Mali without taboos

Interview with Bruno Fanucchi, major reporter.

A demonstration demanding the departure of Malian President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, June 5, 2020 in Bamako © Baba Ahmed/AP/SIPA

Alain Boinet for Défis Humanitaires. Hello Bruno Fanucchi, thank you for accepting this interview for Défis Humanitaires. First of all, as someone who knows Mali and Africa well, how do you analyze the motives that led to the overthrow of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita during the coup d’état of August 18 of last year? 

Bruno Fanucchi. There had been growing a long popular exasperation in Mali because President IBK was very out of touch with reality. His re-election in August 2018 was more than contested, but he did what was necessary to stay in power. This is fairly classic in Africa: leaders in power usually only hold elections if they are sure to win. His main flaw, which worked against him, is Karim Keita, his own son. He was elected deputy and president of the Defense Commission in the National Assembly, and indulged in some very “jet-setting” parties, which went around the world and shocked Mali. Karim himself ruined his father’s political career. He fled to Côte d’Ivoire on the evening of the coup d’état of 18 August 2020, where he was taken in by his good friend Hamed Bakayoko, who had just been promoted to Prime Minister in Abidjan. IBK’s main ball and chain was therefore his son.

In addition to this, there was the widespread corruption that Mali had known before him, which he allowed to continue and worsen, particularly in the justice system and the administration. This led to deep popular resentment, which resulted in the M5 movement and major demonstrations in Bamako starting on June 5. Finally, a handful of courageous young colonels decided to act and “recuperated” the movement to prevent Mali – which had become a failed state – from sinking into anarchy or the Islamists from taking power.

Without it being clear who really gave the order, the government then fired on the crowd on July 10, killing a dozen people and wounding more than 150. That was the wrong thing to do. Critics then focused on Prime Minister Boubou Cissé, who was accused of having “blood on his hands” and who had never assumed his responsibilities. This set off a firestorm and the power fell like a ripe fruit in the coup of August 18, 2020.

DH. The results of the previous legislative elections were contested. Did this event play a role in the coup? 

BF. That’s right: it was the trigger for this popular anger. The results were contested, but the government tried to delay for a few weeks by hiding the face and finally these results were proclaimed: some were cancelled, others confirmed. Hence the great confusion. The result was not long in coming: tens of thousands of Malians took to the streets. Popular exasperation was at its peak. Especially since it was the hot season and the temperature was sometimes between 40° and 45°. Even in Bamako, there are often load shedding, electricity cuts and water cuts. Hence, popular resentment is exacerbated and quite understandable. And when social anger rises, it quickly becomes irresistible and sweeps everything in its path.

DH. Last May 24, another coup d’état. The President of the French Republic, Emmanuel Macron, spoke of a “coup within a coup”. For what reasons, now that the transition is in place, Colonel Assimi Goïta, who had led the first coup, decided to overthrow the President and the Prime Minister in place.  How to understand this?

Colonel Assimi Goita addressing the press at the Malian Ministry of Defense in Bamako, Mali, after confirming his position as president of the National Committee for the Salvation of the People (CNSP). Malik Konate, AFP

BF. Beware of the weight of words that have their importance. For me, this is not a coup d’état. One can speak of a “coup de force”, but a coup d’état which, in Africa, does not leave a single person dead, where there is not a single shot, and where the whole country goes back to work the next day after two weeks of general strike, I say: hats off! Apart from the political class, the vast majority of Malians have experienced this.

That it was a “coup de force”, that the West and international or regional bodies such as ECOWAS were obliged to condemn it diplomatically for form’s sake, is understandable. But to speak of a “coup d’état within a coup d’état”, as President Emmanuel Macron immediately called it, is only a formula and it was very clumsy… I was in Bamako at the time and, apart from the evening of May 24, when everyone was wondering and stayed at home, nothing happened: neither troops nor tanks in the streets. It was more a “Palace revolution”.

Let me explain. It so happens that President Bah N’Daw, himself a former military officer, a very respectable and honest person who had been recalled to put a “civilian” at the head of the Transition, was unfortunately unable to do much during the first nine months of the Transition.

Following the resignation of Prime Minister Moctar Ouane, he immediately reappointed him to form a new government, which was made public on May 24. This new government was very similar to the previous one, but two colonels who had participated in the first coup d’état of August 18, 2020 were excluded (Colonel Sadio Camara, Minister of Defense, and Colonel Modibo Koné, Minister of Security) without consulting Colonel Assimi Goïta, Vice President of the Transition, who was in charge of these two strategic sectors: defense and security.

