Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2021 – Key figures

The Global Humanitarian Assistance Report has been published for over 20 years by Development Initiatives.

It provides a detailed picture of international humanitarian assistance, based on extensive and accurate data. You will find here a summary of 4 of the 5 chapters of this report, the last one being the methodology.

Enjoy your reading!

 

 

 

 

 


Find access to the PDF of the full Development Initiatives report here.

Summaries of 2018, 2019 and 2020 GHARs can be found on the Humanitarian Challenges website, in the “Studies” section.


Chapitre 1: People and crisis

This first chapter takes stock of the extent of global poverty in four points. The central message is that the pandemic has both exacerbated existing needs and fueled new crises in countries that did not need humanitarian assistance, increasing the total volume of aid needed.

People living in extreme poverty are increasingly concentrated in fragile countries at high risk from the impacts of Covid-19

Source: Development Initiatives based on World Bank  PovcalNet, national sources, INFORM Index for COVID Risk and OECD.

  • People living in extreme poverty are increasingly concentrated in countries that are fragile and at high risk from the impacts of Covid-19. In 2020, 66% of people living in extreme poverty (less than $1.90/day) were also living in one of the 52 countries classified as fragile by the report, up from 40% in 2010. Poverty reduction is progressing overall but is very uneven and has increased by 8% in fragile states.

 

  • Acute food insecurity disproportionately affects the poorest and has been stimulated by the pandemic. The report estimates that more than 80% of people living in severely food insecure areas live below the international poverty line ($3.20/day).

 

  • The Covid-19 pandemic exacerbates humanitarian crises, with more people in more countries affected. The pandemic has exacerbated existing crises but has also been the main driver of humanitarian needs in some countries like Iran. The report estimates that 243.8 million people in 75 countries have been assessed as needing humanitarian assistance (224.9 million in 65 countries in 2019). High numbers of people in need remained concentrated in a small number of countries: more than half of those in need in 2021 lived in just nine countries.

 

  • The number of displaced people increased for the ninth consecutive year to 82.1 million (+3.4%). In 2020, 10 countries hosted 54% of IDPs, a similar proportion to 2019. Many IDPs are in situations of protracted displacement with no possibility of safe return to their homes.
    • 58% were forcibly displaced within the country;
    • 32% were refugees (26.3 million);
    • 5.1% were asylum seekers (4.2 million);
    • 4.4% (3.6 million) were Venezuelans displaced abroad.

 

20 countries with the largest forcibly displaced populations and risk of impacts from
Covid-19, 2019 and 2020

Source: Development Initiatives based on data from UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), Index for Risk Management (INFORM) and Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC).

The report also makes two findings:

  • Women and girls in conflict zones are twice as likely to experience gender-based violence. This gap is likely to increase with the pandemic. The UN estimates that there will be 13 million early child marriages between 2020 and 2030 due to the pandemic.
  • The availability and delivery of covid vaccine has not been equitable, and countries experiencing a protracted crisis have some of the lowest single-dose vaccine coverage rates in the world (2.4% compared to 12.5% in other developing countries covered by COVAX).

 

 

Chapitre 2 : Humanitarian and wider crisis financing

In this chapter, the report highlights that in 2020 global humanitarian needs have increased faster than ever, while the growth of humanitarian aid has stalled. International humanitarian aid volumes had been growing steadily over the years 2012 to 2018 (12% per year on average), peaking in 2018 at $31.3 billion.

International humanitarian assistance, 2016–2020

Source: Development Initiatives based on Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service, UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and our unique dataset for private contributions.

Funding needs through UN-coordinated appeals were also following a steady increase (+90% compared to 2015). However, actual funding declined for the first time in 5 years. Of the $38.8 billion requested, $18.8 billion (including $5.7 billion related to covid) was not funded, compared to $11.1 billion in 2019.

