



HARVARD
HUMANITARIAN
INITIATIVE



Humanitarian Action at the Frontlines: Field Analysis Series

Realities and Myths of the “Triple Nexus”

Local Perspectives on Peacebuilding, Development, and Humanitarian Action in Mali

By Emmanuel Tronc, Rob Grace, and Anaïde Nahikian

June 2019

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to offer their thanks to all individuals and organizations interviewed for this research. Special appreciation is also extended to the Malians who supported this paper through their translations of the Executive Summary into a number of languages. Finally, sincere gratitude is expressed to the Malians who have lent their time, insights, and perspectives to this work.

About the Authors

The authors drafted this paper for the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative's Advanced Training Program on Humanitarian Action (ATHA), where Emmanuel Tronc is Senior Research Analyst, Rob Grace is Senior Associate, and Anaïde Nahikian is Program Manager.

About the Humanitarian Action at the Frontlines: Field Analysis Series

The *Humanitarian Action at the Frontlines: Field Analysis Series* is an initiative of the Advanced Training Program on Humanitarian Action (ATHA) at the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative (HHI). It aims to respond to the demand across the humanitarian sector for critical context analysis, dedicated case studies, sharing of practice in humanitarian negotiation, as well as overcoming access challenges and understanding local perspectives. This series is oriented toward generating an evidence base of professional approaches and reflections on current dilemmas in this area. Our analysts and researchers engage in field interviews across sectors at the country-level and inter-agency dialogue at the regional level, providing comprehensive and analytical content to support the capacity of humanitarian professionals in confronting and addressing critical challenges of humanitarian action in relevant frontline contexts. This research is supported by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida).

For more information about the Humanitarian Action at the Frontlines: Field Analysis Series, please contact Anaïde Nahikian (Program Manager, Advanced Training Program on Humanitarian Action) at anahikia@hsph.harvard.edu or Rob Grace (Senior Associate, Advanced Training Program on Humanitarian Action) at rgrace@hsph.harvard.edu. For more information about the field research undertaken in Mali, please contact Emmanuel Tronc (Senior Research Analyst, Advanced Training Program on Humanitarian Action) at etronc@hsph.harvard.edu.

Acronyms

AFISMA: African-led International Support Mission in Mali
AQIM: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
AU: African Union
CMA: Coordination of Azawad Movements
ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States
EU: European Union
EUCAP: European Union Capacity Building Mission in Mali
EUTM: European Union Training Mission
FAMa: Armed Forces of Mali
GoM: Government of Mali
HC: Humanitarian Coordinator
ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross
IHC: Islamic High Council
INSO: International NGO Safety Organisation
IS: Islamic State
LRRD: Linking Relief, Rehabilitation, and Development
MICEMA: ECOWAS Mission in Mali
MINUSMA: United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MLF: Macina Liberation Front
MNA: National Movement for Azawad
MNLA: National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad
MSF: Médecins Sans Frontières
NGO: Non-governmental organization
NSAG: Non-state armed group
NWOW: New Way of Working
OCHA: Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
QIPs: Quick Impact Projects
RC: Resident Coordinator
SDG: Sustainable Development Goals
UN: United Nations
WASH: Water, sanitation, and health

Table of Contents

<i>Executive Summary (Peul Version)</i>	<i>i</i>
<i>Executive Summary (Tamasheq Version)</i>	<i>v</i>
<i>Executive Summary (Songhoy Version)</i>	<i>x</i>
<i>Executive Summary (Bambara Version)</i>	<i>xiv</i>
<i>Executive Summary (French Version)</i>	<i>xviii</i>
<i>Executive Summary (English Version)</i>	<i>xxiii</i>
<i>Introduction</i>	<i>1</i>
I. Key Issues Driving Instability in Mali	1
A. Tuareg Irredentism.....	2
B. Stultified State- and Nation-Building Efforts.....	7
C. Proliferation of Conservative Islam and Jihadism	10
II. The International Response	14
A. Mali as “Donor Darling”	14
B. International Mobilization in the Wake of the 2012 Uprising	15
C. Humanitarian Activities.....	22
III. Implications for the “Triple Nexus”	25
IV. Conclusion	30

Executive Summary (Peul Version)

FEREEJI KATTANDI BAMTAARE, ÑIBNUGOL E MBALLIIGU E NDER MALI.

Hay so tawi leydi Mali ndii wadi duubi sappooji (3) e laawol bamtaare, e dey're to banngedawrugol e laamu potal. Hannde Mali ko leydi jogiidi cafee (tidallaaji), Miskinaagal won to tolni e dum sabu nguurdam cattudam e rafi ndenaangu. Nguu don rafi ndenaangu huulbiniingu, hadgu bamtaare e koddigal moyyal hakkunde leydi Mali ndi.

Hay so tawi leydeele winndere hewde ngari e leydi ndi ko ine wona duubi ngam fabaade, Milliongaaji kewdi ko fayti e Dollars, hakke 296.5 Million Dollars wadaama e balliigu (humanitaire) e hitaande 2019 e dow haala OCHA. Holno pamirten balle winndereyankooje batteede, tawo rafi ndenaangu, cafee laamu e cafee renndo ine njokki?

Holno Ardiyankooje winndere e diiwan o, njokkiri jabbaade njafeegu ndenaagu leydi ndi e dow biibe mayri, jareeki cafee e saahel, jogaade kulwuli watta cafee nde eggude fayta Maghreb walla Erop EKN.....?. Hol yidde e fereji leydi di njogi ngam rentaafe jokkude pelle jom'en fetelaaji, pelle wad'boniyankooje, rafi jogaade njuubudi laamu ngu, e pelle nde ngona laamuyankooje e konnujankooje winndere tawateefe e leydi ndi ?.

Ko yoga e ndeen namne, ciimtol ngol baroori. Fayndaaje cerdudi di leydeele winndere mbadi ngam fabaade Mali, kadi e yiingo ngo renndooji (biibe leydi) njoggani dum. E tentinde, durnude mijooji ko fayti e ngonka e wawde nibnude ngol gonngol (triple nexus) badangol e dental winndereyankeewal hitaande 2016 (forum mondial humanitaire 2016). Fayndaare dental ngal, ko yewte mballiingu ngam fabaade leydeele dañde cafee no Mali ni, ngam fabaade dum en ko fayti e dey're to banngedawrugol, bamtaare, semmbinnde kawral e hoolaare hakkunde biibe leydi e Arabe fabaade be, e wadde gede kewde ko fayti e ballal. Nde golle min buri fewnude de ko'e mijooji celludi, kuccinaadi e gonka nokku o, kono kadi hakke 130 namne e yewte waddaama e yimbe e yimbe haa tenti e hararabe jeyaafe e diiwan o, hey'aafe laamu, jayndiyankooje, Pelle jogiibe feletaaji, yimbe societe siwil, nalan'kooje, jannginooje, haralleebe, gollobe heriibe, gollobe ko fayti e ballal, heboobe balle, yimbe eggube e janngoobe to duude jaafi katirnde e nder Mali (haa tenti e Bamako e hakkunde leydi ndi) e to France hakkunde Bowte (Decembre) e Seedto (Avril) 2019.

Ciimtol ngol famminta em ko tobbe 3 gonnde sabaabu walla haa jooni jokkude wonnde sabaabu dillinde walla jibde leydi Mali ndi.

Tobbere adaniire ndee ko ko fayti e ngonka laamu leydi Mali e njuubudi laamu ngu jogii ngam fewnitde ngonka e kuccam leydi Mali. Ngoyaaji kewdi ine njogaa e nder leydi ndi, ko wayno mbele laamu Mali ngu ko hey'aafe tigi-rigi biibe leydi ndii, e mbele e be njogi mbawga, pellital, fereji e hattane yewde fereji so tawi cafee e tidallaaji ndaani biibe leydi ndi.

Walloobe winndere booyi limtude leydi Mali e leydeele burde deyde e bamtaare to banngedawrugol. Ndiin njuubudi fuddi feñde e leydi ko ko kitaale 90, on tuma nde leydi Mali ndi

salii laamu ndolndolaagu ngam subaade laamu potal (democratie). Kono, won hakkilanteeji walla wittooji ko fayti e bamtaare , tumdi wonnde laamu ngu e yoga e wallidtiibe mun 'en ine tuuma e cadeele laamu Mali dañi e duubi 30 sakkitiidi. Nguyka ardiima fof, e pelle wiindereyaŋkooje gonannde bamtaare booyii muɓɓude gite mun 'en e waylo waylooji e jibru njuɓɓudi e balle bawnoodɛ wallude haa nafa sadne. Goonga mun tan hannde , Mali ko leydi wuurdi e balle ,tee kadi laamu leydi ndi ine ɲakkira fereji , sabiidi addude jibru e balle nde, tee ko to fannduuji di fof , to bannge mballigu, to faggudu, ballal konnuŋkooɓe , mballigu ko fayti e ndenaagu walla haɓtaade terrorism.

Tobɓere dimmere nde ko ko fayti e gonka leyɣi ndi, Tentinon e tobɓere jewtaare leñol Tuarek en. Nde don yewtaare ko muuya boyɗo e tarik leydi Mali haa non sahaa nde jimaandi leydi France iwii e dow leydi Mali. Dawriyaŋkooɓe Tuarek booyi ndartude jewtaare mun ngam iwde e njimaandi Mali, saha fof e ɓe mbaɗa Murtere haa ni e sakkiteende hitaande 2012, ngam famɗinde seɓɓe laamu leydi Mali e diiwan Azawad to fudnaange leydi ndi , Ngol wadi cilol nayabol ko leñol Tuarek'en mbaɗa murtere gila leydi Mali heɓti jewtaare mum e juude France. Sababuuji burdi duɗdeɓe e murtere , e wiyde maɓɓe, ko cadeele nde eggiyaŋkooɓe njogi, kadi wasdeɓe jogaade ardiyaŋkooɓe ko fayti e dawrugol walla laamu, tee kadi ko laamu burngu wawde hutoraade heedi-heeda hakkunde yimɓe , waylo-waylo weeyo, beydogol nguleeki e famɗugol toɓo ine kadi e cadeele burde tammpinde yimɓe o, kadi e ɓee ñiga laamu ngu e welsindaande ndeɓe , welsinaare haa fina tawa , renndo e faggudu Tuarek'en. E dow dum kadi, Laamu leydi Mali ine welsindii leñol FULBE ko fayti e jokkondiire mawnde gonde hakkunde leñol e pelle jom 'en fetelaaji (jihadist). Kadi leñol fulbe ine waasi natde e gollirnde laamu ngu tigi haa no haanirini, yeru: ɓe kewaani e konnuŋkooɓe Mali (Armee) , dum non , E ɓee kolli wonnde ko ɓe joñaabe walla welsindaabe. Dum ine jeya ko beydata cadeele hakkunde leyɣi, haa teñti e cadeele leydi ko wayno (ndemanteeri e durngo).

Murtere hitaande 2012, addani leydi Mali ndi cayɗeele mawnde e kuubal kono kadi haa teñti e leñol Tuarek 'en . Jeytaare Azawad , leñol Turek fof e kuubal meeda wallitde miijo jeytaare nde, dum ine jeya e cadeele Tuarek'en ,tee gaddude cadeele e ceerungal hakkunde maɓɓe.Nguurndam leyɣi goddi ko wayno SONGOY, FULBE E ARABEEBE e nokku oo ine jeya ko beydi cadeele ndee. Yidde maɓɓe jewtaare non, addani leyɗeele Sahel cadeele mawnde, haa teñti e rafi ndenaangu e danle cuɗiide, ine jeyaa e hedɛ beydude pelle wadboniyaŋkooje e pelle joggiide feletaaji. Gila hitaande 2012 , yeygol dorog e sifa kabirde fof, dum ine jeya ko beydi huɓɓude jeenge e nokku o. Tugnaade e rafi jogaade hattane laamu ngu e rende leydi ndi, ndeen pelle wadboniyaŋkooje ine beydi joggaade e wuurnude hareeji hakkunde leyɣi walla pelle. Bingu babaagu hakkunde joggiibe fetelaaji ine kadi jeyaa ko beydani pelle wadboniyaŋkooje nde seɓɓe, hay ni yoga e pelle joggiinde fetelaaji ine dum kutoroo sadne , dum wadi ngoɣaaji mum ine laɓti.

Tobɓere tatabere ndee, ko jibde leydi Mali, addude e mayri diine Lislam mo ndi wowaanii e rokkude nde don pelle wadboniyaŋkooje doole ngam no ɓe beydori addude jibru e mayri. Hitaande 2012 , hakkunde colte e duujal, dental pelle murtiyaŋkooɓe nde certii, dum woni sabaabuhokkude pelle islamiyaŋkooje nde seɓɓe. Pelle kewde ko wayno : AL KAEDA TO MAGHREB, MUJAO, E ANCAR AL DINE, njaggii nokkuuji kewdi to fudnaange leydi ndi, ngam yidde joyɣinde saria to fudnaange leydi Mali ko dum wonno mijooji yoga e maɓɓe. Ngam famɗere laamu leydi Mali joggaade hattane lamaade , joggaade junngo raɓɓo,ɲakkude ganndal, tayyondiral gonngal hakkunde laamu ngu e leyɣi gondi ton,suudi laamu e kala

maale laamu gonnoodé njanii. Kan gonka , pelle jihadin̄kooje dè , kutoriima dùm, haa tenti e renndooji di ndañata yoga e balle iwruđe e laamu. Piggal ngal konnuṅkoođe leydi Mali bađa hitaande 2012 , woni sabaabu tayonndiral woni hakkunde won e renndo ngo, beydi badonndiral hakkunde maḅḅe e pelle jihadin̄koođe . Nde don pelle jihadin̄koođe ndokkiḅe joga e fartan̄geeji ko fayti e Cellal, ñawoore, jannde, ngalu ley leydi, gollirde laamuyan̄kooje,caḁeele ko fayti leydi (gese walla durirdi) e Ndenaagu.

E dow dùm , lislam kesam kesmaw, ine adda waylo waylooji ko fayti e ngonka renndo. E diwanuujji di jihadin̄koođe heḅtunoo, ḅe ḅuurno tugnaade ko'e jannde Ura'aana, e noddude ḅe ko fayti e jihad. Pelle jihadin̄koođe cemmbinii e dow yimbe ḅe jannde fodde janngede, sabiinde uddugol hakke teemedde cuudi janngirdi to hakkunde e fudnaange- sahal leydi ndi. Mballiingu ngu konnuṅkoođe winndereyan̄koođe mbadi e Mali, saha e caggal caḁeele hitaande 2012 nde, ko mijooji mbammaadi ko adii, tee gonduudi e payndaaje to banngedawrugol,dùm woni arde huutoraade ngalu leydi ndi, dùm woni daṅde nafoore mum.

Pelle winndereyan̄keeje kewde walla dee diiwan ko wayno: Dental dowlaaji Erop (union europeenne), Dental dowlaaji Afrik (union Africaine), Dental dowlaaji winndere (Nations unies), Sedeao.....Cakki fereji kewdi ngam jam,kawral,ḅamtaare mballiigu keboorto.

Teskuyaaji tati 3 mawdi ine ngoodi e mballiigu winndereyan̄keewu ngu: go'o fof ko fayndaare rabbinde wodde, gonka ka leydi ndi woni ka, dùm woni wuurde tan e mballiigu, walla heḅde hofa juude mun ngam wattude yakaare mum fof e leydeele gondè haa non tenti e ḅee don walliroobe ko fayti e konnuṅkoođe e ndenaagu, ḅamtaare e fabaade, tawo non , nde don leydeele walla pelle ndusat tan laamu leydi mun no yettiniri paydaaje mun, e no ndaroori darnde mun.

Caḁeele dimme dee ko mballiigu ngu leydeele winndere de mbadi, ḅee ḅuri tugnaade ko'e ndenaagu, ḅee njoṅi kaldigal e deyre. E dow dùm , payndaaje ḅurde laḅtude ndee leydeele nde coomi e gardogol leydi france, ḅee ḅuri tugnaade ko habaade pelle jihadin̄koođe, dùm non ko gila hitaande 2012,caggal nde fudnaange leydi jagga, kono kadi ine heen rafi ndenaagu to hakkunde leydi too, don kadi pelle jihadin̄koođe e wadboniyan̄koođe hebbinii.

Tataabel ,ko haa joni , tinnaare ndee pelle winndereyan̄koawooje nde mbadi,ine yawonii,haa non tenti e wasde ḅe gollide e yimbe jeyaabe e diin nokkuuji, tee kadi tee kadi, tawo ko yimbe ḅee ndarde mun'en keḅtinaa. Biḅḅe leydi Mali ine ñiinga no feewi, tee ñiingaali gonndudi e maana pelle bayde no: MINUSMA, UTM, EUCP, heḅloobe sojeeḅe e sadarmeri Mali.

Caggal dii do heḅlooji fof, ley'yi Mali kewdi nguurndam mun'en hannde ine satti, ko'e kulwuli tan e rafi ndenaagu wona , tee subaka fof caḁeele ine beydo, e dùm kadi e ḅee daḅḅude no ḅe njuḅḅiniri nguurndam maḅḅe to banngal cellal,ndiyam moy'Yam, no ḅee ngiwri e tampere e no ḅee njuḅḅiniri faggundu maḅḅe. Kadi ceerungal manngal ine hakkunde ley'yi dii e aroobe wallude ḅee, walla caḁeele hakkunde maḅḅe. Won walloobe tuumateeḅe wonnde ñukkintoobe laamu, walla woḅḅe ko golle mun en jaafi, beydugol rafi ndemaagu e nokkuuji di, usti no feewi golle maḅḅe sabu won e nokkuuji di ḅee ngala hattane jottaade, so wona tan jeyaabe doon, kono dùm kadi hollaama wonnde e dùm famdi ngartam.

Dee dō cadeele fof ine pamna men ko helmere nde todđi (triple nexus), holliraande wonnde safaara keso, Feere fof hannde tewteteende yo wonniri e dawrugol, ko dūm tan waawi rentinnde mijooji e payndaale walliyaŋkooŋe to banŋe ɓamtaare, ndemaagu, kaldigal. Caggal nde mijooji ndurna, yiyaama hay ngo dōn miijo wawa jokkude e nder Mali. Tee ko dūm hunnde laɓtude, ine tidii hannde seerdunde golle hakkunde konnuŋkooŋe e kambe gollotooŋe to mballiigu e jam e dey're no ngartiri. E uddorde haala ka, darnde pelle winndereyaŋkooje, konnuŋkooŋe , ine poti laɓtineede.