As the real boss of the August 2020 “coup plotters”, Colonel Goïta – who at 37 years old already has a brilliant military record and a real record of service – thought it appropriate to immediately call the President and the Prime Minister to account and to upset the order of things a little.  To maintain the unity and cohesion of the army.

DH. Following the coup d’état of August 18, 2020, an ambitious program was drawn up in conjunction with ECOWAS: institutional reform, electoral redistribution, the fight against corruption and impunity, and presidential and legislative elections, all within a period of 18 months. There are now only 9 months left, is this program realistic? 

BF. We are already halfway through the Transition and, to put it bluntly, in nine months it has not done much, Malians have not seen any change. This Transition was led by very respectable people, but they did not prove to be up to the task. There are enormous burdens in Mali, in the administration, in the justice system, in all the bodies of the State, and not much has changed in 9 months.

Under international pressure to hand over power to civilian authorities after 18 months, the program of reforms was not tenable. It looks good on paper, but you can’t reform the constitution and make all these reforms in such a short time.

In order not to alienate the international community once again, the new president of the transition, who was sworn in on June 7, has also declared that the February 27, 2022 election date will be met. However, there are doubts about this… Let’s be realistic.

In his inaugural speech, Colonel Goïta announced that “two-thirds of the sovereignty funds of the presidency will be abolished,” or 1.8 billion CFA francs per year, which “will now be used to provide water and to create health centers for the most destitute populations throughout the national territory. This is a concrete announcement that I think will be followed by effects, while nothing had really changed in the life of the State these last 9 months. But the example comes from above.

DH. A former Malian minister says that the biggest problem in Mali is the centralized state. He advocates a decentralized unitary state that includes all components of Malian society and even customary and religious authorities. Is decentralization part of the solution? 

BF. Basically, he is absolutely right. Decentralization is an important issue, but it is a long process. I know well the former Prime Minister Moussa Mara, and he is a great supporter of decentralization. Already on the campaign trail, he is currently traveling all over Mali preaching security, decentralization, and the fight against corruption, but successful decentralization and a revised Constitution cannot be achieved in 9 months, we must be realistic. Perhaps we should tell the Westerners to stop putting pressure on the Malians, who must remain masters of their own country. That there may be other priorities even before decentralization, such as security.

Westerners must change their software and their glasses and stop telling Malians: “hold elections on February 27, 2022”!

To me, in a country where children have not gone to school for more than 7 years, the priority would be to reopen the schools, to redeploy the State administration throughout the country, and to ensure above all the security of the people in a country at war where villages die every day. Isn’t security the first freedom? Elections are good, but they are not necessarily the emergency in Mali.

The stigma of the attack on the Dogon village of Sobane Da, in central Mali, June 9, 2019. ©REUTERS/Malick Konate

Let’s look at what is happening in the north of the country.

My friend Coumba Traoré (also Secretary General of the Bamako Forum) has just spent three weeks in June in the north of Mali, in villages that have not seen an authority from Bamako since 2012! She gathered under the palaver tree, in 21 villages, the women of the North to listen to their grievances and make a documentary giving them a voice.

What do they expect? The basic public services that any state worthy of the name must provide to its most destitute populations: access to water and electricity to allow them to live in dignity, to stay and work on site and to feed their families. And thus prevent their own children from enlisting in the jihadist movements, which have no shortage of money to survive.

Colossal sums of money have been allocated to Sahel Alliance programs, but nothing, absolutely nothing, has reached these northern villages. This is the cruel reality: under the hot desert sun, international aid evaporates…

DH. In the past, the media have reported anti-French demonstrations in Bamako. What is the situation and is there any resentment among the population against French policy in Mali? 

BF. Anti-French demonstrations exist, but they are not very important. In Mali, they are mostly instrumentalized by some foreign powers, like Russia. We know how effective the Russian mercenaries of the Wagner group are in the Central African Republic, and how they are able to manipulate the crowds skillfully, always against France: they pay a few people to hold banners and signs in the front row proclaiming “Death to France” and they wave Russian flags in the background, it is child’s play. With social networks, it goes very fast and unfortunately does a lot of harm. France has not taken the measure of this psychological and media warfare and has not taken any effective decision to defend itself and to organize the response on social networks.

The anti-French demonstrations were therefore largely instrumentalized and orchestrated, and then, because of the lack of a response, they became more widespread… Today, it is President Macron himself who is fueling the anti-French resentment of African youth, with his tweet condemning the pseudo coup d’état without appeal on the very evening.

