The Challenge of Humanitarian “Reinvention”

While a federal appellate court validated on August 13 the budget cuts imposed by the Trump administration on international aid[1], it is worth reflecting on the underlying dynamics of this historical reversal, beyond its immediate—and often devastating—consequences for the most vulnerable populations on the planet.

The humanitarian sector is likely experiencing the most existential crisis in its history, and this observation is no longer really in doubt. Indeed, studies and analyses have multiplied in recent months, attempting to warn and convince, through countless articles, of the foreseeable risks and devastating effects of the budget cuts announced by the main funders of international aid. Among these, the freezing and then elimination of more than 80% of U.S. aid, culminating in the dismantling of USAID[2], represents a true catastrophe for the millions of people who relied on the programs previously supported by the U.S. agency for their survival. A modeling study published in early July by The Lancet estimates that the proposed budget reductions could lead to the deaths of 14 million people, including more than 4.5 million children[3]. “They risk abruptly halting—or even reversing—two decades of progress in the health of vulnerable populations. For many low- and middle-income countries, the resulting shock would be comparable in scale to a global pandemic or a major armed conflict,” commented Davide Rasella, co-author of the study and researcher at the Barcelona Institute for Global Health[4]. Other analyses corroborate these projections, estimating, for example, that 2.3 million children suffering from severe acute malnutrition will no longer have access to the treatments necessary for their recovery, in many countries with failing healthcare systems[5].

These figures are staggering when considered against the lessons of history, the ambitions expressed for decades by the international community regarding sustainable development[6], and more broadly, the fundamental basis of what brings us together as a society—the concept of humanity. Beyond the shock experienced by humanitarian actors faced with unfolding tragedies, it is reason itself that seems attacked by the political decisions causing the current crisis.

From economic rationality to political volatility

In response to this crisis, analyses have proliferated to assess not only the impact of these cuts but also to demonstrate their irrationality in view of the amounts involved (and their insignificance in terms of effects on the macro-budgetary balance of the countries concerned), as well as the counterproductive effects they could generate, even with regard to the national interests of the donor states (starting with global public health issues, given the cessation of funding for numerous vertical programs—HIV, malaria, etc.—and support for failing health systems). These findings have been established and known for a long time, and no one seriously disputes today the causal links showing that international aid is an element of global stabilization benefiting all. Nevertheless, acknowledging this does not mean that nothing needed to be changed or radically transformed in the international aid system, starting with the structure and mechanisms of its funding, whose fragility and political dependence are now more exposed than ever in light of the current crisis, even as its positive effects remain evident. Thus, facing such evidence, how can we explain decisions taken by governments, sometimes against what appears to be their own interest or that of their population, and at a relatively modest cost?[7] At first glance, this seems opaque, and perhaps it is because, focused on the system itself—its objectives and impacts—we overlook a crucial factor in understanding current developments: the conditions that allow it to thrive.

Historical reversal or a new era?

The current crisis gives the impression of a major step backward or a return to almost immemorial gains—a feeling entirely legitimate given the real halt in allocated funding and the threat it poses to the survival of the international aid system. However, it is worth recalling that this system remains relatively “young,” both in terms of international relations and the history of international solidarity more specifically. Indeed, while the United Nations system was established in 1945, as a response to the trauma of World War II, functionally it only truly took off after the Cold War in the 1990s, during a very particular historical period. The concept of “humanitarianism,” at least in its modern form, had responded to other “forms” before being structured and defined within its current scope. Each of these historical incarnations developed under specific conditions, linked to particular ideas about society and governance, both from governments and their populations. From the creation of the Red Cross when war became industrialized, producing unprecedented casualties, to the invention of “borderless” humanitarianism during the paralysis of the international system due to bloc opposition, the era and environment always shape how the act of “saving lives” is conceived and structured. The contemporary period, now ending, is no exception.

