Interview with Maurice Gourdault-Montagne

Alain Boinet. For our readers, could you briefly walk us through the highlights of your diplomatic career?

Maurice Gourdault-Montagne. I was a diplomat for just over 40 years. I joined the French Foreign Ministry—not through ENA—but through the Foreign Service’s “Orient” competitive exam, so I’ve always had a strong interest in the wider world beyond Europe. That didn’t prevent me from holding positions in India and across Europe, including two postings in Germany and one in the United Kingdom. I then went on to Japan and China, and I spent a great deal of time in ministerial offices, notably serving as Chief of Staff to Prime Minister Alain Juppé. Later on, I became diplomatic advisor and Sherpa to President Jacques Chirac. So I had a career that combined roles in political offices and postings abroad, including four ambassadorships—to Japan, the United Kingdom, Germany, and China—and I finished my career as Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Alain Boinet. Thank you for that introduction. You recently wrote a book titled “Others Don’t Think the Way We Do,” published by Bouquins Éditions. What does that idea mean to you, and what are its implications for international relations?

Maurice Gourdault-Montagne. “Others don’t think the way we do” is the mindset that anyone interested in difference, in the world, and in what we call “foreigners” should adopt. I began my career with an ambassador who told me, “You know, a German is not a French person who happens to speak German.” That really struck me, and I realized it naturally applies to all nationalities and cultures.

Each of us carries an emotional and cultural background that we inherit from our parents, our environment, and our education. This means we do not see the world in the same way. I emphasize this strongly because I believe that peoples, in particular, share a kind of collective emotional memory.

I once met a British history professor at Cambridge who told me, “It’s very important for the British to understand what it means to be occupied.” He had written books on the French Resistance. He said, “The European continent is a history of invasions, occupations, and occupiers that people try to drive out.” The British don’t have that experience, so it has to be explained to them. That made me think again: others don’t think the way we do. When we look at war or at how the world is evolving, we see it through the lens of our position, our culture, and the emotions we carry.

Each of us could reflect on the emotions we carry as French, German, British, Italian, Indian, Chinese, and so on. Every people has its own history. That history shapes them and shapes how they see the world. This must be taken into account. Every time we meet someone from a different culture, we should ask: how do they see the world? What is their perspective? It is necessarily different from ours, and we need to learn how to interpret it. Learning to interpret others is at the very heart of the diplomat’s profession—but I believe it is also essential for anyone interested in what happens beyond their own borders.

Alain Boinet. So we must be able to embrace both the universality of human nature and the differences that explain why others do not think as we do—and figure out how to reconcile the two. That is exactly the challenge.

Maurice Gourdault-Montagne. Universalism is a very French concept—the idea of the universality of what we represent. What is truly universal? For example, the experience that peoples and individuals have of freedom. But freedom is understood very differently.

In societies where the group takes precedence over the individual, freedom does not carry the same meaning. On the other hand, freedom in the face of oppression is something that is universally shared. I would also say that human dignity is universally shared. That dignity, however, is expressed differently depending on the people. And anything that is degrading, that diminishes the individual, is strongly rejected in every civilization.

But expressions of freedom or dignity can sometimes take very different forms. And that is why others do not think the way we do. We have our own conception—one shaped by Europeans, and by the French in particular, as far as we are concerned. Then, when you go to Africa, yes, freedom and dignity exist there as well. The same is true in Asia. But they are expressed within contexts that are completely different.

Alain Boinet. We have just marked the somber anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. What is the geopolitical significance of this act of aggression? Could this war have been avoided at the time? And what is the main challenge for us now?

Maurice Gourdault-Montagne. So we have indeed marked—if that’s even the right word—the passing into a fourth year of war, which now exceeds in duration the Great Patriotic War that the Russians fought against the Nazis, and likely also surpasses the number of days of World War I, which lasted four years.

We are in a very particular situation in which a divide has ultimately opened up between two parts of the world. This divide became apparent when the United Nations General Assembly responded to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine—an attack on a free, independent, and sovereign country within internationally recognized borders, and in clear violation of the UN Charter. What was particularly striking is that, when it came time to condemn this aggression during the General Assembly vote, although a majority voted to condemn it, between 40 and 60 of the 193 countries chose to abstain, as if it did not concern them.

And yet these are sovereign countries that care deeply about their own territorial integrity and support the UN Charter in all its dimensions. Why did they abstain? Because they believed that the West should deal with its own problems without involving the rest of the world—that this conflict was not their concern. It was even described at the time as a war “between white people,” between Russia and NATO countries. In their view, it may have been avoidable, a proxy war with the United States in the background. This perception became even more pronounced when sanctions were imposed on Russia: only so-called “Western” countries—the United States, Europe, and a few others, essentially OECD countries—enforced sanctions, while the rest of the world largely stayed outside the system, continuing trade with Russia.

