Unlike the water of the Nile when we look downstream, particularly in Egypt, the time to resolve the conflict we are talking about is passing in vain… and the possibility of agreement remains ever distant.
The Renaissance Dam is a major hydroelectric project on the Blue Nile in Ethiopia, and since its construction began in 2011, the dam has been at the heart of a regional conflict mainly involving Ethiopia, which initiated the project, Egypt and Sudan. The Renaissance Dam dispute is one of the most important water-related issues in the world, particularly in recent years, as it involves Africa’s two most populous states after Nigeria. This dam has a major impact on the vital resources of Egypt, which is massively dependent on it for agriculture and irrigation, so much so that without this river life could come to a standstill in the country. This article therefore aims to take stock of the conflict, focusing on the outcome of the negotiations, the current and foreseeable impact, and the outlook for the future.
Conflicting points of view
For Ethiopia, the dam represents a crucial project, aimed at generating around 6,000 megawatts of electricity, which would triple the country’s electricity capacity. The dam is seen as a solution to the country’s energy challenges, as well as an engine for economic development. But in fact, the symbolism of the dam’s construction goes beyond the economic issue. Its construction was a message to Egypt and Sudan: Ethiopia no longer needed their approval as a condition for building development projects in the Nile basin, thus rejecting the 1929 and 1959 agreements.1
The date of the dam’s construction is not neutral: the current project dates back to the 1950s and 1960s, but the Egyptian refusal and lack of support and international investment prevented it from being implemented. In this context, 2011 represented the optimal moment for Ethiopia, following the independence of South Sudan and the chaos generated by the ‘Arab Spring’ that was destabilising Egypt at the time.
‘The Egyptian state understands the demands of Ethiopian development, but this development must not be at the expense of others’. – President Al-Sissi, June 2021.
From the point of view of the Egyptian government, Egypt is facing an ‘existential’ crisis. The Renaissance Dam poses a clear and direct threat to Egypt’s national security, as it fears that filling and operating the dam will significantly reduce the flow of water from the Nile, affecting its agriculture, industry and domestic needs, which we will discuss in more detail later.
Located between Ethiopia and Egypt, Sudan shares these concerns. Although the Great Renaissance Dam (GERD) could regulate flooding and provide cheap electricity, there are concerns about water management and the impact on its own irrigation projects. Sudan’s position on the Renaissance Dam remained ‘neutral’ between Egypt and Ethiopia until mid-2020, and political and media positions in Sudan focused mainly on the dam’s positive impact on the Sudanese economy and its role in regulating the flow of the Nile. However, there was a change in Khartoum’s position in 2021, which moved closer to the Egyptian position, in favour of signing a binding agreement with Ethiopia prior to filling the dam. However, the current war in Sudan is putting the dam issue on the back burner for the war-suffering Sudanese. This weakening of the Sudanese position… consequently weakens the Egyptian position, which welcomed Sudanese support.
Fruitless negotiations
The negotiations between the parties to this dispute, especially Egypt and Ethiopia, have gone through several phases. The nature and terms of the negotiations in the latest round have changed from what they were several years ago. First there were the technical studies of the dam and the assessment of its effects on the downstream countries of Egypt and Sudan, then negotiations on the implementation of the recommendations of the international committee of experts, and finally negotiations on the rules for filling and operating the dam. Now that the fifth stage of the filling process is underway this summer, the scope of the negotiations has narrowed considerably, and is limited to the future operation of the dam.
Generally speaking, although the negotiations were primarily aimed at establishing binding rules for the filling and operation of the dam, in order to protect the interests of the three countries, they were marked by a lack of trust and a lack of political will to reach a binding agreement, especially on the part of Ethiopia. The Ethiopian regime, which initiated the project and therefore considered itself to be the strong party, wanted to dominate the negotiations, opting for a strategy whereby the absence of an agreement was better than a weak or binding agreement that did not suit it. This policy of fait accompli was therefore the norm on the Ethiopian side… Countered by threats from the Egyptian side. The two sides accused each other of various faults, with the Egyptian side believing that Ethiopia’s recognition of and commitment to previous agreements was the only way out of these disputes.
The most notable moments in these negotiations were the signing of the agreement in principle in 2015 and the intervention of the United States and the World Bank in 2020, which led to a final agreement on the project that Egypt signed… but Ethiopia withdrew at the last moment, rejecting American pressure from the Trump administration. The last phase of the negotiations, which took place in December 2023, failed like the previous ones, prompting Egyptian officials to put an end to the negotiations, which they said were ‘nothing but a waste of time’.
An existential issue for Egypt
The impact of the Renaissance Dam on Egypt is significant and, as such, a source of extreme concern for many sectors of Egyptian society. By controlling the flow of the Blue Nile, the dam could seriously affect the quantity of water available downstream, and therefore in Egypt. Taking into account the world average ‘water poverty’ threshold, which is estimated at 1,000 m³ per year per inhabitant, even though Egypt draws all its resources from the Nile, it is considered to be one of the water-poor countries, because the share of water per inhabitant does not exceed 600 m³ per year, due to the country’s strong demographic growth. If we combine this situation with the construction of the Renaissance dam, the per capita share of water in Egypt should fall below 500 m³ per year…
Projections estimate that the productivity of key crops such as maize and wheat could fall substantially as a result of the reduction in water available for irrigation.