Of the 55 calls in 2020, only 7 received 75% or more of the required funding. The number of calls with less than a quarter of the funding requirement met worsened significantly in 2020, with 17 calls receiving less than 25% coverage. In 2019, no calls were funded at less than 25%.

 

Funding and unmet requirements, UN-coordinated appeals, 2011–2020

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS and UNHCR data

The UN-coordinated appeals do not represent all the needs, so significant funding is provided outside of the appeals. For example, in 2020, the needs of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) rose sharply to a record level of over 1 billion, while the funding gap continued to widen (58% coverage).

In addition, the role of the broader development community is increasingly important and countries in crisis now receive far more development funds than humanitarian funds.

Official Development Assistance (ODA) received by countries in crisis has thus increased from 47% of total ODA in 2010 ($51 billion) to 65% in 2019 ($94 billion). The proportion of ODA reported as humanitarian aid has doubled from 15% in 2010 ($7.6 billion) to 29% in 2019 ($27.2 billion).

 

ODA from multilateral development banks to the 20 largest recipients of humanitarian
assistance, 2010–2019

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC CRS

Multilateral development banks (MDBs) have become increasingly active in crisis contexts, providing increasing volumes of ODA to countries in crisis.

MDB disbursements to the 20 largest recipients of humanitarian assistance have doubled since 2014, from $5.4 billion to more than $10.7 billion in 2019. However, the share of disbursements in the form of grants has decreased significantly in favor of loans.

For the epidemic response, total MDB financing reached $120 billion in April 2021, 95% of which was in the form of loans. The IMF has been the largest contributor, committing $50.4 billion to date.

Finally, the total volume of ODA with disaster risk reduction as its primary objective has increased from $1.4 billion in 2018 to $1.9 billion in 2019.

 

Chapitre 3 : donors and recipients of humanitarian and wider crisis financing

This third chapter makes the key finding that most government donors increased their contributions in 2020, but significant reductions by a few key donors caused overall aid to stagnate.

The volume of international humanitarian aid from the top 20 government donors in 2020 stabilized at $23.1 billion. As in previous years, the top 20 public donors in 2020 contributed 96 percent of total international humanitarian aid allocations. The top three donors (US, Germany, and the UK) accounted for 61% of total donor contributions.

 

20 largest public donors of humanitarian assistance in 2020 and percentage change
from 2019

Source: Development Initiatives based on OCED Development Assistance Committee (DAC), UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service and UN Central Emergency Response Fund data

The largest donors to Covid-19 were the United States, Germany, and Japan.

It should also be noted that many donor countries also hosted exiles and that most government spending within their own borders is not accounted for. In the previous year, three countries accounted for nearly two-thirds of all in-country refugee spending: Germany (29 percent), the United States (21 percent), and France (13 percent).

Another important indicator highlighted in this chapter is the proportion of gross national income (GNI) devoted to international humanitarian assistance because it reflects the importance of humanitarian spending relative to the size of a country’s economy. Within this framework, five donors provided more than 0.1 percent of GNI as international humanitarian assistance in 2020, as shown in the following infographic.

 

20 donors providing the most humanitarian assistance as a percentage of GNI, 2020

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS, UN CERF, World Bank World Development Indicators and International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook data

The proportion of total private funding from individuals continues to grow. For example, in 2019, international humanitarian aid from private donors increased by 9%, from US$6.2 billion in 2018 to a record $6.8 billion in 2019.

Sources of private international humanitarian assistance, 2015–2019

Source: Development Initiatives based on GHA’s unique dataset of private contributions.

While total international humanitarian aid stagnated, 112 countries received more than $5 million in humanitarian aid compared to 69 countries in 2019. One explanation is that the top 10 recipients received 57% of all funding or $13.3 billion (-11%) in 2020 compared to 66% ($15 billion) in 2019.

In addition, with $1.3 billion provided in response to the pandemic, these countries actually received $12.0 billion for other pre-existing or emerging humanitarian needs in 2020, $3.0 billion less than in 2019.