Ngoo dō widto, ngo hummpitiibe mbaɗi, ngam dañde fereji laɓtinooji toɓɓe baɗɗe fayiida kono ,jam, ɓamtaare , mballiigu ngam leydi Mali ndi wawiirta yaltude e ka gaska, ko ɓuri fof yawde e yaccude e yewtinaande darnde pelle winndereyaŋkooje, golle mun en e hakkilantaagal mun'en, watta addanoyde men walla diwaan o fof cadeele hakkunde ley'yi e ko waynon.

Executive Summary (Tamasheq Version)

**Tazazafte id tidite tane “ karadhe haratane wine djer tahananite
wine issoudare n-akal id wine kel alghafete”
Tichereyene n-oussoudare n-akal, moukina n-alghafete id timachalene
in kel tahananite daghe Mali**

Takalawkalawte

Tila a ilane marawe wityane n-issiyassa id issoudare n-akal, a iroune tamosse sounde “akal erdhalane idjane ilhoriya tiknate id ichaghile n-ilhoukoum ihouskene” houndaghe, Mali tamosse addawlat tiknate talakhawte. Tikna talakhawte taghawssene daghe tinahaye amroumare d-ogchad makhorene. Ibba n-assakanete a ikassene ticheriyene id tizidjawte n-akal id tikawte isse data id awa ekhalene timoudre in timité n-addawlat in mali fuk. houndaghe tahadhara in-aljamaghate n-idoualene ahodjane id timadhe in miliontene in dollars amechelnene daghe taghawssinene ti daghe in hak awataye a awadhene – sounde \$296.5 USB in miliontene ine dolare daghe albabe in tidhilte idjane kel tahananite daghe awataye wa daghe in 2019 daghe awa tina OCHA - idek imik wasse tatwadjarah tidhilte n- aljamaghete n-idouwalene daghe akal houndaghe haratene akadhrike a tadjene at amossane alghafete d-imik wasse erdjache akal?

Idek imik wasse tilalene n-amachalene n-idoualene fuk id n-amachalene in kalene wi atayenese assiwadhe in tidite n-ibba nassouhou n-adawlat, fal idimate in mouzaghane n-akal, dassé atwadja afal “ogchal wane n-assahra” warhine itewadhe ikalene wine ilmaghribe(magreb) – d-ilihine hasene, id wine atayene n-europe ? Inar awa taghale d-awa tasdarhane timité n-aka, izaghnene daghe derhane wane djer ajamaghatene in kel tazoli id wani kel timarene, daghe ibba in tidjawte nawa asdharhanene n-amachalene wine ilhoukoume id n-inamachalene wi wartila ilhoukoume, id kel alkhaskar wine idoualene fuk ?

Takalawkalawte tisitakhbalete issistanene, tifatene awadhnene harate “n-aljawabe n-aljamaghate n-idoualene” daghe Mali, id awa ordane kel akal falasene. Ate amossene, ad idjrouwane aljawabene asohatnene fal ichimichile id timoudre n-awa sitawana “ karadhe haratane wine djer tahananite wine issoudare n-akal id wine kel alghafete” ti atwadjanene daghe tidawte n-aljamaghete n-idoualene fal tahananite daghe awataye wane 2016, a isitakhbalene ikalene wi daghe idja amaremare sounde Mali, yade iknine takariste in-issiyassa toharete daghe oumaghe in makana n-alghafete, d-issoudare n-akal d-awa ekhalene titbakha tine kel tahananite. Ichaghilene wine war ilkemane yare imroumorene adjotnene idjanene fal taghasse daridoghate id sistanene n-idinate odjarnene temedhé id karadhete timarwene nawadime ahedhernene daghe awa idjane at amossene kel akal, kel ilhoukoum id kel aljabha, imouzarene n-akal, imanokalene in-ichaghibe, imasaghrane, kel salane, kel tahananite, ilwikilene n-idoualene, imachaghalene d-idinate wi ika anafa, idinate wi adjewadhnene in kalene wi yadhdene, d-atanlibene - daghe Mali (houlane daghe Bamoukou d-aghrime wane ihane amasse n-adawlat) id daghe France, ghore iyore wane dujamber 2018 id wane ibril 2019.

Takalawkalawte ta daghe tilé fal karadhate haratene ichamnene tisse alwak fuk tiwinatide ibba tizidjawte daghe Mali. Harate wa azarene adjene fal ilhoukoum n-addawlat id sawetane wine moukina n-addawlat tane mali. Akal ahate achawachatene adjotnene, sounda asse ilhoukoum wane mali hak tamité ghide tila daghisse ilwikilene nesse isse tadobate ahissane tikine harate daghe timizoghene nassane warene raghisse, tadjassane asoudmare idoutene daghe ikna azinnildjournou.

Ahodjane inane madhalane n-idoualene Mali tamosse “atalib erdhane” issiyassa wane tezhate nedasse wane issoudare n-akal. Idjoulouyete in Mali daghe icheghile intede daghe wityane wine tazayate timarwene, dharate issimititi n-ilhoukoum wan ataakhate tane elkhaskare sedasse sissiyassa n-ilhoukoum tassodjedahate idinate idmanesse. Daghe awene daghe timousnawene azizeharmane amsisdhale inesdebarane daghibane ilhoukoum iwarsarho. Achimichidje odjarane daghe oumaghe ya éhéré, inassedebarene wine addawlat assebananene in ibane alkhabela nilhoukoum wane Mali yi issimititi in takharha nichaghile wan anhadjene. Awene iwar fal tahaihaite imbahou najarawe imadhalene. Achili Mali tolahe d-akal warin ila issibabe wilyene ar wane tidehelene id tilimaze, daghe ibane issimititi in takharhatane ilhoukoum ta tenhadjate tamosse ilhoukoum tan Mali a issinadamane takharha tan oumaghe dajarawe, intidelilene tine meshenene, meghe tin abaktawe, tin issoudare n-akal, tadhilte nelkhaskare meghe animatafene dibane achare.

Harate wasse issine imaghe yade tassaghe tamité daghe azarene salane wine alhoriya in kel tamasheq, a ahodjene ilane djer tarayene id derhane izdjaranide tinfousene in kel Mali id incharanide alwak wade idjlene koufar. Imanokalene in kel tamacheq a iroune dagh azamane tamaghane ye ilhoriya djeressane id Mali, awene daghe ad awene id tanakra ta daghe n-awataye wane 2012 - yade ibbasse falassene takhkame mali daghe gharmane wi daghe n-Azawade daghe iffare wane emaynadje n-akal - awene daghe a tidja tanakra tasse akozate in kel tamasheq wa fal tikrache Mali ilhoriya daghe awataye wane 1960. Etkarane, takmotene adjotnene atafane idinate wine kel tamasheq - kel adjama id kel rizedjane in kel akal daghe itiwayene sedesse fal manassene daghe talakhawte warilene imouzarane daghe ilhoukoum azainene assimmiskile n-azamanene id tikousse nassane - d-ibba in djinawane - farornene awene a assewadhane y-idinade wine kel tamashaq. Ibban yade idjine idjarohate y-ilhoukoum wane amasse in Mali abbasse hine idjrahan ghide awa amossene alasil, dawa amossene awasse iderane in kel Tamasheq. Dedesse nawene daghe, ibba n-idjourouhate n-ilhoukoum tane mali ye timité tane folane, inta a assewadhane dimzakanzare d-ibba n-inimidjrahe djer awa ossaghane tamité tane folane d-aljamaghate tane kel timarene. Idja daghe asse tamité tane folane daghe alasil ghide ware iknene tartite id daguane wine ilhoukoum, sounde awasse ware idjitene daghe alkhaskar, idja ghorssene daghe asse ware atwarhane itiwayane dague daghe iffare id manessene. Awene daghe a assewadhene ikinassene djer essene id timité ta yadhate, houlane daghe awa ekhalene tierché in daguane daghe akal, d-aharé wane ihane idere n-akal.

Tanakra tane awataye wane 2012 tidja ogchadene adjotnene - daghe akal fuk - id djer timité tane kel tamasheq. Ilhoriya wane Azawad, isse war tilkeme timite tane kel tamasheq fuk, amosse awene tatbaghite ta tazounete tamité. Iha daghe emele in timité ta yadhate tizaghate daghe gharmane wi daghe sounde, Arabane, Ihatatane meghe ifolane awa d-awayene ibba in tartite. Dharate awene, tatbaghite tane ilhoriya tala tifatene awadhene harate, awa a amossene assakanete id zadjorene isse kalene, inta ad issarghassene issarmadhide oudjchawane, n-

erkidinate awa awayene albarodhene warene amosse kel akal. Wane awataye wane 2012, marsandise wane taba ta labassete id ahadhare in manokalene wine chidjouchnene taba ta labassete d-awa dertene sawa ad awayene alanrorete id ikinassene warene imoukene. Ibba n-ahadhare n-ilhoukoum wane mali dague dague yadhe, inta a amossene tahinchoudjiste nerki idinate ibdha kel akal issarmasse effewe djer timité. Imalte daghe anmarne djer kal tazoli awene dhaghe a ikassene ye kel taba ta labassete yade atalmadene, ahane daghe tahawsse d-ajamaghatene ti odjene issiyassa wane aljabha at amosse daghe awa daghe djarawene harate itanedhe gahe, awene daghe takhawsse tilate takssete.

Harate wasse karadhe inta ad awayene talakhawte in Mali, amosse aweyene awa ikfane assahate d-issilfitilfitile mokhorene n-ilislame "makhorene" iknede awene agaye n-aljamaghatene wine kel tazoli in kel timarene. Daghe ewelene wan-awataye wane 2012, oqchade n-awa astaghalene kel ajobha, awedhaghe ad awayene kel timarene d-ilislame nassene daghe ilane assahete makorene awene daghe aljamaghatene adjotnene at amossene - al-Qaeda tan ilmaghrib sitawana (AQMI), aljamaghatene ta tissartayete kel jihade daghe afella n-afrikhia sitawana (MUJAO), d-aljamaghatene tane kel Ansar al-Dine - wi armasnene akal chik filtaghene makhorene atwana daghe, iyadhe, ilane inniyate in tidja in katiba iyete sibdidane daghisse ichêreghà daghe akal wane amaynedje in mali. Talakawte in timiniya tane mali, d-ibba nataghile id tiyité d-iniyate nawa d-imalene d-ibba in tassakhe makhorete d-awa fal abba hine tatwadrate ibrene in mouzagthane, inesse ilhoukoum id hanane n-adawlat fuk. Taghawsse tedaghe a awossene chik y-aljamaghatene tane kel timarene, tahinchoudjiste houlene djer idinate wine tilakhiwene warene ila wala iyene ahadhe n-imissi timghoutare nassene ti dirousnene wahassene tanatide ilhoukoum nassene houlene atwachadjene daghe awataye wane 2012, aljamaghatene tine iknene oudjiche n-idinate id timité tane djamatene wi oudjijnene, a tene hakene, awasse amghatarene idjachene dharate awene edague in tafate, tade oya ilhoukoum, daghe awa amossene issekate, ichêreghà, tegharé, ad hakene idinate awasse amghatarene, hanane n-adawlat fuk, makana djeridinate, awa odjarene awene daghe awa ekhalene alghafete.

Dharete azamane wene, id tidjawate n-ilislame wa ossohene awehide adjene daghe timouzoghe id timoudre tahodjete. Daghe kharmane wi atafane aljamaghatene wine kel timarene, tanminak tidja fal tagharé n-alkhorane id tidjawte in chakatewane daghe kel tazoli nassene. Aljamaghatene tikna tisousste nidinate, sounde tina batate tidja tagharé, tasse itanedhe a tete issawadjene, awene dadhe ad-awayene a wa fal aharane a awadhene temedhe in lecole wane takaferte daghe amasse n-akal d-afala daghe affala n-akal.

Tighawssiwene ti idjanene ghore tassawte in kel alkaskare wan nesdabarate wine idoulene daghe Mali, dharate tanakra tane awatay wan 2012 isradhane ichaghilene atwadjane fal issiyassa tane nadabarate n-idoualene wine koufar id d-idoualene wine atayene, awene daghe wire infa are idoualene wine tadjanene adabara. A adjene daghe adjorene wi daghe n-attayene id wine aljamaghatene n-idoualene hikide aljamaghatene tane europa, id tartine n-ifrekhia, id aljamaghatene n-idoualene tasse itawana moujmaghe idoual id aljamaghatene tan idoualene n-afrekhia wisse itawana CDAO, astabaghene tidjawte n-ichaghile wa daghe mare adje alghafete, issoudare n-akal id tadhilte n-idinate.

Karadhe titbakha ichlaynene ad izdjarene daghe ichaghilene wi daghe nawa amossene aljawabe n-inesdebarane n-idoualene ye kel akal. Ta tazarete ibba n-issitakhbile n-ahine

ilanine. Taghawssé tadaghe a ihi akal amaradeghe isse ware tila ghide ar awa inene inesdebarane n-idouwalene awa ekhalene - kel touchma d-agale n-akal, assoudare n-akal id tadhile tan ghore kel tahanite – wi, date harate fuk, oudjayene ilkamene y-ilhoukoum wane mali yade issitbite ichêregHà nesse ye mouzaghane n-akal.

Taghawssé tasse sanatete ad izdjaride aljawabe n-aljamaghetene n-idoualene ta tadjate adabara fal alghafete awene daghe a asnabatarene ichaghilene hine ilanene yade idjine midjridane d-alghafete, ghore mouzaghane, ghore atayene, id daghe iddawlat fuk, ekaye, haratene adjotnene ware daghe sane azare har France iknasse alkaskare inesse diha daghe daghe Mali ghore awataye wan 2012 har amaradhaghe inta daghe a odjane awa ekhalene tidjawte in taghawssiwene tine agale id tine kel touchma - tine alghafete daghe affala d-amasse n-akal in mali, id tahadhara daghe daghe takhtaftene y-aljamaghetene tane kel timarene d-aljamaghetene n-initene n-erk idinate fuk.

Tasse karadhetene, aljamaghetene n-idoualene wi tadjanene adabaratene war idjene a awadhene harate, sedeghe, ad sahadharene kel akal daghe moukinate d-imik wasse martardjiche tidhilde. Kel mali iknene ibba n-issibarik in-idinate wi odjanene azizdje nakal daghe Mali, soude wisse itawana kel (MINUSMA), id aljamaghetene in kel erope wi odjanene adaribe in kel touchma wine mali sitawana (EUTM), id aljamaghetene n-idinate n-erope wi odjanene adaribe in kel touchma at omossene polistene, jadarmatene id garditene sitawana (EUCAP).

E ikene ilmoudene tadjene, tizzaghe timité in mali tizzaghe har amaradhane daghe ibba n-alghafete d-alarorete id timatanene samomnene hak achel imaghane yé tidhilde daghe a ikchene, d-ammane iswane, isifrane, yade izdjarene talakhawte idjriwane timoudre todjdahete. Dharete awene ilé a adjene djer awa ihakane d-awa idjarawene, alwakhiyene tasohate tassakhe. Awa idhalene idjantene kel akal awarene ezleye id kel touchma meghe daghe kel touchma wi ifarnene imanesse. Iyadhe daghe itiwagradhane fal awasse aharene tetawene tassene fal a adjene soude tidrissé in tidhilde d-issiyassetene. Idjla azamane, d-ibba n-alghafete d-oumaghe yade awayanide tidhilde warete tarteye id harate, awene daghe a ifnazene tassawte in wi dahalnene atwayene wine kel akal. Tadjilawte in haratene amara daghe awarene idja a iware sarho, agaghe fal sawetene wine kel tahanite, d-asouhou n-eddasse n-ichadhilene id tidawte n-adabaratene ahanene abara oghadene.

Tighawssiwene tidaghe fuk oharnete harate d-awasse itawana “ karadhe haratane wine djer tahanite wine issoudare n-akal id wine kel alghafete,” marene immasse “haratene wisse mare idjine ichaghilene”, houdaghe awa altaghbalene ad oumsousouhoune awa ekhalene tidhilde, assoudare n-akal, id wi odjanene kel touchma d-alghafete. Awa d-izdjarene daghe tidawene ti idjanene id kel akal issikna ibba in tarha in karadhe haratene widaghe daghe Mali. Daghe ifare wan kel tidhilde, midjridene wi akhalnene alghafete ichiwache idinate awasse ware itakhile yé kel issiyassa id tidhilde daghe Mali. Awa idjane dodhadene isikna awasse, achili daghe alhaletene ta daghe tilé tartite hourouwate djer ichaghilene wi aghalnene kel touchma, alghafete id magjrade, d-ininate wi yadhnene odjanene tidhilde d-oussoudare n-akal. Dharete awene, ilate haratene warene atwassene djer aljamaghetene in nesdabarane n-idoualene d-awa issibdadene karadhe haratene widaghe warene arteye.

Ichaghile wa daghe isikna, daghe awa atwanhayene, tasidjariste, azzarane sirisse wi odjanene alghafete, d-oussoudare n-akal id tidhilde fal makana nawa egchadene daghe Mali,

assarimadhe n-oudjiche in-aljamaghatene in nesdebarane n-idoualene yade adje fal
“ichaghilene” wisse inimahale, a tane idjine awene daghe tarha imasse a labassene dahe
ahanaye nahine ilanine, d-awade mare awi daghe taghawssiwene id kinassene daghe amasse
n-akal d-atayenese.

Executive Summary (Songhoy Version)

**Yassaye nda haya ka tabati wane “haya hinjaa wo di ka go ganda jine koy di ga
nda hinni cere game nda alafiya goy koy diyo”
Ganda di hunandi di wane dookate, alafiya hinse nda hinni koy
diyo wane goy di Maali kuna**

Duurayndi yammante di

Gaabindi jiiri woyey jinekoy politiki nda alwaakati kuuku ka go guandi masanda “demokarati nda amirterey boyro”, Maali ti ganda ka go hinsaka luufu. Nga talkaterey di go hinsa ka beeri nda hayadi go bisanda toro miseyey ka go tonton. Si hiskaney jaagney di ka go huddjum go kunandi seene adamaije diyo wane goy jine di nda maracasiney lafiyante maali adamaije diyo ga. Nda million jangey boobo dolar kawdi nda ka bene jiiri jul – haye ka too miliyone \$ 296,5 SUD adama-ije taarey faaba dira wane idjorfu di 2019 jiiri di se OCHA do - mise fonda yer go faham nda ganda tana diyo wane faaba di, hawjey, nda amirtereydi wane kamkam di ?

