to every threat, because some would not justify the President of the Republic launching a nuclear escalation process. I therefore believe that these are the threats to which the Minister for the Armed Forces is referring when he says that they can hurt us without taking us beyond the threshold of the use of our deterrent.

Volodymyr Zelensky and Sébastien Lecornu in Kiev © Compte X de Volodymyr Zelensky

It is therefore to counter these threats that we must have a military and security tool at the cutting edge of technology. To take an example – totally imaginary – if swarms of drones were to strike simultaneously at several places of power in Paris, it would certainly be a very serious blow to our country’s security, but nuclear weapons would not be of much use to us in this specific case, even if we had identified with certainty who was behind this terrorist attack. You can also imagine combining several kinetic attacks of this type with large-scale hybrid attacks such as cyber actions or large-scale disinformation operations on social networks. Today’s societies and technologies are evolving in ways that make it unnecessary to conquer a country in order to destabilise it and eventually break it up. We need to be aware of this and guard against it.

  • If the United States were to withdraw from NATO or from the defence of Europe, what would be the defence architecture for those countries in Europe that retain sovereignty over their defence? Is the European pillar of NATO the solution or rather an ad hoc coalition of leading countries?

First of all, since the inauguration of the President of the United States, there have been no declarations in favour of a pure and simple withdrawal from NATO, and personally I don’t believe in it. NATO is a military alliance and in the world we live in, being able to count on allies is an asset, even for the United States. On the other hand, it is quite possible that the Americans will say to the Europeans in an even clearer way than hitherto: ‘the defence of Europe is your problem, put the resources into it because we are saving ours for a potential confrontation with China’. We will then have to manage with minimal investment from the Americans, but within the tried and tested framework of cooperation that has existed since 1949. There will certainly be things to adapt, but it won’t be a leap into the unknown.

  • In the event of the United States withdrawing its nuclear umbrella in Europe, the French President has said that he is open to discussions on extending the protection of French nuclear weapons. The idea may seem simple, but putting it into practice would be tricky. Is it feasible?

Without going into detail, the current American nuclear umbrella in Europe is neither designed nor organised in the same way as the French deterrent for strictly national use. It would take a great deal of effort in terms of doctrine and adaptation, as well as consultation between European allies, to put in place the equivalent without American resources. But we are not there yet.

  • Coming back to the war in Ukraine, how do you assess the balance of power on the battlefield?

The balance of power is still in Russia’s favour for the simple reasons of its size, its resources and the support it manages to mobilise from outside. I’m thinking in particular of the reinforcements in equipment and men that have come from North Korea. Having said that, I think that the resilience and dignity of the Ukrainians deserve to be highlighted, even though American support is slipping away without being fully compensated for by European efforts.

Experimental leadership courses continue at the National Army Academy © Ukrainian Ministry of Defense
  • A ceasefire is on the agenda in Ukraine, but how can it be guaranteed? Maps are even circulating showing the presence of French and British troops. But Vladimir Putin doesn’t want that. What are the possible scenarios for guaranteeing a ceasefire, if not a peace agreement?

Russia knows very well that if Western troops are stationed on Ukrainian territory, this will considerably complicate its plans to destabilise the part of Ukraine that it does not already control. It would certainly require major concessions in other respects for it to finally accept this scenario. Unless the United States resolves to impose it by also committing itself to providing security guarantees for the ceasefire. I suppose that these are the issues that are at the heart of the intense negotiations taking place at the moment.

  • Recent polls show (Odoxa) that 3 out of 4 French people are ready to support a rearmament effort and another (Opinion Way) that 50% of 18 to 30 year olds are ready to join the army in the event of a conflict threatening our country. What do you think of public opinion on this subject?

The French are perfectly aware of what is at stake and they certainly remember General de Gaulle’s quote: ‘Defence is the first duty of a state and it cannot fail to fulfil it without destroying itself’. Young French people are much more aware of security issues than previous generations, and what’s more, they are interested in these subjects because they make sense. I find this survey rather reassuring, even if we can also wonder about the attitude of the 50% who will not want to answer the country’s call. This is the point that needs to be worked on without delay, because if Ukraine is still standing after three years of war, it is largely due to the maintenance of its national cohesion.

  • How will the world be restructured, with the return of neo-empires, nation-states and ad hoc coalitions in a context where the West is divided between the United States and Europe?