This marked the emergence of a global fracture—between what we call the Western world and what later came to be known as the Global South.

We had already seen early signs of this divide. After what I would call the missteps of the United States in the Iraq War, followed by the subprime crisis—the 2008 financial crisis—a number of countries began to think: “Western leadership is no longer working; Western governance is no longer credible; we cannot follow it as it is.” This led to the creation of the BRICS in 2009—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and later South Africa—which has since expanded to include additional countries.

This divide has only deepened. Another major turning point was the Gaza crisis, following the October 7 massacre carried out by the terrorist organization Hamas and the subsequent bloody and indiscriminate response by the Israeli army in Gaza.

Here again, the Global South reacted, pointing out what it saw as a double standard: while the West rightly condemned Russian aggression and sought to bring Vladimir Putin before the International Criminal Court, it appeared far more hesitant to apply the same approach in condemning the actions of the Israeli army and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. As a result, South Africa brought a case against Israel before the International Court of Justice, with Ireland also supporting the move—drawing in part on its own historical memory of British colonization.

This has further widened the divide. The Global South frames the Palestinian issue as one of colonization, seeing Palestinians as experiencing something similar to what their own ancestors endured under Western colonial rule.

We are therefore in a world that is deeply fractured. Today, of course, we also have the “Trump factor,” but we can come back to that later.

You asked whether this war could have been avoided. I believe that the war in Ukraine—with its hundreds of thousands of dead and wounded, widows, orphans, and displaced people, and its profound damage to the international order—might perhaps have been avoided. In my view, while we addressed economic issues after the fall of the Soviet Union, we failed to accompany that with a robust framework for arms control, as had been done with the Helsinki Final Act following the 1975 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

At the time, there was a comprehensive system regulating conventional arms, intermediate-range missiles, the START treaties, the ABM Treaty, and ballistic missiles. That system no longer exists; we allowed it to unravel. At the same time, the collapse of the Soviet Union fundamentally reshaped Europe’s security architecture, yet we failed to build a new one.

At one point, President Macron said that we needed to rebuild a European security architecture “including Russia.” This was not well received by some countries at the time. But security is indivisible: one country’s security is tied to that of others. If I want to feel secure, the country across from me must also feel secure.

Russia invoked this very issue of security to justify its aggression against Ukraine, particularly regarding Ukraine’s potential membership in NATO. I am among those who believe that while any country has the right to choose its alliances, it must also take into account the balance of power and its geographic reality. Pushing Ukraine toward NATO membership may have been perceived as a provocation. I am not alone in this view—several prominent American diplomats, including Henry Kissinger, shared this perspective.

In that sense, we may have gone too far, providing Russia with a pretext. Russia has long struggled with the loss of territories that were once part of its imperial and later Soviet sphere, and it retains a sense of a lost empire. The aggression is clearly Russia’s responsibility, but we likely failed to do what was necessary to come together and ask: what should our shared security architecture be?

The United States remains the dominant power, and it is primarily up to them to engage directly with Russia. Europeans must also have a seat at the table. France and Germany, in particular, should have urged the United States to take this issue seriously earlier, warning that it risked escalating.

There were, of course, the Minsk agreements—two rounds of negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, with France and Germany acting as mediators. But the United States was not directly involved. These negotiations ultimately failed, in part because neither the Russian nor the Ukrainian side fully honored their commitments. I personally attended one session, representing our minister, and I can say that bad faith was evident on both sides.

There were many missed opportunities. In many international situations, the issue of security is absolutely central.

That remains true today. Take the situation with Iran: it is fundamentally a security issue—for both Gulf countries and Iran. Neighboring countries must reach agreements on mutual security. That requires political creativity and a great deal of boldness.

Alain Boinet. In your book, you specifically mention that President Chirac had a global vision of security, and that in 2006 he asked you to reach out to Moscow, Berlin, and Washington—together with one of your colleagues, Laurent Bili—based on the idea: “Why not provide Ukraine with a form of dual security guarantee, ensured jointly by NATO and Russia?” Ultimately, this did not come to fruition, but it could have been a solution.

Maurice Gourdault-Montagne. It could indeed have been a solution. The idea was a form of dual security guarantee in which NATO on one side and Russia on the other would ensure Ukraine’s security. In effect, this would have meant a neutralized Ukraine, overseen by the NATO–Russia Council.

This idea was very appealing to the Russians. When I discussed it with them, one of Putin’s diplomatic advisors immediately responded, “Well, that would solve the Sevastopol problem.” At the time, Crimea was still part of Ukraine—Russia had not yet invaded it, as it did in 2014, nor annexed it. Crimea was Ukrainian, and for the Russians, the idea of seeing the Sevastopol naval base surrounded by NATO, if Ukraine were to join the alliance, was simply inconceivable.