I saw Malians, of all political persuasions, standing up against France and Macron. The Malians did not understand this policy of “double standards” of the French president going, in April to N’Djamena, to the funeral of President Idriss Déby and adoubting in Chad overnight the son of the president, who was never elected, but denouncing the following month in Mali a “coup d’état” that did not result in any death or gunfire. It is incomprehensible!

I would add that Macron has no lesson in democracy to give to Africa because he has lost all credibility after having endorsed an unconstitutional third term of office for Alassane Ouattara in Côte d’Ivoire and Alpha Condé in Guinea Conakry, despite hundreds of deaths and arrests in these two countries in crisis.

DH. President Emmanuel Macron, at a press conference on June 10, announced a new framework for Operation Barkhane. He specified that France could not substitute itself for state services and the sovereign choices of states. In a context of deteriorating security in Mali and in neighboring countries, how is this statement perceived?

BF. It was done in two stages. On June 3, France announced that it was freezing all military cooperation with FAMA. This was a very bad signal: how can we explain to the Malians that the French army is staying in Mali but no longer doing anything with the Malian national army? The French army is not at home and cannot behave as if it were in a conquered country…

This was a first mistake of taste. Even if it was intended to put pressure on him, this first warning shot fell flat: Colonel Assimi Goïta remained upright in his boots and did not change his political line for all that, happy and proud to have obtained that ECOWAS did not take economic sanctions against Mali, as it had done in 2020. As we know, it is always the people who pay for economic sanctions, not their leaders.

On June 10, President Macron made an announcement that some journalists have described as “the death of Barkhane. Let us be exact and precise: the transformation of Barkhane, whose boss, General Marc Conruyt, I greeted in Bamako, will be phased in until 2023, with a reduction in the number of troops and not a complete withdrawal of troops, as Macron had clumsily suggested.

This blackmail was very badly received in Mali and in the French army. French soldiers have done an excellent job in Mali since 2013 with Serval, then Barkhane. But any operation that lasts over time threatens to get bogged down, especially if we don’t put all the resources and political will into it. The transformation of Barkhane was something that everyone wanted to see, but to do it “on the fly” by linking it to the institutional upheavals in Bamako was another serious political error.

Macron has mixed and superimposed two agendas: it may indeed be popular to make the French believe that we are withdrawing from Mali on the eve of the presidential elections next April, but it damages our credibility in Africa. For two good reasons: reducing the size of Barkhane and giving it a new mission will take time and cannot be done overnight if we do not want to see Mali collapse in one fell swoop. Moreover, this announcement by the head of the army is hardly elegant or respectful of all our soldiers and officers who have fallen in Mali, and whose families may legitimately feel that they died for nothing!

French soldiers from the “Barkhane” operation leave their base in Gao, Mali, on June 9, 2021. AP

DH. The Covid-19 pandemic is deteriorating the economic and social situation everywhere and in Africa. The IMF estimates that 300 billion dollars should be injected to support African economies and France has taken strong initiatives in this direction. But, in the meantime, how do Malians live from day to day?

BF. I believe the priority for Mali is security. But there is an obvious social front. After two weeks of a general strike affecting mainly civil servants and bringing Mali to a standstill, the National Union of Malian Workers (UNTM) made a sensible decision the day after May 24. May 25 was a holiday in Mali, but from May 26 everyone went back to work and life resumed normally, there was no longer any strike. This is even extraordinary. This does not mean that the basic problems have been solved: low salaries, unemployment, corruption… All this unfortunately exists in Mali and has been further aggravated by the pandemic, because what keeps people alive in many African countries like Mali is the informal economy. When you can no longer go out and work, when there is a curfew, it is complicated. People who live on 1,000 or 2,000 CFA francs a day, if they no longer have any activity, they have nothing because there is no social insurance or unemployment benefits. One job in Mali supports at least 10 people. When you lose your job, it is a whole family that has nothing to live on. This is the harsh reality that Malians have to face.

DH. You were in Bamako during this “Palace Revolution” on May 24 to participate in the Bamako Forum, which is nicknamed the little “Davos” of Africa. What is this Forum and what is its interest?

BF. The Bamako Forum is an original think tank that has existed for more than 20 years. It was founded by Abdoullah Coulibaly, who created the Institut des Hautes Études en Management (IHEM) just before and always refused to be a minister. He is truly the man who made me love Mali, because he cares about the stability, security, peace and development of the country. This year’s theme was perfectly relevant: “Human capital: priorities for a successful transition in Mali”.

