Humanitarian aid sanctioned?

An interview with Thierry Mauricet, Director General of Première Urgence Internationale, on the consequences of sanctions regimes and anti-terrorist measures on bank transfers by humanitarian organisations.


Alain Boinet: Thierry, can you tell us what are the concrete consequences of sanctions regimes and anti-terrorist measures on the bank transfers of humanitarian organisations to finance their aid projects for populations affected by crises and what are the consequences?

Thierry Mauricet : The humanitarian aid provided by NGOs cannot be done without financial means. In addition to fundraising through public generosity (which demonstrates the confidence of citizens in non-governmental humanitarian organisations), most NGOs benefit from funding from institutional donors such as the European Commission or various UN agencies such as the UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, to name but a few. Similarly, many states allocate funds to aid agencies such as the United States through The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) or The Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), or Great Britain through the Department for International Development (DFID), not forgetting the Crisis and Support Centre (CDCS) of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the French Development Agency (AFD).

This funding often concerns assistance programmes for populations living in countries under embargo and/or under financial sanctions set up by the UN, the European Union, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the US Department of the Treasury, not forgetting states, including France. Public humanitarian aid donors are obviously aware of this. By granting funds to NGOs, they recognise that humanitarian organisations in their field work are not affected by these regulations.

However, from January 2015, following the heavy financial sanction imposed on BNP Paribas by the US Department of Justice for violating the US embargo on certain countries, French banks have all progressively tightened their banking compliance rules. While this approach is understandable (as they fall under the French Banking and Financial Regulation Act and the Monetary and Financial Code), it now makes it extremely complex, and sometimes even impossible, to transfer the funds needed to implement humanitarian aid projects to countries under embargo and/or financial sanctions, when humanitarian crises are taking place there. These compliance standards may even extend to third states not covered by an international sanctions regime, but located in areas considered “at risk”.

The countries concerned by the geographic and/or thematic (to combat the financing of terrorism) sanctions regimes in force are currently the following:

Afghanistan, Belarus, Burundi, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Niger, North Korea, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, Venezuela, Yemen, Zimbabwe. NGOs are present everywhere.

A nurse examines a child during a consultation in a health centre supported by the humanitarian aid NGO Première Urgence Internationale, in Bangui, capital of the Central African Republic, on 18 January 2018 / ©Gwenn Dubourthoumieu

French banks thus systematically request that each transfer be documented (employment contract and pay slip for expatriate salaries when their name or nationality is suspected, contract from institutional donor(s) for sending cash or payments from suppliers to the countries of intervention, etc.). However, this increasing administrative burden is now almost the “ideal” case for an NGO, as many banks now totally refuse to execute transfer orders to these countries despite all the authorisations and derogations obtained and produced by NGOs from DG Treasury, the United Nations and the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).

Remittances are essential to the implementation of humanitarian aid in the field, and to do this, NGOs based in France need to use the French banking system. However, given the obstacles caused by the excessive interpretation of compliance rules by almost all banks, they are increasingly obliged to ask their staff to carry out the physical and cash delivery of the funds needed to continue aid projects, or to use parallel cash transfer systems via money transfer agents. These alternative methods of transferring funds limit the capacity of NGOs to act and expose their staff to security risks. Indeed, in addition to the risks incurred by physical transfers, delays in payments from local suppliers can also lead to serious security problems for NGO staff.

To illustrate these banking difficulties from another angle, NGOs also face problems in receiving the funds allocated to them by institutional donors. Indeed, when these payments are addressed to NGOs and they concern a project taking place in a country subject to embargo and/or sanctions, it is not uncommon for these payments to be blocked by the recipient bank on the grounds that the transaction is contrary to its compliance policy (including when these funds are addressed by the US Department of State, which is the equivalent of the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs).

These difficulties in transferring and receiving funds have an impact on the NGOs’ cash flow and consequently on their teams in the field, which is a hindrance, not to say an obstacle, to relief and assistance operations which are nonetheless essential to the vulnerable populations we assist.