Complementary narratives now obsolete

From a certain perspective, the past twenty-five to thirty years represent a kind of “golden age” of humanitarianism, as never before in history were so many preventable deaths averted. While never fully covering all identified needs for access to essential services for the most vulnerable populations affected by crises, the progress made by the aid system in identifying needs and organizing an appropriate large-scale response has had a tremendous impact on survival, unmatched by previous mechanisms of human solidarity. Such achievement was only possible because the conditions for such growth were met, combining political will and financial means. The undermining of these conditions is at the root of the crisis observed in recent years—and we must ask why.

2025, ©PUI Syria Rural Damascus Projects, Visit O.ROUTEAU

Looking at the current situation from a broader perspective, we sense a deadlock directly linked to the fact that the narratives supporting the conceptual framework of humanitarianism are made obsolete by evolving realities. This deadlock, and the contradictions it creates for the governments of the main donor countries, explains the profound reversal currently observed.

First, the foundational narrative that has become ineffective relates to the idea of social progress. International solidarity (developmental or humanitarian) has always been anchored, in one way or another, to a sense of moral duty and/or social justice, aligned with the growing prosperity experienced by populations in “developed” countries. Following a continuous period of rising prosperity (the “Trente Glorieuses”), in a world where politics aimed to improve people’s living conditions and meet their material needs, it seemed coherent, even essential, to develop a discourse asserting that the collective ambition should be to eradicate extreme poverty globally and ensure universal access to essential services. In an era of mass consumption and leisure-focused societies, with information technologies making global living conditions visible, persistent famine, malnutrition, or child mortality appeared as glaring inconsistencies detrimental to the civilizational progress promoted by Western societies. Victorious in a unipolar world, the capitalist model was expected to meet citizen aspirations and support minimal development in the least advanced countries while ensuring access to essential services for the most vulnerable worldwide.

But in a “finite” world, where the energy-intensive, consumerist Western growth model is increasingly challenged, and prosperity recedes for large segments of Western populations, political discourse inevitably changes. The narrative of international solidarity struggles to anchor itself. While alternative societal choices are possible, the prevailing discourse increasingly leans toward pessimism and inward-looking thinking. The populist and conservative wave sweeping across the West, with Donald Trump as a prominent figure, acts as a principle-based hostile force toward international solidarity, resistant to rational arguments regarding Northern states’ responsibilities or interests. This complicates efforts by aid actors to fight proposed budget cuts. As governments slash social budgets and public services, cutting development aid reinforces, at low cost, the idea of global effort: “the state must cut here first before taxing its citizens more.” Politically, it avoids controversy over declining living standards at home linked to foreign aid spending. While not the sole reason, the degraded economic context and the end of the myth of infinite prosperity create fertile ground to challenge the concept of humanitarian responsibility. The famous phrase, “France cannot welcome all the misery of the world”[8], resonates today as strongly applied to international solidarity as it did domestically decades ago.

A second powerful narrative supporting donor investment in humanitarian objectives is that of peace. For an extraordinarily long period, the West—and Europe in particular—experienced a relative absence of war on its territories, promoting the civilizational notion of the “end of war.” War, though never entirely gone, was largely a distant phenomenon affecting other regions. This context allowed international law, especially humanitarian law, and related institutions to flourish, offering hope for humanity. The return of war—geographically, e.g., the conflict in Ukraine, and in form, i.e., high-intensity clashes—shatters this utopia. These geopolitical shifts expose inconsistencies and double standards among past “codifiers,” highlighting the selective application of principles. While violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) have always existed, overall coherence was previously maintained by official discourse supporting lawful conflict management. Today’s tragedy in Gaza exceeds the immediate atrocities against Palestinians; it accelerates the deconstruction of the humanitarian space and undermines IHL. Gaza exemplifies this trend, which increasingly challenges aid actors to define a “legitimate humanitarian zone”[9]. Whether in the Sahel, Ukraine, Gaza, Afghanistan, Sudan, Myanmar, Lebanon, or the DRC, this quest grows ever more complex.

Finally, a third narrative mobilized resources from the global North for populations affected by humanitarian crises. This narrative, sometimes called “empathy by kilometers,” suggested that emotional engagement diminished with distance. While partly true, another factor inversely influenced the ability to mobilize resources: as humanitarian crises were once seen as distant and temporary, mobilizing resources in prosperous countries seemed coherent. However, as crises globalize, even affecting wealthy countries, this narrative becomes less effective.

