An article by Cyprien Fabre
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) annual figures on Official Development Assistance (ODA) are generally eagerly awaited. This data aggregates Official Development Assistance (ODA), i.e. all the financial contributions made by public bodies to a number of countries in support of their development[1]. The largest ODA providers are brought together in a committee, the Development Assistance Committee, or DAC, based at the OECD. Some countries, as well as most international organizations, also choose to notify their aid, and the figures presented by the OECD thus give a good idea of the international public financial flows dedicated to development, and humanitarian funding is one of them.
Producing this data is a lengthy, year-long process, involving the analysis of each project by each donor who reports its ODA for the previous year to the OECD. It is not, therefore, an immediate measure of crisis response, but a tool for analyzing trends on a common basis. What do the numerous figures for 2022 tell us?
General ODA trends in 2022
Global ODA has increased by 22%, from 235 billion USD in 2021 to 287 billion USD in 2022. The proportion of ODA mobilized by the 32 DAC countries remained roughly stable at 63%.
The 2022 data were all the more eagerly awaited as they show the impact of the war in Ukraine on aid budgets in general and humanitarian aid in particular. Ukraine alone received USD 29.4 billion (Figure 1), almost exclusively from DAC members, and representing 10.2% of total ODA in 2022. Just 10% of this aid was counted as humanitarian aid. Ukraine is thus one of the few recent crises for which the rate of development aid is so high, due in particular to substantial budgetary support.
As a corollary of the Ukraine crisis, in-donor refugee costs have risen sharply, from USD 12.9 billion in 2021 to USD 33.3 billion in 2022. These costs represent 14.7% of total ODA from DAC countries in 2022.
Overall ODA to the most fragile contexts[1] has decreased in volume. ODA provided by all donors to fragile contexts[2] has fallen steadily, from a peak of USD 103.5 billion in 2020 to USD 95.7 billion in 2021 and USD 93.1 billion in 2022. This represents a decline of 10% over a two-year period (Figure 2).
Humanitarian aid is most affected by this decrease in the most fragile contexts. Between 2021 and 2022, the biggest decreases are in humanitarian ODA (from USD 24.3 billion to USD 20.8 billion) and ODA for peace[3]. Conversely, ODA for development in fragile contexts has risen slightly (from 62.7 billion USD in 2021 to 64 billion USD in 2022).
ODA has fallen in the most difficult fragile contexts. ODA to extremely fragile contexts fell from 37.2 to 31.2 billion USD between 2021 and 2022. Among the 15 extremely fragile contexts, four have seen significant declines in the amount of ODA received, notably Sudan (down by 3.3 billion USD), Syria (down by 1.46 billion USD), Afghanistan (down by 676 million USD) and Somalia (down by 623 million USD). Only the Republic of Congo has benefited from a significant increase in ODA between 2021 (USD 222.6 million) and 2022 (USD 765.8 million).
The decrease in ODA to Sudan between 2021 and 2022 should not necessarily be seen as an anomaly, as the amount of ODA allocated to Sudan in 2022 remains higher than in all individual years from 2014 to 2018. The statistical anomaly is mainly explained by the USD 5 billion provided to Sudan in 2021. This high amount is largely explained by budget support from the IMF (USD 1.4 billion) and a re-engagement and development policy reform package from the World Bank (USD 1.3 billion). This amount can be interpreted as having been disbursed in the wake of the Sudanese revolution and in support of the temporary shift at that time towards more democratic governance. Setbacks in 2023 with the outbreak of civil war suggest that disbursements are likely to continue to decline. This should be reflected in ODA figures for the coming years.
Syria and Yemen both saw a drop in overall ODA in 2022 due to a decrease in humanitarian ODA, particularly from non-DAC countries, partially offset by an increase in development-related ODA.
Afghanistan, the first year under Taliban control, received similar amounts of humanitarian ODA between 2021 and 2022 (USD 2.2 billion versus USD 2.1 billion). However, ODA for peace has fallen sharply, while ODA for development has also declined to a lesser extent.
Humanitarian ODA
Overall humanitarian ODA from all official donors remained relatively stable in volume between 2021 (36 billion USD) and 2022 (36.7 billion USD). This levelling off is mainly due to a significant drop in humanitarian aid provided by non-DAC countries, which fell from 8.2 to 6.1 billion USD between 2021 and 2022 (- 2.1 billion USD), offset by the continued increase in aid provided by DAC members, from USD 25 billion in 2021 to a new record of USD 26.9 billion in 2022 (+ USD 1.8 billion), with multilateral commitments also rising from USD 2.9 billion in 2021 to USD 3.7 billion in 2022 (an increase of around USD 870 million).
The DAC as a group remains the main provider of humanitarian aid, accounting for 73.2% of total humanitarian ODA in 2022, the highest share since 2016. Global humanitarian response remains primarily a DAC affair, with an all-time high of 26.9 billion USD in 2022. This represents a significant increase of 7.8% on 2021 in terms of volume, and an even more substantial increase on 2020 (+27.8%).