So this proposal would have addressed that issue, as well as Russia’s broader strategic concern as a largely landlocked country, with limited access to open seas—through ice-bound routes in the north, the Russian Far East in the Pacific, and the Baltic Sea. In that sense, Russia lacks easy access to so-called “warm waters,” particularly through the straits leading to the Mediterranean, which is critically important for a major power.

So we were in that situation, and we likely missed an opportunity. But President Chirac was at the end of his term, there was little momentum behind the idea, and the Americans told me that, coming from France, the proposal made them smile. In their view, we had already tried to block the first wave of NATO enlargement to several Central and Eastern European countries, and although we hadn’t stopped the second, they believed our intentions were clear. That was when we understood that the U.S. objective was to bring Ukraine into NATO.

This reflects the application of Brzezinski’s doctrine, outlined in his book The Grand Chessboard: that Russia cannot be a great power without Ukraine. In the strategic rivalry between Russia and the United States, the advantage lies in ensuring a Russia without Ukraine—and that has been a consistent element of U.S. policy since the end of the Soviet Union.

Alain Boinet. You mentioned President Donald Trump in particular. How do you view his second presidency since January 2025? Is it a deep and lasting disruption of the international order, or just a temporary phase?

Meeting at Mar-a-Lago between President Donald Trump and President Volodymyr Zelensky

Maurice Gourdault-Montagne. What is interesting is that President Trump has indeed been elected to a second term in a context already deeply deteriorated in terms of the rule of law and global governance.

We know that the United Nations and international organizations are largely paralyzed in their decision-making capacity. Fortunately, they still exist as platforms for dialogue and for certain actions—I’m thinking in particular of UN climate conferences. But when it comes to conflict resolution, there is a deadlock, and the Security Council is no longer functioning effectively. There is also a growing challenge from so-called emerging countries, about a dozen of which—such as India, Indonesia, Brazil, and others—have become major political, economic, military, and sometimes technological powers. As a result, they want a greater say on the international stage and are contesting the existing international order.

There is also a widening global divide, illustrated by the war in Ukraine and the conflict in Gaza—both unresolved, and on which the United Nations has been unable to act effectively. President Trump enters this already disorganized context, alongside societies that are themselves unsettled, including American society, which is experiencing a sense of decline as emerging powers have taken positions once held by the United States. Today, the U.S. finds itself in competition with a major rival that already surpasses it in certain areas and has significant advantages: China.

President Trump comes into this environment, is elected and then reelected—and Americans know what they are doing in choosing him. What we are seeing is a real rupture. It is interesting to examine the objectives: the goal is to restore the United States’ position, accompanied by a very specific ideological framework, symbolized by the influence of major tech players. In essence, the aim is to secure control over energy resources, rare earths, and financial power in order to ensure U.S. hegemony.

Financial leverage would naturally be restored by bringing the dollar to a favorable level, enabling the United States to revive its industrial base, since an overly strong dollar can be detrimental to trade. Countries with trade surpluses vis-à-vis the United States would be penalized—hence the tariff policies implemented by Trump. Beyond that, the strategy involves acquiring as much energy and as many rare earth resources as possible, even through predatory means. This approach is outlined in Trump’s National Security Strategy, and we can already see it being implemented.

At the beginning of the year, for example, there was the removal of Maduro in Venezuela. This was done without the kind of ideological justification—such as promoting democracy or human rights—that traditionally accompanied American interventions. Instead, the objective appears to have been to secure oil resources and likely to deprive China of access to roughly 5% of its oil supply that came from Venezuela, as well as to cut off returns on the $60 billion China had invested there, which it was being repaid in oil.

Then there was the Greenland episode. While framed as a security issue by President Trump, it is in reality largely about rare earth resources. In negotiations with China, it is not enough to ensure security over Greenland; the key is to control its rare earths directly. Even if it takes a decade to develop refining capacity, it is strategically better to hold such assets outright rather than indirectly through Denmark.

In my view, the Greenland issue is not over, and it clearly illustrates this drive to secure control over rare earth resources. Today, we see a similar dynamic in the conflict with Iran, initiated by Israel with U.S. support. Here again, the long-term objective is to gain access to Iran’s energy resources and to deprive China of an estimated 15–20% of its oil supply. Combined with the situation in Venezuela, this could represent 20–25% of China’s supply, putting its development at risk.

This is the ultimate objective. In the U.S.–China rivalry, China controls around 60% of rare earth production and 80% of refining capacity, while the United States seeks to secure control over global energy resources. We are therefore in a situation where President Trump’s return represents a total disruption.