Faced with the risks of fraudulent use of funds in crises where groups labelled as terrorists operate, humanitarian NGOs have taken numerous protection and control measures. What are they and is this sufficient?

Accountability and transparency are key to the legitimacy of humanitarian NGOs. Protecting against the risk of misappropriation of funds is a constant concern. Accounting for the funds they have, the way they use them and the programmes they run is an integral part of their operational and financial management. Various codes of conduct, to which many NGOs adhere, as well as widely shared organisational practices, are a reminder of the need for any association to see itself as accountable both to aid recipients and donors.

In practice, the achievement of these objectives mobilises various stakeholders within and around the NGO: private or public aid donors with their demands for rigour, transparency, accountability, traceability and efficiency; the national and international staff of the NGO for whom commitment, motivation and quality are cardinal values; the populations receiving the NGO’s programmes who, in their vulnerable situation, expect speed, efficiency, quality, relevance and sustainability.

Robina Awujia, midwife for Première Urgence Internationale, has just helped give birth to little Adut Mabior, at the Majak Kaar health centre, located in north-western South Sudan, on 30 April 2018 / ©Gwenn Dubourthoumieu

In order to comply with these various requirements, and to explain to donors, the public and any control body, how donations and funding are distributed, what they have been used for and the expected results, the associations have always implemented concrete mechanisms to mobilise and hold accountable those in charge of carrying out projects and, at the same time, submit to external processes of results evaluation and accountability.

It is important to note that in recent years, NGOs have been faced with an exponential increase in control and audit mechanisms (ex ante and ex post) on the part of public donors, despite the fact that they are sometimes redundant or out of step with operational realities. These growing administrative constraints are leading to a sharp increase in the number of staff employed by NGOs so that they remain capable of meeting them.

However, the “Grand Bargain”, launched at the World Humanitarian Summit in May 2016, was concluded with an agreement between the largest donors and humanitarian agencies (24 states including the UK, the USA, France, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland and the European Commission) committing them to improving the efficiency and effectiveness of humanitarian action in a number of ways, including harmonising and simplifying reporting requirements.

This commitment has in fact remained ineffective and each donor still tends to have a unique understanding of the elements of its relationship with NGOs, which then have to juggle different policies, administrative and operational constraints, modes and frameworks.

In order to demonstrate that NGOs are achieving the programme objectives for which funds were raised, it is time for public donors to focus their legitimate demands for accountability on striking the right balance between the operational processes of aid delivery and the establishment of control policies, systems and procedures.

Several years ago, you initiated this issue within the CHD, then Coordination Sud and within the framework of the Humanitarian Concertation Group with the Crisis and Support Centre of the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs. What has been done so far and where are you today?

In February 2017, a working group entitled “Humanitarian Access & Banking System” was set up within the Humanitarian & Development Coordination (CHD), a collective of 52 NGOs. Since its creation, this group has brought together more than twenty member or invited NGOs. All the NGOs that participated in this first meeting reported the same difficulties with bank transfers and their growing concern that they would not be able to continue their relief operations if these blockages persisted and/or increased.

At the end of this first meeting, it was decided to organise a meeting as soon as possible between the NGOs and the different Ministries and State administrations involved in this issue (the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of the Armed Forces, the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Economy and Finance, so that a common position can be adopted on this subject, from a tripartite (State/NGO/Banks) perspective of transparency and mutually agreed and guaranteed security, so that the banks can once again execute, in full confidence, bank transfer orders to countries under sanctions as well as to neighbouring States.

After explanation of the issue and a request addressed to the Director of the Crisis and Support Centre at the time, a meeting was organised at the end of 2017. Around the same table, a number of NGOs members of the CHD, representatives of the DG Treasury, the Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel et de Résolution (ACPR), the organisation for the processing of intelligence and action against clandestine financial circuits (TRACFIN), the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of the Interior as well as several compliance officers from French banking institutions met. For most of these administrations and departments, the problem and its consequences were almost a discovery.

