Security and Humanitarians: With INSO, Lessons from the Field

 

The question of the safety of humanitarian workers (or members of UN field teams) has accompanied the history of modern humanitarian action since its beginnings. It goes hand in hand with the questions of « How far should we go? » and « How do we act, and which risks do we manage? », which are inherent to this commitment, at least whenever it involves intervening in an armed conflict zone (or in natural disasters accompanied by banditry and looting). As Alain Boinet recalled in an article published in Droit et pratique de l’action humanitaire in October 2019, as well as in Défis Humanitaires: « While humanitarian action is a duty that falls under the ethics of conviction (according to the opposition between the ethics of responsibility and the ethics of conviction theorized by the philosopher Max Weber), its implementation in insecure contexts generates multiple risks, notably for humanitarian personnel, for whom organizations must assume responsibility. »

 

But a negative trend has followed humanitarian action itself like a shadow: there was a time when humanitarians enjoyed a relative degree of respect, one that recognized in them representatives of a form of neutrality and independence that helped everyone. This respect was by no means absolute, far from it, but it offered teams some protection. Then came a period when being a humanitarian did not provide any particular protection. Finally, we have entered a time in which humanitarian personnel are being specifically targeted (attacks, killings, hostage-taking, etc.).

 

It is precisely the consequences of this deterioration that the United Nations Security Council sought to address once again, as part of a concern it has consistently held over the past ten years, by adopting on 24 May last Resolution 2730, which calls on states to respect and protect humanitarian and United Nations personnel in accordance with their obligations under international law. This resolution, adopted with 14 votes in favor and one abstention (Russia), was introduced by Switzerland and co-sponsored by 97 Member States. It should be recalled that Security Council Resolution 2175 of 29 August 2014 had already noted « (…) an increase in acts of violence committed (…) against national and international personnel of humanitarian organizations (…) ». Likewise, Resolution 2286 of 3 May 2016 stressed that « (…) humanitarian workers (…) are increasingly the target of acts of violence (…) violence against the wounded and the sick, medical personnel and humanitarian workers. »

 

What are these obligations under international law that underpin these various UN resolutions? As Alain Boinet recalled in his article, « they are the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols of 1997 and 2005, as well as the rules of customary international humanitarian law requiring parties to an armed conflict to respect and ensure respect for IHL, which provides for the protection of the wounded and the sick, medical personnel and humanitarian workers: Rule 31 of customary IHL states that humanitarian relief personnel must be respected and protected. Rule 55 establishes the principle of freedom of movement for humanitarian relief. »

 

 

To examine the underlying causes and stakes of the situation addressed by the UN Security Council, we need to turn to INSO (International NGO Safety Organisation), an NGO founded in 2011 and headquartered in The Hague, Netherlands, which serves as a « platform » dedicated to security coordination and advice for humanitarian organizations operating in high-risk contexts. INSO works in 17 countries, benefits 1,202 NGOs, and employs 1,307 people in the field:

 

On 24 May, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2730, calling on states to respect and protect humanitarian and United Nations personnel. How did INSO receive this initiative, and what does it represent in your view?

 

INSO: INSO welcomes Resolution 2730 as an essential reminder to conflict actors of their obligations to ensure the protection of humanitarians. The clauses calling for concrete action to assess risks to humanitarians and to develop relevant recommendations through regular reporting and solid evidence are highly appreciated. It is a recognition that the data generated by field-based platforms such as INSO is essential for the safety and access of NGOs.

 

From January 2023 to May 2024, INSO documented 1,944 incidents affecting humanitarians, including 57 killed, 208 injured and 185 abducted. What is your analysis of the trend in the rate of incidents affecting humanitarians?

 

INSO: Every incident is a concern, and it is always troubling when our colleagues are exposed to this type of incident; any violation of IHL is unacceptable. However, it should be noted that in recent years, the annual number and rate of serious impacts on NGOs worldwide have often been stable or have declined; the drivers of this trend are due to several factors, both internal and external to NGOs. That said, changes in conflict patterns in Afghanistan and Syria have been significant factors. Moreover, although they matter for our perception of risk, incidents involving NGOs account for only a relatively small proportion of all incidents reported on the ground, ranging between 0.9 and 1.5% of all incidents recorded in a given year.