Added to this is a rejection by the United States of multilateral rules, which are seen as constraints on freedom—an ideology shared by many of those around him, particularly in the tech sector. This marks a sharp break with the multilateral order as it previously existed, not to mention U.S. withdrawals from organizations such as UNESCO and the WHO. The United States had already contributed to weakening the WTO, going back to the Obama administration, when judges were no longer appointed to its appellate body.

Trump is thus entering an already highly unstable global order and seeks to reclaim all the levers that would allow the United States to reassert its dominance and win the race for advanced technologies against China—which is the central issue. This is the situation as we see it, and it constitutes a major rupture.

Alain Boinet. You’ve already partly addressed my question about your understanding of the war being waged by the United States and Israel against Iran, its economic consequences—particularly the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz—as well as the repercussions for Gulf countries, the future of Gaza, and the war in Lebanon. What might become of the Abraham Accords in this reshuffling of the deck?

Current state of circulations in the Strait of Hormuz on March 31, 2026 – Satellite Images, Marine Traffic

Maurice Gourdault-Montagne. We are indeed facing a war whose outcome and resolution remain highly uncertain, because Iran is holding firm and proving resilient. Iran is a sophisticated country that has likely been underestimated. It is the heir to ancient Persia, which once confronted Sparta and Athens—the stories of Xerxes and Artaxerxes, as told by Greek historians. It is a vast country, roughly three times the size of France. It has endured within a complex cultural environment shaped by Turkish and Ottoman civilizations, the Arab world, the Caucasus, and China. It has maintained its distinct identity and unity throughout history. Iran is also highly developed intellectually. Despite being under sanctions for 47 years, it maintains high-level universities and is capable of developing advanced technologies.

It should not be underestimated. It has prepared for war and has two key strengths: first, its capacity for anticipation—developed without the same financial resources as the Gulf states—and second, its strategic position controlling the Strait of Hormuz. Today, this war will likely target U.S. interests in the Strait—whether infrastructure, assets, or military bases. Iran also holds a major strategic choke point in the Strait of Hormuz. This situation could drag on. The countries most affected so far—those suffering the most from Iranian drones and missiles—are the Gulf states, particularly the United Arab Emirates, which have been targeted in more than half of Iran’s attacks.

The United Arab Emirates and Bahrain are signatories of the Abraham Accords. From that perspective, once the war ends, there will likely be a complete reorganization of Gulf security. What has caught Gulf countries off guard is that most of them rely on U.S. protection and have purchased American weapons. This includes Saudi Arabia. They already experienced a shock in 2019, when doubts arose about U.S. protection after Houthi attacks on Saudi Aramco facilities went unanswered.

It was the case much more recently, after the Twelve-Day War and the Israeli bombing of Qatar, which is a stronghold of American presence in the region since there is an American base of command for the whole area with 10 000 men. Many had wondered on the nature of the American protection. Today, we are starting to realize that buying weapons to Americans and being protected by them does not protect you, all the more so as Americans have chosen to support the one that assaulted Iran, without warning and therefore exposing countries that objectively are American allies. So, of course, in the future, all this will cause a reorganization of security. We have seen it already after the issue of Qatar when Saudi Arabia made a security deal with Pakistan. There will likely be a shift towards East.

And everyone is aware of American unpredictability, President Trump’s whims within the frame of the strategy he implemented and is methodically unfolding, which is thought-provoking.

And then, everyone is aware of America’s unpredictability and President Trump’s whims within the framework of the strategy he has put in place and is methodically implementing, and this warrants careful consideration. It is important for all the countries involved to determine whether China is not the pole of stability and the economic engine we need—not by placing ourselves under its protection, but by ensuring that the growth and prosperity of our peoples can be secured with greater stability, by establishing stronger and more robust ties with China. This may even take the form of greater polarization. We have seen that passage through the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz is now authorized by the Iranians for ships that pay the toll in yuan. The Chinese currency will undoubtedly continue to gain importance. Previously, the Chinese had put in place a whole system to circumvent the sanctions that apply when conducting transactions in dollars while under U.S. sanctions. Today, dollar transactions still account for 50%, while yuan transactions make up 10%. But if oil transactions in the Gulf are increasingly conducted in yuan—as was already the case before—we can see that this trend is gaining momentum. This may not destabilize the dollar, but it could compete with the dollar more intensely than has been the case to date. So these are very significant consequences.

Before that, I think the consequences of this war will be felt in other areas. There’s energy, oil, and then gas. When we look at the ripple effects, particularly in India, where there are now 400 million Indians who can no longer find gas cylinders and are forced to cook their food over charcoal or cow dung, as in the past. This means that these 400 million Indians will no longer be able to eat at the small neighborhood and street restaurants that used to be available. So this is a huge problem.