This was followed by numerous meetings between NGOs, the CDCS, the DG Treasury and certain bank compliance departments (which for the latter two had no knowledge of the accountability, control and compliance processes already in place in NGOs).

Parallel to these discussions, certain recommendations and statements were made on this issue in order to take into consideration the specific positioning of NGOs such as the National Consultative Commission on Human Rights in its October 2018 opinion, the United Nations Security Council in its Resolution 2462 of March 2019 or the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) through its Recommendation No. 8.

Première Urgence Internationale in Iraq / ©Thibault Savary

In 2019, banking blockages continued and were reinforced. The maximalist approach to risk management led some French banks to close NGO accounts on the grounds that their activities were taking place in countries subject to embargoes and sanctions, or requesting the signature of letters of affirmation stating that the NGO concerned was prohibited from operating in certain countries subject to the same sanctions. Coordination SUD (regrouping 175 NGOs) in turn became actively involved in this advocacy, and the new CDCS Director in turn took up the issue. Mandated by the Deputy Director of the Minister’s office, initiatives under the aegis of the CDCS have multiplied (inter-ministerial meetings, consultation meetings in Brussels) and NGO/DG Treasury/Banks meetings have continued.

At the beginning of January 2020, some NGO representatives were invited to meet the President of the Republic to discuss the humanitarian situation in Syria. It was on this occasion that I was able to talk about the difficulties we were encountering in terms of bank transfers. The President discovered the extent of the problems caused by these blockages in the banking system and asked the diplomatic unit of the Elysée Palace to look into the matter. Unfortunately, the Covid-19 pandemic hit France in turn a few weeks after this meeting, thus stopping the momentum.

The past 4 years have been a real journey of the cross to acculturate all these stakeholders who did not know how NGOs work. Convincing them of the good practices put in place by the NGOs (even though they are well known to the MEAE), and constantly demonstrating their professionalism and their great rigour, without obtaining any real relaxation from the banks, quite the contrary.

On 21 January 2018, Morgane Faber, logistician for Première Urgence Internationale, receives medicines for the Ndele hospital and the 20 health centres supported by the NGO in the north of the Central African Republic / ©Gwenn Dubourthoumieu

What about the practices of institutional partners in France, both CDCS and AFD? On this subject, it seems that AFD is now asking partner NGOs to draw up lists of beneficiaries to be sent to them. What is the situation and how are humanitarian NGOs reacting?

The increase in credits allocated to humanitarian action and national and international laws and regulations on Countering Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (LCB/FT) is leading French institutional donors to ask NGOs that receive their grants to set up an increasing number of accountability and traceability processes for financial flows.

Since the beginning of this year, CDCS and Agence Française de Développement (AFD) have strengthened the clauses in their grant agreements that require beneficiary NGOs to screen any legal or natural person that may be the subject of a financial or monetisable transaction. In other words, all expatriate and national staff, all suppliers and other service providers, and all partner NGOs must, before contracting and payment, be checked using screening software to ensure that these legal and natural persons are not on any list of sanctions or embargoes of the United Nations, the European Union and France.

Many of CDCS’s and AFD’s NGO partners do not have screening software which costs 20 000.00 euros per year, nor the staff, in sufficient numbers, needed to process these countless and time-consuming seizure operations.

For CDCS, considering the prevalence of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), screening is limited to partnership, commercial and salary transactions with any legal or natural person. To date, screening is required for each invoice and at the first euro, and for all staff paid before hiring and then on a regular basis, this method also applies to any partner legal entity.

On the other hand, AFD, considering the prevalence of banking regulations on its grant agreements, is adding to the scope retained by CDCS the screening of any transaction linked to programmes based on cash transfers and any monetisable donation (a simple pair of crutches is considered as an asset that can be resold and can therefore contribute to the financing of terrorism) in favour of any natural person, thus including the “ultimate” beneficiaries of aid (whatever their age).