Overall, countries outside of the top 10 recipients received more funding in 2020 than in 2019, but less if those for Covid-19 are removed.

10 largest recipients of international humanitarian assistance, 2019–2020

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Financial Tracking Service (FTS) data.

 

CHAPITRE 4 : funding for effectiveness and efficiency

According to this chapter, international humanitarian assistance would have been provided broadly in the same way in 2019 as in previous years: multilateral organizations received most of their funding from public donors, and NGOs from private donors.

Channels of delivery of international humanitarian assistance, 2019

Source: Development Initiatives based on Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS) and UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) data and Development Initiatives’ unique dataset for private contributions.

Local and national actors are often the first to respond to crises, especially since the Covid-19 pandemic and the resulting restrictions on access. Commitments made at the Grand Bargain, an agreement among the largest donors and humanitarian agencies in 2016, included a global target of 25% of total international humanitarian aid transferred to local and national actors by 2020. Since then, while the absolute volumes of international humanitarian aid passed directly to local and national actors have increased, the scale of this aid falls far short of expectations.

 

Direct funding to local and national actors reporting to UN OCHA FTS, 2016–2020

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data

Pooled funds are an increasingly important part of humanitarian funding because of their responsiveness and flexibility. They consist of the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and the Country-based pooled fund (CBPF). Contributions to the UN pooled funds fell sharply in 2020 to $1.5 billion from a record $1.8 billion in 2019.

It should be noted, however, that the proportion of PBC funding to country organizations continues to grow despite the absolute decrease in CBPFs.

 

 

 

Total funding to UN-managed humanitarian pooled funds, 2011−2020

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA’s CBPF Grant Management System and UN CERF data.

Quality funds (multi-year, unearmarked funding as a proportion of total funding) are another option favored by the Grand Bargain. They should represent 30% of international humanitarian aid by 2020. While they have increased significantly in volume by 2020, as a proportion of total funding, they remain below 2016 levels.

Proportion of resources received by UN agencies reported as earmarked and unearmarked, 2016–2020

Source: Development Initiatives based on data provided bilaterally by UN agencies.

Multi-year funding is, according to the Grand Bargain, funding that lasts 24 months or more from the start date of the initial funding agreement. This method of funding provides implementing agencies with predictable resource levels that can allow for efficiencies and effectiveness by allowing them to plan ahead.

15 donors, which provided 84% of total government humanitarian assistance in 2020, allocated 42% (US$6.5 billion) of their multi-year humanitarian funding in 2020 compared to 50% (US$7.3 billion) in 2019.

Finally, the volume of humanitarian cash and voucher assistance (CVA) continued to grow in 2020 across all types of organizations. This method that can be rapidly deployed in suitable areas was often the modality chosen to respond to the Covid-19 pandemic.

 

Total funding for humanitarian cash and voucher assistance, 2015–2020

Source: Development Initiatives based on data collected with the help of the Cash Learning Partnership from implementing partners and on UN OCHA FTS data


To summarize, here are the key 2020 trends to remember:

– Humanitarian needs are growing: 243.8 million people living in 75 countries have been assessed as needing humanitarian assistance. The Covid-19 pandemic is exacerbating and creating humanitarian crises.

– While global humanitarian needs have grown faster than ever, the growth of humanitarian assistance has stalled. Appeal coverage rates are declining.

– Most government donors increased their contributions in 2020, but significant reductions from a small number of key donors have caused overall aid to stagnate. Overall, countries received less funding in 2020 than in 2019, particularly if those for Covid-19 are removed.

– The structure of international humanitarian assistance remains the same: Multilateral organizations received most of their funding from public donors, and NGOs from private donors. The funding commitments made at the Grand Bargain are far from being met.

 

Rodolphe Rouyer

 

The Afghanistan of the Taliban and us

Humanitarian mission in the eighties. A month’s walk to reach the north of Afghanistan. From right to left, Alain Boinet, Fahim, François and Jean-François.