A second problem that will affect India, but also Egypt, African countries, and the United States: 30% of fertilizers and all fertilizer-related chemicals pass through the Strait of Hormuz. Sulfur, ammonia, urea, industrial products, helium, and aluminum-related products all pass through the Strait of Hormuz.

In short, this will bring agriculture to a standstill. In a number of countries, spring planting will not be possible with the fertilizers and agricultural chemicals that are typically used. Won’t all of this lead to lower crop yields, resulting in a decline in self-sufficiency for some countries or an increase in imports for many others? Consequently, food shortages—and food shortages leading to famines.

We are in an extremely serious situation, the full extent of which we have not yet grasped. And the Iranians hold the upper hand: they control the Strait of Hormuz, and so far no one has seriously considered clearing the Strait of Hormuz by force. In fact, all they would need to do is sink a few ships in the strait, and that would disrupt traffic for a long time.

The Iranians’ strategy is to create a crisis so severe that all the countries of the world, for both energy and food security reasons, will pressure the United States to end the war.

There is also the Israeli dimension you mentioned. The Israelis, for security reasons—which is their strategy following October 7, and one that is understandable—attacked Iran and believed that by decapitating the regime, the country would collapse. But that is not the case, given Iran’s structure, the country’s political organization, and the fact that they themselves had planned for this decapitation by preparing, down to the last minute, to replace leaders in all regions where they have a degree of autonomy to respond to strikes, as well as the means to do so.

Following a Hezbollah attack, the Israelis decided to launch a massive incursion into southern Lebanon. They drove a million Lebanese from their homes. In the end, they are doing in southern Lebanon what they did in Gaza. This is undoubtedly part of the “Greater Israel” policy and represents concessions made by Netanyahu to the members of his coalition. One need only hear them speak of securing southern Lebanon, and thus extending as far as the Litani River. One can imagine an annexation of southern Lebanon by Israel at the expense of Lebanese sovereignty. This is therefore a very serious event and a challenge to the existing order, all without a coherent political plan. It is, once again, a negation of the sovereignty of neighboring countries and a failure to resolve the Palestinian issue, which has been completely sidelined.

No one is talking about what is happening in Gaza right now. No one is talking about what is happening in the occupied territories, particularly in the West Bank, where Israeli settlement activity and the behavior of the settlers have become completely intolerable, to the point that retired Israeli generals have denounced in an op-ed what they call “Jewish terrorism.”

The situation is getting worse. It is true that the Iranian regime is a despicable regime, one that massacred its own people and youth in early January. Wasn’t this war launched by the Americans and Israelis without fully assessing all its consequences? Wouldn’t negotiation have been preferable—negotiation under pressure, as had been attempted at the very beginning, particularly in January, with Omani intermediaries on the verge of reaching an agreement?

We have embarked on an adventure whose consequences are difficult to gauge, but which is undoubtedly among the most serious and far-reaching military ventures we have seen in a very long time.

Alain Boinet. In your book, does the “return of empires” you mention also entail a return of nation-states, and how might this development relate to the European Union, the United Nations, and multilateralism?

Maurice Gourdault-Montagne. Yes, empires are being reestablished. In fact, there are empires that existed as such, like the Russian Empire, which became the Soviet Empire. You also have the Chinese Empire, and the Chinese are not conquerors. The Chinese have a concept of unity: a geographical unity, a cultural unity—a Chinese cultural world—because China is also a multi-ethnic country. In China, you have the Han, and then you have about fifty other ethnic groups.

You have India, with the former Mughal Empire, but it is not being reconstituted, because Pakistan was obviously part of it, and Bangladesh as well. Nevertheless, you have a sphere of influence—the sphere of influence of South Asia—which includes the Indian Ocean and the countries located there. So these are sometimes empires in the strict sense, they are also spheres of influence, they are zones of clientelism.

So indeed, there is a fragmentation of the world as it once existed. The Westernized North is now divided between Europeans and the United States, and then there is a challenge emerging from there to a single system of rules shared by all. We are now seeing a kind of regionalism emerge in the world.

Nevertheless, I believe we must not deny the fact that globalization has taken place. Globalization has enabled exchanges between countries: exchanges of people, exchanges of goods, exchanges of capital, and cross-border investments. And so a number of interdependencies have been created, which still require rules governing relations between the parties involved.

So there are regions that trade with one another; the European Union trades among its member states. You have regions, notably for example the RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership), which brings together the countries of Southeast Asia, plus China, Japan, Korea, Australia, and New Zealand, which represent, in terms of trade, a very significant preferential tariff zone as well. But interdependencies exist from one region to another.