Among the LCB/FT clauses of these agreements is the stipulation that the beneficiary (the signatory NGO) of the grant declares that “it has not directly or indirectly provided material support or other resources to any person or entity that commits, attempts to commit, advocates, would facilitate or participate in Acts of Terrorism, or has committed, attempted to commit, advocated, facilitated or participated in such Acts” thus introducing a paradoxical notion of the “predictive” faculty that an NGO could have, making it legally responsible in case of breach.

Discussions are underway with the CDCS to specify the screening procedures in order to make them effective from a benefit/risk perspective.

On the other hand, more than a dozen grant agreements, although approved by AFD, have not yet been signed by beneficiary NGOs.

These NGOs argue that the LCB/FT clauses in AFD’s agreements would force them to screen the “ultimate” beneficiaries of aid and that this screening is contrary to their values and IHL principles, a red line that cannot be crossed. Screening the “ultimate” beneficiaries would mean no longer selecting them on the basis of their needs, which would cause NGOs to lose their impartiality, a serious breach of humanitarian principles, and deprive them of their capacity to access.

A midwife from the humanitarian aid NGO Première Urgence Internationale examines a pregnant woman during delivery at the primary health centre in Majak Kaar, north-western Southern Sudan, on 30 April 2018. / ©Gwenn Dubourthoumieu

In view of the next National Humanitarian Conference which will take place in Paris on December 17th, what do you propose with humanitarian NGOs to face the risk of a decrease, and sometimes even paralysis, of humanitarian aid in certain countries?

Topics related to “The impact of sanctions regimes and anti-terrorism measures on humanitarian aid” and “Respect for International Humanitarian Law and humanitarian access” will be discussed in two separate round tables at the CNH. The choice of these topics by NGOs and the drafting of these two round table titles alone reveal the level of concern of humanitarian aid actors.

In his statement to the United Nations General Assembly on 22 September, Emmanuel Macron recalled the importance of respecting international humanitarian law and the fundamental rights of all. He announced the construction of an initiative to ensure the effectiveness of international law, the protection of humanitarian personnel and the fight against impunity. Mr. Macron also underlined the fact that the Humanitarian Space is a common heritage that must be protected by guaranteeing access to civilian populations as well as the protection of the personnel who support them, and that “the neutrality of humanitarian action must be respected and its criminalisation stemmed”.

The President must attend the next session of the National Humanitarian Conference. The NGOs expect him to take this opportunity to announce concrete measures to put an end to the impunity of those who attack humanitarian personnel and the implementation of measures to safeguard the humanitarian space, in order to guarantee and respect the independence and neutrality of humanitarian actors, in line with his recent statements at the UN General Assembly.

It is also expected that, in the face of increasing sanctions regimes and anti-terrorist measures that put NGOs at risk from security and legal risks, it will announce specific exemption measures for humanitarian action and actors, thus reaffirming the prevalence of IHL over all other considerations.

The expectations of NGOs are equal to the threats to the humanitarian space and aid actors: very high.

 

Who is Thierry Mauricet?

After a degree in commerce from the European Business Institute, a law degree from the University of Paris X and a professional activity as an advertiser for 7 years, Thierry Mauricet co-founded the association Première Urgence in June 1992 to help the besieged populations in Sarajevo in Bosnia-Herzegovina. From 1994 to 2011, he was the association’s General Director.

Since April 2011, he has been the Director General of Première Urgence Internationale, an association resulting from the merger of the NGOs Première Urgence and Aide Médicale Internationale.

Première Urgence Internationale aims to provide integrated aid in the fields of health, food security, nutrition, rehabilitation and construction of infrastructures, access to water, hygiene and sanitation, economic recovery, education and protection, in favour of populations who are victims of humanitarian crises.

The annual budget of Première Urgence Internationale is €120 million. It enables us to implement 150 projects in 26 countries in favour of more than 7 million vulnerable people.