Reinventing humanitarianism

Beyond the budget cuts themselves, the current battle is also fought in the realm of ideas. The “software” has changed, and we must acknowledge it to rethink tomorrow’s humanitarianism. While the future shape of humanitarian action is uncertain, some paths can be explored. First, before being a system or category of actors, “humanitarianism” is above all a concept structured around principles, regardless of implementers. Determining the most operational actor in Gaza is less important than safeguarding the fundamental principles, particularly in operations by the Humanitarian Foundation for Gaza (GHF). Preserving core capacities is thus a priority. Similarly, whether the current period ends or not, it has fostered expertise that must not be lost, to prevent repeating past mistakes. Advocacy should include preserving humanitarian capacity. At the same time, it is essential to expand operational and inventive capacities to other actors, local or not. Tomorrow’s challenges are immense, and all energies are needed to succeed in reinventing humanitarianism. Finally, since much is ultimately played at the level of underlying ideas, activism and witnessing humanitarian realities must remain ever-present, as humanitarianism has historically arisen from indignation at worldly injustices.

Olivier Routeau

A graduate in law and political science, Olivier completed humanitarian project management training at Bioforce in 2007. He then joined Triangle Génération Humanitaire as Field Coordinator and later Head of Mission in CAR, Lebanon, Congo-Brazzaville, and Tunisia. In 2011, he joined Première Urgence Internationale, initially as Head of the Africa Unit, then leading the Emergency and Operational Development Service from 2015 to 2018. Since 2018, he has served as Director of Operations. He has also collaborated with IRIS since 2014 and became the Pedagogical Manager of the “International Program Manager” training in 2020.

Première Urgence Internationale

[1] United States: Court Upholds Budget Cuts Imposed by the Trump Administration on International Aid

[2] The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), created in 1961 by the Kennedy Administration and responsible for American economic development and humanitarian aid, whose dismantling took effect on February 23, 2025, following a decision by the newly elected Trump Administration.

U.S. Agency for International Development

[3] Evaluating the impact of two decades of USAID interventions and projecting the effects of defunding on mortality up to 2030: a retrospective impact evaluation and forecasting analysis

[4] U.S. cuts to international aid could cause more than 14 million deaths by 2030

[5] Deep dive: Food aid cuts leave behind a trail of hunger and uncertainty | Devex

[6] Sustainable Development Goals

[7] Before the clear cuts in its funding, USAID represented 0.3% of U.S. federal spending. “American citizens contribute about 17 cents per day to USAID, or roughly $64 per year. I think most people would support maintaining USAID funding if they knew how effective such a small contribution could be in saving millions of lives,” said James Macinko, co-author of the study published by The Lancet on the impact of U.S. cuts in early July 2025, and professor at the University of California (UCLA).

U.S. cuts to international aid could cause more than 14 million deaths by 2030

[8] Statement repeatedly made from 1989 by Michel Rocard, then Prime Minister of France, in relation to migration issues.

[9] Ukraine-Gaza: Why the Zone of Legitimate Humanitarian Relevance is Shrinking | Alternatives Humanitaires

[10] For a long time, it was assumed that humanitarian actors worked toward their own disappearance, and once crises were resolved, they would cease to exist as their raison d’être would be eliminated.

[11] Save And Rescue (SAR). Here we refer to sea rescue operations for populations attempting to reach Europe by sea.

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“The World to Come as Seen by the CIA”

Éditions des Équateurs, Robert, Diane; United States, Office of the Director of National Intelligence; United States, Central Intelligence Agency

What perspectives can humanitarians draw from the CIA’s latest forward-looking report?

On May 28, the French translation of the latest CIA report intended for the U.S. administration was published in France by Éditions Équateurs Documents. The report, published under the title “The World to Come as Seen by the CIA – Analyses, Facts, and Figures”, offers humanitarians—always alert and seeking foresight regarding tectonic shifts, crisis arcs, fault lines, and the major trends of “concrete geopolitics” that condition our actions—an opportunity to examine their own perspectives, drawing from the data and interpretations of the main U.S. intelligence agency, which in Europe often carries a negative image.

