
Last month the Munich Security Conference was held. Even if humanitarians might want to stay as far away from it as possible, it is nevertheless an important event, because it is part of those conferences which reflect the state of security doctrines in Europe and in the world. It therefore gives an idea of the risks of conflicts and, to a certain extent, of what is being done to prevent them. The 2026 report of the conference sets the tone ; it is titled « Under Destruction» to speak of the norms, institutions and cooperation mechanisms which structured collective security and which are now progressively undermined, bypassed or instrumentalized. As a consequence of this hollowing-out of the collective, the 2026 edition had as its main orientation rearmament. Rearmament as the only instrument of true deterrence in the face of well identified threats in Europe. The general idea is that, 80 years after the end of the Second World War, with the GDP of Western Europe 30% larger than that of China and 11 times greater than that of Russia, there is no valid reason for Europe not to defend itself on its own.
In fact, military efforts are significant. These efforts translate into substantial budget allocations towards industry and the army. Given the varied levels of indebtedness in Europe, the level of these allocations requires defining uncomfortable priorities. In other words, where to spend the money that we do not have ? As we know, official development assistance has been one of the first items sacrificed, and much has already been said and written on this subject.
Yet, beyond solidarity between peoples, development cooperation also has a conflict prevention role which is still largely ignored and under-exploited. A cooperation which helps the countries concerned to tackle the factors of crisis contributes to a more stable world. Not only does this stability have beneficial effects for the countries and regions concerned, but, in a poorly understood interest, it also avoids DAC countries having to divert part of their resources and their political attention towards crises which may seem distant from their immediate security priority. After the time of « La Corrèze before the Zambezi » here is the time of « Moscow before the Kivu » (you can find better). But if one thinks about it, crises in the world are not that far from security priorities. Competing powers, state or non-state groups are perfectly comfortable exploiting the various fragilities of certain countries for their political and economic benefit, generally to the detriment of ours. For Europeans, and the French in particular, the Central African Republic and the Sahel are eloquent examples of this. In the peripheral areas of many capitals or urban centers, the State is perceived as a predator among others. The weakness of a State to control its territory and to energize economic development across the whole country and for the whole population leaves room for criminal groups which have no interest in seeing the State extend its control. When the strengthening of State services is precisely supported by development or humanitarian actors, disinformation and the manipulation of feelings against external actors are therefore naturally means for these groups to have peace for their small affairs. These are elements which are not countered with weapons, but rather thanks to good State governance.
This is where development cooperation can help, but the sums allocated to governance, or for example to the judicial sector, or to the management of public resources are minimal and declining. In the accounting of the humanitarian-development-peace nexus, these sectors are part of ODA for peace, with an influence value which is neglected in favor of military deterrence. This progressive abandonment of influence and power under the pretext that it was labeled as « soft » is a serious problem.
That the « soft » is not popular is one thing, but the effectiveness of military options to solve political problems is notoriously weak. In recent years, diplomatic and economic effectiveness, on the other hand, has been able to take certain countries much further in political and economic partnerships, again, often to the detriment of Europe.
More importantly, must aggressiveness really become our new offer to the world ? Is it for our rearmament alone that the European model would be looked at, appreciated or hated throughout the world ? Is it that, in countries exposed to the greatest fragilities, populations ask for a Europe that offers the same thing as the other « partners », but more slowly ? Or are we bearers of solidarity, in addition to interests ?
The term value is a bit overused, it sounds like an old reactionary, but anyway article 2 of the Treaty on European Union lists the foundations of the Union: human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, rule of law, respect for human rights. Why would these values not remain an integral part of our international cooperation and, ultimately, of our attractiveness and our security ? Humanitarian aid as well as development cooperation take part in this effort, and it is important to see them as a broader strategic tool which integrates security. This is not calculated as such in strategic visions, but the failures of a security approach to peace will soon show again their limits. Global risks — climate change, biodiversity loss, pressures on water, pandemic risks — will not retreat before an aircraft carrier. Our collective security passes through peace, and development and solidarity are vectors of it.
This will not happen on its own, development is not a priority for most political leaders. It is also that development and humanitarian action suffer from speaking essentially to themselves. The number of conferences, of ‘panels’, of ‘workshops’ where an agency speaks to an NGO which speaks to a donor which speaks to a bank is staggering. If solidarity is perceived as a tool of yesterday’s world and not as a strategic asset, then we must go and convince, because it is the only way to regain a model that works — and the funding that goes with it.
Cyprien Fabre.