Mise foo nda boro diyo ka go mise di kuna ganda morodiyo ra nda ganda manodiyo ra go bonne ka faaba ka keidi ciimi wo ka ci ganda gaabi jaagney di Adamey ije diyo ka toogne di, nda ngi wane nafaa lawal si kuna hal i ma ganda “ hasaraw sahelien“ di masi too magreb di kuna - nda ka bisa do ti, nda europi wane sinti di nda nga beene di? maa ga ti komin di boro ka goro dooti wane baadi nda haydi ki go baatu, ka hima ka dira boro diyo ka go kanbe malfa nda boro diyo ka go may anniya ka go bisa ka go hinne ka toro wala ka hasar boro diyo wane baadi ga, Gandi wane jine koydiyo nda wo diyo ka na ti ganda jine koydiyo nda ganda tanadiyo wane jine koydiyo, nda ganda tanadiyo wane sardasudiyo wane anniya di?

Hantum wo go siri haayey ga, gaabi tanayagney ga “ganda diyo kul wane borodiyo ka go do ti wane jaabi di” Maali, nda komindiwane borodiyo ka go do ti wane guna di ngi do. Meere, a ti i ma duu jeesesu cere cerente nga wane dirandi di ga nda nga hunandi di “haya hinjaa wo di ka go ganda jine koy di ga nda hinni cere game nda alafiya goy koy diyo” wane fasal di ka dam di gandadiyo kul wane guna cere di faada 2016 alwakati, nda ka go may goy nongu diyo ka ra hasaraw go masanda Maali, ka goy politiki wane hanga nda ka go keydi alafia, wane taadidi nda koy jine, nda ka key faabayoy kuna borodiyo ka tilasu yanje sabe se. Goy wo go key jeesesu cere cerente beene nda bayray fo s.,haya di ga wala muu haya ka go bisa borey zagu nda waraza ki go haan beene nda ka guna goy ije boubou, cere cerente wo diyo ka go nangu dira - ka tonton a ga koyterey di wane alwakil, borodiyo ka diaw malfa wane alwakil si diyo ka key, nda boro wane alhaku di wane alwakil, dorkoto koy diyo, ekol alfa, alhabar no koy diyo, entepener diyo, faaba duu koy diyo, borodiyo ka hun ngi nangu dira, cawkoy ber diyo - maali kuna (cere cere ga Bamako kuna nda koyra diro ka go a gandi di maasu kuna) nda faranci, desanbur 2018 nda awiril 2019 game.

Hantoum woo go goy hangudi tammaha hinja beeriyo ga ka koy nda ka go koy nda sakul yisikaney jaagney Maali ta. Hongudi tammaha lawal go sinba gandadi kokoterey dira di taka di ga nda maali gandadi hinsadi fondo taka di ga. Hujum booboyo go bara gandadi kul kuna, ka taasi ka bay ka nda maali kokoyterey di go nda ciimi nda go sawa alwakilterey ra nda wane

komin boro diyo sii diyo kul nda hinney ka i go hinne ka kaate alwaakati sandey, te di kuna jaabey seeranteyo nda hungunteyo.

Maali gay ganda tanadiyo faaba koydiyo go cirbundi ka ci “ ekolije siifa boyro“ jine koy politiki fonda ta. Garni wo si ka fata 90 jiririyo di kun, saadi kana Maali a dam amirterey taka baaru alwato nda ka wara sardasudiyo amirterey hoteydi. Wo banda, jine koy bayrayey hay ka go ba ka duu jiiri waranza go cirbundi mu goy koy diyo wane bayray Maali ganda di wane amirterey di wane kambi ga. Njorfu duu taasiwo mu go hinsa ka yahdar nda ganda tana diyo jine goy koy diyo yalla cimarije kokoyterey di a ma hinne ka bar nda ka hirawdi cere hayadiyo ka gohinne ka faaba ga. Ciimi di ci Maali ka hanno ganda ka go hinne huna gna faaba, nda faaba boobo jaagney mu kokoyterey borodiyo wane bardi ki kaate, ko may na ka si bisa sene i ka mu boroyo ka go no alahidu hungu woyo se, Faaba boubou duu, ka ma ka huna haya wane, jine koy njorfu wane, sardasuyo, wala hay ka gohimanda alafia taasi wane haayan ka go sinba kame beriwoyo ka damdi tangam.

Hongu tammaha hinkate di go sinba komin boro diyo, wane huna cere di, go cerbundi cere cere ka surgu boro diyo wane bogno kawdi wane haa di, ga alwakati kuku nda alkadar hiraw cere ka booni ka hun Maali wane taariki dira nga ka fata kate anasara diyo wane ganda di banda. Surgu boro diyo wane politiki boro beeridiyo gay i go taasi i ma kay ngi bomo ga tana fo Maali ganda di benne. Malfa jaw ga ka cerbundi ngi dooray di, wo ka na hinsa ka gay 2012 jiiri - hal i ma hin ka keyndi Maali lamudi ganda masudi kuna. Azawad ganda di gurma di do kuna - nda ka ti surgu borey manga jaw taaci te di jaa Maali duu nga borcintarey di anasara diyo lamu di banda 1960 jiiri di kuna. Ka taasi dooray boobo yo kana surgu boro diyo - gandji borodiyo nda saw boro diyo - ti ganda di boro yo ka ganda di fur nda jeere ndi bogno ga talkaterey ra, jine koy nda politiki tignay kokoyterey kuna ka go hinsa ka sinba boro diyo ka ngi goy nda cere wane bandi cere. Alwaakati bar di - cere cere ga koran beer di nda bana jaagney - ka go tonron alwaakati foyo kuna go kaate hanburey tonron nangu di boro diyo ga a go kate ka tonton mu hasaraw maali borodiyo ga ka yalla surgu boro diyo wane alasal di, ngi wane huna taka di, nda alkadar di. Wo di bande, maali ganda di alakkal yandi jaagney fulane diyo aljama di se, go tonton hasaraw di nda fahamey jaagney di doo here fafay ije terey di ka go hinne ka bara ngi nda jihadis diyo aljama di nda cere game. Mise kul ka nda fulane diyo aljama di go kanba ngi lasal terey jenodi ka more gandadi alhakum foyo, sanda ngi wane huraw lufo maali gandadi wane sardasu diyo kuna, i go cii ngi wane anniya ka i si teejai di i nda ka fur di ngi bong ga. Wo di ga tonton muu aljama diyo nda cere game yanje cere haa diyo, gandadi wane duudi nda mise diyo kul, nda duray di ka go gandi cire.

2012 jiiri wane tun di dam hasaraw beer - gandadi kul kuna - nda surgu boro diyo cere game. Azawad borcinterey di, ka benne ganda surgu boro diyo kul na wafaku, ka tondi foo ka go jamma boro diyo. Aljama tanayan wane yahdar ka go huna koyra wo kuna, sanda Laram diyo, koyra borey wala fulan diyo ka go hanga djamma. Wo di banda, borcinrerey tondi diyo go nda sotol foyo wo di na ci haya, haya di ka ci haya ci boro diyo yiskananey di nda boro diyo juru di ka koy ganda diyo ra, nga ga kaate boro futu diyo gandi di ra, a cegnandi muu boro futu diyo kakanda malfa ka na ci ganda di boro diyo. jaa 2012 jiiri ra hiraw, tabba futu di wane mamala nda ka hiraw di tabba futu di wane mamala koy amirdiyo nda haya ka nda i go hima. Nga ga kaate toroyo nda yanjeyo ka si kaney. Maali kokoyterey yahdar jaaney nangu tanayo kuna nga ga katé boro futu diyo wane hiraw di, ka tun di taw boro diyo boro diyo game. Hin cere muu bara malfa jaw koy diyo nda cere game, wo di nga jamdi tabba futu

mamala koydiyo se i ma bay di haya dika ra i go mise di kuna malfa jaw koy di aljama di ka bisa bayray politiki fondo ra, haya di ka se i go bayray nda muu ngi wane alhamadiyo.

Hongu tammaha hinjante di ka lufundi Maali, go kaate ka sindu di nda ka sinji sene amisilmi terey almana “beeri” foo nda jihadis diyo aljama wana tonton. Koron alwakati 2012 jiiri di kuna, malfa jaw koy diyo dine cere di hasara, wo di ya kaate islamis diyo nda jihad diyo may gaabi beeri. I ka muu aljama boobo alqaeda almaghrib ka se i go har (AQMI), aljama di ka go bara jihad diyo afriki gurma dira ka se i go har (MUJAO), ansar idine - aljama diyo di ka dine ganda di tanba, i boro foo yo, go may anniya ka key di acharia Maali gurma gandi kuna. Maali kokoyterey di tulu di, nda lakkal yandi jaagney nda ka duu alkkal, ka dam anniya haya di ka go ka se nda dinne cere jaagney beeri nda alakkal jaagney yandi boro diyo ka go huna nangu di ra, kokoyterey nda ganda di kokoyterey hu diyo wane kayri. Haya wo da ga ka tanba hiraw cere sene boro diyo ka ci talka yo ka si nda walla tiji foo hawre ngi tillasu cinadiyo kokoterey di na dam ngi se. Nda mu sardasu diyo wane juru di 2012 jiiri di kuna, aljama wo diyo hinsa ka huru ganji boro diyo nda saw boro diyo moro diyo, ka hinsa i se hayadi, ka ici ton nda i hiraw kokoyterey nangu dira ka ci, ma sanda safari mise, achara mise, caw mise, ka huru kokoterey nangu di kuna, haya di ka bisa a kul ci ngi wane hawje albasi kuna.

Jamane si di banda mu, i kayndi almisilmi tarey sindo di a kaate haya boobo yo huma nda ngi wane goro taka gaynte. Koyra wo diyo kana jihadis diyo go kanba wafaku damdi ka sa ije mayra diyoma caw tiira, wala i ma hiraw ngi wane sardasu diyo ra. Aljama di hinsa ka siiti boro diyo, sanda, bayray no di mise dira, nda mise ka cawndi ga hima ka damdi, a kaate tubabu ekol huu janguyo wane daabu ganda di maasu nda nga gurma dandi di kuna.

Goydiyo ka damdi Maali ra ganda tana diyo wane kaa di alwaakati, tun di alwaakati nda nga banda 2012 jiiri di i fasal goyyo ka damdi nda bayrey nda tubabu diyo nda ganda diyo ka go wanga ga addibara, i har mu kana goy diyo kul ka damdi i si nafa kala tubabu diyo danga diyo. Haya booboyo ka bisa wo diyo ka wanga ga nda ganda tana diyo wane aljama di nda ganda tana diyo wane aljama di - nda eropu aljama di, nda afriki ganda marante diyo ka se i go har ganda gna di, nda afriki ganda diyo kul marante di ka se i har CEDAO - ikeyndi goy boyroyo siifa ka ra alafia go hinne ka duundi, nda jine koy goy, nda boro diyo wane faaba di.

A go fata ganda di nangu dido sendey beeri hinjaa ganda tana diyo addibara koy diyo jaabi di kuna. Lawal ci haya ka go gaywane tabati jaagney. Miso da ra ganda di go marayda ka ra haya kul si bara kala haya ka ganda tanadiyo addibara koy diyo - har. Haya di ka ci surdasu diyo nda danda di hawjey di, ganda di jiine koydi mise di, nda hinni koy diyo faafa di – wo, haya di kul jine, i wangu ka hanga Maali kokoyterey di hali ma tabati ndi achara di ganda di huna koy diyo se.

Haya hinkante di ka ra jaabi di fata ganda tana diyo aljama di ka go hugey nda addibara yo alafiya benne wo di nga jamdi goyyo ka go gay har i ma ma dam ciiniyo nda alafiya huna koy diyo nangu di, wanga di do, nda ganda diyo kul kuna, ngaa, haya booboyo ka ganda tana diyo dam – faransi da nga go i jine ngasardasu diyo go yanje ne da Maali ja 2012 jiiri di hal marayda nga ga go hugey nda addibara diyo ka ti ganda hawdjey nda sadasu diyo mise di – nda alafiya Maali ganda gurma nda a masu di kuna, nda ka yahdar ka dam anniya jihadis diyo aljama di nda boro futu diyo aljama sii diyo kul.

A hinjante di, ganda tana diyo aljama di ka go hungry nda addibara diyo na dam haya wo ndahaya jina. I go hahdar di ganda boro diyo hinsa diyo kunanda mise di kana faaba diyo go ka i duu. Maali boro diyo si barakundi boro diyo ka go ka ga hugey nda ganda di yiskaney Maali kuna ka se i go har (MINUSMA), nda eropu boro diyo ka go nda sardasu diyo wane cawndi ka se i go har (EUTM), nda eropu aljama tana foo di muu ka hugey nda polisi diyo, jandarmu diyo nda dardi diyo wane cawdi mise diyo ka se i go har (EUCAP).

Caw di ka bisa kaate cere game, maali boro diyo ka too haya marayda a go huna alafiaya jaagney ra, nda toroyo nda bun hotoyo, i go binni gay ka gnaa baaru kul, hari, safari, i jam i fata talkaterey ra i ma duu huna ka go wasa. Wo di banda, haya kuku go bara boro diyo di ka noo nda wo di ka i go duu game, sa foo yo hiraw cere di ga sendu. Faaba koy diyo boro diyo dam gi nda haya ka si fey nda sardasu diyo wala muu sardasu diyo ka go tuku ngi bogno. A foo yo muu go ciiney gi haya di ka se i go daabu ngi moo diyo haya boobo yo beene sanda faaba ciina di se nda addibara. Jamane diyo koy, nda alafia jaagney nda ka taasi wo diyo ka go kaate faaba masi hanga nda haya, wo di muu ci haya ka go kumandi faaba koy diyo wane kaa di ganda boro diyo nga fur di. Haya diyo wane sanbadi marayda si dam di nda mise boyro, ka tangam tonbiwoyo benne hinni koy diyo, nda noo koy diyo, nda addibara diyo, maradi kago fondo cecente.

Mise woyo kul go mara nda haya haya di ka se i go har “haya hinjaa diyo ka ci hiini nda danda jine koy nda alafia taasi koy diyo game” ka go ka “haya di ka benne goy diyo go dam”, ka muu ka haya lawal na ci ka politiki di, meere muu ima yadda ka faaba cere haya di ka ci hinni taasi, ganda jine koy di, nda ganda foo diyo wo jine koy diyo, nda wo diyo ka go hugey nda sardasu diyo alafia taasi kuna. Haya di ka fata mara diyo ka dam di ganda koy diyo i cerbundi haya hinja baa jaagney Maali kuna. Ka na faaba koy diyo, tuku ciiniyo wo di ka ci alafiya, go hujum di boro diyo haya di ka se i si jaw bayray koy se nda binni Maali kuna. Haya di ka dam di maraysa go cerbundi, haya di ka se hano mise di ka go bara, beeri goy diyo game ka go sinba sardasu diyo, alafiya nda ciini, nda wo diyo ka go hugey nda faaba diyo nda ganda jine koy. Wo di banda, haya foo yo go bara ka si bayndi ganda tana diyo wane aljama di nda haya di ka tabati ndi haya hinjaa si diyo ka si mara.

Cawwo cerbudi, haya di ka go gunandi kuna ayananda, nda yaa mardi, ga wo di go hugey nda alafiya, ganda goy jine, nda faaba haya diyo ka harassa Maali kuna, a yana da ga ganda tana diyo aljama di hiraw si wane cegnadi hal i ma dam “goy diyo” wo di yo ka go hima ka dam goy diyo, wo di muu hinne ka albasi huna kuku kuna, nda haya di ka ga hinne mise diyo kuna, ganda di nda ganda di wo ka wanga ga.

Executive Summary (Bambara Version)

BAMANANKAN

« Taabolo saba, basigi, baanyumankè nyèntaa » **ka maana ni cinyèn**
Sininyèsigi yèrèkòrò nyèntaa, basigi ladilali a ni baanyumankè baara Mali kònò.

BAKURUBA

Ka a dan san tan caama kèlen kò nyèntaa politiki la ani sònkèlen kò a ma ko “bèyafanga ni jamana dōsen nyuman” a yeera ko Mali ye jamana fangatan ye. A ka fantanya ka bon wa a bada ka basigibaliya taabolow bi juguya ka taa. O basigibaliya min ye jòrònako ye bè a ka nyèntaa gèlèya kosèbè a ni jamanadenw ka nyèntaa n’u ka siginyònya nyuman cinyèn. O bèè n’a ta, ka da jamana wèrèw nali kan a ni dolar wari miliyòn kè mè yirika dilen n’a dunen kan san wo san – o misaali ye miliyòn 296.5 USD min dira san 2019 ka dèmèn do jamanadenw ma OCHA ka fòlila – a bi faamu cokodi ko jinyèn jamanaw ka dèmèn ma se ka sabati don jamana jòsen nyuman la, a ni a ka basigi a ni jamanadenw tòpòtòli la ?

Cokojumèn, jamanawèrè kèbaa ni kèrèfè jamanaw bi se ka Mali to a dèsekò bolo, ka taa jamanadew juguya la, k’o sababu jònjòn kè “Saheli burujali” ka na yèlèn ka se tilebin jamanaw (Magrobu) fò Farajèla dance la? O kumana sa, jamana dugulenw yèrèw ka nyènsigi ni u ka nyinifènw ye mun ye k’u sirilen to jèkulu wèrèw sako la, n’o ye marifatigiw, dantèmèdinè tigiw, fanga tigiw a ni jamana wèrè kélèbolow ye?

Nin hakili jakabò sebèn in sinsinen nin nyininkali damadò kan; jamana wèrèw ka jijali Mali kònòn a ni jamana dugulenw ka miiriya oluw kan. Kèrèn kèrèneya la, ka “triple nexus” miirina wèrè don kow taabolo ni u sinsinni la, miirina minuw tara Jinyèn bèè Baanyumankew ka Jèkafò senfè san 2016 la ni o bi tali kè burujali bè jamana minuw kònòn I na fò Mali, ka oluw politiki taabolo sinsin, ka fangaw kè kelen ye, ka nyènshin basigi ni nyèntaa a ni baanyumankè tòpòtòli ma. Nin baara sigilen bè kòlòshili ni sènsèni a ni sògòbèli kan ; k’o masòrò kumanyònya 130 kòfè a ni sègèsègèli dugulen kunda – k’o farangan kè fanganbon tigilamòw ye, ni marifatigi jèkuluw ye, ni jamana kònòndenw, ni kosugubalaw, ni lakòlikaramòkòw, ni kunafonidilaw, ni danbetigiw, kosègèsèglaw, lasigidenw, kènyèrèyew, tònòdunlaw, mògò minu y’u sigiyòrò bila, a ni kalanden kòròbaw – Mali kònòn (kèrèn kèrèneyala Bamako ni camancè bolo) a ni Fransi, ka’ ta desanburu kalo san 2018 fò avrili kalo san 2019.