History will remember August 31, 2021 as the symbol of the chaotic withdrawal of the United States and its NATO allies from Afghanistan after 20 years of a war that began with the Soviet invasion on December 27, 1979. Now that the Taliban have taken over Kabul and are likely to be there for a long time, it is time to draw some useful lessons for thinking about the new period that is beginning.

I speak here in a personal capacity as a friend of Afghanistan since a first humanitarian mission in 1980, followed by many others with Solidarités International and a constant advocacy to support the Afghan population. Let us also remember that Afghanistan played a decisive role with NGOs in the humanitarian revolution of the “duty to assist” which commemorated its 50th anniversary last year and which has since been decisive for the access of relief to populations in danger in the world.

I am well aware that in writing these lines I am leaving the humanitarian field in the strict sense. I believe that this is the moment to share my experience and my thoughts insofar as political errors, ideological errors, ignorance and conflicts generate endless tragedies. This has been the case in Afghanistan for 41 years! And then, I hear and read in the media so many approximations, errors and biases from people who have never been to Afghanistan and who basically don’t know much about it, that it leads me to speak out.

Afghans crowd at the tarmac of the Kabul airport on August 16, 2021, to flee the country as the Taliban were in control of Afghanistan. @Carlos Branson / Alamy Stock Photo

We all have in mind the images of panic at the Kabul airport, the bloody attacks of the Islamic State in Khorasan (EI-K), the chaos and fear. I have a thought for all those Afghans who have fled their country and those who have not yet been able to leave. One never goes into exile without suffering. Let us salute the commitment of all the countries, including France, who have evacuated those who have cooperated with them to protect and welcome them.

A predictable victory.

While clear-sighted observers and men and women on the ground expected a Taliban victory after the withdrawal of the Americans and their allies, no one, not even the Taliban, had foreseen such a rapid collapse of the government, the army and the police, and finally of all opponents. This is the first time in the country’s 40-year history that this has happened, and it speaks volumes about the regime that was put in place after the Bonn Agreement on December 5, 2001, following the fall of the Taliban.

The American military intervention under the mandate of the United Nations was justified after the destruction of the World Trade Center in New York by Al Qaeda on September 11, 2001, and the 3,000 victims that it caused. The mistake was to believe that the Taliban were definitively defeated after their withdrawal from Kunduz and Kabul. More serious was the political error of not inviting them to participate, along with all the other Afghan factions, even though they are very divided among themselves and sometimes as radical as the Taliban, in the Bonn agreements, even though the primary objective was to put an end to the conflict and promote reconciliation.

But what is the main cause of the Taliban’s victory 20 years later? Is it not the fact that they wanted, against all odds, to impose a Western-style political model on a country that is not Western, forgetting its identity and historical characteristics, its long tradition of fierce independence and its reputation as the “graveyard of empires”?

Taliban in Kabul on August 18, 2021 @John Smith/ Shutterstock

Hubert Védrine, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, announced (Marianne 20 to 26.8.2021) “Afghanistan is the tomb of the right to interfere” and added “We lied to these peoples in danger”. Bernard Kouchner, another former minister, has just retorted (L’Express 26.8.2021) “No, the right to interfere is not dead”. This is the whole debate between the school of geopolitical realism and national interests, and the one mainly based on human rights. However, interference in the affairs of another country is not a novelty in international relations.

Here we must remove an ambiguity that consists simply in distinguishing between humanitarianism and politics. The humanitarianism we are talking about in this article is that of neutrality, of the impartiality of aid based without exclusivity on the urgency of vital needs and the independence of these actors. If interference will never end, it is likely that Western interventionism and “state building” will be seriously revised, if not forgotten.