Associative activities :

– Adminsitrator of the Federation of the Voice of the Child from 14 March 1995 to 18 November 2006;

– Member of the National Consultative Commission on Human Rights from 10 May 1999 to 25 March 2009;

– Secretary for Humanitarian Coordination and Development from 6 May 2013 to 4 June 2018;

– President of the Humanitarian and Development Coordination since 4 June 2018;

– Administrator of Coordination SUD since 13 December 2018;

– Administrator of Coordination SUD since 13 December 2018; Director of Coordination SUD since 13 December 2018; Referring Administrator of the Humanitarian Commission of the Board of Directors of Coordination SUD since 26 September 19;

– Member of the Humanitarian Coordination Group of the Crisis and Support Centre of the MEAE since its creation in November 2013.

“International Solidarity is the concern of the whole nation”.

Interview of Philippe Jahshan, President of Coordination Sud, by Alain Boinet. On the financing of international solidarity following the Covid-19 crisis.

Alain Boinet : The CICID (Interministerial Committee for International Cooperation and Development) of February 8, 2018 decided to increase ODA (Official Development Assistance) on a progressive trajectory to reach 0.55% of France’s GNP (Gross National Product) in 2022. In the current context of the global pandemic and recovery plan, will this commitment be fulfilled?

Philippe Jahshan: If we speak in percentage terms, yes, and probably as early as this year! But this is due to the contraction of GNI (Gross National Income). Therefore, we will have to speak mainly in terms of volumes. We will judge whether or not the pre-COVID mandate commitments have been met on the objective of 15 billion.

 

During a recent meeting with Jean-Yves Le Drian, Minister of Europe and Foreign Affairs with Coordination Sud, the latter affirmed that the objective was indeed to secure the ODA budget course in 2021 at 0.51% of GNP? Are you reassured by these words?

The Minister has shown his determination to secure the means for ODA and we welcome this. But we are going further. We believe that we can no longer be satisfied with pre-crisis commitments. The situation has totally changed and we have entered into a major and historic rupture that must be addressed at the right level.

 

Faced with the Covid-19 pandemic, which particularly affects the most fragile countries, you recently declared that “France can no longer be satisfied with pre-established objectives”. Indeed, the liquidity needs for these countries are essential. In spite of a debt moratorium, the latest G-20 seems rather divided and wait-and-see on this subject. Aren’t we wasting precious time?

Absolutely. We’re wasting very precious time. If we take up Ester Duflo’s analyses, she argues that it is much less costly economically, socially and humanly to produce debt that is repayable over very long periods of time, but which produces immediate recovery – and therefore activity – rather than letting entire populations fall into poverty traps due to a lack of immediate investment. This, in fact, produces greater economic cost in the short and medium term, not to mention the social and human cost. In fact, our countries have made this calculation for themselves. This is the purpose of the European recovery plan that France has put forward. And for some, it remains insufficient.

We ask that the same reasoning be applied to developing countries. By revising upwards the pre-crisis ambitions in terms of ODA, in France, as in Europe and at the level of all bi or multilateral donors. Because there can be no recovery or sustainable recovery and stability without integrating a share of international solidarity into our national efforts.

Estimates of the human, health, social and economic cost of the crisis for developing countries are massive. Before the summer, the United Nations estimated the immediate needs at around $500 billion. And France, by the way, had initiated this mobilization. The President of the Republic had called on the IMF (International Monetary Fund) to release $500 billion in international monetary creation, and had pledged that France’s share (around $25 billion) could be directed towards developing countries. This, coupled with his commitment to cancel the debts of the poorest countries, constituted an ambitious roadmap. Unfortunately, the initiative at the IMF was blocked by the United States, and debt payments were only postponed.

So, if we take stock of the situation today, we see that no massive effort has been undertaken by any donor country. The European Union and the countries of the North as a whole have not devoted any additional euros to ODA. This is very regrettable.