Lapòrò in bè tali kè ko bakuruba saba de la, minuw ye Mali bila basigibaliya sira kan kunun fò bi. O fòlò bi tali kè fanga taasira la a ni Mali jamana yèrè jòcoko kura la. Jòròna caaman bi jamana kònòn, minuw bi tali kè fanga tila cogo la tilennènya, jamanadew cè a ni ka jaabi jèlen ni miirilen di u ma nin donbè gèlèya kònòn.

A mènna, dèmènba jèkuluw ye Mali jate « kalanden nyumanw » fè nyèntaa politiki kè cokonyuma la. O nyèntaa walènw daminèna san 1990 la, ka sababu kè bèyafanga kundon ko nyuman la, ka sòròdashiw ka jaakoyafanga dafiri. Nga, a bi san bisaba bò bi, nyèntaa baaraw cinyèni bi bò jamana nyèmòkòw yèrè ka kòkòròdonni la. Yèrèta nyinni de yakubayara wa,

dèmèbaa jèkuluw ko fanganyèmòkòw yèrè de bannen do nyèntaa baaraw kèli ma. Kumacinyèn yèrè de b'a jira bi ko Mali kèra jamana ye, min sirilen do dèmèn sugu caaman la wa fanga ka yèlèmalibolow ka suman wa u tè se kow sigiyòròma ; dèmèn dòn de bi shuuru jamana kan, k'o kè sòrò ni magwèn sinsinlan ye. O koko kelen fana do ka nyènshin jamana basigi a ni benganikèlaw kèlèli ma.

Layinin bakuruba filanan ye jamanaden ka jékasigi ye n'o misaali ye burudaamèw ka yèrèmahòrònya kuma banbali ye; o min daminèna kabini tubabutile la n'a bi taa ka segin. Burudaamèw ka politiki nyènmòkòw mènna ka farali nyinni ka bò Mali la n'o nana kè u ka banbanci waleyaw, san 2012 la - walasa ka Mali fanga dògòya Azawad kònòn, jamana tilebifè – ni nin y'a tako naaninan ye kabini Mali y'a ka yèrèmahòrònya sòrò san 1960 la. Burudaamèw nyunkukun yèrè ye miirina min b'u la k'oluw fantanya la, k'u kèrèfè dèna Maliko la; wa ko jòyòrò tè u bolo politiki fanga la, min taabolo ye yuruku yuruku ye. Jinyèn waati yélèma – jango funtèni barika bonyanli la a ni sanji dòkòya – kèra sababu ye mògòw ka yiran yiran juguya, k'u ban fanga ye, ka tugu fangan min ma burudaamèn taabolo jati, k'u ka sekow n'u ka dònkow jati, k'u ka sòròbolow sankòròta. Fan wèrè fè, Mali fanga ma' janto Fulaw la, o kèra sababu ye ka Fulaw ni silamèyakèlèn tigilamògòw gèrè nyòkòn na. Hali n'a sòròla Filaw magèrèn tè fanga shun na, misali la, Fula ma caaya jamana kèlèbolow la, u ka jate la, kèrèfèdèn ni wolomali talen bè k'u sègèrè. O fana bi fònyònkò juguya shiya cè, kèrènkèrèn la dugukolo ko fan fè a ni nafasòròfènw kan.

San 2012 kèlèbolo wili nana ni nyangata caaman ye – ka nyènshi jamana bèè ma – a ni Burudaamèw yèrèw ma. Azawad ka yèrèmahòrònya kòkòròdonen tè Burudaamè bèè jèèrèlèn fè; o fana nana n'oluw farafarali ye. Shiya wèrè minuw bè o kabila kelen la, Arabuw, Kòròbòròw walima Filaw, oluw fana bè farafarali juguya. Fan wèrè fè, o yèrèmahòrònyali kòlòlò dòw ye basigibaliya ye, a ni sigiyòrò bila, a ni yuruku yuruku jako jamanaw ninyòn cè a ni marifatigi yèrèmabilaw. Kabini san 2012, drògu n'a feereba juguw nana ni fònyònkò n'a kèlè banbaliw ye. Mali fanga ka dèsbanciya kòsòn, ka dèse ka yòrò ninuw kanda, maafaajuku kuluw caayara, jamanadenw farala a ni bènbaliya bonyan la. Marifatigi kuluw ka sinaya y'a to feere yuruku yuruku tigilamòw ti se ka kamali politiki marifatigiw fè ka sòrò oluw ka sòròsira ye o de ye; a kèra u bolo kamanagwan ko ye.

Layinin kunbaba sabanan min wolola Mali ka fèkèya la, o sinsinen do silamèya dinè famuya kura kan a ni jaadikèlè tigilamògòw caayali kan. San 2012 labanna, banbagaci kuluw cinyènna nyònkòn ye o nana wolo silamè dinè kogèlèntigiw ka sankòròta la fò k'u kè banbagaci kulu dò ye. Silamè dine bolofara caaman (AQMI, MUJAO, Ansardin) ye jamana yòrò caaman minè jona dòw bolo, ko u bina kalifa ni shariya sigi Mali kòrònfè dugu bèè kònòn. Mali fangabonba ka finyènya kanman a n'a ka shini nyènsigi miirina ntanya k'o fara kòròna mògòw yèrèmabila miirinaw kan, a ni marabolo serwisi ntanya kan, Mali buruja la. O cogoya de y'a to, jona jona, jaadikèlè tigiw y'u madon jamanaden la, kèrèn kèrènenya la, kòlibaatòw, minuw ye bololankolon ye ni gòwèrnman ma fèn kè u ye. Hali dangarilen kò u la, u ye sinsin yòrò sòrò dugujanw kònòn k'o sababu kè u ye kuntilena dò jira mògòw la a ni dèmènw kènèya la, shariya la, kalanko la, kèlèban la a ni basigili la.

Taalen nyènfè, silamè dinè senkòrò taamabaw kèra sababu ye ka yèlèmè don seko ni taabolo la. Kafo minuw bè jiyaadikèlè tigiw bolo, nyènshi kèra kuranè kalanni ma a n'a hakili yèlèma

walew. O la, ekòliso kèmè nyònkòn datukura jamana kòrònfè a ni a camancè la, walasa mògòw k’u nyènshin silamè dinè kalan ma.

Wilikajò min kèra san 2012 la, jamana wèrè kèlècèw fè, olu bèè miiriya tara nin jamana wèrè politiki hakilila ye; wa u kèkun jònjòn de ye ka jamana wèrèw ka sòrò makaran. A kèra kèrèfè jamanaw ye wo, a kèrè jamana wèrèw ye wo – Farajèw ka jèkulu, Farafinna jèkulu, Farafinna tilebi jamanaw – nununw bèè ye hakilanaw ta walasa basigi ni nyèntaa a ni dèmèn bi se ka sabati.

Jamana yèrè kònòn, finyèn saba yeera jamana wèrèw ka jaabili la. A fòlò ye donjan nyènsigibaliya ye. Mali ka ko gèlèya n’a warali kòsòn bi, a nyènèbòli sirilen do jamana wèrèw de hakilila ni u ka taabolo la – kèrèn kèrènyèya la sòròdashiw a ni lakananbaaw a ni baanyumankèw – minuw, sani u ka Mali gòwèrèman dèmèn a ka hakilila kan, oluw b’u yèrè bila jamana nòn la ka o jòyòrò n’o ka kètaa kè jamanaden ye.

Nin ko in finyèn filana bi talikè lakana sankòròtali la jamana wèrèw fè ka sininyènsigi baaraw bila kòfè, i na fò sigikafò ni basigi jamanadenw ye. O la sa, jamana wèrèw ka jate ni u ka taabolo ye – oluw nyènmògò ye Fransi ye ; a n’a ka kèlèkè cèw kabini san 2012 ni o taabolo ye basigi ni kèlè – oluw balannen do basigibaliya kòlòlòw kèlèli ye kòrònfè a ni camancè la k’u nyènshi jiyadikèlètigiw ni faalifuutigiw ma.

Sabanan b’a jira ko jamana wèrèw ka wilikajò kònòn, jamanaden minuw bi nyangata kònòn, oluw sen ma don ko nyènèbòlila. Malidenw bè o foroba tigèlumali kè sanga bèè, missali la MINUSMA kanma kèrèn kèrènyèya la ; a ni Farajèla jèkuluba, a ni EUTM minuw nana Mali sòròdashiw labènni la ; a ni EUCAP min nakun ye lakana ye ka nyèn shin polisi, jandaramu ni gardiw ma.

Nin girinkajò bèè kòfè, Maliden caaman bi lakanabaliya gèrèntè kònòn, o n’a kèwalejuguw ka sòrò u mako bè dèmèn la walasa ka baloko nyènèbò, jiko, kènèyako, fantanya kèlèli, a ni nyèntaa fèrè jònjònw. O bè kòfè, gèlèyaba de bi jamanaden ni dèmèba jèkuluw cè. Baanyumankèw bi makuma u ka fiyentòyala a ni u ka nafantanya fò ka taa se u ka nyankataw ma, ni u ka yuruku yuruku ma. Nin nana bagin gèlèyaw la baanyumankèw fanfè, ka na’ tòto baanyumankè dugulenw dònòn ye. Nin waati in na, o yélèma wolola kojugu la, ka tugu, gèlèya donna démén fèsèfèsèli n’a nyèndòn, n’a nyènshi yòrò, ni dèmèn yèrè kècoko n’a nafabòbaaw.cinyèn lakika kan.

Nin ko nyaaminen nunuw bèè jòyòrò bè « Taabolo saba, basigi, baanyumankè nyèntaa » la ; o min jiralen do i na fò “tòpòtòli miirina kura », nin ka sòrò politiki bèè kun ye ka sira bò baanyumankè miirinaw ni nyèntaa cè, a ni lasigidenw ni sòròdashiw ni lakana cè. Jate laban ye min jira, o ye ka’ fò kènè kan, Malidenw y’a jira k’u ti sòn nin kècoko kura lawaleyali ma fiyew. Baanyumankè tòn mògòw fana fè, ni lakanali konyènw bòlenkò a la, oluw ka jòrònako dò ye politiki kana fereke baanyumankè la. Wa taabolow b’o de jira kaban, ka tuku bi, yòrò cokoya kanma, a kèlen do soroba nyamin ye dòkèlaw ni nyòkòn ce, sòròdashiw wo, basigi tigi wo, sigikafò tigi wo, baanyumankè tònw wo, nyèntaa kow wo, shi kelen nin shi la bilen. A laban na fènsidònbaliw bè ko in na, n’o ye jamana wèrè mògòw ka fèn saba nunuw fara ka bò nyònkòn na.

Nin hakilijakabò kèrèn kèrènen in kònòn, n’i ye dòkèlaw ka yamaruyaw bèè yee, a ni ka baara telimanw yee oluw minuw bè talikè basigi la, a ni nyèntaa, a ni baanyumankè la ka nyènshin Mali jòlikura ma, i b’a yee ka’ fò kònònamiiri kun bè ka nyènshin jamana wèrè minuw bè jamana kònòn oluw ye yòrò wèrè taabolow ta minuw bi se ka gèrèntè se Mali ma taalen nyènfi, o n’a kòlòlòjuguw dugulenw kan fò ka taa se kèrèfè jamanaw ma.

Executive Summary (French Version)

Mythes et réalités du “triple nexus”

Perspectives locales sur le développement, la construction de la paix et l’action humanitaire au Mali

Résumé

Malgré plusieurs décennies de politiques de développement, et longtemps considéré comme un “modèle de démocratie et de bonne gouvernance”, le Mali est un pays très fragile. Son niveau de pauvreté demeure très élevé et le contexte est traversé par des phénomènes de violence croissants. Cette instabilité sécuritaire préoccupante réduit considérablement les perspectives de progrès social et de vies communautaires pacifiées des populations maliennes. Et malgré une présence internationale dans la durée, et des centaines de millions de dollars levés et dépensés chaque année – à l’image des \$296.5 millions USD dans le domaine humanitaire budgétés pour l’année 2019 selon OCHA - comment comprendre l’aide internationale face à la dégradation persistante de la gouvernance, de la sécurité, et du fonctionnement de la société ?

Comment les acteurs internationaux et régionaux contribuent-ils à maintenir cette réalité d’Etat fragile, au détriment des populations civiles, et dans l’intérêt principal de prévenir que le “chaos sahélien” ne se répande au Maghreb – et au-delà, aux frontières de l’Europe ? Quelles sont les attentes et les aspirations des communautés locales, qui doivent naviguer au gré des influences de groupes armés et extrémistes, les velléités des acteurs gouvernementaux et non gouvernementaux, et les forces militaires internationales ?

Ce rapport se penche sur ces questions, les différentes dynamiques de la “réponse internationale” au Mali, et les perceptions de communautés locales à leur égard. En particulier, il s’agit d’offrir une analyse critique sur le fonctionnement et la viabilité de ce concept de “triple nexus” mis en avant lors du Forum Mondial Humanitaire en 2016, et qui a vocation sur des terrains de crise comme le Mali, à forger un alignement politique et opérationnel entre les efforts de construction de la paix, le développement, et l’action humanitaire. Ce travail se base sur une analyse empirique et scientifique sur le contexte, mais aussi à travers plus de 130 interviews et consultations auprès des nombreux acteurs, principalement locaux – incluant des représentants du gouvernement et de groupes armés, des membres de la société civile, activistes, enseignants, journalistes, humanitaires, analystes, diplomates, entrepreneurs, bénéficiaires de l’aide, personnes déplacées, et étudiants – au Mali (en particulier à Bamako et dans la région centre) et à l’étranger, entre décembre 2018 et avril 2019.

Le rapport explore trois enjeux majeurs qui ont conduit et conduisent toujours à la déstabilisation du Mali. Le premier enjeu tient à la gouvernance de l’Etat et aux processus de reconstruction de la nation malienne. De nombreuses inquiétudes existent à travers le pays, sur le fait de savoir si le gouvernement malien est véritablement et équitablement représentatif de ses différentes communautés et en capacité de leur apporter dans un quotidien difficile, des réponses concrètes et réfléchies.

Le Mali a longtemps été présenté par les bailleurs internationaux comme un “élève modèle” dans le cadre de politiques de développement. Cette dynamique a émergé dans les années 90, lorsque le Mali a effectué une transition démocratique et rejeté la dictature militaire. Cependant, les expériences de développement depuis près de trente années révèlent surtout une complicité des acteurs dans les faillites de gouvernance de l’État malien. La recherche de la rente est prédominante, et les acteurs internationaux du développement ont négligé combien le gouvernement a résisté au changement et manipulé les programmes devant y contribuer. La réalité est que le Mali aujourd’hui est devenu un État dépendant de multiples aides conjoncturelles et structurelles, et que les autorités gouvernementales, par des efforts de réformes trop limités, sont devenues adeptes de cette doctrine du maintien du flot d’aide, qu’il soit humanitaire ou d’économies du développement, militaire, ou en lien avec des questions sécuritaires liées au contre-terrorisme.

Le second enjeu tient à la coexistence des communautés, illustrée en particulier par la question de l’indépendance Touareg, une longue et intergénérationnelle aspiration émanant de l’histoire malienne et ayant resurgi à la fin de la colonisation française. Les leaders politiques Touareg ont longtemps cherché une certaine autonomie à l’égard de l’État malien, par la rébellion armée dont la plus récente en 2012—afin de limiter le contrôle central malien la région de l’Azawad dans la partie nord du pays—et qui constitue la quatrième rébellion Touareg depuis que le Mali a obtenu son indépendance coloniale en 1960. Les griefs majeurs exprimés par les populations Touareg—issues de communautés nomadiques et pastorales—résident dans le sentiment d’avoir été sans cesse marginalisés et appauvris, manquant de représentation et de poids politique dans un gouvernement plus orienté vers des réseaux clientélistes. Le changement climatique—en particulier l’élévation des températures et la baisse des pluies saisonnières— a constitué un stress additionnel sur les populations locales et a contribué à accroître l’hostilité vis à vis des autorités centrales maliennes, qui ont de manière constante négligé les dimensions culturelles, sociales, et économiques Touareg. Par ailleurs, le manque d’attention de la part de l’Etat malien vis à vis de la communauté Peul, accroît les tensions et les incompréhensions envers les liens que cette communauté peut avoir avec les groupes islamistes. Bien que la communauté Peul demeure traditionnellement distante vis à vis des organes de l’Etat, par exemple avec la faible intégration dans les forces armées nationales, elle exprime généralement le sentiment d’être discriminée et isolée. Ce qui alimente aussi les conflits inter-communautaires, en particulier sur les questions d’accès à la terre et de manière générale, aux ressources naturelles.

Le soulèvement de 2012 a eu des conséquences directes - non seulement pour l’ensemble du pays - mais aussi au sein des communautés Touareg. L’indépendance de l’Azawad, n’étant nullement soutenue par l’ensemble des communautés Touareg, reste un point de division. L’existence d’autres communautés vivant dans cette région, Arabes, Songoyos ou Peuls accompagne cette division. Par ailleurs, la question de l’indépendance recèle des dimensions régionales importantes, en particulier en termes de sécurité et de flux migratoires, et participe à l’accélération de réseaux d’économies informelles transfrontaliers, et la prolifération de groupes armés non-étatiques. Depuis 2012, le trafic de drogue et la présence des narcotrafiquants génèrent un niveau de conflit et de violence sans précédent. Profitant de l’incapacité de l’État malien à contrôler ces zones, ces réseaux criminels aggravent les divisions intercommunautaires et intensifient les conflits. La concurrence entre les groupes

armés rend les trafiquants de moins en moins contrôlables, y compris par les groupes politico-militaires pour lesquels ils constituent une ressource, mais aussi un sujet de préoccupation.

Le troisième enjeu conduisant à la fragilisation du Mali, réside dans le renforcement et la dissémination croissante d'une interprétation d'un islam "conservateur" et dans l'émergence des groupes armés djihadistes. Au printemps 2012, l'unité des rebelles engagés s'est brisée, ce qui a entraîné la montée d'un islamisme radical et sa domination en tant que mouvement de rébellion. Plusieurs groupes islamistes radicaux—dont al-Qaeda au Maghreb Islamique (AQMI), le Mouvement pour l'Unité et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest (MUJAO), et Ansar al-Dine—ont rapidement pris le contrôle de larges territoires et annoncé, pour certains, leur intention d'ériger un califat et d'imposer la Sharia dans le nord du Mali. Du fait de la faible gouvernance de l'État malien, son manque de vision stratégique et intellectuelle pour le futur du pays, mais aussi de la déconnexion totale et du sentiment d'abandon au sein des communautés locales, les services publics et les infrastructures de l'État se sont effondrés. Cette situation a été très rapidement et judicieusement exploitée par les groupes djihadistes, surtout au sein des communautés les plus dépourvues d'assistance et où les besoins élémentaires ne sont pas apportés par le gouvernement. Même en partie défaits militairement depuis 2012, ces groupes se sont inscrits durablement au sein des sociétés et communautés rurales et éloignées, en leur offrant, si ce n'est un chemin, des alternatives pour palier au vide et aux carences de l'État, en termes de santé, justice, d'éducation, d'accès aux ressources, et aux services publics, mais aussi en matière judiciaire, de gestion des litiges, et plus généralement en matière de sécurité.

