“The World to Come as Seen by the CIA”

What perspectives can humanitarians draw from the CIA’s latest forward-looking report?

On May 28, the French translation of the latest CIA report intended for the U.S. administration was published in France by Éditions Équateurs Documents. The report, published under the title “The World to Come as Seen by the CIA – Analyses, Facts, and Figures”, offers humanitarians—always alert and seeking foresight regarding tectonic shifts, crisis arcs, fault lines, and the major trends of “concrete geopolitics” that condition our actions—an opportunity to examine their own perspectives, drawing from the data and interpretations of the main U.S. intelligence agency, which in Europe often carries a negative image.

Before delving into the most significant analyses of the report, it is important to highlight two major “biases”:

1. The report is conceived, written, and structured solely from the perspective of U.S. interests and “extreme and critical” threats to them. It is likely that a similar report produced by French intelligence, while pointing out the same unavoidable phenomena, would highlight others, create a partially different threat hierarchy, and perhaps provide a more nuanced or complex vision.

2. The report is designed for the current U.S. administration—i.e., the Trump administration. Between the lines, one can detect a vision aligned with, and anticipating, the ideological assumptions and worldview of that administration. Similarly, the absence of a mention of a phenomenon (climate change, for example, as we will return to) is itself indicative of the threat posed by the refusal of the world’s leading power to address that issue.

With that said, the presentation of global perspectives by the world’s leading power cannot leave one indifferent; above all, it cannot “leave the world indifferent,” since U.S. perceptions, in turn, shape the world.

Structurally, the French edition comprises three distinct parts: the report titled Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, the transcript of a U.S. Senate hearing on current global threats, and finally a section Analysis, Facts, and Figures concerning nine countries/states selected, presumably, as significant.

Let us examine, in a non-exhaustive way, the report’s most decisive analyses regarding “extreme and critical” threats to U.S. interests and attempt to discern their consequences or factors for humanitarians in their present and future work.

The first threat cited in the report as affecting U.S. interests (a priority confirmed in the Senate hearing) is organized crime and drug cartels responsible for the massive influx of drugs into the U.S. (notably fentanyl, which has caused widespread deaths), human trafficking, and illegal immigration. While a serious and real threat, this priority is largely influenced by the ideological focus of the current U.S. administration on immigration and related crime (drug inflow, prostitution, and migrant influx often viewed as inseparable). For humanitarians, this political orientation toward border closure and deportation suggests the need to implement or expand programs for the Caminentes (“those who journey”): migrants stranded in Central America or forcibly returned without resources or shelter. The coming years may see a growing population of men, women, and children left with nothing, either there or here, who will require assistance—from daily survival to education.

A persistent threat emphasized by the report is the continuation or increase of terrorism risk. In Asia and the Middle East (except Yemen), ISIS is identified as the primary actor capable of resurging—even without territory—taking advantage of any regional or local instability (e.g., in Syria), expanding as in Somalia or West Africa where it rivals Al-Qaeda networks, and inspiring local initiatives in Europe or Russia. ISIS-Khorasan in Central Asia is described as particularly aggressive, seeking to exploit “high-vulnerability travel routes.” In West Africa and the Sahel-Saharan belt, regional Al-Qaeda affiliates will increasingly destabilize states like Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger (and further toward the Gulf of Guinea), with growing attacks on urban centers and diminishing government control. The report highlights the coordination between active Al-Qaeda affiliates in Yemen (AQAP) and Somalia (Shabab) with the Houthis, facilitating access to more sophisticated weapons and possible coordination to strike Western interests and commercial traffic. For humanitarians, already aware of this threat, the report reinforces the need to anticipate risks along local or cross-border routes, isolated settlements, and logistics chains. Western-origin humanitarians will increasingly be threatened and targeted where these organizations expand, and access to the most remote populations may be risky, contested, or blocked.

China is presented as a source of both regional (expansionist policy in the South China Sea, de facto annexation of islands and islets, military encirclement and harassment of Taiwan) and global threats. U.S. analysts anticipate a coherent “galaxy” of major risks from China’s deliberately aggressive actions: disruption of supply routes and logistics chains used by Western countries, threats to critical infrastructure (energy, security, health, transportation, banking networks, etc.), and information, communication, and internet systems; covert use of AI to manipulate data and open-source information (similarly cited for Russia); and data exfiltration from Western internal or external networks. Humanitarians, who position emergency stocks abroad and ship supplies worldwide, must consider the vulnerability of their logistics chains. Likewise, humanitarian organizations increasingly produce and rely on borderless digital information—data, communications, mapping. To what extent are our systems immune to intrusion, exfiltration, or manipulation?