General Assembly of Coordination Sud, 2019. Jean-Yves Le Drian and Philippe Jahshan. ®CoordinationSud

 

The budget of the European Union for international solidarity is in retreat for the period 2021-2027 following the recovery plan of 750 billion euros. What should we think about it and can we hope that multilateral organizations such as the IMF or the World Bank will come to abound the indispensable resources by the transfer of communicating vessels.

To date, there are no guarantees for this. It is undoubtedly the calculation of several donor countries, as in France, to bet on a global recovery through the IMF or the World Bank, but as I said earlier, to date, this has not worked. National egoisms are taking over. We hoped that the European Union would do its part and make room for international solidarity in its recovery plan. The reality of the negotiations, especially with those who have been called “frugals”, has been one of sacrifice, especially of this international part of the plan. These are deplorable and short-sighted calculations.

 

When we see the situation in Lebanon or Mali, or even in Afghanistan, we say to ourselves that good political, economic and social governance is indispensable for the useful use of all foreign aid. What can this inspire the actors of international solidarity?

The variety of situations calls for solutions to be measured according to each context. However, based on these three countries, we can usefully reiterate the importance of never considering solidarity as an external object; that is, thought of by the one who helps, for the benefit of the one who needs to be helped.

In this sense, as in our own countries, the real nets of resilience and development are to be found in the vitality of the local civil society, its associative actors and those who create and carry out economic activity, especially social and solidarity-based. They are located in the foundations of citizen and democratic participation and proximity. They are located in the countless local know-how, often poorly valued in the history of development, because they are considered of lesser value than the technologies of the developed world. It is with these actors, and it is in what makes it possible to produce full, independent citizens, that international aid must be invested. It is in the actors who build true democratic transitions.

For the three cases cited, we can sometimes wonder whether the bulk of the resources have been devoted to this. We know how much aid is incriminated because it can feed corruption here and there, and it has been able to maintain impotent regimes despite common sense in so many countries. This is undoubtedly true. But it is not the principle of aid or solidarity that should be condemned, but the methods, objectives and real purposes of this aid.

 

As a vector and tool of international solidarity, many NGOs are impacted by the situation, at the risk of having to reduce if not interrupt certain aid programs, however crucial, at the very moment when their action is indispensable. What do you expect from public authorities as a measure?

We have made several proposals on this subject. A number of them have been taken into account and I welcome them. For example, that of relaxing the conditions and rules for AFD (Agence Française de Développement) co-financing for programs for the year 2020; the guarantee that volumes and subsidies for ongoing programs will be maintained, even in the event of a halt or delay in execution; or access for NGOs, like all associations, to measures to help the country’s general economy: deferring charges, access to short-time working measures, access to state-guaranteed loans, etc.

Finally, following our meeting with Jean Yves Le Drian at the end of May, we obtained additional exceptional funding of 20 million euros for humanitarian aid and development projects by French NGOs. This is a major effort in a constant ODA budget. But more than 140 French NGOs responded to the Minister’s appeal through Coordination SUD, for a total of 440 projects corresponding to more than 272 million euros. We have thus demonstrated the extraordinary vitality of the sector despite the crisis, and its capacity in two weeks to mobilize and produce proposals for action with the State.

I hope that this will contribute to transforming a little more, the perception that the authorities may still have of the role, capacity and effectiveness of French NGOs.

But beyond these measures, we also called for exceptional support for patronage and public generosity, notably by increasing the tax exemption for donations to 75% for the last half of the year, so essential especially as the end of the year approaches. I regret that this request was rejected by the government during the parliamentary debate on the 3rd budgetary correction last June.

I also regret that, at this stage, no structural support measures have been put in place to make up for the associations’ losses in operating costs. NGOs in particular have very diversified resources. They are strongly supported by the generosity of the public and by patronage. Estimates on this point are bad for the end of the year, and probably for 2021. The lost means are not recovering. These are all co-financing that the NGOs will not be able to honor, including from public donors who would have maintained their support.