In addition to Prime Minister Moctar Ouane, a dozen members of his government were to attend the forum, all of whom had agreed to be present. It turns out that the government resigned the day before the Forum opened. No minister finally came. Only the Prime Minister, who was reappointed, took up the challenge and came to give the closing speech on Saturday, two days before the fateful date of May 24 when he was forced to leave office.

DH. What is the added value of this Bamako Forum?

BF. This Forum is above all a “big family”, but it does not only bring together Malians. It also brings together Africans, Europeans and even Americans… We meet leading personalities such as my friend Cheikh Tidiane Gadio, Vice President of the National Assembly of Senegal after having led Senegalese diplomacy for 9 years in a row under President Abdoulaye Wade. He is a convinced pan-Africanist who created and presides over the Pan-African Institute of Strategy (IPS) in Dakar. Or like Professor Alioune Sall, president of the Institute of African Futures, who is a renowned and talented sociologist, who synthesizes the work of the Forum. These proposals and recommendations are traditionally handed over to the Malian president at a reception at the Palais de Koulouba at the end of the Forum.

As it brings together ministers, decision-makers, intellectuals, economists, and start-ups, this Forum has an aura and a great influence on the entire continent. This year, talented young Africans were awarded prizes in sectors such as technology, innovation or female leadership… Africa is indeed full of talent, but it is still necessary to know them and make them known.

DH. Isn’t there a contradiction between the daily military action against groups described as jihadists and terrorists and the intention of the Transition to negotiate with some of these groups? What is the short-term future?

BF. The future of Mali is not rosy, because the security problem is far from being resolved. But let’s not mince words either: you can only make peace with your enemies!

We will have to talk to our enemies, even the worst ones, whether they are called jihadists, terrorists… This precondition given by Macron to the Malians, ordering them “not to negotiate with anyone as long as French soldiers are there” does not hold water for a moment. And there have been hostage releases, such as that of former Prime Minister and opposition leader Soumaïla Cissé and French hostage Sophie Pétronin, which were obviously obtained in exchange for hard cash during negotiations with the kidnappers, even though any “ransom” has always been officially denied by the authorities in Paris and Bamako.

But what is more serious is the release of nearly 200 “terrorists” in exchange. The French soldiers of Barkhane, who continue to do the job in Mali, thus “neutralized” in June a certain Abu Dardar, who was among the jihadists released last October. That is the scandal. France has turned a blind eye to all this. Of course, one day we will have to talk to people who are neither sympathetic nor recommendable. How can we do otherwise?

We have also seen it in Afghanistan with the Taliban, in Somalia with the Shebabs and in Mali with those who are called “jihadists”, if you kill one, ten others rise up to avenge their brother. If we do not understand this logic, we will not understand anything and this war against “terrorism” will be endless.

DH.How would you like to conclude and what do you think of humanitarian action in Mali, of its raison d’être in such a degraded context ?

Supply in Kidal, Mali, ©Solidarités International

BF. On the political front, let Malians first reconcile and decide among themselves what the best solution is. If the presidential and legislative elections do not take place on February 27, it is not the end of the world. Of course, in the meantime, there have been massacres or killings every day for the past 8 years and settling of scores in Malian villages between traffickers or groups of different ethnicities. So there is a highway and work day and night for the humanitarian action that needs dedicated people and volunteers, as you were part of it with “Solidarités International”. All these volunteers do useful and efficient work, but it must be recognized and respected, and their lives must not be put in danger by boasts or orders that exacerbate anti-French resentment in the field. And they endanger the lives of Malians who take the risk of working with the French for a good cause because life is worth nothing in these countries.

Hats off to those who continue to engage in humanitarian action: there is so much to do, even if their action will never be more than a drop of water in this ocean of sand and needs.


Who is Bruno Fanucchi?

Bruno Fanucchi has been a long-time reporter for the “Parisien” newspaper and has been traveling for more

 than thirty years in Africa and the Middle East from Abidjan to Beirut, from Bamako to Cape Town, from Dakar to Jerusalem, Lomé or Libreville. A specialist in geopolitics, he has interviewed numerous heads of state or rebel leaders and covered elections as well as

 international summits or coups. In Paris, he chaired the Diplomatic Press and then the

Association of Defense Journalists, for which he organized several missions in Africa. Going to meet the political actors or committed decision-makers of the Continent, he is above all a man of the field: he works today for the economic website AfricaPresse.Paris and several magazines for the general public such as “Divas”.