‘Unilateral and uncooperative practices in the operation of this oversized dam could have a catastrophic impact,’ Egypt’s Minister of Water Resources, Hany Swelim, told the UNWater 2023 plenary session, noting that ’if these practices continue alongside a prolonged drought, it could result in more than 1.1 million people leaving the labour market, the loss of around 15% of Egypt’s agricultural area and a doubling of the country’s food import bill.’
In addition to the implications for agriculture, changes in the flow of the Nile could also have long-term effects on Egypt’s ecosystems and economy. The reduction in agricultural land and the loss of almost a million hectares could mean the displacement of 2 million families and a 12% drop in agricultural production, leading to a food deficit of 5 billion Egyptian pounds, jeopardising the country’s food security.
This loss of agricultural land and the halting of projects to rehabilitate it will naturally lead to the loss of employment opportunities that the agricultural sector used to offer to 6.5 million workers, resulting in an increase in the unemployment rate. The impact will also extend to other sectors such as fishing and tourism, especially in Aswan and Luxor. For fishermen, there are no more floods every year, and the quantity of fish is constantly decreasing. Types of fish such as whiting and mabrouka have become rare, and even Nile tilapia, the fish known as the cheapest (considered the ‘fish of the poor’), is also declining due to the salinity of the water. This scarcity is driving up prices, making fish unaffordable for a large proportion of the Egyptian population.
As a result, Egypt is now facing a serious social crisis stemming from rising unemployment and internal migration. And this at a time when Egypt is already suffering from a major economic crisis. An exacerbation of the situation as a result of the foreseeable new impacts of the Renaissance Dam could therefore make the situation unbearable in the country, encouraging even more illegal emigration to escape misery and poverty.
The Renaissance Dam alters the availability of water for Egypt, particularly during periods of drought, when Ethiopia withholds water from the Nile. This situation could force Egypt to draw more intensively on its water reserves, such as the Aswan reservoir, accelerating the depletion of these water resources if Ethiopia fills the dam. In other words, the construction of the dam will mainly affect the water in the ‘High Dam’ lake, also known as ‘Lake Nasser’, which will have an impact on electricity production capacity, with a drop of almost 40%, forcing the country to resort to other solutions to compensate for this loss, such as buying electricity or building fuel-fired power stations… which will add to the deficit in the Egyptian economy. Egypt depends on hydropower for 9% of its energy, and although this may not seem like much, in a crisis situation, every resource is precious.
Conclusion: The outlook… between reality and what needs to be done
Internally, Egypt has begun to change its agricultural practices, limiting the cultivation of certain water-intensive crops such as rice and bananas, and promoting more efficient irrigation methods. Efforts are also underway to renovate irrigation canals in order to reduce water losses and better distribute crops according to their water requirements between different regions. Efforts are also being made to increase the quantity of water, to use desalination rationally, to develop facilities and to maintain supply networks in order to increase the overall efficiency of water use, including rainwater. The cost of reprocessing seawater to make up the shortfall in water, particularly drinking water, adds to the burden on the Egyptian economy.
In conclusion, we can only conclude that Ethiopia has succeeded in imposing its policy of fait accompli, making the dam a reality… which threatens the lives of millions of people in Egypt and Sudan, because it is the people who pay the price for conflicts and political decisions. It therefore seems more necessary than ever to reach an agreement on the operation of the dam and its functioning, in order to avoid a fatal crisis whose repercussions will not be limited to the African continent. A crisis of illegal emigration from Egypt, which is already hosting millions of refugees and suffering from an unprecedented economic crisis, is the last thing Europe wants at this time. The European Union must therefore put this conflict on its agenda as quickly as possible.
What’s more, the countries that have the capacity to play an important mediating role, from my point of view, are those most involved in the investment linked to the dam: China and the United Arab Emirates. President Al Sissi’s reference to this crisis during his visit to China in May could be interpreted as a call for Chinese mediation to reach a binding agreement on this ‘dam of discord’. In fact, multi-party mediation may be the solution to reaching an agreement. However, there must be the political will to put an end to this conflict, which is perfectly resolvable. We are at a time in history when we are seeing many conflicts and too many people suffering… We must do everything we can to avoid adding another tragedy.
Ahmed Elbanna
1 The 1929 Agreement: Signed between Egypt and Great Britain (on behalf of Sudan, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda), in which Great Britain undertook not to undertake, without prior agreement with Egypt, any irrigation or electricity production works likely to harm Egypt’s interests, reduce the level of water reaching it or alter the date of arrival of the water. Egypt has the right to oppose the construction of any new project on the Nile and its tributaries.
The 1959 agreement: The 1959 Nile Waters Agreement is an agreement between Egypt and Sudan concerning the shared control and use of the waters of the Nile. Under this agreement, the entire average annual flow of the Nile, estimated at 85 billion m3, was shared between Sudan, which received 18.5 billion m3, and Egypt, which received 55.5 billion m3. The agreement also gave Egypt the right to build the Aswan dam.
Ahmed Elbanna
Ahmed Elbanna is an Egyptian student in the M2 International Conflicts and Crises programme at the University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne and winner of the 2023-2024 Eiffel scholarship. He is the current assistant to the founder of Solidarités International, Mr Alain Boinet. Interested in conflicts and crises from a humanitarian perspective, Elbanna completed his dissertation at Cairo University on the integration of Syrian refugees in Egypt.
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