Au fil du temps, la prolifération d'un islam conservateur apporte des transformations culturelles et sociales profondes. Dans les régions sous contrôle de groupes djihadistes, l'accent a été mis sur l'enseignement du Coran et l'endoctrinement. Les groupes ont mis sous pression, par exemple, l'accès à l'éducation, et le type d'enseignements à offrir, poussant la fermeture d'une centaine d'écoles à travers le centre et le nord-est du pays.

Les actions menées à travers l'intervention armée étrangère au Mali, durant et après les soulèvements de 2012 ont été pensées et mises en place par des visions politiques internationales et régionales, et sont teintées principalement d'un sentiment qu'elles servent ou doivent servir d'abord des intérêts étrangers. Plusieurs entités régionales ou internationales—y compris l'Union Européenne, l'Union Africaine, les Nations Unies, et la Communauté Economique des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest—ont appliqué un large éventail de stratégies sur la construction de la paix, du développement, et de l'action humanitaire.

Il ressort au niveau local trois grandes lacunes dans le cadre de la réponse internationale. La première est le manque de vision à long terme. L'ampleur du phénomène de dépendances multiples dans lequel fonctionne le pays aujourd'hui et le fait que ce fonctionnement reste totalement dépendant de la présence et des choix internationaux—en particulier les acteurs militaires et sécuritaires, de développement et humanitaire—qui, avant tout, se substituent plutôt qu'accompagnent et soutiennent le gouvernement malien dans la mise en place de ses tâches régaliennes auprès des populations locales.

La seconde lacune provient d'une réponse internationale qui a privilégié la question sécuritaire au détriment de travaux de long terme en faveur du dialogue et de la paix, au

niveau local, régional, et national. En effet, les priorités et considérations majeures des acteurs étatiques internationaux — au premier chef de la France qui intervient militairement au Mali depuis 2012 et conserve une approche dominée par les enjeux sécuritaires et militaires — restent principalement ancrées sur le traitement des conséquences de l’insécurité dans le nord et le centre du Mali, particulièrement eu égard à la présence de groupes djihadistes et de réseaux criminels.

Troisièmement, les efforts internationaux n’ont que trop peu, jusqu’à présent, impliqués les acteurs locaux de manière inclusive dans le planning et la mise en place de processus d’appuis. L’opinion publique malienne exprime des critiques régulières et appuyées, par exemple envers la Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation au Mali (MINUSMA), mais aussi envers l’Union Européenne concernant la Mission de formation de l’Union Européenne (EUTM), mandatée pour former les forces armées maliennes, mais aussi la mission civile européenne (EUCAP), dédiée à la formation des forces de sécurité, incluant la police, la gendarmerie et la garde nationale.

Parallèlement à toutes ces formations, de nombreuses communautés maliennes continuent de vivre dans une constante insécurité, subissant des actes de violence au quotidien, et restent en quête d’assistance pour couvrir leurs besoins de première nécessité, en termes d’eau potable, et de prise en charge médicale, pour sortir de la pauvreté et accéder à une économie formelle. Par ailleurs, il y a une certaine distance entre les acteurs de l’aide et les communautés locales, parfois même des relations difficiles. Les acteurs humanitaires sont perçus comme engagés dans un agenda militaire ou sécuritaire, ou à la solde de services secrets. D’autres sont critiqués d’être aveugles sur leur faible impact opérationnel et sur les conséquences politiques de leurs actes. Au fil du temps, le niveau d’insécurité et le défi pour négocier un déploiement humanitaire indépendant et neutre a conduit à limiter la présence des personnels sur le terrain, laissant surtout seuls les personnels locaux. Cette évolution semble pour le moment avoir malheureusement un impact négatif en termes de qualité, de délivrance suivant les besoins strictement identifiés comme humanitaires, la défense de principes humanitaires, l’efficacité des programmes, et l’élaboration de stratégies opérationnelles en phase avec les réalités.

Toutes ces problématiques ont des implications sur la mise en place de ce concept de “triple nexus”, présenté comme la “nouvelle approche opérationnelle”, alors que l’objectif avant tout politique, vise à resserrer les liens entre les initiatives humanitaires, de développement, avec celles diplomatiques, militaires et sécuritaires. Les conclusions des rencontres sur le terrain auprès des populations civiles montrent surtout un rejet cinglant de cette idée de mise en œuvre de ce type d’approche au Mali. Du côté des acteurs humanitaires, outre les questions sécuritaires directes, une des inquiétudes tient au risque potentiel d’une forte politisation de l’action humanitaire au Mali. Les faits actuels le démontrent déjà malheureusement, car aujourd’hui dans ce contexte, il y a un profond mélange des genres entre les activités liées à l’action militaire, à la paix et au dialogue avec les parties, avec celles concernant les programmes humanitaires et de développement. Enfin, de sérieuses inconnues demeurent quant aux approches des acteurs internationaux et la mise en place des trois piliers séparément.

Cette étude de cas pointe, au regard des prérogatives, mandats, et priorités des acteurs dans les domaines essentiels que sont la paix, le développement et l'humanitaire pour la reconstruction du Mali, l'urgence de mener une introspection profonde au niveau de la présence internationale afin de savoir précisément comment ces "idéaux" calqués sur un contexte, peuvent être une source de danger à long terme, et ce que cela implique dans la compréhension des causes des tensions et autres conflits locaux et régionaux.

Executive Summary (English Version)

Despite decades of development programming for a country once upheld as a “model democracy” in Africa, Mali remains a country destabilized by extreme poverty; escalating violence and instability; and diminishing prospects for Malians’ futures in education, livelihoods, and stability. Even in light of an ongoing international presence and intervention in the country, and millions of dollars raised and spent each year on humanitarian programming, the persistent degradation of governance, livelihoods, and security continues.

What drives this state of affairs? How have international and regional actors contributed to sustaining a stagnating state at the expense of civilian populations and in the interest of preventing transnational Sahelian turmoil from expanding into the Maghreb and beyond to European borders? What are the expectations and aspirations of local communities as they navigate the interconnected influences of extremist groups, government actors, and international military forces?

This paper examines these questions and offers reflections on various dynamics of the international response and the perceptions of local communities in this context. In particular, this analysis assesses the viability of the “triple nexus” concept, which aims—in protracted and complex crises such as Mali—to forge an operational and policy alignment between international peacebuilding, development, and humanitarian efforts. The paper is based on a desk analysis of relevant literature, as well as over 130 interviews and consultations undertaken with a variety of stakeholders, including government and non-state armed group representatives, civil society members, activists, journalists, humanitarians, analysts, diplomats, entrepreneurs, beneficiaries, displaced people, and students. The interviews were conducted in Mali, particularly in Bamako and in Central Mali, as well as abroad, between December 2018 and March 2019. The paper proceeds in four parts. Part I examines the key elements driving instability in this context. Part II focuses on international responses. Part III discusses the implications for the “triple nexus.” Part IV offers concluding remarks.

The report explores three major issues that have contributed to and are still driving the deteriorating stability in Mali. The first issue is the coexistence of communities, illustrated, in particular, by the issue of Tuareg separatism, a long-standing, inter-generational aspiration that stems from Mali’s history as a former French colony. Tuareg political leaders have long sought autonomy from the Malian state, the most recent rebellion being in 2012, which aimed to liberate from Malian governmental control the Azawad region in the northern portion of the country. The major grievances expressed by the Tuareg populations—which are nomadic, pastoral communities—are that they have been politically marginalized and impoverished, lacking representation in a government oriented toward serving clientelist networks. Climate change—in particular, rising temperatures and decreased rainfall—has placed further strain on the Tuareg population and has contributed to increased hostility against the Malian authorities, who have consistently neglected this essential dimension of Tuareg cultural and economic life.

The uprising of 2012 had devastating consequences not only for the whole of the country but also within the Tuareg communities. The independence of Azawad, by no means supported

by all Tuareg communities, remains a divisive issue, particularly across other ethnic communities—including Arabs, Songos, and Peuls—living in the Azawad region. Moreover, the 2012 uprising and its aftermath have also had definitive and lasting regional dimensions, particularly in terms of security, migration, the acceleration of cross-border criminal and informal economic networks, and the proliferation of non-state armed groups. Since 2012, drug trafficking and the presence of drug traffickers have contributed to fueling unprecedented levels of conflict and violence. Competition between armed groups makes traffickers increasingly more violent and challenging to neutralize, namely, by the political and military actors for whom they represent both a resource and a concern.

The second issue is the governance of the state and the process of rebuilding the Malian nation. Concerns are prevalent across Mali regarding the extent to which the Government of Mali (GoM) adequately represents the diverse groups and ethnicities present in the country and contributes to these groups' livelihoods in a concrete and meaningful way. Mali has long been known as a "donor darling" of the international development sector. This dynamic emerged in the 1990s, when Mali transitioned from military dictatorship to electoral democracy. However, the development experiences of nearly thirty years reveal international development actors' complicity in the GoM's governance failures. Rent seeking is prevalent, and international development actors have overlooked the many ways in which the GoM has been resistant to change and has manipulated these international programs. The key dynamic is that Mali has become a country dependent on aid in its many forms, and its government, in spite of limited reform efforts, has become adept at maintaining and channeling international aid flows, whether for humanitarian, development, military, or counter-terrorism aims. Another key element that has further exacerbated tensions has been the GoM's consideration of the Peul community. While it is commonly noted that Peuls have not been motivated toward interacting with state authorities or integrating into the armed forces, the GoM's perceived discrimination of Peuls has further fueled inter-community conflicts regarding access to land and resources and has kept Peuls isolated from the larger Malian community.

The third issue leading to the weakening of Mali is the cultivation and dissemination of an increasingly conservative interpretation of Islam and the emergence of jihadist groups. In spring 2012, the unity of the rebels engaged in the uprising shattered, resulting in a radical Islamist take-over of the rebellion. Various radical Islamist groups—among them, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, and Ansar al-Dine—quickly gained control over territory, and various groups announced the intention to erect a caliphate, imposing Sharia law in northern Mali. In the midst of the weak governance of the state, lack of strategic and intellectual vision for the future of the country, and a complete disconnect and sense of abandonment among communities, public services and state infrastructure have crumbled. Jihadist groups judiciously exploited this situation, particularly in the most destitute communities, where the government fails to meet basic needs and deliver services. Although partially defeated militarily since 2012, these groups have integrated themselves into rural and remote societies and communities, offering actors in these areas alternatives to overcome the vacuum and shortcomings of the state in terms of health, justice, education, access to resources, public services, and security.

Over time, the proliferation of conservative Islam is bringing about a cultural transformation in Mali. In regions controlled by jihadist groups, emphasis has been placed on Quranic

teaching and indoctrination. Groups have put pressure on, for example, access to education and the type of education that is offered, pushing the closure of hundreds of schools across the central and northeastern areas of the country.

External efforts to intervene in Mali leading up to, during, and after the 2012 uprising have been shaped by regional and international politics and colored by perceptions and concerns about self-interested motives. Various international and regional bodies—including the European Union, the African Union, the United Nations, and the Economic Community of West African States—have implemented a wide array of peacebuilding, development, and humanitarian endeavors. At the local level, there are three major shortcomings in the international response. First, there is a lack of long-term vision. The extent to which the country functions and enjoys relative stability remains dependent upon the international presence—including security, development, and humanitarian actors—which substitute, rather than support, the GoM in its capacity to provide basic services and security to the population.

Second, the international response has prioritized security at the definitive expense of more expansive, long-term peacebuilding efforts. Indeed, the main considerations of international actors—in particular, France, which intervened after the 2012 uprising and still has a dominant military presence in the country—have been the insecurity in the north and the central part of the country, particularly in terms of the presence of jihadist groups and criminal networks.

Third, international efforts have insufficiently included local actors in planning and implementation processes. Malians have directed this criticism, for example, toward the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), as well as toward the European Union, in particular, regarding the European Union Training Mission (EUTM), mandated to train the armed forces of Mali, as well as the European Union Capacity Building Mission in Mali (EUCAP), which focuses on training Malian security forces, including police, the Gendarmerie and the National Guard. Despite these international efforts, Malian communities continue to live in constant insecurity and persistent poverty, victims of violence on a daily basis, lacking potable water, access to healthcare, and economic opportunities in the formal economy.

Humanitarian actors have an uneasy, and at times difficult, relationship with Malian communities. Some humanitarians are perceived to be engaged in intelligence gathering. Others have been criticized for being blind to the minimal humanitarian impact and political consequences of their activities. Over time, insecurity and the challenges of negotiating independent and neutral humanitarian deployment have led international NGOs to limit staff presence, particularly that of international staff, leaving behind local staff. This development has adversely impacted the quality, delivery, and effectiveness of programming.

All of these issues have implications for the “triple nexus,” also referred to as the “New Way of Working,” a policy concept that aims to forge linkages between humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding initiatives with diplomatic, military, and security agendas. The interview findings of this article amount to a scathing rebuke of the appropriateness of applying the “triple nexus” concept in Mali. One major concern that policy actors in the

humanitarian sector have articulated about the nexus in general is that it risks politicizing humanitarian action. In Mali, this concern has indeed proven valid. In Mali, there has been a definitive blurring of the lines between peacebuilding, development, and humanitarian activities. Moreover, there have been severe deficiencies in how international actors have approached and implemented each of the nexus' three prongs individually. This case study highlights—with regard to the prerogatives, mandates, and priorities of the actors in the essential areas of peace, development, and humanitarian aid for the reconstruction of Mali—the urgency for deep introspection on the degree and influence of the international presence, in order to anticipate precisely how these ideals, applied in a complex context such as Mali, can be a source of danger in the long term.

Introduction

Despite decades of development programming for a country once upheld as a “model of democracy” in Africa, Mali remains a country destabilized by extreme poverty; escalating violence and instability; and diminishing prospects for Malians’ futures in education, livelihoods, and security.¹ Even in light of an ongoing international presence and intervention in the country, with millions of dollars raised and spent each year on humanitarian programming,² the persistent degradation of governance, livelihoods, and security continues. What drives this state of affairs? How have international and regional actors contributed to sustaining a stagnating state at the expense of civilian populations and in the interest of preventing transnational Sahelian turmoil from expanding into the Maghreb and beyond, to European borders? What are the expectations and aspirations of local communities as they navigate the interconnected influences of extremist groups, government actors, and international military forces?

This paper examines these questions and offers reflections on various dynamics of the international response and the perceptions of local communities in this context. In particular, this analysis assesses the viability of the “triple nexus” concept, which aims—in protracted and complex crises such as Mali—to forge an operational and policy alignment between international peacebuilding, development, and humanitarian efforts. The paper is based on a desk analysis of relevant literature, as well as over 130 interviews and consultations undertaken with a variety of stakeholders, including government and non-state armed group representatives, civil society members, activists, journalists, humanitarians, analysts, diplomats, entrepreneurs, beneficiaries, displaced people, and students. The interviews were conducted in Mali, particularly in Bamako and in Central Mali, as well as abroad, between December 2018 and March 2019. The paper proceeds in four parts. Part I examines the key elements driving instability in this context. Part II focuses on international responses. Part III discusses the implications for the “triple nexus.” Part IV offers concluding remarks.

I. Key Issues Driving Instability in Mali

This section discusses three key issues that continue to drive instability in Mali. The first is Tuareg irredentism, a long-standing, cross-border, and inter-generational issue that stems from Mali’s history as a former French colony. The second is Mali’s stultified state- and nation-building process. The third is the proliferation of conservative Islam and jihadism in the country. These three dimensions of the context constitute, as one analysis states, three inherently incompatible “visions” of the future of the country, those being: “separatist, statist, and jihadist.”³ As this section will discuss, the result has been a context beset by protracted

¹ For a critique of the notion that Mali is, or was, a “model of democracy,” see Joe Penney, “Mali’s Model Democracy Myth,” *Think Africa Press*, February 8, 2013, <https://thinkafricapress.com/restoring-democracy-mali-never-had/>.

² See “Bulletin Humanitaire Mali: Janvier-Février 2019,” Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/BIH_Jan_fev_darft%20210319_F.pdf, which notes that \$296 million has been sought for 2019.

³ Luca Raineri and Francesco Strazzari, “State, Secession, and Jihad: The Micropolitical Economy of Conflict in Northern Mali,” *African Security* 8, no. 4 (2015): 249.

and deteriorating instability, inter-ethnic and inter-communal tensions, chronic poverty, and persistent humanitarian needs.

A. Tuareg Irredentism

Tuareg political leaders have long sought autonomy from the Malian state. Indeed, the most recent rebellion in 2012 was the fourth Tuareg rebellion since Mali achieved independence from French colonial rule in 1960.⁴ Although, the events leading up to 2012 marked a political escalation of the conflict between Tuaregs and the Government of Mali (GoM). The 2012 rebellion was unique in that its primary objective was not simply Tuareg autonomy within the Malian state but rather full independence for the Azawad region of Mali, an area in the northern portion of the country.⁵ This agenda grew out of the establishment of the National Movement for Azawad (MNA), founded in 2010 and devoted to seeking nonviolent means to achieve independence for Azawad.⁶ The MNA's initially peaceful efforts spiraled into escalating political tensions that culminated in the form of an armed rebellion in 2012, led by a coalition of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), which is an offshoot of the MNA, and radical Islamist groups. The first declaration issued by the MNA in 2010 highlights the gravity of the stakes for the opposition:

Today, Azawad has become a zone of conflict fought over by countries and extremist groups who care only for their own interests. As for the Azawadis themselves, they are simply caught between the anvil and the hammer of so called terrorist groups. Azawad is now prone to all manner of regional and international interventions...in which the people of Azawad are given no role at all, except that of a useless spectator, forced to look on while the image of their homeland is ruined and its national riches plundered by governments and multi-national companies...⁷

In addition to the international dynamics that the above quote discusses, a key grievance of the Tuareg population of Mali—which are nomadic, pastoral communities—is that they have been politically marginalized and impoverished, lacking representation in a government “driven by the need to finance its clientelist networks from which the Tuareg are excluded,” as one scholar writes.⁸ Moreover, the inability of the Malian government to adequately deliver on key concerns such as development and security, coupled with its reputation for corruption and impunity— one scholar cites allegation of the the GoM's “collusion with drug traffickers and AQIM [Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb]”—fuels Tuareg discontent.⁹

⁴ Devon Douglas-Bowers, “The Crisis in Mali: A Historical Perspective on the Tuareg People,” *Global Research*, February 1, 2013, <https://www.globalresearch.ca/the-crisis-in-mali-a-historical-perspective-on-the-tuareg-people/5321407>.