Delivery of civil society recommendations to countries
of the G7 to Jean-Baptiste Lemoyne, Secretary of State to the Minister of Europe and Foreign Affairs at the C7 summit – Paris, July 1, 2019. ®CoordinationSud

During your interview with Jean-Yves Le Drian you talked about the LOP (Law “solidarity development”) for international development and he announced its relaunch. When could it intervene and what are the stakes for you.

The timetable is not yet specified. We are hoping for a relaunch of the project for this fall. The minister spoke of a relaunch as early as September and the CESE (Economic, Social and Environmental Council) has already been seized of a project rectified following the Covid crisis. So, this confirms that the process is resuming. So much the better.

For us at Coordination Sud, this law must embody France’s political commitment to build a world that is less unequal, without poverty and more ecological. It must enshrine our country’s commitments to the implementation of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change and the SDOs (Sustainable Development Goals), and in this sense, it must provide the means to ensure greater coherence between domestic public policies and international development policy. It must resolutely enshrine France’s commitments to the promotion and defense of human rights and equality between women and men. This law must also affirm our country’s commitment to the defense of international humanitarian law and all the humanitarian principles that are so often flouted today in so many fields.

We also believe that the law must enshrine the essential role of civil society and international solidarity associations in particular. The recognition of their right of initiative, stemming from the freedom of association enshrined in our Constitution; and consequently, the place and role of the citizen in the exercise of France’s international solidarity.

In short, we say that development policy is not just a matter for the executive. But it must be the business of the nation as a whole. And the law must embody it.

Finally, of course, we expect the law to confirm a programmatic budgetary dimension, projecting the ambition of reaching 0.7% of our GNI by 2025, and setting the precise steps to achieve this by that date. The President of the Republic, in his speech on the recovery he wants, stated that all public policies must be built over a long period of time. Development policy is, par excellence, a long-term policy. It would be incomprehensible if the program adopted in 2021 were to stop only at the end of the five-year period.

 

How do you wish to conclude?

By thanking you! And by expressing the hope that the crisis we are going through, which will probably constitute a major breakthrough in the history of this century, will be an opportunity for a better world: in other words, the trigger to accelerate the social, ecological and democratic transformations that are at work just about everywhere and to better respond to citizens’ aspirations for greater participation and consideration.

Last spring, Jean Yves Le Drian expressed his fears that tomorrow’s world will be worse than the one before; he was no doubt not wrong. Let’s make sure that this is not the case! And what better lever than international solidarity for this?

 

Who is Philippe Jahshan?

A graduate of the Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris (Sciences Po) with a specialization in International Relations and development professions, Philippe Jahshan has been involved in NGOs and particularly in Solidarité Laïque since 2002. After holding several positions as project manager, he became in 2009 the delegate for international actions, then in 2016 the delegate for external relations.

At the same time, Philippe has held several mandates in international solidarity collectives: coordinator of the Euromed France Network (2005-2008), administrator (from 2006) then president of the F3E (2010-2012) and administrator of Coordination SUD since 2010.

Within Coordination SUD, Philippe Jahshan has been particularly involved in European issues. As Coordination SUD’s European referent, he represented Coordination SUD within Concord, where he co-chaired the Policy Forum between 2011 and 2012, and was its representative at the European Commission’s Policy Forum for Development until 2015.

Elected to the Coordination SUD Board in 2012, he served as Treasurer and then Vice President. Since January 2015, Philippe Jahshan has been President of Coordination SUD (re-elected for a second three-year term in December 2017). He is a member of the National Council for Development and International Solidarity, and of its Bureau as an NGO. He sits on the Board of Directors of the AFD. Since November 2015, he has been a member of the Economic, Social and Environmental Council, in the group of associations. In this capacity, Philippe Jahshan was rapporteur to the Cese for an opinion on French Cooperation in the framework of the 2030 sustainable development agenda.

Finally, in October 2016, he was elected President of the Mouvement Associatif (the coordination of French associative collectives).