Before delving into the most significant analyses of the report, it is important to highlight two major “biases”:

The report is conceived, written, and structured solely from the perspective of U.S. interests and “extreme and critical” threats to them. It is likely that a similar report produced by French intelligence, while pointing out the same unavoidable phenomena, would highlight others, create a partially different threat hierarchy, and perhaps provide a more nuanced or complex vision.
The report is designed for the current U.S. administration—i.e., the Trump administration. Between the lines, one can detect a vision aligned with, and anticipating, the ideological assumptions and worldview of that administration. Similarly, the absence of a mention of a phenomenon (climate change, for example, as we will return to) is itself indicative of the threat posed by the refusal of the world’s leading power to address that issue.

With that said, the presentation of global perspectives by the world’s leading power cannot leave one indifferent; above all, it cannot “leave the world indifferent,” since U.S. perceptions, in turn, shape the world.

Structurally, the French edition comprises three distinct parts: the report titled Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, the transcript of a U.S. Senate hearing on current global threats, and finally a section Analysis, Facts, and Figures concerning nine countries/states selected, presumably, as significant.

Let us examine, in a non-exhaustive way, the report’s most decisive analyses regarding “extreme and critical” threats to U.S. interests and attempt to discern their consequences or factors for humanitarians in their present and future work.

The first threat cited in the report as affecting U.S. interests (a priority confirmed in the Senate hearing) is organized crime and drug cartels responsible for the massive influx of drugs into the U.S. (notably fentanyl, which has caused widespread deaths), human trafficking, and illegal immigration. While a serious and real threat, this priority is largely influenced by the ideological focus of the current U.S. administration on immigration and related crime (drug inflow, prostitution, and migrant influx often viewed as inseparable). For humanitarians, this political orientation toward border closure and deportation suggests the need to implement or expand programs for the Caminentes (“those who journey”): migrants stranded in Central America or forcibly returned without resources or shelter. The coming years may see a growing population of men, women, and children left with nothing, either there or here, who will require assistance—from daily survival to education.

A persistent threat emphasized by the report is the continuation or increase of terrorism risk. In Asia and the Middle East (except Yemen), ISIS is identified as the primary actor capable of resurging—even without territory—taking advantage of any regional or local instability (e.g., in Syria), expanding as in Somalia or West Africa where it rivals Al-Qaeda networks, and inspiring local initiatives in Europe or Russia. ISIS-Khorasan in Central Asia is described as particularly aggressive, seeking to exploit “high-vulnerability travel routes.” In West Africa and the Sahel-Saharan belt, regional Al-Qaeda affiliates will increasingly destabilize states like Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger (and further toward the Gulf of Guinea), with growing attacks on urban centers and diminishing government control. The report highlights the coordination between active Al-Qaeda affiliates in Yemen (AQAP) and Somalia (Shabab) with the Houthis, facilitating access to more sophisticated weapons and possible coordination to strike Western interests and commercial traffic. For humanitarians, already aware of this threat, the report reinforces the need to anticipate risks along local or cross-border routes, isolated settlements, and logistics chains. Western-origin humanitarians will increasingly be threatened and targeted where these organizations expand, and access to the most remote populations may be risky, contested, or blocked.

China is presented as a source of both regional (expansionist policy in the South China Sea, de facto annexation of islands and islets, military encirclement and harassment of Taiwan) and global threats. U.S. analysts anticipate a coherent “galaxy” of major risks from China’s deliberately aggressive actions: disruption of supply routes and logistics chains used by Western countries, threats to critical infrastructure (energy, security, health, transportation, banking networks, etc.), and information, communication, and internet systems; covert use of AI to manipulate data and open-source information (similarly cited for Russia); and data exfiltration from Western internal or external networks. Humanitarians, who position emergency stocks abroad and ship supplies worldwide, must consider the vulnerability of their logistics chains. Likewise, humanitarian organizations increasingly produce and rely on borderless digital information—data, communications, mapping. To what extent are our systems immune to intrusion, exfiltration, or manipulation?