An example of the networking between humanitarian aid and development in Mali

Jean-Bernard Veron, the author of this text, is a long-time development specialist within FAD and now in several NGOs. He has played an important role in bringing humanitarian and development closer together to better meet the needs of populations in crisis zones that he also knows as a man in the field. The case study presented here, which dates back a few years, is a good example of the diversity of possible modes of intervention and their complementarity. 

                                                           

This networking, in a crisis context, between humanitarian aid for displaced populations and host communities and the revival of economic activities, took place in Mali in the Mopti region, more precisely in Konna and Barygodonga, as well as in Gao and Timbuktu.

Funded by the Foundation of France, these projects were implemented on the ground by the APFO [1]

Animals around the troughs of a water tower in rural Mali ©Solidarites International 2019

1. Purpose and objectives

The selection of projects was based on a twofold observation.

On the one hand, the security crisis has jeopardized the coverage of the needs of IDPs and has led to an overload in host communities, particularly in the area of food.

On the other hand, IDPs have had to interrupt the activities that enabled them to be economically self-sufficient. Moreover, their return, once security was restored, would be hampered by the deterioration of their means of production: looted seed stocks, bunds on irrigated perimeters and degraded contour lines due to lack of maintenance, slaughtered or stolen livestock.

These projects therefore aim to help populations affected by the crisis by targeting rural activities, agriculture and livestock breeding, and by combining humanitarian aid and the revival of the beneficiaries’ economic activities.

They are therefore multi-objective projects, in line with this dual purpose.

The first of these objectives is to cover the basic needs of IDPs. To this end, food supplies, impregnated mosquito nets against malaria and, where necessary, the care of malnourished children have been financed.

The second is to relaunch activities that will enable beneficiaries to do without humanitarian aid and regain their autonomy when the security of their region of origin allows them to return.

To this end, the projects have financed :

  • for agricultural activities: seeds and inputs, shovels and wheelbarrows to rehabilitate the dikes of irrigation perimeters, donkeys and carts to transport crops and manure;
  • for livestock: sheep and ewes for the benefit of the women who were engaged in this activity, in addition to market gardening, as well as cotton cake for animal feed.

The third objective, and this is one of the specific features of these projects, is to strengthen the resilience of the beneficiaries in the face of risks, particularly climatic risks. Thus :

  • the seeds provided are selected seeds, particularly wasa rice, combining good yields, adaptation to sometimes erratic rainfall, favouring short-cycle varieties that are resistant to parasitic weeds such as striga ;
  • the women who are to take care of the animals receive training in fattening and care.

The fourth objective, and this is another specificity, is appropriation, according to a bottom-up approach that favours the use of local structures. This is how projects are proposed and implemented by FOs (grassroots farmers’ organisations) without recourse to foreign actors, such as humanitarian or development NGOs. The content of the projects and the choice of beneficiaries is made through discussions between the members of each of the FOs concerned.

As regards the relationship between the beneficiaries of irrigated rice projects and their FOs, the latter provide seeds, inputs and diesel for irrigation pumps and collect a fee at harvest time to cover these costs. FOs can also buy the crops from farmers and sell them on wholesale markets.

Regional APFOs provide technical support [2] and make available to FOs the financing delegated to them by the national APFO [3]. As for the latter, it centralises the requests coming from the grassroots, which it compares with the available resources. It is also responsible for the capitalisation and dissemination functions among member organisations, in particular by resorting to exchange visits between FOs.

Farm in Mali, ©MINUSMA/Harandane Dicko

2. The projects and their results

A point to be underlined is that these projects, with few exceptions, include components implemented by men, in this case rice growing, and others devolved to women in the form of market gardening and/or livestock farming.

As a result, they are in line with a principle of diversification of activities that enables families to better cope with possible hazards, particularly climatic ones.

It should also be noted that in this respect they are based on precautionary practices that predate the current political and security crisis.

There are two projects in the Mopti region.

The Konna FO project targets rice cultivation. It is an irrigated perimeter comprising 300 plots of land of between a quarter and a hectare each. The first harvest shows quite respectable yields, varying between 40 and 50 quintals of paddy per hectare.

The Barygondonga FO combines a market gardening component, carried by the women of this village and focused on the production of onions and potatoes, and a fish farming component implemented by young men (production of fry and a grow-out basin). It should be noted that the women of the FO borrowed from a microfinance institution to build two storage sheds and they repaid this loan without difficulty.