 

At the same time, crime accounts for the majority of incidents involving NGOs. The fact that the overwhelming majority of serious incidents involving NGOs are motivated by a perception of wealth, rather than by targeting based on NGOs’ activities or profile, is consistent with this trend.

 

Nevertheless, despite a steady annual decline in NGO worker deaths in particular, it is possible that, as we continue to scrutinize the 2023 data, we will see a temporary reversal of the downward trend in serious incidents. This is because crises erupted rapidly in places such as Sudan and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, which directly contributed to the increase in the number of NGO worker deaths.

 

 

National staff of humanitarian organizations pay the heaviest price for insecurity in the field. Can INSO corroborate this?

 

INSO: There is a clear demand for global analysis aimed at NGO headquarters staff so that they can better support their teams in the field, including national staff. To this end, INSO produces dozens of reports tailored for humanitarian leaders and managers, who form a network of around 140 NGOs and donors at the global level (headquarters), and 1,200 NGOs in the field.

 

Indeed, colleagues of national or local origin are the most likely to experience a serious incident. Looking at the reasons, we find that the percentage of incidents involving national staff is almost identical to the percentage of national staff within the overall NGO population, which in both cases is above 90%. This is the most reliable determinant of the composition of victims of serious incidents, alongside other factors that contribute to NGO risk, ranging from risk tolerance to subnational dynamics. This underlines the importance of field-based platforms for understanding and managing risks to NGOs, as it is difficult to understand risks when you are not close to partners.

 

Among these data, it should be mentioned that it is the national staff of international NGOs who are most affected, rather than the staff of national NGOs. This is because national staff of international NGOs make up the largest group of humanitarian workers in the field. Nevertheless, INSO works tirelessly to understand the internal and external nuances that can amplify risk, to ensure that analysis, advice, training, crisis management and emergency support are guided by the needs and profiles of our partners.

 

 

What characterizes the evolution of humanitarian personnel security?

 

INSO: Security risk management for NGOs has improved considerably with the introduction of field-based platforms to help NGOs make informed decisions. With this development, we have seen NGOs share information at unprecedented levels; by having a platform, NGOs understand and contribute to collective security. In addition, as localization continues to guide humanitarian strategies, the field-based approach to analysis and advice has allowed national NGOs to access the support systems traditionally available to their larger international counterparts.

 

And over the past ten years?

 

INSO: NGOs have witnessed unprecedented growth in field support for their risk management efforts, and have made good use of it. Moreover, these efforts are increasingly inclusive; for example, more than 40% of INSO’s roughly 1,200 partners are national NGOs.

 

The establishment of reliable mechanisms for collecting and sharing data at the local level, driven by the « Saving Lives Together » framework, is at the heart of this evolution. The task ahead of us now is to support and scale up operationally relevant initiatives. Through field-based platforms, NGOs demonstrate that they are willing to support collective security by sharing information and perspectives, contrary to some narratives currently being spread around the challenges of security risk management.

 

 

What perception does INSO have of the measures taken by humanitarian organizations to mitigate and manage security risks for their field staff? What works?

INSO: We work with NGOs on a daily, weekly and monthly basis across all of our field offices. Through these engagements in security roundtables, trainings and site reviews, we see how important information sharing is. In our roundtables, where NGOs feel comfortable sharing what has worked and what has not, we learn and our partner NGOs learn. Security risk management is a constantly evolving process, and regular, open communication allows us to make sure we can keep pace with that evolution.

We know that NGOs are fully committed to the principle of « Stay and Deliver. » Our data show that only a very small percentage of individual serious incidents lead to a loss of access or a permanent withdrawal for NGOs. This suggests that NGOs understand the risks they face and feel they have the capacity and the support on the ground to deal with them.

Nevertheless, through meetings with key informants, regular engagement and surveys, INSO has found that the rapid onset of a crisis can change NGOs’ perceptions of risk, of their presence and of their strategies over a relatively short period. This is probably because NGOs are balancing duty of care with the need to stay and deliver. In such cases, they take into account humanitarian needs, resilience, programme criticality and conflict sensitivity, while also examining their risk tolerance.

The classic components of security risk management, based on humanitarian principles and acceptance, remain the most useful tools for mitigating risk. As the contexts, and the world, in which we work evolve in unforeseen ways, best practices in risk mitigation have proven their worth.