The Chinese threat is compounded by Russia, which poses risks to Western satellite networks and related communications systems. Humanitarians must question their increasing dependence on vulnerable satellite links. Notably, the report does not mention the risk of Russia cutting undersea internet cables, despite NATO taking it seriously—perhaps intentionally downplaying Russian culpability.

SCO Summit, Shanghai 2025 ©X_Narendramodi

Regarding Ukraine, U.S. analysts do not foresee an imminent collapse along the contact line. Their assessment can be summarized: “The longer the war continues in Ukraine, the more Ukraine will lose.” The report notes Russia’s current military advantage and capacity to continue its campaign longer than Kyiv. Compared to the French former Chief of Staff’s caution that victory favors the adversary who can endure slightly longer, the CIA report highlights the growing risk of large-scale conflict between NATO allies and Russia, including potential nuclear weapons use. While the humanitarian role in a nuclear conflict is theoretical, humanitarians must consider what their role—or absence thereof—would be in a high-intensity, widespread European conflict, where operational procedures, safety guidelines, and logistics could collapse. The potential scale of displacement and humanitarian need would far exceed current capacities, placing humanitarian organizations among the first victims of high-intensity war in the West.

In the Middle East, written before recent Israeli-U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear and military installations, the report lists expected critical threats: attacks on Israel and U.S. facilities, blockages of energy, trade, and logistics routes by Iran or its proxy in Yemen (Houthis). Regarding Syria, the report underscores volatility after Bashar al-Assad’s fall and the risk of ISIS resurgence. For humanitarians, vigilant in the region, this is a reminder: worsening political and military volatility, attacks on minorities (Alawites, Druze), interventions affecting Rojava, or renewed Turkish action would jeopardize access to isolated or displaced populations.

As noted, what a report omits can be as telling as what it includes: climate change. During the Senate hearing, Tulsi Gabbard, Director of National Intelligence, was directly questioned about its absence. Her response—that the report focuses on the most extreme and critical national security threats—implies to humanitarians that the U.S. is unlikely to fund adaptation or resilience programs for vulnerable populations. Consequently, humanitarian needs related to climate change may exceed expectations and capacities. By contrast, French think tanks, such as Institut Montaigne, acknowledge climate’s centrality to policy planning by 2040.

The final section covers nine countries, revealing symbolic and strategic choices. Notably, Denmark, Greenland (separately treated), and Canada are included. Two cases stand out: Syria—marked as “head of state: vacant,” highlighting U.S. ambiguity regarding figures like Ahmed al-Charaa/Al Joulani—and Turkey, whose dossier underscores the massive refugee intake, highlighting the complex humanitarian challenge of new arrivals, return policies, or mass movements toward Europe.

Conclusion

High-intensity Russia-NATO conflict where humanitarian actors would have limited role; growing instability in the Middle East, West Africa, the Sahel-Saharan belt, and Central Asia; threats to supply chains; ongoing risks to information and communication systems; possible data manipulation; U.S. disregard of climate-related humanitarian impacts; and massive unmet humanitarian needs. While the CIA report may be oriented, sometimes simplistic or unnuanced, one fact is clear: humanitarians face pervasive danger and must act—or reinvent themselves—to remain relevant.

Pierre Brunet

Writer and Humanitarian

Pierre Brunet is a novelist and member of the Board of Directors of the NGO SOLIDARITES INTERNATIONAL. He became involved in humanitarian work in Rwanda in 1994, then in Bosnia in 1995, and has since returned to the field (Afghanistan in 2003, the Calais jungle in 2016, migrant camps in Greece and Macedonia in 2016, Iraq and north-eastern Syria in 2019, Ukraine in 2023). . Pierre Brunet’s novels are published by Calmann-Lévy: Barnum in 2006, JAB in 2008, Fenicia in 2014 and Le triangle d’incertitude in 2017. A former journalist, Pierre Brunet regularly publishes analytical articles, opinion pieces and columns.

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