⁵ See Baz Lecocq and Georg Klute, “Tuareg Separatism in Mali,” *International Journal* 68, no. 3 (2013): 430.

⁶ See Andy Morgan, “The Causes of the Uprising in Northern Mali,” *Think Africa Press*, February 6, 2012, <https://thinkafricapress.com/causes-uprising-northern-mali-tuareg>.

⁷ See *ibid.*

⁸ Thomas Krings, “Marginalization and Revolt Among the Tuareg in Mali and Niger,” *GeoJournal* 36, issue 1 (May 1995): 60.

⁹ Ole Martin Gaasholt, “Northern Mali 2012: The Short-Lived Triumph of Irredentism,” *Strategic Review for Southern Africa* 35, no. 2. (November 2013): 80.

Tuareg culture and livelihood rely on unrestricted movement—often across neighboring countries: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Libya, and Niger—for a plethora of reasons, including trade and agriculture.¹⁰ Yet, restrictions on mobility have endured since the days of French colonization, limiting opportunities for livelihoods and causing a scarcity of resources in areas where the Tuareg are situated.¹¹ Climate change—in particular, rising temperature and decreased rainfall—has placed further stress on the Tuareg population and has contributed to growing hostility against the Malian authorities, who have increasingly neglected the nomadic dimension of Tuareg cultural and economic life.¹²

The 2012 uprising and its aftermath have had definitive regional dimensions. In particular, there were spillover effects from the civil war that erupted in Libya in 2011.¹³ With the fall of the regime of Muammar Gaddafi, who had engaged in significant economic investments in Mali, as one report states, “Mali was deprived of one of its main political brokers and economic benefactors. Together with the heavy weapons that accompanied returning well-equipped and well-trained Tuareg ‘vigilantes’ of the Islamic Legion, this development precipitated the outbreak of the 2012 crisis.”¹⁴ Indeed, a significant number of Tuaregs from Mali—estimates range from hundreds to thousands—fought alongside Gaddafi’s troops in Libya,¹⁵ and Malian rebels in 2012 benefitted from arms acquired from Libya.¹⁶

In spring 2012, two developments occurred that would further escalate the conflict. First, President Amadou Toumani Touré, formerly a general in the Malian army and president since 2002, was removed from power through a military coup, driven by dissatisfaction over his

¹⁰ See Merise Jalali, “Tuareg Migration: A Critical Component of Crisis in the Sahel,” Migration Policy Institute, May 30, 2013, <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/tuareg-migration-critical-component-crisis-sahel>, which offers analysis of the centrality of migration to Tuareg life.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² “A Climate Trend Analysis of Mali,” United States Geological Survey and the United States Agency for International Development, August 2012, <https://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2012/3105/fs2012-3105.pdf>.

¹³ Adam Nossiter, “Qaddafi’s Weapons, Taken by Old Allies, Reinvigorate an Insurgent Army in Mali,” *New York Times*, February 5, 2012, <https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/06/world/africa/tuaregs-use-qaddafis-arms-for-rebellion-in-mali.html>.

¹⁴ Grégory Chauzal and Thibault van Damme, “The Roots of Mali’s Conflict: Moving Beyond the 2012 Crisis,” Clingendael Institute, March 2015, 45, https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/The_roots_of_Malis_conflict.pdf.

¹⁵ Peter Gwin, “Former Qaddafi Mercenaries Describe Fighting in Libyan War,” *The Atlantic*, August 31, 2011, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/08/former-qaddafi-mercenaries-describe-fighting-in-libyan-war/244356/>.

¹⁶ For analysis on the use of weapons in Mali between 2012 and 2013, see generally “Rebel Forces in Northern Mali: Documented Weapons, Ammunition and Related Materiel,” Conflict Armament Research and the Small Arms Survey, April 2013, <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/E-Co-Publications/SAS-SANA-Conflict-Armament-Research-Rebel-Forces-in-Northern-Mali.pdf>. See also Thomas Fessy, “Gaddafi’s influence in Mali’s coup,” *BBC News*, March 22, 2012, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17481114>, which notes, “The trouble began when hundreds of Malian combatants who had fought to defend the late Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi, fled back home with weapons... and formed the most powerful Tuareg-led rebel group [the MNLA] the region has known...”

handling of the insurgency. The MNLA enjoyed a spate of early military victories,¹⁷ and military actors blamed Touré,¹⁸ calling the regime “incompetent” and criticizing “the incapacity of the regime to fight against the terrorists.”¹⁹ Touré eventually conceded and resigned, subsequently fleeing to exile in Senegal.²⁰ In the wake of the coup, in April 2012, the MNLA declared Azawad to be an independent state.²¹ In the words of one scholar, “The difference between previous conflicts and the January 2012 rebellion in terms of the ability and determination to demand independence” is that after “the state’s collapse in 2012” following the coup d’état, there “was the immediate opportunity created to claim independence.”²²

Second, rebel unity shattered, resulting in a radical Islamist take-over of the uprising. Various radical Islamist groups—among them, AQIM, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, and Ansar al-Dine—quickly gained control over territory that the MNLA had held, and various groups announced the intention to erect a caliphate, imposing Sharia law in northern Mali.²³ Over the course of the following year—in part due to international security concerns driven by the threat of jihadism—the conflict became definitively internationalized, with interventions undertaken by the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and neighboring countries, as the next section of this paper will discuss in greater detail. France has been a prominent international security actor in this context, launching Operation Serval—and later, Operation Barkhane—to assist the GoM’s efforts to defeat the rebels.²⁴

Ultimately, the 2012 revolt was not successful in bringing about an independent state of Azawad. Leading up to presidential and parliamentary elections held in July 2013, the GoM and the MNLA signed a peace deal by which the MNLA agreed to hand over the northern town of Kidal—which the MNLA had captured after French troops gained control of the city from Islamists in early 2013—to the GoM.²⁵ In late 2013, the fragile truce with MNLA

¹⁷ See Thomas Fessy, “Mali Tuareg Rebels Declare Independence in the North,” *BBC News*, April 6, 2012, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17635437>; and “The Roots of Mali’s Conflict,” 11.

¹⁸ Adam Nossiter, “Soldiers Overthrow Mali Government in Setback for Democracy in Africa,” *New York Times*, March 22, 2012, <https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/world/africa/mali-coup-france-calls-for-elections.html>.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ “Mali’s Ex-leader Amadou Toumani Toure Flees to Senegal,” *BBC News*, April 20, 2012, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17782979>.

²¹ See Fessy, “Mali Tuareg Rebels Declare Independence in the North.”

²² Gaasholt, “The Short-Lived Triumph of Irredentism,” 69.

²³ “Mali: Islamists Seize Gao from Tuareg Rebels,” *BBC News*, June 28, 2012, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-18610618>.

²⁴ See “Présentation de l’opération Serval,” Ministry of Defense of France, last modified May 14, 2013, <https://www.defense.gouv.fr/english/actualites/international/presentation-de-l-operation-serval>; and “Opération Barkhane,” Ministry of Defense of France, last modified February 14, 2019, <https://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/barkhane/dossier-de-presentation/operation-barkhane>.

²⁵ Thomas Fessy, “Mali and Tuareg Rebels Sign Peace Deal,” *BBC News*, June 18, 2013, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22961519>.

separatists broke down in the north.²⁶ The MNLA seized control of parts of Kidal city and the towns of Menaka, Agelhok, Anefis, and Tessalit.²⁷ Subsequent peace talks culminated in an Algerian-brokered peace accord signed in 2015 between the GoM and various non-state armed groups (NSAGs) operating in the country, formally ending the conflict.²⁸ Nevertheless, opposition groups still maintain a certain degree of political and state ambitions. For example, as of February 2019 in Kidal, the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA), an umbrella organization for opposition groups that includes the MNLA, issued new regulations prohibiting residents from selling and consuming alcohol and re-emphasized the importance of the qadi, which function as judges under Islamic law.²⁹ Furthermore, foreigners must obtain a CMA-granted residence permit and be accompanied by a local “guardian.”³⁰

Two overarching shortcomings of the Algiers Accord are important to highlight. First, the Algiers Accord was insufficiently inclusive. The Accord’s signatories, in addition to the GoM, included two NSAG coalitions: (1) the CMA and (2) the Platform of Armed Groups, which represents a collection of generally pro-government NSAGs and entities driven by more localized agendas.³¹ But the Accord did not include members of civil society not represented by NSAGs in Mali and also excluded relevant NSAGs, in particular, jihadist groups.³² Even negotiating with jihadist groups has been a controversial option that the GoM has rejected.³³

²⁶ “Tuareg Separatist Group in Mali ‘Ends Ceasefire,’” *BBC News*, November 29, 2013, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-25161049>.

²⁷ “Mali: Tuareg Rebels ‘Defeat Government Army in Kidal,’” *BBC News*, May 22, 2014, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27511448>.

²⁸ For the text of the Accord, see “Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali Resulting from the Algiers Process,” https://www.un.org/en/pdfs/EN-ML_150620_Accord-pour-la-paix-et-la-reconciliation-au-Mali_Issu-du-Processus-d’Alger.pdf.

²⁹ See “Mali: À Kidal, la CMA se Substitue Encore un Peu plus à l’Etat,” *RFI*, February 19, 2019, <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20190219-mali-kidal-cma-substitue-encore-peu-plus-etat>; and Diana Goff, Madina Diallo, and Anca-Elena Ursu, “Under the Microscope: Customary Justice Systems in Northern Mali,” Clingendael Institute, July 2017, 15-18, https://www.clingendael.org/pub/2017/under_the_microscope_customary_justice_systems_in_northern_mali/3_role_of_the_qadi/.

³⁰ See “Mali: À Kidal, la CMA se Substitue.”

³¹ See Gaudence Nyirabikali, “Mali Peace Accord: Actors, Issues and Their Representation,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, August 27, 2017, <https://www.sipri.org/node/385>; “Mali SSR Background Note,” International Security Sector Advisory Team, last modified November 2, 2019, <https://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library/Country-Profiles/Mali-SSR-Background-Note>; and Chris Simpson, “Trouble in the Heart of Mali,” *The New Humanitarian*, June 30, 2016, http://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2016/06/30/trouble-heart-mali?utm_source=IRIN+-+the+inside+story+on+emergencies&utm_campaign=c14118db6a-RSS_EMAIL_ENGLISH_ALL&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_d842d98289-c14118db6a-15757289.

³² Cecilia Hull Wiklund and Claes Nilsson, “Peace in Mali? An Analysis of the 2015 Algiers Agreement and its Implementation,” FOI, November 2016, 15, <https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI-R--4311--SE>.

³³ Aliou Hasseye, “Negotiations with Jihadists? A Radical Idea Gains Currency in Mali,” *The New Humanitarian*, April 19, 2018, <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2018/04/19/negotiations-jihadists-radical-idea-gains-currency-mali>.

Second, implementation of the Accord has stalled and conflict has continued to flourish in Mali in an unpredictable and increasingly volatile manner.³⁴ Interviewees commented that a lack of political will on the part of the GoM, as well as a lack of sufficient consultation with local communities throughout the peace talks, has caused the process to stagnate. One interviewee criticized the “lethargy” of the state, noting that, in the wake of the Accord’s stalled implementation, Malians exist in a state of “no war, no peace, in limbo and total insecurity.” Other interviewees highlighted that the GoM alone is not solely responsible for the shortcomings of the Accord. The leaders of opposition NSAGs are generally based in Bamako, profit from the continuation of conflict, and have demonstrated little to no proactive will in terms of upholding their side of the Accord. One analysis mentions that “renewed commitment to implementation by the signatory parties is in itself insufficient to generate sustainable peace in Mali.”³⁵ As the report continues, “There is a need for continued dialogue, which would also provide an opportunity to address outstanding issues and to extend the ownership of the peace process to groups currently excluded from the process.”³⁶

It is important to note that the opposition is comprised of groups sometimes violently opposed to one another, a situation on which the GoM has capitalized in the negotiation and implementation process.³⁷ Indeed, the Tuareg population is far from monolithic. As one author has written to illustrate this point: “What do the Tuareg want? A facetious and yet honest way to answer that question would be to find a person called ‘the Tuareg’ and ask him. You might as well find ‘the English’ or ‘the Japanese’ and ask them what they want while you are at it.”³⁸ The Tuareg are divided into clans and sub-clans,³⁹ beset by inter-group competition that has deep historical roots.⁴⁰ As one analysis highlights, after the uprising in the early 1990s, the Tuareg population became fragmented “along tribal lines, reflecting power dynamics internal to Tuareg society which can be traced back to alliances and hostilities formed within the context of colonial penetration.”⁴¹

Some Tuaregs joined Islamic extremist groups—for example, the Tuareg-dominated Ansar al-Dine—that battled the MNLA. The trajectory of one key opposition figure, Iyad Ag Ghali, illustrates the complex dynamics of these intra-Tuareg tensions. Ag Ghali was active in the

³⁴ See generally “On the Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, Emanating from the Algiers Process: Evaluation of Implementation in 2018,” The Carter Center, February 18, 2019, https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/conflict_resolution/mali-3e-rapport-eng.pdf.

³⁵ “Peace in Mali?” 4.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ See Fabien Offner, “New Sahel Anti-terror Force: Risks and Opportunities,” *The New Humanitarian*, October 30, 2017, <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2017/10/30/new-sahel-anti-terror-force-risks-and-opportunities>.

³⁸ Andy Morgan, “What Do the Tuareg Want?” *Al Jazeera*, January 9, 2014, <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/01/what-do-tuareg-want-20141913923498438.html>.

³⁹ Chauzal and van Damme, “Roots of Mali’s Conflict.”

⁴⁰ Elena Dal Santo and Elizabeth Johanna van der Heide, “Escalating Complexity in Regional Conflicts: Connecting Geopolitics to Individual Pathways to Terrorism in Mali,” *African Security* 11, no. 3 (2018): 274-291.

⁴¹ Lecocq and Klute, “Tuareg Separatism,” 426.

preceding Tuareg rebellions and harbored ambitions to lead the MNLA. However, the MNLA disowned Ag Ghali due to his “theocratic” objectives which, according to the MNLA, contradicted “the foundations of Tuareg culture and civilization.”⁴² Ag Ghali proceeded to found Ansar al-Dine and allied the group with AQIM, creating deeper fissures with his former Tuareg allies.

Overall, the uprising of 2012 has had direct consequences not only for the country as a whole but also for relations between Tuareg communities. The independence of Azawad has by no means been supported by all Tuareg communities and remains a point of division within the Tuareg population. The Tuareg political leadership in the north does not necessarily represent the interests of the broader Tuareg population in Mali. Clashes have persisted between the politically influential Tuareg representatives—military and civilian—and local communities, including those from numerous ethnic groups impacted by the Tuareg Azawad movement. As one study states, “[T]he armed groups involved in Mali’s insurrections in each instance have never represented more than a small minority of the north’s inhabitants.”⁴³ In 2012, some Tuaregs even fought on the side of the GoM against the separatists.⁴⁴ An interviewee—referring to the outcomes of the Algiers Accord, which have arguably brought greater disaccord to the country, in particular, enflaming tensions between the political leadership, civilian populations, and the military—stated, “The Tuareg have never suffered as much, or been humiliated, as when Tuareg leaders claimed independence of the Azawad region.”

B. Stultified State- and Nation-Building Efforts

A widespread sense persists in Mali, as interviewees attested, that the government is plagued by dysfunction, exacerbated by corruption and impunity. While there were positive hopes regarding the presidential elections in July 2018, ultimately, no significant changes emerged to repair the GoM’s substantial governance problems, and the breakdown of trust between the GoM and its people has been left to fester. Ambiguity persists about who bears responsibility for the current state of affairs and how the state should function. There is a lack of strategic and intellectual vision for the future of the state and a lack of local capacity.⁴⁵ Indeed, public services and the country’s infrastructure have crumbled, a situation that jihadist groups have widely exploited, particularly at the community level where basic needs and services are not met. The situation in the realm of education is particularly dire. An interviewee reported that in 2009, in the Abeïbara Cercle of the Kidal Region of northeastern Mali, there were an estimated 10,200 schools; since 2011, there has not been a single school open in the region. There is an overall perception among many Malians, including the numerous Islamic groups opposing the state, that the GoM prioritizes the preservation of the

⁴² Julius Cavendish, “The Fearsome Tuareg Uprising in Mali: Less Monolithic than Meets the Eye,” *TIME*, March 30, 2012, <http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2110673,00.html>.

⁴³ Stephanie Pezard and Michael Shurkin, “Achieving Peace in Northern Mali: Past Agreements, Local Conflicts, and the Prospects for a Durable Settlement,” RAND Corporation, 2015, 24, <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a617796.pdf>.

⁴⁴ Lecocq and Klute, “Tuareg Separatism,” 431.

⁴⁵ Richard Reeve, “Mali on the Brink: Insights from Local Peacebuilders on the Causes of Violent Conflict and the Prospects for Peace,” Peace Direct, July 2018, 21, https://www.peacedirect.org/us/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2018/07/P772-PD-Mali-LVP-Report-ENG_WEB.pdf.

state, despite its mediocre governance abilities, its failure to stand independently from international actors, and its inability to demonstrate its presence in all regions of the country.

The GoM has fallen short in investing in state functions geared toward promoting economic growth or bolstering the GoM's governance capabilities, instead prioritizing investments in security, even in spite of the GoM's fears of another coup d'état. As a high-ranking government official mentioned during an interview, 23% of the GoM budget is directed toward military and security forces. Indeed, it is often evoked, as one interviewee from Burkina Faso reflected, that GoM authorities do not adequately monitor and control military spending, which remains a decidedly lucrative source of income for the military and the administration of the GoM.