There are also two projects in the north of the country.

The one in Gao has an agricultural component, centred on rice cultivation with the provision of seeds and inputs, as well as wheelbarrows and shovels to repair the dikes, and a livestock component with the provision of two sheep/sheep per woman, cotton cake as animal feed and basic training in veterinary care and fattening.

The rice farmers benefiting from this project have recorded a satisfactory harvest, while farmers in the surrounding area, who grow rainfed or bank crops, have suffered from the lack of rainfall during the last winter.

The project in Timbuktu has the same irrigated rice and livestock components, to which is added a market gardening component for women.

The results obtained by these projects are interesting :

  • yield of 50 to 60 quintals of paddy per hectare;
  • increase from 2 to 8 beds for each of the women beneficiaries of the market gardening component;
  • earlier calving of the ewes;
  • revival of the seed dynamic [4], it being specified that the seeds used are of good quality, adapted to the climatic context and supplied by specialised FOs supported by a project financed by IFAD;
  • securing part of the income from the sale of market garden produce, by selling on credit to civil servants who are more reliable consumers because they receive a salary to guarantee payment of their purchases.

As for the choice of beneficiaries by the FOs concerned, it targeted either the most vulnerable, especially widows, or some particularly efficient actors, in order to serve as examples for the other members of the FO.

3. Conclusion

Each of these projects can be considered technically successful in view of the yields obtained or the fact that the ewes have already had a first calving. They are also in line with the target number of families affected.

Moreover, where there have been cost overruns as mentioned in the call for projects, these overruns have been borne by the PDOPA without reducing either the volume of supplies or the number of beneficiaries.

Market gardening project in the Mopti region of Mali ©AFD

However, this does not mean that they do not face various difficulties. These are of two kinds.

Difficulties due to the vagaries of the weather and, more specifically, the mediocrity of the last wintering, resulting in reduced water availability and the impossibility of linking two crop cycles together. Irrigation pumps have been able to partially overcome these problems, but at the limit of their capacity. And some of them look dangerously old.

More worrying is the question of crop marketing. Indeed, their marketing may have locally and temporarily unbalanced the supply-demand ratio and thus had a depressing impact on sales prices.

To cope with this, storage and conservation capacities for perishable foodstuffs, such as onions or milk, need to be set up. These will make it possible to spread out the flow of products over time. In order to meet this challenge, contacts have been established with a system of collective granaries financed by Swiss Cooperation under the Pana Go project.

Jean-Bernard Véron


Who is Jean-Bernard Véron?

Jean-Bernard Véron - BabelioJean-Bernard Véron is currently a member of the editorial team of the magazine Afrique Contemporaine, after having been its editor-in-chief for 12 years. He is also a member of the Nepal and Emergency/Post-Emergency Committees of the Fondation de France, after having been the director of the International Solidarity Committee. Finally, he is a member of the bureau and the board of directors of the Franco-Laotian NGO CCL (Committee for Cooperation with Laos) and a member of the board of directors of the Franco-Afghan NGO AFRANE.

He has spent most of his professional career at the French Development Agency, where he held the positions of :

  • project manager at the Brazzaville agency
  • project Manager in the Economic Studies Division
  • geographical desk officer Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea
  • geographical desk officer Madagascar, Somalia, Djibouti
  • project manager in the Macroeconomic Studies Division
  • head of the Macroeconomic Studies Division
  • head of the Agricultural and Rural Development Division for Central, Eastern and Southern Africa
  • director of the Asia, Caribbean, Pacific Department
  • adviser to the Director of Strategy
  • head of the Crisis Prevention and Post-Conflict Unit

Jean-Bernard Véron is a graduate of the Institut of Political Science of Paris (International Relations section), holds a DEA in Economics and a DEA in Political Science and B.A. degrees in History, Geography, Anthropology and American Literature.


[1] The APFO (Association of Professional Farmers’ Organisations) brings together some 200 organisations, which may take the form of associations, cooperatives or farmers’ unions.

[2] With the exception of projects implemented in Gao and Timbuktu, where, given the insufficient capacities of the two regional AOPPs. Support was indeed provided by the National AOPP.

[3] The National AOPP also carries out advocacy work vis-à-vis the public authorities, in particular to operationalise the agricultural orientation law passed by parliament or to denounce land expropriations. In addition, it has set itself the complementary objective of strengthening grassroots organisations and empowering them financially.

[4] Several POs have therefore embarked on the production of improved seeds, adapted to the different ecosystems of Mali and duly certified.