So we need a comprehensive multilateral rule that applies to everyone. Today, we are in a phase of disruption, and I think necessity will lead us to find rules that allow us to continue trading from one place to another. We are in a phase, I would say, of contraction. I believe that a day will come when we will be forced to return to common rules that will have had to be negotiated.

All of this will also require taking into account the relative influence of each party. And this brings us back to the issue of global governance. International organizations today must take into account the influence of each country because the so-called emerging nations are challenging this global governance, arguing that it does not reflect the respective influence of each country. This is a long-term effort. So it is a challenge to the Security Council as it currently exists. There are already some countries proposing reforms. There are countries committed to multilateralism, such as France and the countries of the European Union, because the rule of law is a principle that unites us. And other countries outside Europe, such as Mexico—which is a country committed to the rule of law—and many Latin American countries are as well. China is also committed, in its own way, to a form of multilateralism.

How can we integrate everyone’s perspectives to try to rebuild a global order?

Today, we are in a phase of conflict and destruction. The most resistant to the rule of law and international law are currently the Americans, who have never truly wanted to join systems that bind them. This has been the case since the Americans’ non-ratification of the Treaty of Versailles in 1920 and their absence from the League of Nations. In 1945, they joined the UN. Today, they are distancing themselves from the multilateral rules established by the UN.

But I believe necessity will prevail. Even as the world divides and fractures, there are mutual needs across the globe that will require rules to govern how we operate.

Alain Boinet. For France as well as for Europe, what should be done in the face of Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump, and Xi Jinping? Doesn’t this situation prove General de Gaulle right in hindsight?

Maurice Gourdault-Montagne. You’re right. The Economist ran a headline asking, “What if the French were right?” It’s not about saying we were right. I think General de Gaulle’s vision of sovereignty and decision-making autonomy is something very important.

Because countries change, the world changes, and the society of 30 years ago—even more so 50 years ago—is not the one of today. The societies of each country have evolved—due to technological progress, increased prosperity, and the changing world—and global society has evolved as well.

So what should we do? We have certain advantages. France is part of Europe. France has existed as a nation-state for a long time. France has its own problems. Indeed, France is weakened, but France has strengths. France has a state, and France is largely the state. The nation-state is the French concept.

France has a unique strength in a highly diverse world, because France is not an ethnic nation; it is a nation built on a shared vision. And so France unites its citizens around that vision. As Renan said: France is the daily commitment to a national vision. So let us rediscover our vision.

France is part of Europe. Europe is a project that should not be underestimated, because we tend to say, “Yes, Europe doesn’t work.” Europe has been entrusted with certain powers, notably those related to international trade and the common agricultural policy. And then Europe is a political project, because we—each of the countries of Europe—are freely united around values such as democracy, human rights, and the gains we have made for our freedoms in all their forms. And that is the European acquis.

And then Europe is a space of peace. And we have too much of a tendency, in a world of conflict like the one we live in, to forget that this space of peace is extraordinary. As for me, I am part of the first generation not to have fought a war against the Germans, and I am not just talking about the wars that preceded World War I and World War II, nor the war of 1870.

We’ve been at war with the Germans every 30 years, generation after generation. So, ever since the Peace of Westphalia in the 17th century, French and German armies have always been fighting each other, regardless of which flag they served under.

Today, we haven’t fought within Europe for 80 years. That’s truly extraordinary. And when you travel the world and meet people from countries that have enemies at their borders—enemies they were at war with just a few years ago, or with whom they’re about to go to war again—and you tell them about Franco-German reconciliation and peace in Europe, they look at you in amazement and think to themselves that it’s possible.

So I believe this example should be celebrated. It was built around the values I was talking about. But above all, the French and Germans developed shared values, and that is what matters.

I think we must therefore return to the values of the Enlightenment, particularly the values of freedom and the struggle to secure those freedoms—freedom of assembly, of thought, of religion—which have shaped the Europe in which we live.

So today, in the face of the aggression we are enduring, Europe must use the weapons at its disposal. When I speak of aggression, I am thinking in particular of what the Americans have decided to do. The Americans have never liked Europe, because it is, I would say, a potential competitor to their power, particularly in economic and financial terms.

Today, we have conceded on the trade front without reacting, without truly negotiating, in this agreement with the United States, which imposes tariffs on French and European products in the United States.

As for American products, we also have an advantage in services, and there we could take a stand against the Americans. We face a threat to the digital sector. The European Union has successfully adopted two directives on digital services and content, because we are protecting our children and our values. The Americans would like to dismantle these two resolutions on digital services and digital content—these two European directives. We cannot allow, in the name of freedom of expression, just anything to circulate in the digital realm, especially anything that may undermine human dignity. We must therefore be prepared to fight on this issue.