The main humanitarian donors remain the same: the USA (42.9%), despite a drop in volume, followed by Germany (13.5%), which for the first time overtakes the EU institutions (11.8%). Together, these three donors provide around 68.2% of all DAC humanitarian aid. This extreme concentration is dangerous, as declines are appearing. The biggest declines concern major suppliers of humanitarian aid: the USA (- 714 million USD) and Japan (- 286 million USD). France stands out here, with a substantial increase in humanitarian ODA, from 92 to 340 million USD between 2021 and 2022. This increase is in line with France’s various commitments in this area, notably at CICID 2018. Against this backdrop of strong growth, it should be emphasized that France’s response to humanitarian needs in Ukraine in 2022 has not been at the expense of other crises.
However, the DAC’s humanitarian effort has decreased. In 2021 and previous years, humanitarian ODA represented around 15% of total DAC member ODA, up to 33% for the United States. This proportion fell to 12.4% in 2022, roughly the same level as in 2015. Because it started from a very low base, the substantial increase in France’s humanitarian response means that this humanitarian effort will rise from 0.7% in 2021 to 2.3% ODA in 2023, which is still well below the average for DAC countries and places France as the 14th DAC humanitarian donor in 2022.
Overall, humanitarian ODA provided by non-DAC countries decreased from 8.2 billion USD in 2021 to 6.1 billion USD in 2022, a first decline after several years of relative stability (2018-2021). These countries still provided 16.6% of humanitarian ODA in 2022, but this represents the lowest proportion since 2015: these countries provided 22.8% of global humanitarian ODA in 2021. A pronounced trend for these donors is the significant decrease in the amount allocated to Yemen, from USD 661.7 million in 2021 to USD 100.9 million in 2022.
The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia have both reduced their humanitarian ODA allocations in 2022 compared with 2021, by 49.1% and 79.1% respectively. Qatar, the second largest non-DAC member in terms of humanitarian aid allocations in 2022, has increased its humanitarian ODA from 367 million USD in 2021 to 443 million USD in 2022.
Multilateral humanitarian aid
The World Bank’s IDA becomes the largest multilateral donor of humanitarian ODA in 2022, with 1.4 billion USD compared with 824 million in 2021. The World Bank alone now accounts for 37.4% of multilateral humanitarian ODA. This rate is significant and illustrates the growing involvement of multilateral development banks and international financial institutions in crisis response and even humanitarian affairs. The largest projects here focus on climate-related disasters (e.g. in Pakistan, India and Bangladesh) as well as on growth and reconstruction in conflict-affected areas (e.g. in north-eastern Nigeria and Ethiopia).
The World Bank’s commitment is followed by that of CERF (USD 760.6 million; 20.4% of the multilateral humanitarian total) and several UN agencies, with an overall increase from 2021 to 2022 (e.g. +9.3% for UNHCR, +10.6% for WFP, +21.9% for UNICEF and +41.1% for UNFPA).
Geographical allocations
Unsurprisingly, the crisis in Ukraine altered allocation priorities, with the proportion of total humanitarian ODA destined for Europe rising from 3% to 12% of the total. Conversely, the proportion of humanitarian ODA destined for Asia (from 51% to 41%) and, to a lesser extent, Africa (from 29% to 27%) fell (figure 9).
Despite the decrease in the proportion, humanitarian ODA volumes to Africa remained stable, rising from 10.3 billion USD in 2021 to 10.1 billion USD in 2022. Humanitarian ODA to Asia decreased from USD 18.3 billion to USD 15.1 billion, mainly due to a USD 2.3 billion decrease in humanitarian allocations to Syria and a USD 500 million decrease in allocations to Yemen.
The increase in humanitarian ODA to Europe is due almost exclusively to Ukraine, which received 2.9 billion USD in 2022. Most of this humanitarian aid was provided by DAC members (95%), many of whom supported Ukraine for the first time in 2022. Multilateral organizations also increased their assistance to Ukraine, in particular the United Nations, mainly through a CERF allocation of 62.6 million USD.
Humanitarian ODA to Ukraine was probably not entirely additional. Total humanitarian ODA increased by around 700 million USD, while humanitarian ODA to Ukraine alone accounted for 2.9 billion USD. Not all humanitarian ODA to Ukraine can therefore be considered additional to humanitarian aid to other crisis zones.
This sequence of figures and percentages is perhaps a little dry. But it does tell us something. Firstly, a major crisis that is geographically or politically close to the main donors naturally has an impact on the distribution of volumes. Secondly, the main historical humanitarian donors continue to support the effort. That said, the concentration of aid remains dangerous. The current system remains static, and does not represent a global solidarity of all for all. A possible drop in aid budgets, combined with a global political reshuffle, will require us to rethink the way we help countries and populations during periods of crisis. Should a redefined humanitarian approach be extended to other sectors to become the default crisis response instrument, or should it be narrowed down to only those situations that require the mobilization of humanitarian principles? The debate has been going on for a long time, but it is becoming increasingly acute.
Cyprien Fabre
Cyprien Fabre is head of the “crises and fragility” unit at the OECD. After several years of humanitarian missions with Solidarités, he joined ECHO, the European Commission’s humanitarian department, in 2003, and held several positions in crisis contexts. He joined the OECD in 2016 to analyze the engagement of DAC members in fragile or crisis countries. He has also written a series of “policy into action” and “Lives in crises” guides to help translate donors’ political and financial commitments into effective programming in crises. He is a graduate of Aix-Marseille Law School.