To return to Afghanistan, I recently thought to myself that if we had not lived in the Afghan countryside, if we had not lived with combatants in the field as humanitarians do by necessity, if we had not slept and eaten in the mosques where we were welcomed, if we only knew the cities, the elites and the leaders, it would be difficult to deeply understand this country and the majority of its population, all ethnic groups included. Gérard Araud, former French ambassador to the United States, goes so far as to say, “The Taliban are undoubtedly closer to the mores, beliefs and practices of the majority of the country than the elites of Kabul. Did we understand that the Taliban, bearers of a rigorous conservative Islamic model strictly applying Sharia law, would then become the patriots of the struggle against the foreign presence and acquire a new legitimacy among the population?

Can democracy and liberalism be imposed by force of arms and can George W. Bush’s project of “state building” for democracy be continued in Afghanistan? Bush’s “state building” project to democratize the Greater Middle East through violence by attacking Saddam Hussein’s Iraq with the consequences we know: lies, chaos, destruction, strengthening of Shiite Iran, creation and expansion of Daech whose metastases are now found in Afghanistan, the Sahel, the Lake Chad region, Liberia and which is spreading in sub-Saharan Africa towards the Gulf of Guinea.

The President of the Republic, Emmanuel Macron, has just taken stock of it by applying it to Mali: “I do not believe in “state building”: it is not up to the West to go and build a state in Mali”. And he added in an interview with the Journal du Dimanche (29.8.2021) from Iraq, where he was participating in an international conference on stability and the fight against terrorism: “We have drawn the consequences in Mali before their time of what we saw in Afghanistan.

The question now is what to do with Afghanistan, its 38 million inhabitants and the Taliban, who are likely to be there for a long time. Emmanuel Macron provided a first response when France, Great Britain and Germany submitted a draft resolution to the United Nations Security Council. This resolution aims to define “under UN control, a ‘security zone’ in Kabul” in order to continue the evacuation of Afghans who have worked with the French and other Western countries. This is one of the preconditions for any relationship with the Taliban,” he said. Discussions have begun with the Taliban in Doha and with Qatar in order to “set up airlift operations.

This is a prerequisite for a dialogue that could then be continued and expanded with the Taliban, as several countries are already doing. In the past and for a long time, many experts considered Afghanistan not to be an international strategic issue and therefore neglected it. And yet, in 40 years, this country has seen successive interventions by the Soviet Union, the United States and NATO. Finally, the intervention of the French Head of State on television on August 16 on Afghanistan has suddenly given this country a completely different status, not without reason. Afghanistan today confronts us with 5 unavoidable strategic issues that are as many challenges: terrorism, drugs, immigration, geopolitics and human rights.

The 5 strategic issues in Afghanistan.

Terrorism. At stake is whether Afghanistan can become a base for international terrorism. The double suicide bombing by Daech or the Islamic State in Khorasan (EI-K) on Thursday, August 26, is a real declaration of war against the Taliban. What distinguishes the Taliban from Daech and Al Qaeda is that the former is only interested in Afghanistan, whereas for the Jihadists it is only a base to spread terrorism and their ideology elsewhere in the world. The Taliban made a commitment with the Americans in Doha, and more recently with the Chinese, that Afghan territory would not be used for terrorist purposes around the world. They must therefore demonstrate this.

The pain of families after the Islamic Emirate bombing at Kabul airport @ John Smith/ Shutterstock

I would like also to recall some facts that are forgotten or overlooked. Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda had been in Afghanistan for a long time before the Taliban took power in September 1996. The Taliban were not informed and did not participate in the attack on the World Trade Center that led to their downfall. They probably learned the lessons of this as well as those of their refusal to hand over Osama Bin Laden, for reasons of honor since he had fought with the Mujahideen, described by the West as “freedom fighters” against Soviet troops, when they could have simply invited him to leave.