Europe has the means to respond, notably this anti-coercion tool. I believe that one day we may have to implement it if the aggression becomes too severe. It was originally designed to counter China, and we do face challenges from China as well. China’s overcapacity is threatening European industries, particularly in the automotive sector.

So what should we do? How should we respond to all this? There is a tremendous amount of work to be done, and Europe is not without resources. For Europe to be strong, it must be able to develop its capabilities.

Europe has infrastructure, Europe has a form of organization, Europe has a standard of living that continues to attract global interest, and Europe has the stability of a region governed by the rule of law. We must be able to attract capital.

We are working on the capital markets union, known as the Savings and Investment Union. It is moving forward slowly, but we must make progress here because I believe it is one of our strengths. Giving Europe financial depth would certainly be a way to move forward faster and stronger.

There is work to be done. There are, of course, the divisions that still run deep among Europeans. But I believe that the gravity of the situation—the challenge to the status quo we have known until now, as reflected in the conflicts we are experiencing—will likely spur us to take action and move forward.

And as has often been said: it is during serious crises that Europe moves forward. We saw this with the COVID crisis: for the first time, we established debt mutualization through the recovery plan. I believe that the crisis we are currently facing, and those on the horizon, will undoubtedly bring new progress for Europe.

Europe is an opportunity, and we must continue to build Europe.

© Ministry of the Armed Forces – Illustration of the Universel national service file

Alain Boinet. In a short book titled “Our Denial of War,” historian Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau writes that the war in Ukraine “forces us to reevaluate our own relationship to war” and to prepare for it, as Fabien Mandon, the Chief of the Defense Staff, recently announced. What are your thoughts on this?

Maurice Gourdault-Montagne. I believe Audoin-Rouzeau’s book is an excellent one, because there is indeed a tendency to forget that, first and foremost, history is tragic and that conflict is part of human life: individual conflict, collective conflict, and conflict between nations.

I was just talking about the zone of law and the zone of peace that we have created in Europe and that protects us from war. I do not think that the countries of the European Union, which have suffered so much from war and have now renounced war—which are, so to speak, immune to war—will return to it.

But on the other hand, we have enemies who target us, because we get in their way, because we are competing with them, and because, for security reasons, for reasons of traditional hegemony, they may be watching us.

We must assess the threat. So we must prepare for war. There is a way to say this. I absolutely disagree with the way General Mandon spoke about this matter, asking mayors in France—whose job it is not—to prepare for war and to prepare to see our children die. I believe that presentation was inaccurate. Nevertheless, it is important for a nation to know what risks it may face, and today efforts are being made in that direction.

Thus, the reintroduction of voluntary military service, which is currently being implemented, should help restore what used to be called the “spirit of defense.” The bond between the military and the nation must be strengthened. The military, indeed, is on the front lines to, I would say, protect the national community. But the home front—that is, the nation—must also be closely connected to the military.

In this regard, I believe work is currently underway that is extremely valuable for the future.

On our part, we must undoubtedly rearm, because, to preserve—and this is the old Roman saying—“if you want peace, prepare for war.” So being ready for war means rearming. We have undoubtedly been too confident that we would forever reap the dividends of peace. The world has been reshaped differently. The world is returning to a period of conflict, because there are richer countries, because there are ambitions—reviving ambitions.

I don’t necessarily think the threat comes, as it once did, from a lethal attack by the Russian army storming into the plains of Poland, Germany, or France. Instead, war takes other forms—what we call hybrid wars. There are cyber wars, the remilitarization of space, and the challenges we face at the poles.

So we need to be strong in order to speak out, to have a say, and that requires rearmament; it requires a strong military that is ready to defend us if necessary.

Preparing for war right now—I don’t think it’s coming. But nevertheless, having a mindset focused on defense and strengthening the relationship between the military and the nation is something very useful and necessary for a country like France in the situation we find ourselves in today.

Alain Boinet. Usually, foreign policy isn’t a major issue in French elections. However, some journalists believe this will no longer be the case in the 2027 French presidential election. What is your opinion on this?

Maurice Gourdault-Montagne. I believe that today we realize that geopolitics—as it is called, meaning international relations and the conflicts within those relations, or shifts in centers of gravity—affects the everyday lives of the French people.

When you look at your electricity bill, you realize that it’s a result of what’s happening in the Gulf, and of what’s happening in Ukraine. We’ll see this in the food sector as well; it affects the lives of nations, relations between peoples, and international relations.

So I think that, even if it won’t be the top issue raised during the election campaign, the international dimension will be more prominent than it has been so far. Because, in their daily lives, the French are feeling the jolts of this fractured and violent world we live in.