Still, interviewees spoke about the widespread lack of trust that Malians have in, and even hatred for, the Malian armed forces (FAMA). This issue is a manifestation of inter-ethnic tensions that persist in Mali and that have become aggravated since the events of 2012. As a result of the prioritization of funding for the military and security apparatus, poverty and lack of economic opportunities force communities to seek out other means of earning livelihoods in the informal, rather than the formal, sectors. There is, as one report states, a "violent war economy in which prominent businessmen rely on small private armies to protect trafficking routes,"⁴⁶ and indeed, trafficking in the country further fuels violence and instability.⁴⁷ Since 2012 in particular, drug trafficking and the presence of drug traffickers has created unprecedented levels of conflict and violence. Taking advantage of the Malian government's inability to control these volatile areas, criminal networks have aggravated inter-communal divisions and intensified conflicts. Competition between armed groups—including by the politico-military groups for whom they constitute a resource, but also a matter of concern—makes traffickers increasingly difficult to control.⁴⁸

Concerns are prevalent regarding the extent to which the government adequately represents the diverse groups and ethnicities present in the country and contributes to these groups' livelihoods in a concrete and meaningful way.⁴⁹ A Malian state that is progressive and linked to local realities is a "fiction," according to one interviewee. Interviewees described Mali as a context in which political elites are generally cut off from social and local realities, especially outside of the capital, Bamako. Elsewhere in the country, communities still have significant expectations of the GoM in terms of basic services (including health, education, infrastructure, and security), but the GoM is absent, fueling a vicious cycle of unmet expectations and frustration. These inadequacies in governance also point toward a greater ideational shortcoming related to the cultivation of a Malian nation. As one study of local actors in Mali

⁴⁶ "The Sahel: Mali's Crumbling Peace Process and the Spreading Jihadist Threat," Commentary, International Crisis Group, March 1, 2017, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/mali/sahel-malis-crumbling-peace-process-and-spreading-jihadist-threat>.

⁴⁷ "Drug Trafficking, Violence and Politics in Northern Mali," Report No. 267, International Crisis Group, December 13, 2018, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/267-narcotraffic-violence-et-politique-au-nord-du-mali>.

⁴⁸ See generally *ibid*.

⁴⁹ See Jaimie Bleck and Kristin Michelitch, "The 2012 Crisis in Mali: Ongoing Empirical State Failure," *African Affairs* 114, issue 457 (October 2015): 598-623.

has found, there is a sense among those that the GoM fails to politically prioritize that “the current idea of the Malian nation fostered by southern Malians and the Malian state offers them no place” and that the GoM is “treating them as, at best, second-class citizens.”⁵⁰

The mistrust between communities and the central authorities remains strong. If there is violence in a particular location, the GoM does not mobilize quickly to react, but rather, communities are met with silence and inconclusive investigations. Communities perceive that perpetrators are not held accountable and impunity remains dominant among government officials and in their approaches to responding to violence. An interviewee expressed that constant institutional blockages, political conflicts between old and new groups in power, generational conflicts, false starts in national reconciliation processes, plans of action never adopted at the ministerial level, the lack of decision-making spirit at the top of the state, and “navel-gazing” in the capital and big cities has bogged down the political and security vigor of the country.

In general, the ethnic and cultural dimensions of Malian society are key to understanding the persistent conflict. Indeed, Mali is ethnically eclectic. While figures remain uncertain, it is estimated from reports that the Tuareg account for approximately only 1% of the population.⁵¹ The largest ethnic groups in Mali are the Bambara (approximately one third of the population), the Fulani or Peul (approximately 14%) the Sarakole (approximately 10%) and the Senuto (also approximately 10%).⁵² Interviewees discussed a deterioration in terms of how culture in its diverse forms in Mali is appreciated, cultivated, or preserved. In particular, there is a lack of preservation of language, cultural rites, or ways of life, all of which have damaged the social fabric of the country. The tensions between, on the one hand, agro-pastoral, traditionally nomadic communities (such as the Tuaregs), and on the other hand, agriculturally stationary groups, has been exacerbated by the GoM’s policies, which have entailed reforms that give priority to agriculture without respecting nomadic traditions. This preferential treatment to those who have established themselves in “static” agricultural communities, and the resulting conflicts, have yet to be sufficiently addressed.

Another consideration has been the GoM’s treatment of the Peul community, further exacerbating existing tensions and misconceptions regarding the community’s close connection with jihadist groups. Interviewees noted that it is common knowledge that the Peul ethnic group entirely lacks representation in the army. FAMA forces have repeatedly directed violence—including disappearances and mass executions—toward Peul communities.⁵³ There is perceived discrimination of the Peul that has further fueled inter-community conflicts regarding access to land and resources and has kept Peuls isolated from

⁵⁰ Pezard and Shurkin, “Achieving Peace in Northern Mali,” 35.

⁵¹ “The World Factbook: Mali,” Central Intelligence Agency, last modified May 30, 2019, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ml.html>.

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ See generally “In Central Mali, Civilian Populations Are Caught Between Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Fact-finding Mission Report,” International Federation for Human Rights and Malian Association for Human Rights, November 2018, https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/fidh_centre-of-mali_population-sized-between-terrorism-and-counter-terrorism_727_en_november2018.pdf.

the larger Malian community. According to an interviewee, “If you look at where [the GoM] implement schools or hospitals, if they have the choice between Peuls place or another one, they will choose the other one.” It is also commonly noted that the Peul lack motivation to interact with governmental authorities or integrate into the armed forces. The Peul way of life remains distinct from other Malian communities, prompting a lower level of interest in school and an aim to preserve a traditional, pastoral means of livelihood.⁵⁴

Overall, resolving inter-communitarian and inter-ethnic conflicts remains the key to security and peace in Mali and is one reason why the Algiers Accord has not been held up. While Malians have historically addressed these tensions through traditional mediation, dialogue, and other community-based relational methods, these modes are no longer workable in the current context, wherein some communities have resorted to violence and paying off governmental authorities to achieve their economic or security aims. As one government official explained, traditional chiefs remain very important and influential, particularly in the more remote areas of the country far removed from large urban centers. These chiefs play an active role as mediators between conflicting communities, but such traditional leaders are not exempted from the reaches of government corruption. As one interviewee indicated, these individuals have increasingly been compromised and appear driven by financial incentives and monetary gains to protect their positions of power.

C. Proliferation of Conservative Islam and Jihadism

Compounding these issues is the fact that jihadist groups have been expanding their presence and influence in the country, where over 90% of the country identifies as Muslim.⁵⁵ Following their military defeat by French forces in 2012, Islamist groups have chosen a strategy that inscribes them inside Malian communities and that entails using terror tactics in their operations. One example is the Macina Liberation Front (MLF), a group affiliated with Ansar al-Dine and led by Amadou Koufa, a Peul from Mopti.⁵⁶ The MLF has been responsible for attacks against UN, French, and Malian forces, as well as civilian populations.⁵⁷ In 2017, the group announced a merger with AQIM and Ansar al-Dine.⁵⁸ The MLF is composed primarily

⁵⁴ For more information, see Tabital Pulaaku International, which aims to promote the Peul (or Fulani) communities in terms of socio-economic and cultural development programs:

<http://www.tabitalpulaaku.org>.

⁵⁵ “The World Factbook: Mali.”

⁵⁶ See Jacob Zenn, “The Sahel’s Militant ‘Melting Pot’: Hamadou Kouffa’s Macina Liberation Front (FLM),” *Terrorism Monitor* 13, issue 22 (November 13, 2013), <https://jamestown.org/program/the-sahels-militant-melting-pot-hamadou-kouffas-macina-liberation-front-flm/#.VlgQj3arSUK>; and Ryan Cummings, “Attacks from Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb Will Likely Continue in North and West Africa,” *Global Observatory*, February 29, 2016, <https://theglobalobservatory.org/2016/02/attacks-from-al-qaeda-in-the-islamic-maghreb-will-likely-continue-in-north-and-west-africa>.

⁵⁷ For MLF attacks against schools, see “In the Center of Mali, the Extremists Proclaim School ‘Haram,’” *Sahelien*, June 7, 2017, <https://sahelien.com/en/in-the-center-of-mali-the-extremists-proclaim-school-haram>.

⁵⁸ Conor Gaffey, “African Jihadi Groups Unite and Pledge Allegiance to Al-Qaeda,” *Newsweek*, March 3, 2017, <https://www.newsweek.com/al-qaeda-groups-unite-sahel-563351>.

of Peuls due to Koufa's targeted recruitment of young Peul fighters.⁵⁹ There is a strong regional component to the recruitment of Peuls, which are historically nomadic people, but today, many have transitioned to more sedentary and urban lifestyles. Peul communities living in surrounding countries—including Senegal, Niger, Cote D'Ivoire, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Guinea, and Benin—were called on to join the jihadist group in its attacks against the UN, African Forces, and “apostate” Peul communities not adhering to the Islamist ways of life.⁶⁰

As there has been a lack of stable management of the Malian state and an inadequate security system in the face of rising instability, communities have turned their support toward Islamic groups, which in light of the GoM's governance and security shortcomings, have been able to gain communities' trust. In some areas—for example, Gao, a northern region in Mali—the communities have appreciated the presence of Islamist groups, as they have provided judicial, health, and security services that the GoM had been unable to successfully deliver.

Various analyses of the factors that have driven Malians to join or support radical Islamist NSAGs suggest that ideology is just one among many prominent elements. More significant are concerns related to economic and physical security in the midst of deteriorating governance.⁶¹ As one report notes, “The jihadists exploit the excesses of law-enforcement officials to offer an alternative in matters of justice, education, or the management of natural resources and public goods to communities. This ‘competition’ attracts a significant part of the population, especially among the most deprived communities.”⁶² Considerations that have driven support for the MLF include, as one analyst writes, “decades-old conflicts over land tenure and resource sharing between largely Peul herders and sedentary populations, social conflicts within Peul communities, and the need for protection against perceived threats from Tuareg and other armed groups, as well as from the Malian army following its return to Mopti.”⁶³ In turn, Malian authorities have responded to these rebel forces through “anti-terrorist operations characterized by numerous abuses against civilians, primarily the Fulani [Peul] community,” as one report notes.⁶⁴

In terms of ideology, one can see the powerful influence of conservative Islam in Malian society at play through the preaching and recruitment by Koufa, alliances among numerous transnational groups, and in the discourse of the Islamic High Council (IHC), the most

⁵⁹ “Décryptage: Al-Qaïda Appelle les Peuls au Jihad,” *France 24*, YouTube video, November 9, 2018, https://youtu.be/SYM_HZ3vGiM.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ See Anthony Morland, “Why Some Malians Join Armed Groups,” *The New Humanitarian*, January 25, 2018, <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2018/01/25/why-some-malians-join-armed-groups>; Dal Santo and Elizabeth Johanna van der Heide, “Escalating Complexity;” and “‘We Hope and We Fight’ Youth, Communities, and Violence in Mali,” Mercy Corps, September 2017, https://www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/Mercy%20Corps_Mali_Hope%20and%20Fight_Report_Eng_Sept%202017.pdf.

⁶² “In Central Mali,” 77.

⁶³ Andrew Lebovich, “The Death of a Jihadist: A Chance to Curb Mali's Conflict,” Commentary, European Council on Foreign Relations, December 13, 2018, https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_the_death_of_a_jihadist_a_chance_to_curb_malis_conflict.

⁶⁴ “In Central Mali,” 9-10.

influential religious entity in the country, which blames the government for poor leadership and bad governance, and for falling under the influence of France. Imam Mahmoud Dicko, the president of the IHC, is a strict follower of ultra-conservative Wahhabism but has generally sought to mediate between the GoM and the NSAGs engaged in the 2012 conflict. He has condemned the violent actions that jihadist groups have pursued in northern Mali, yet has, at points, negotiated with these groups.⁶⁵ His call to Malians for an anti-government rally in February 2019 indicates the position of strong opposition to the GoM that the IHC adopts.⁶⁶

One episode emblematic of the IHC's influence occurred when the Dutch government, with the support of the GoM, had planned to introduce a new sexual educational text book for teens. However, the book met with IHC opposition due to a chapter that discussed sexual orientation, leading Dicko to assert that the book promoted homosexuality. In December 2018, the GoM announced that it would withdraw this proposal.⁶⁷ As this episode suggests, the proliferation of conservative Islam is bringing about a cultural transformation in Mali. In regions controlled by jihadist groups, emphasis has been placed away from community and cultural priorities in favor of Quranic teaching and indoctrination. Jihadist groups have pressured schools to the point that some teachers no longer want to teach, leading to widespread school closures. In the words of one expert:

We're in a kind of ideological competition... The ideology of the jihadists is Salafism, the conventional school carries the image of the West where people are turned towards the world. If this conventional school is closed, only the Koranic school will remain. Children often have only a 'recitative' knowledge of the Qur'an, and do not even know how to pray. It is easy to manipulate them. These religious extremists are doing everything to ensure that the two schools don't cohabit.⁶⁸

One interviewee noted that six hundred schools in the center of the country had been closed due to these jihadist pressures.⁶⁹ This development is especially critical given Mali's demographic realities: almost half of the country's population is under fifteen years old.⁷⁰

⁶⁵ Joshua Hersh, "Mali's Top Islamic Leader Sees Conservative Values Flourishing At Home," *Huffington Post*, October 22, 2013, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/mali-mahmoud-dicko_n_4133218?guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAMQL4MNeYpLSBf7xierzFJ_UXQBGT6zko6BQ6j1KytrCdUu-EtQUKeKOBYTGROIY2Tm8t5u_SBwq1jByK2_LDtxS_oHvTWiCH04aQHVUIzNWlqEz9e6VXulPvnRyymaZF6CNH4cq_GDfif1XKCj4JhkSTHyU-vKIJ_UhCKcBD&gucounter=2.

⁶⁶ Alessandra Prentice, "Thousands Rally in Mali to Protest Ethnic Violence," *Reuters*, April 6, 2013, <https://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFKCN1RI083-OZATP>.

⁶⁷ "Mali: Le Gouvernement Abandonne la Réforme de L'éducation Sexuelle," *RFI*, February 20, 2018, <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20181220-mali-gouvernement-abandonne-education-sexuelle-college-mahmoud-dicko>.

⁶⁸ "Extremists Proclaim School 'Haram.'"

⁶⁹ For more information, see "OCHA Mali – Rapport Inter-Cluster: Janvier – Juin 2017," Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 6-7, <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Rapport%20trimestriel%20ICC%20Q1%20et%20Q2%202017%20-%20Final.pdf>.

⁷⁰ "The World Factbook: Mali."

Jihadists have also put an end to cultural events, traditional practices, and other forms of community or ethnic expression, further neutralizing and destroying the social and cultural fabric that once illustrated the richness of the country and represented Mali as a unified state. Indeed, the influence of radical Islamic groups, in spite of the economic and security benefits that has fueled support at the community level, has actually aggravated, rather than diffused, inter-group tensions and conflicts.

Although local in their approach, jihadist groups in Mali also follow an international logic, leveraging international networks and support throughout the Sahel region, such as Algeria, and beyond.⁷¹ These groups have developed a coherent doctrine in alignment with global groups such as al Qaeda. As one scholar notes, in Mali, one can see “al-Qaeda’s ‘localization’ strategy” in effect, given that al Qaeda “exist[s] in the region as an umbrella organization, accepting new members and groups tied to it by interpersonal and strategic bonds, while making open affiliation with IS [Islamic State] and the massacre of civilians redlines for membership.”⁷²

Security continues to worsen in Mali, with an increase in terror attacks particularly targeting UN peacekeepers, Malian troops, international forces, and civilian populations.⁷³ Jihadist groups oppose the international armed presence in Mali and perceive that this intervention supports the GoM’s corruption. Yet, jihadists have induced compliance with their authority through fear, have been responsible for atrocities as they have fought to gain and maintain territory, and have promoted the notion that international actors (for example, humanitarian and human rights professionals) are enemies of the Malian state.⁷⁴ The international community, and the GoM, fear an Islamic revolution in the country, although, as one interviewee noted, “As long as there is [an] international presence in the country, there will not be an Islamic uprising,” a notion that signals the persistently dependent nature of the GoM on international armed security forces to maintain the country’s stability. One interviewee noted that, to incentivize civilians to participate in terrorist activities, jihadist groups had advertised that 6,000 euros would be paid to someone who would put down an improvised explosive device intended to harm an international convoy, such as FAMA, UN, Barkhane, or other international forces considered to be interfering infidels. This tactic has been seen particularly in the center of Mali. For communities suffering from a lack of ability to achieve an adequate standard of living, there is the constant lure of financial support through such violent means.

⁷¹ As the role of Algeria in this regard, see, for example, Jean-Pierre Filiu, “Pourquoi l’Algérie Protège le Pire Jihadiste du Sahel,” *Le Monde Blogs*, October 21, 2018, <http://filiu.blog.lemonde.fr/2018/10/21/pourquoi-lalgerie-protège-le-pire-jihadiste-du-sahel/>.

⁷² Jacob Zenn, “AQIM’s Alliance in Mali: Prospects for Jihadist Preeminence in West Africa,” *Terrorism Monitor* 15, issue 8 (April 21, 2017), <https://jamestown.org/program/aqims-alliance-mali-prospects-jihadist-preeminence-west-africa/>.

⁷³ There were 183 such attacks in the country in 2016. In 2017, the number had risen to 226. In 2018, there were 237. See “Implementation of Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2423 (2018): Report of the Secretary-General,” United Nations, March 5, 2019, 3, <https://undocs.org/en/S/2019/207>.

⁷⁴ Natasja Rupesinghe and Morten Bøås, “The Violence in Mali is Getting Bloodier, But Religion is Not Necessarily at its Root,” *The Broker*, April 10, 2019, <http://www.thebrokeronline.eu/Blogs/Sahel-Watch-a-living-analysis-of-the-conflict-in-Mali/The-violence-in-Mali-is-getting-bloodier-but-religion-is-not-necessarily-at-its-root>.

II. The International Response

This section directs attention toward international efforts to grapple with the issues that the previous section addressed. The section offers an overview of, first, the history of international development efforts, second, international engagement in the wake of the 2012 uprising, and third, ongoing humanitarian activities in the country.

A. Mali as “Donor Darling”

Mali has long been known as a “donor darling” of the international development sector. This has roots in the colonial period of the country, during which, as one Malian scholar notes, “We are the transition between North Africa and Africa that reaches the ocean and the forests. This gives us an important strategic position: whoever controls Mali, controls West Africa— if not the whole of Africa... The arrival of colonisation tore us apart. It felt like a cut, almost like a surgical operation.”⁷⁵ The more recent legacy of development aid for Mali stems largely from the 1990s, when Mali transitioned from military dictatorship to electoral democracy.⁷⁶ These efforts are primarily led by EU member states, which contribute approximately 80% of Mali’s total international development aid.⁷⁷ However, the scholarly literature on development aid to Mali reveals international development actors’ complicity in the governance failures discussed in the previous section. Rent seeking is prevalent, and as one analysis notes, “The tax and customs agencies, for example, where inspectors keep as much as 30 percent of the penalties they assess, remain ‘administrative fiefdoms,’ whose staff undermine reform attempts.”⁷⁸ Another analysis states that Mali’s “‘donor darling’ status has further obscured persistent shortcomings in liberal governance,” and international donors have “enthusiastically and uncritically overemphasized” the GoM’s potential for progress and reform.⁷⁹ One assessment of international development efforts in Mali makes the case that, in the years leading up to 2012, “aid consolidated a regime that grew increasingly unpopular and discredited, so that aid and donors—voluntarily or otherwise—contributed to widening the gap between Mali’s good international image and domestic grievances.”⁸⁰

⁷⁵ “Shadow War in the Sahara: ‘War on Terror’ or Competition for Natural Resources? A Look at the US and French Military Presence in Africa,” *Al Jazeera*, May 13, 2017, <https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/specialseries/2016/10/shadow-war-sahara-161009025023817.html>.