Drugs. Afghan production of poppies, from which opium and then heroin are derived, accounts for 84% of the opiate drugs sold in the world. In 2021, Afghan opium production was 6300 tons and would represent between 20 and 30% of the GNP, or between 4.1 and 6.6 billion dollars, against 18% for legal agriculture. In 2020, the area of land used for poppy cultivation increased by 37%, or 250,000 hectares, about four times more than in the mid-1990s!

In July 2000, a fatwa issued by Mullah Omar, founder and leader of the Taliban, led to a near eradication of poppies in 2001, from 4,600 tons in 1998 to 185 tons in May 2001, concentrated in the northeast. In a recent article entitled “How the West let Afghanistan become the country of drugs again” (Le Figaro 25.8.2021), Bernard Frahi, Honorary Controller General of the National Police and former Director of the UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime) regional office for Afghanistan and Pakistan (1998 – 2002), calls for “renewed dialogue” and “taking the Taliban at their word by challenging them to impose a total ban on opium cultivation”.

Migration. Many fear a vast migration movement comparable to the Syrian refugees who left Turkey for Europe in 2015. There have long been nearly 2.5 million Afghan refugees in Iran and Pakistan, mostly from the war with the Soviet Union. This year, many have returned from Iran. In addition to the 123,000 Afghans evacuated from Kabul airport since August 14, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has said it fears that 500,000 Afghans will leave this year in a “worst-case scenario,” but that “no exodus has been recorded” so far.

According to a recent UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) report card in Kabul, 558,123 people have been displaced by the fighting since the beginning of the year. It is also true that Afghanistan today represents a land of continuous emigration because of the fighting, endemic poverty and high demography. The Afghan border crossings are currently closed, with the exception of Spin Boldak in the southwest, where cross-border movements are common. Thus, no significant exodus is seen at this stage, but care must be taken to avoid the possible consequences of rapid impoverishment, weakening of the humanitarian effort, and isolation of the country.

Assistant Foreign Minister Wu Jianghao with the delegation led by Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar @Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Wang Yi meets with the Head of the Political Commission of the Taliban of Afghanistan Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar @Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs

International relations. The entire geopolitical balance has been destabilized by the Western withdrawal, the collapse of the regime of President Asraf Ghani and the victory of the Taliban. The Chinese did not wait for the Americans to leave before officially receiving a delegation led by the Taliban’s number 2, Mullah Baradar. Turkey, through its president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, announced its intention to cooperate. Iran, for its part, seems willing to do so, and Russia will be pragmatic if it receives assurances regarding security and terrorism. Let’s not talk about Pakistan, which has always supported the Taliban, or Saudi Arabia and Qatar, which recognized them in 1996. The question for the United States and the EU countries is whether they will give these countries a free hand in the future and what an alternative policy could be!

Human rights. This will be the major stumbling block between the Western countries and the new Taliban regime. What about elections, parliament, media, education, culture, the role of women in society? When the Taliban came to power in Kabul between 1996 and 2001, they left behind the memory of a regime that severely enforced Sharia law (stoning, public execution, amputation, harassment and physical punishment) and prevented young girls from accessing higher education and working. Recently, the Taliban, through their spokesperson, officially stated that they needed competent women, especially in education and health, and that they could work according to Islamic rules. They also asked the civil servants to stay at their posts. Isn’t this an opportunity to take them at their word and set red lines?

The test of humanitarian relief.

The first test for both the Taliban and Western countries will be humanitarian aid. Will the Taliban prevent or coerce it after their victory, and will the West stop funding it after they leave?

Najmuddin Hilal at the ICRC orthopedic center in Kabul @ICRC

Today, one in three Afghans do not have enough to eat, and 14 million people are at risk of starvation, if not possible famine, according to the United Nations. UNICEF warns that one million children are at risk of severe malnutrition. And since the beginning of the year, the fighting has caused 550,000 displaced people to require ongoing assistance. The World Health Organization (WHO) is concerned that 500 tons of medicines and medical supplies stored in Dubai have not been delivered.