The Chinese threat is compounded by Russia, which poses risks to Western satellite networks and related communications systems. Humanitarians must question their increasing dependence on vulnerable satellite links. Notably, the report does not mention the risk of Russia cutting undersea internet cables, despite NATO taking it seriously—perhaps intentionally downplaying Russian culpability.

Regarding Ukraine, U.S. analysts do not foresee an imminent collapse along the contact line. Their assessment can be summarized: “The longer the war continues in Ukraine, the more Ukraine will lose.” The report notes Russia’s current military advantage and capacity to continue its campaign longer than Kyiv. Compared to the French former Chief of Staff’s caution that victory favors the adversary who can endure slightly longer, the CIA report highlights the growing risk of large-scale conflict between NATO allies and Russia, including potential nuclear weapons use. While the humanitarian role in a nuclear conflict is theoretical, humanitarians must consider what their role—or absence thereof—would be in a high-intensity, widespread European conflict, where operational procedures, safety guidelines, and logistics could collapse. The potential scale of displacement and humanitarian need would far exceed current capacities, placing humanitarian organizations among the first victims of high-intensity war in the West.

In the Middle East, written before recent Israeli-U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear and military installations, the report lists expected critical threats: attacks on Israel and U.S. facilities, blockages of energy, trade, and logistics routes by Iran or its proxy in Yemen (Houthis). Regarding Syria, the report underscores volatility after Bashar al-Assad’s fall and the risk of ISIS resurgence. For humanitarians, vigilant in the region, this is a reminder: worsening political and military volatility, attacks on minorities (Alawites, Druze), interventions affecting Rojava, or renewed Turkish action would jeopardize access to isolated or displaced populations.

As noted, what a report omits can be as telling as what it includes: climate change. During the Senate hearing, Tulsi Gabbard, Director of National Intelligence, was directly questioned about its absence. Her response—that the report focuses on the most extreme and critical national security threats—implies to humanitarians that the U.S. is unlikely to fund adaptation or resilience programs for vulnerable populations. Consequently, humanitarian needs related to climate change may exceed expectations and capacities. By contrast, French think tanks, such as Institut Montaigne, acknowledge climate’s centrality to policy planning by 2040.

The final section covers nine countries, revealing symbolic and strategic choices. Notably, Denmark, Greenland (separately treated), and Canada are included. Two cases stand out: Syria—marked as “head of state: vacant,” highlighting U.S. ambiguity regarding figures like Ahmed al-Charaa/Al Joulani—and Turkey, whose dossier underscores the massive refugee intake, highlighting the complex humanitarian challenge of new arrivals, return policies, or mass movements toward Europe.

Conclusion

High-intensity Russia-NATO conflict where humanitarian actors would have limited role; growing instability in the Middle East, West Africa, the Sahel-Saharan belt, and Central Asia; threats to supply chains; ongoing risks to information and communication systems; possible data manipulation; U.S. disregard of climate-related humanitarian impacts; and massive unmet humanitarian needs. While the CIA report may be oriented, sometimes simplistic or unnuanced, one fact is clear: humanitarians face pervasive danger and must act—or reinvent themselves—to remain relevant.

Pierre Brunet

Writer and Humanitarian

Pierre Brunet is a novelist and member of the Board of Directors of the NGO SOLIDARITES INTERNATIONAL. He became involved in humanitarian work in Rwanda in 1994, then in Bosnia in 1995, and has since returned to the field (Afghanistan in 2003, the Calais jungle in 2016, migrant camps in Greece and Macedonia in 2016, Iraq and north-eastern Syria in 2019, Ukraine in 2023). . Pierre Brunet’s novels are published by Calmann-Lévy: Barnum in 2006, JAB in 2008, Fenicia in 2014 and Le triangle d’incertitude in 2017. A former journalist, Pierre Brunet regularly publishes analytical articles, opinion pieces and columns.

 

 

I invite you to read these interviews and articles published in the edition :

• A comprehensive humanitarian and geopolitical overview
• THE GLORIOUS YEARS – Interview with Bernard Kouchner
• The Challenge of Humanitarian “Reinvention”
• Report from Ukraine – Between War and Resilience
• “The World to Come as Seen by the CIA”
• Tribute to Gérard Chaliand
• They speak out for Défis Humanitaires