There is no doubt that there is an imperial reflex in the world today, not to say an imperialist reflex. However, this does not mean that all is lost for those who do not suffer from this pruritus. We have entered a period of great change, and the cards can be reshuffled very quickly. There will be room for pragmatic countries that are confident in their talents and have rid themselves of the shackles that restrict energies. To achieve this, however, we must be prepared to change our agenda and accept the balance of power.

Reduced aid to war-torn Gaza © UNRWA
  • More than 50,000 people have died in Gaza, most of them civilians, and many infrastructures have been targeted and destroyed (hospitals, drinking water stations, electricity stations). First-aid workers, humanitarian aid workers and journalists have been killed. The same is true of Ukraine. Several European countries have just broken their international commitments on the use of anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions, which they are going to use again. What will become of the Geneva Conventions and international humanitarian law, and will wars consider civilians on the opposing side to be the enemy in the same way as combatants?

We have just lived through a period of several decades of intra-state conflicts in which the conquest of the population to obtain its support, willingly or by force, was the very aim of the conflict. Remember the Somali militias who divided the country into feudal fiefdoms, organising the predation of the population and humanitarian aid.

Unfortunately, the people are always the first victims of war. This is true across the ages, because they are also a means of weakening the will of the adversary. The systematic destruction of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, which is in no way a military objective, is being carried out with the aim of weakening public resistance and getting the government to capitulate.

This is a crime under international treaties, but it does not mean that the law of armed conflict and international humanitarian law are disappearing, even if some have decided to disregard them. I’m not convinced that impunity is definitely the rule, and respect for the law is also what differentiates the different protagonists in a conflict.

  • How would you like to conclude?

Firstly, by thanking you for opening up the columns of your hundredth issue to me.

Secondly, I would like to remind you that in these times of great change, humanitarians, like the military, are practitioners who are used to dealing with the reality of conflict. Their advice will be invaluable in building the world of tomorrow.

 

 

Grégoire de Saint-Quentin
Army General (2S)

Grégoire de Saint-Quentin is 63 years old. A graduate of the Ecole Spéciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr, he completed a full course of military studies, leaving in 2020 with the rank of General (2S).

His military career was marked by special forces and joint operations. During the first part of his career, he was involved in numerous operational missions, most often as joint commander. He then commanded the 1st Marine Infantry Parachute Regiment from 2004 to 2006. An auditor of the Institut des Hautes Etudes de la Défense Nationale in 2009, he was appointed general in 2011 and successively commanded the French elements in Senegal, Operation Serval, special operations and finally all joint operations from 2016 to 2020.

In September 2020, he used his operational experience to develop high-tech intelligence and defence capabilities, in particular as Senior Vice President of Preligens.

Since September 2024, he has been Chairman of the ADIT group’s risk management company GEOS. Grégoire de Saint Quentin is Grand Officer of the Légion d’Honneur and Grand Officer of the Ordre National du Mérite.

I invite you to read these interviews and articles published in the edition :

 

So here we are

So here we are. The world before us has collapsed. Humanitarians who see the world through its sufferings could feel it coming, even if the brutality of the shock allows us to be a little dazed. It is all the more violent because the system, already under great external pressure, is collapsing from within. The budget cuts announced by many European countries gave us the beginnings of what was to come.

All of a sudden, we’re left with nothing. For a long time, report after report, we have all known that the concentration of humanitarian funding in the budgets of a small handful of donors represented a danger. Many efforts have been made to diversify, with little result. Why is this?

Development cooperation and humanitarian aid are so ingrained in our systems – the rich help the poor – that we forget why they exist. It’s not really a question of morality. States do not fall within the realm of morality, and if your government spends your tax money to give it to people outside the national community without any obvious return, it is because it has an interest in doing so. When this interest is no longer perceived or perceptible, then there is a problem.

Source: Official Development Assistance (ODA), OECD

America’s ruthlessness should not obscure the fact that many donor countries have been announcing budget cuts for months. But no one is giving any more. Why should we give to countries whose governments, and sometimes whose populations, no longer want to hear from us? Why should humanitarian aid, which is counted in the budget as official development assistance and financed almost exclusively by the countries of the political West, be perceived as neutral? For a long time now, humanitarian neutrality has only been perceived by those who provide it.

With a clear political objective in mind, development aid was designed to enable the least economically advanced, newly independent countries to compensate for the lack of a tax base that would have enabled them to invest in their own physical and social infrastructure. Some countries, particularly in Asia, did this and integrated into the world economy, while others did not. Development cooperation then became a way of getting the least developed countries to converge towards a Western model, not only in economic terms, but also in political and societal terms. Democracy, human rights, gender equality and so on. Can there be economic development and a reduction in poverty outside this model? It would seem so, as surprising as it may seem to us.