The United Nations humanitarian agencies, through the voice of Martin Griffiths, the ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) and humanitarian NGOs have committed themselves to remain in Afghanistan in accordance with their mission. But there is no shortage of obstacles. Will the Taliban keep their commitment when they ask the humanitarians to stay and continue their aid? This is only possible if the principles of neutrality, impartiality, independence and the practice of complete control of the aid cycle are respected: assess, implement, verify and report.

An NGO manager, active in the field since 1987, mentions several immediate difficulties. Whether it is access to banks, which are closed while the need for cash is daily, especially to pay Afghan employees, the current blockage of airports, the need for supplies of medicines, or the issue of customs clearance with the Taliban who are not very familiar with these issues.

For his part, Olivier Routeau, Director of Operations for Première Urgence Internationale (PUI), said that he had already moved on to the question of the aftermath: how do we continue to act with the Taliban in power? It turns out that this was already the case in territories already controlled by the Taliban. In the eastern province of Nangarhar, the Provincial Health Commettee is now headed by a Taleb official who facilitates working meetings. But there is still no authority and no rules established at the central level. Olivier Routeau is also concerned about the famous anti-terrorist laws (COTER) that could criminalize humanitarians. As is often the case, humanitarians must adapt to act, but all share the conviction to “stay and deliver”. For example, MSF has a hundred expatriates on the ground, and in general, Afghans working in these humanitarian health organizations in particular, are not very concerned by departures and evacuations. It is more difficult for development projects, particularly in the field of education.

Since the beginning of humanitarian aid in 1980, it has never been interrupted despite successive military and political breakdowns. It has constantly adapted to its principles and practices, and to the relationships established with Afghans for over 40 years. So much so that the United Nations (UNOCHA) has defined a framework for relations with the Taliban in a document entitled “Engagement strategy with Taliban in Afghanistan”.

Even today, humanitarians cannot leave Afghanistan and its 38 million inhabitants. Thus, UNICEF and WHO call for “the immediate establishment of a reliable and robust humanitarian airlift to send supplies” and I would also add qualified personnel to reinforce the teams on the ground.

A tentative conclusion.

How to conclude in a context of constant evolution and change? What will be the composition of a future Afghan government? Will the evacuation of Afghans be allowed to continue, and what will be the attitude of Western countries and other actors?

Basically, there are two main choices. Either seek to isolate the Taliban, or even punish them, or engage in a dialogue justified by the five strategic challenges of terrorism, drugs, mass migration, geopolitics and human rights.

Isolating and punishing the Taliban would certainly radicalize them and drive them into the arms of countries with little regard for human rights, or even Al-Qaeda and Daech, who would be strengthened in their position and influence.

The former deputy representative of NATO in Afghanistan, Mark Jacobson, a veteran of the American army, has just declared in an interview with the newspaper Libération (30.8.2021): “We have to resign ourselves to some kind of agreement with the Taliban”. No, we must not resign ourselves but understand that, without any angelism, the best way to make the Taliban listen to us on human rights and future evacuations is to dialogue with them on the resolution of the major challenges that the current Afghan reality imposes on everyone.

Isn’t the role of diplomacy also to talk with one’s enemies? And dialogue does not mean bowing down, on the contrary! Finally, in spite of the Taliban’s rough rigorism, we also know the pragmatism of the Afghans and the end of this 20-year war can ease their minds.

The first tests will concern the continuation of the evacuation of Afghans, humanitarian aid and the composition of their government.

And then, Afghanistan is 38 million human beings, nearly half of whom are under 15 years old. In 30 years, there will be 65 million of them in a country that has a structural deficit of cereals to feed its population. Finally, climate change threatens the Himalayan range of the Hindu Kush, a real water reservoir for this country which may one day run out of water for its agriculture.

Is this the end of the war in Afghanistan? Is this the beginning of a path to peace? That’s what’s at stake.

Alain Boinet.