Alain Boinet. In January 2025, the U.S. administration dissolved USAID and eliminated most of its humanitarian and development funding worldwide. This decision was preceded by drastic cuts in these areas in France and in most OECD member countries. In the face of this partial abandonment of international assistance to populations at risk and developing countries, humanitarian workers and development experts warn of the serious consequences this will entail. Is “human security” around the world not also a prerequisite for international security? How do you assess this new situation, which breaks with previous policies, and its consequences for our relations with the countries and populations concerned?

Maurice Gourdault-Montagne. Je suis de la génération qui a accompagné la montée en puissance de l’aide publique au développement, et notamment tout ce qui avait été fait avec cet objectif des 0,7 % du PNB de la part des pays comme la

France, a goal we are striving to achieve—and it was the goal back when I was working for President Chirac.

The United Nations also set sustainable development goals, so there were lofty ambitions driven by the context of globalization.

Globalization helped eradicate some poverty and promote infrastructure in a number of countries that needed it. It helped raise ambitions in the area of health. When I was a G7 sherpa, health was among our main objectives, because we needed to eradicate polio and other diseases that were undermining a number of countries.

We were driven at the time by a sense of justice. There needed to be justice in the distribution of the world’s wealth, and all of this was taking place in a promising context—it was the end of the blocs—and so there were great common causes that were shared.

To these common causes was added the issue of climate change, which obviously affected a group of countries that were more disadvantaged than others; for example, the Sahel region was more severely impacted.

It was the context of globalization that gave rise to new players—the so-called emerging economies—and the distribution of wealth across the globe took on a slightly different form, but nevertheless, those objectives remained.

What is interesting is that there was a sudden rupture, as you yourself mentioned, and we saw this in the early 2020s with major conflicts, particularly the war in Ukraine. The war in Ukraine diverted—because we had to support Ukraine in terms of its armaments—a portion of what we were prepared to provide in development aid, redirecting it toward rearmament and the distribution of weapons and aid to Ukraine.

Thus, both the redistribution of global wealth—due to the rise of emerging economies— the impoverishment of the countries that were the main donors of this official development assistance, particularly France and the United Kingdom, and the fact that there are other actors, such as China for example, who are very active in countries that were recipients of development aid—all of this calls into question, I would say, the objectives that had been set.

Does this mean we should back down? I think the poorest countries are the hardest hit.

This decline in development aid, compared to the original plan, has primarily affected the countries that were already the poorest; the others have managed to get by.

So we must not lose sight of this goal. In France, the National Assembly unanimously passed a programming law for international aid—a multi-year law, a commitment. We are not honoring that commitment. I believe that, to address the need for justice in the world, we must resume this fight for development aid, which is being seriously and problematically lost sight of. Obviously, the United States is leading the way.

That does not mean that, just because the United States is ending USAID, we should cut off our own resources for this development aid, which remains, in my view, a priority for global stability.

Alain Boinet. How would you like to conclude?

Maurice Gourdault-Montagne. I would like to conclude by saying that we are living through an extremely difficult period, a period in which a new world is taking shape, one in which we must move beyond the usual frameworks and ideological paradigms.

As French people, we have become trapped in intellectual frameworks and patterns of reasoning, and we need to rediscover what makes France unique, that is, to engage with the whole world without prejudice, trying to understand that others do not think like us, that they may also be right on many issues, and that their approach deserves to be taken into consideration. In short, it is not up to us to always be the leader, but perhaps it is up to us to get involved in others’ initiatives and contribute our experience.

We need to be a little more humble, but never lose confidence, because the great values that France has always upheld—namely, freedom and dignity—are values that can be found throughout the world.

Maurice Gourdault-Montagne

Born in Paris in 1953, Maurice Gourdault-Montagne, after studying political science, law, and Oriental languages, joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1978, where he spent his entire career, alternating between posts in Paris and abroad.

He served notably as spokesperson for the Quai d’Orsay (1991–93), Chief of Staff to the Prime Minister (1995–97), and diplomatic advisor and Sherpa to the President of the Republic (2002–07), a role that notably involved strategic dialogues with India and China, as well as abroad, notably as French Ambassador to Japan (1998–02), the United Kingdom (2007–11), Germany (2011–14), and China (2014–17). Finally, he served as Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2017–19).

References

Others Don’t Think Like Us, Maurice Gourdault-Montagne, Bouquins Editions (November 13, 2022), 404 pp.

Maurice Gourdault-Montagne brings to life the major diplomatic events that have shaped France from the Mitterrand era to the present day. More than just the memoirs of a great diplomat, this book is the work of one of the foremost experts on international relations over the past forty years. As a leading figure and expert, the author sheds light on strategic issues whose relevance continues to impact our lives. Maurice Gourdault-Montagne is a man of character. His intellectual vigor gives…

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