Historically, humanitarian aid came from private or religious initiatives. Governments then took over. Since we can’t prevent or stop war, let’s repair its consequences as best we can. Humanitarian aid is as much a reflection of the bad political conscience of rich, democratic countries as it is of our collective good conscience. Funded almost exclusively by government budgets, it has become an industry with no economic competition or ideological adversaries, and therefore resistant to introspection and reform. The marker of success was the constant increase in budgets, and the increase in budgets led to a concomitant increase in the field of humanitarian aid. This cycle has been broken, what are the consequences?

In eastern Chad, the WFP distributes food to new arrivals from Sudan. Photo WFP/Jacques David

The countries of the ‘South’, now very sensitive to external signs of sovereignty, do not want aid, but investment, the only way to stay afloat and develop economically. They have much more choice than before, and are mixing and matching their partnerships according to their interests, sectors and offers. Imagine a country negotiating arms and education with one partner, roads with another, and technical assistance with yet another. Humanitarian aid is rarely negotiated, but it comes largely from the same donors and players.

The countries of the North, now very sensitive to their spending, do not want to help, but to invest, as the only way of maintaining their geopolitical and economic standing. The focus seems to be on the transition from aid to investment, with this summer’s Seville summit on financing for development as the high point of the forthcoming reforms. This means that the focus will be on countries with economic development potential, and that the others will be satisfied with humanitarian aid.

This is how the ‘global Gateway’ model has mapped out a path that is the only valid and politically audible one. The ‘differentiated approach’ to be applied to the most fragile contexts is far from being defined, and it is no coincidence that ECHO is nominally in charge of it, nor that the Commission has postponed the development of an integrated approach to fragility. It is not a priority.

Source : U.S. Foreign Assistance By Agency, ForeignAssistance.gov

So what are we changing?

Aid reform cannot really avoid thinking about why we want to help and how. This is no longer intangible, and the arguments of the twentieth century no longer hold water, either in the South or in the North. Even if humanitarian budgets are better protected from cuts, solidarity NGOs will have to rethink themselves in terms that are audible. Preservation of values or creation of added value? What is on offer? Perhaps this is what we need to redefine, beyond the ‘capacity to manage programmes in complicated areas’ that defines the humanitarian world. Human solidarity still exists, and should continue to exist. Whether this necessarily translates into programmes for the distribution of goods or services on behalf of donors is perhaps open to discussion.

Of course, it’s the closest communities that make the first effort, and sometimes the biggest. Because they are there on the spot, because they themselves have been affected by a disaster or conflict, they mobilise. This effort is not standardised, but it is often adapted. Local organisations exist, and they mobilise all the better because they are known and recognised in the affected communities before the shock. In this respect, ‘localising aid’ is one of the biggest sea snakes in humanitarian aid. But the concept is flawed. Localising aid’ implicitly means that aid is primarily international, but that local actors – often conceived solely in terms of local NGOs – need to be involved. But if international players are providing essential volumes of aid, who said that they alone were responsible for helping victims everywhere? What if our role was not so much to ‘localise’ aid as to support local efforts on their own terms? Because the capacity of local players is built up in the same way as that of international players: by the number of operational responses they have decided on, managed, financed and evaluated, and by the number of mistakes they have made.

This is undoubtedly where one of the changes lies. At the level of mentalities. We need to ask ourselves who on the ground has the capacity to act and how we can help these initiatives, technically and financially, making the most of our technical and logistical expertise, rather like the many very local development NGOs that were very active in the 1960s to 1980s, before the humanitarian steamroller drained all resources. It’s a different approach, based on partnership rather than immediate action, but perhaps one worth exploring. Could we do it?

 

Cyprien Fabre is head of the “crises and fragility” unit at the OECD. After several years of humanitarian missions with Solidarités, he joined ECHO, the European Commission’s humanitarian department, in 2003, and held several positions in crisis contexts. He joined the OECD in 2016 to analyze the engagement of DAC members in fragile or crisis countries. He has also written a series of “policy into action” and “Lives in crises” guides to help translate donors’ political and financial commitments into effective programming in crises. He is a graduate of Aix-Marseille Law School.

I invite you to read these interviews and articles published in the edition :