⁷⁶ Jonathan Sears, “Mali Expects an Uneventful Presidential Election—That’s Why It Might Not Be,” *Quartz Africa*, July 27, 2018, <https://qz.com/africa/1340690/mali-election-boubacar-keita-faces-voter-apathy/>.

⁷⁷ Moussa Djiré, Djibril Sow, Kissima Gakou, and Bakary Camara, “Assessing the EU’s Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Interventions in Mali,” *Whole-of-Society Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding*, March 24, 2017, 21, <https://www.woscap.eu/documents/131298403/131299900/Mali+-+USJPB.pdf/Mali%20-%20USJPB/index.pdf>.

⁷⁸ Catriona Craven-Matthews and Pierre Englebert, “A Potemkin State in the Sahel? The Empirical and the Fictional in Malian State Reconstruction,” *African Security* 11, no. 1 (2018): 7.

⁷⁹ Bruno Charbonneau and Jonathan M. Sears, “Fighting for Liberal Peace in Mali? The Limits of International Military Intervention,” *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 8, issue 2-3 (2014): 14.

⁸⁰ Isaline Bergamaschi, “The Fall of a Donor Darling: The Role of Aid in Mali’s Crisis,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 52, no. 3 (2014): 348.

Mali's "donor darling" status sets the scene for the events that transpired in 2012 and afterward. Post-2012, international actors have committed billions of dollars toward Mali's reconstruction, as well as toward the stabilization of the region, including 3.25 billion euros committed at a donor conference convened in Brussels in 2013,⁸¹ additional pledges made at a conference convened in Paris in 2015,⁸² and 843 million euros that the European Union has committed—through the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa established in November 2012—to address the root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa, in support of development programming with the aim of strengthening governance, employment, and community resilience.⁸³ However, interviewees cited that, despite this significant financial investment and diversity of programming support, there remains limited proximity to populations in need in some of the most acutely affected areas of the country. Others expressed that development programs have not addressed or sought to confront structural or underlying foundational issues and have not been engaging with jihadist groups. This barrier between programming priorities and field realities for populations living in affected areas has exacerbated, rather than assuaged, tensions and antagonisms between communities.

The key dynamic is that Mali has been a dependent country on a multitude of fronts—including development assistance, emergency humanitarian aid, as well as counterterrorism and security assistance—and its government has become adept at maintaining international aid flows even in spite of limited reform efforts. One scholar has stated very bluntly that, in Mali, there is a "lack of significant possibilities for there to be a self-sufficient empirical state in the foreseeable future. In short, Mali is made up. It is a pretend state, a theatrical production."⁸⁴ As the next sub-section explains, the crisis that emerged in 2012 only perpetuated and exacerbated this state of affairs.

B. International Mobilization in the Wake of the 2012 Uprising

External efforts to engage in Mali leading up to, during, and after the 2012 uprising have been shaped by regional and international politics and colored by perceptions and concerns about international actors' self-interested motives. In response to the March 2012 coup, for example, ECOWAS planned its Mission to Mali, MICEMA.⁸⁵ However, the mission never came to fruition, in part due to resistance from Algeria, which is not an ECOWAS member.⁸⁶ Under the ECOWAS umbrella, the President of Burkina Faso mediated to resolve the coup crisis, but

⁸¹ "Donor Conference for Mali is a Success," African Union, May 21, 2013, <https://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/fr/node/7265>.

⁸² "Communique Final," Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, October 22, 2015, <https://www.oecd.org/fr/cad/Mali-2015-Communique-Final-FR.pdf>.

⁸³ "EU Mobilises the International Community for Africa's Sahel Region," Press Release, European Commission, February 23, 2018, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-1142_en.htm.

⁸⁴ Craven-Matthews and Englebert, "A Potemkin State," 17.

⁸⁵ Djiré, Sow, Gakou, and Camara, "Assessing the EU's Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Interventions in Mali," 15.

⁸⁶ Lori-Anne Thérault-Bénoni, "Lessons from the Malian Crisis for the International Security Architecture," Institute for Security Studies, April 15, 2013, <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/lessons-from-the-malian-crisis-for-the-international-security-architecture>.

local actors in Mali perceived that his ulterior motive was to consolidate his domestic power and strengthen his country's relations with France.⁸⁷

The AU created the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA), but in light of the time AFISMA would need to actually deploy, President Touré requested France to rapidly militarily intervene, and the Operation Serval was launched.⁸⁸ The operation, led by French and Chadian forces, aimed to restrain the jihadist threats emanating from the north of the country that were descending on Bamako. The operation was successful in retaking territory captured by Islamist groups, driving them out of cities they held in northern Mali. At that time, there was widespread support for the operation among Malians, motivated by the recognition of the practical need for the military intervention.⁸⁹ Nevertheless, Malians concurrently expressed criticisms of France's perceived ulterior motives (for example, the exploitation of natural resources and controlling migration flows), especially given its past as the country's former colonial ruler.⁹⁰ When AFISMA was deployed, the mission suffered from the opposite problem: Malians perceived AFISMA to be legitimate but ineffective.⁹¹

AFISMA was later enveloped by the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), mandated by the UN Security Council in April 2013.⁹² MINUSMA, however, has suffered from perceptions of both illegitimacy and ineffectiveness and has even been called an "occupying force" in Tuareg regions. The early stages of the MINUSMA presence were seen as hopeful, but its reputation degenerated rapidly as attacks against civilians escalated, demonstrating to communities that MINUSMA's attempts to protect civilian lives remain unsuccessful. Interviewees criticized MINUSMA for its inability to ensure security for the population, and particularly, for failing to warn communities of potential security threats. Many local actors do not consider MINUSMA to be a stabilization and protection of civilian apparatus at all, but rather, an entity that seeks to preserve its own protection. Furthermore, many Malians have expressed that they actually feel less safe when MINUSMA is present, patrolling, or passing through villages, especially in light of the pervasive violence that has been directed toward MINUSMA by jihadist groups.⁹³ Indeed, many interviewees indicated that a region where MINUSMA is present is perceived as a more insecure area. MINUSMA is the deadliest UN "blue helmet" mission, with over 180 MINUSMA fatalities since the mission

⁸⁷ Isaline Bergamaschi, "French Military Intervention in Mali: Inevitable, Consensual Yet Insufficient," *Stability: International Journal of Security & Development* 2, no. 2, Article 20 (2013): 5.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, at 6.

⁸⁹ Sophia Sabrow, "Local Perceptions of the Legitimacy of Peace Operations by the UN, Regional Organizations and Individual States—A Case Study of the Mali Conflict," *International Peacekeeping* 24, no. 1 (2017): 159-186.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

⁹² Djiré, Sow, Gakou, and Camara, "Assessing the EU's Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Interventions in Mali," 16.

⁹³ See Offner, "New Sahel Anti-terror Force;" and Ruben Andersson and Florian Weigand, "Intervention at Risk: The Vicious Cycle of Distance and Danger in Mali and Afghanistan," *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 9, no. 4 (2015): 519-541.

began.⁹⁴ Additionally, in areas where MINUSMA is active, the cost of living has risen significantly, particularly in the center of the country.

An additional aspect of MINUSMA that colors its sense of illegitimacy is the perception that MINUSMA lacks a cultural connection to, and understanding of, the local context, including how its presence affects local populations. Communities view MINUSMA as cut-off from local actors and see the mission as a financier of small projects, contributing to the local economy. International non-governmental organizations (NGOs) tend to shy away from working with MINUSMA in order to maintain reputational distance. Additionally, MINUSMA has financed projects for communities in jihadist areas, therefore indirectly serving radical groups. However, many local NGOs work closely with MINUSMA due to an interest in receiving financing. The mechanism by which MINUSMA works toward development ends is Quick Impact Projects (QIPs), which are community projects (focused, for example, on infrastructure, training, or employment) that are short-term (lasting six months or less) and relatively inexpensive (costing no more than \$50,000).⁹⁵ The aim of QIPs for the military and the GoM is to enhance local community acceptance, diminish hostility, and minimize the potential for targeted attacks. As noted by a publication by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), “Whilst exceptions exist, in general it has been shown that the more adverse a context is in security terms, the more acceptance-driven ‘humanitarian’ activities the military will conduct. It is not by chance that the four UN military operations with the largest budgets for QIPs are MINUSMA, MINUSCA, MINUSTAH and MONUSCO, precisely the only four missions with the stabilization rationale.”⁹⁶ Herein lies the problem. In these contexts, QIPs show that considerable progress can be made to create stability via “winning hearts and minds.” However, these programs also create considerable and dangerous confusion by blurring military and humanitarian operations, despite diverging agendas and rationales.

One interviewee articulated the view that MINUSMA attempts to “purchase peace” between communities through such high visibility projects rather than usefully contributing to long-term infrastructure initiatives. Another interviewee’s comments express a widely held concern about QIPS:

International actors like MINUSMA attract teachers and other educated professionals, as they have the means to pay more. As a result, these professionals abandon their work in the communities with the hopes of earning more money. But for how long? Is it sustainable for local professionals to privilege working with such actors? How is this impacting their own communities?

⁹⁴ “Mali: UN Mourns Three Guinean Peacekeepers Killed, Condemns Attack ‘In Strongest Terms,’” United Nations News, February 23, 2019, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/02/1033431>.

⁹⁵ See “Quick Impact Projects (QIPS),” United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, <https://minusma.unmissions.org/en/quick-impact-projects-qips>.

⁹⁶ Alejandro Pozo Marín, “Perilous Terrain: Humanitarian Action at Risk in Mali,” Médecins Sans Frontières, March 2017, 13, https://www.msf.org.za/system/tdf/publications/perilous_terrain_humanitarian_action_at_risk_in_mali.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=7128&force=.

Overall, interviewees discussed three overarching shortcomings of the international response in Mali that the rest of this section will highlight. First, there is a lack of long-term vision. The extent to which the country functions and enjoys relative stability remains dependent upon the international presence—including security, development, and humanitarian actors—which substitute, rather than support, the GoM in providing services to the population. Interviewees indicated that, in general, the presence and programming of the international community hinders the opportunity to cultivate national will and functions as a crutch, creating further dependency. Many actors in Mali perceive the international community to be dedicated to the substitution of the state, operating without adequate reflection regarding how to work toward independent state functioning. As one interviewee expressed, “Authorities want to maintain the same system of neo-paternalistic resources management, with no strategies, no vision of the society, no engagement in root issues, just a daily management of the country.” There is a perception that the international community should facilitate and support good governance but instead lack political courage to address fundamental issues in Mali—for example: pastoral livelihood, climate change, security, and protection—that are of real concern to the people. Communities feel that they continue to be abandoned due to this dysfunction, particularly when it concerns their culture and traditional ways of life and when international engagement fails to support or reinforce the development of local capacities. Ultimately, as the interviews revealed, Malians widely perceive that the international community feeds into state corruption and exploitative structures that do not connect with the local population.

Second, the international response has prioritized security at the definitive expense of more expansive, long-term peacebuilding efforts. Indeed, the international community’s main security considerations have been the insecurity in the north and the central part of the country, particularly in terms of the presence of jihadist groups and criminal networks. As one analyst writes, “excessive focus on terrorist threats and security concerns runs the risk of ignoring crucial internal dynamics—such as governance and human rights—and can come at the explicit cost of development.”⁹⁷ Furthermore, another analysis states, “The root causes of violence in the Centre [of Mali] are localized; however, the presence of international military forces in the state/region exacerbates local tensions.”⁹⁸

For the past five years, Operation Barkhane—launched by France in August 2014 to “fill the void” left by the lack of the state’s capacity⁹⁹—has aimed to minimize the threat of jihadist groups, which have become increasingly volatile and dangerous for civilians, in the Sahel. Barkhane supplanted Operation Serval, adopting a regional approach to the permeable borders in the Sahel and to deter members of armed groups from other countries from seeking refuge in Mali. Comprised of approximately 4,500 soldiers in the Sahel, of which 2,700 are present in Mali, the force is viewed as an effective military actor involved in the conduct of

⁹⁷ Tuesday Jade Reitano, “Comparing Approaches to the Security-Development Nexus in the Sahel and their Implications for Governance,” *Governance in Africa* 1, no. 1, Article 4 (2014): 3.

⁹⁸ Yalla Sangaré and Jason J. McSparren, “Acknowledging Conflict across Mali’s Centre: Drivers and History,” *Journal of African-Centred Solutions in Peace and Security* 3 (September 2018): 27.

⁹⁹ Morgane Le Cam, “Au Mali, L’opération ‘Barkhane’ Ensablée en Terre Oubliée,” *Le Monde*, May 4, 2019, https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2019/05/04/barkhane-l-ensablement-en-terre-oubliee_5458125_3212.html.

hostilities and combatting terrorism and have reportedly “neutralized” over 600 terrorists since 2014.¹⁰⁰

In late February 2019, France restated its intention with Barkhane to support Mali “as long as necessary and as long as Mali will wish.”¹⁰¹ Alongside Barkhane, and highlighting the increasingly aligned priorities emblematic of the “triple nexus,” the French Development Agency has progressively been redirecting its funding priorities toward the Sahel, citing the aim of doubling its contribution over the coming years.¹⁰² According to the *BBC*, “85 million euros of French development aid were recorded during a ceremony in Bamako, including 35 million direct subsidies intended in particular to cope with cash flow difficulties of the Malian state, which is struggling to collect taxes in many areas.”¹⁰³

A large majority of interviewees expressed that Barkhane has a certain degree of influence over state authorities and the administration of public services and that, in the words of one interviewee, “without the presence of Barkhane, the country would collapse under jihadist pressures,” and with a reluctant tolerance, despite Barkhane’s shortcomings, “there is no alternative today.” However, Barkhane has not been able to ensure the protection of civilians. Between November 2018 and March 2019, over 4,700 civilians (an increase of 46% since the same time frame last year) were killed in the Sahel in over 1,200 violent incidents.¹⁰⁴ There is also a perception among Malians – promoted by the internet, photos, and other media – that Barkhane aims primarily to exploit natural resources. As one journalist writes, “The increasing militarisation of Africa is a new profit centre, coveted by the military-industrial complex with millions of dollars of contracts for arms manufacturers and private contractors... [A] new division of the African continent is underway as new powers seek to ensure oil supplies, strategic minerals, arable land and even the water under the desert sands.”¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁰ See John Irish, “Don’t Take Our Troops for Granted, France Warns West African States,” *Reuters*, May 28, 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-westafrica-security-france/dont-take-our-troops-for-granted-france-warns-west-african-states-idUSKCN1SY28J>; and Quentin Lopinot, “What Does ‘European Defense’ Look Like? The Answer Might Be in the Sahel,” *War on the Rocks*, March 19, 2019, <https://warontherocks.com/2019/03/what-does-european-defense-look-like-the-answer-might-be-in-the-sahel/>.

¹⁰¹ “La France Conforte son Soutien Militaro-Financier au Mali,” *BBC News*, February 23, 2019, <https://www.bbc.com/afrique/47345449>.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁴ See “Political Violence Skyrockets in the Sahel According to Latest ACLED Data,” Press Release, ACLED, March 28, 2019, <https://www.acleddata.com/2019/03/28/press-release-political-violence-skyrockets-in-the-sahel-according-to-latest-aced-data/>. See also Morgane Le Cam, “Au Cœur de la Guerre Antiterroriste Avec les Soldats de la Force ‘Barkhane,’” *Le Monde*, May 28, 2019, https://www.lemonde.fr/m-le-mag/article/2019/05/28/au-c-ur-de-la-guerre-antiterroriste-avec-les-soldats-de-la-force-barkhane_5468417_4500055.html?xtmc=barkhane&xtcr=1, which discusses a recent incident in which armed actors attacked women and children in the central region of Ouinerden. During this incident, Barkhane was unable to respond and come to the aid of civilians in a region increasingly victimized by insecurity.

¹⁰⁵ “Shadow War in the Sahara.” For an overview of Africa’s natural resources, see “Mapping Africa’s natural resources,” *Al Jazeera*, February 20, 2018,

Illustrating the extent to which many Malians fear Barkhane and perceive its actions to be detrimental to the country, one interviewee described the relationship between Mali and Barkhane as: “in a bag you have eggs [the Malian people] and stones [Barkhane].” In this dangerous proximity, the Malian people will always pay the price in the face of protracted violence and military operations. The extent to which long-term success in terms of security is achievable remains to be seen. Amadou Koufa—the MLF leader, as discussed in the previous section—was thought to have been killed by French forces in November 2018 but resurfaced in a video that circulated several months later.¹⁰⁶ The intention is that Barkhane will ultimately be replaced by forces from the Group of Five (G5) Sahel joint security force—comprised of forces from Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger—but interviewees expressed disbelief about whether such a handover of responsibility will actually ever successfully occur. There is a perception that there currently is no alternative to Barkhane capable of bringing forth a comparable level of protection and influence. In this sense, the international presence breeds local dependence.

The mission of G5 Sahel appears as strongly ambitious to promote cooperation and coordinated efforts to curb the rising challenges associated with transnational terrorism, trafficking, illicit trade (including arms, drugs, and slavery), and to address the interconnected causes and implications of extreme poverty. The European Union remains the most significant donor to the G5 Sahel countries, pledging 8 billion euros in development aid from 2014-2020.¹⁰⁷ Nevertheless, as one author writes, “Competing agendas among the G5 states and international stakeholders can slow or stagnate progress, and militarization often accrues unwanted byproducts. These refuel root causes of the conflict that prompted a breakdown in stability at the region’s epicentre in Mali.”¹⁰⁸

Third, international efforts have insufficiently included local actors in planning and implementation processes. Malians have directed this criticism toward MINUSMA, as well as toward the EU, in particular, regarding the European Union Training Mission (EUTM), mandated to train the armed forces of Mali, as well as the European Union Capacity Building Mission in Mali (EUCAP), which focuses on training Malian security forces, including police, the Gendarmerie and the National Guard. EUCAP, specifically, has been criticized for insufficiently integrating local competencies and capacities in implementing its mandate and

<https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2016/10/mapping-africa-natural-resources-161020075811145.html>.

¹⁰⁶ “‘Dead’ Mali Jihadist Amadou Koufa Reappears in Video,” *BBC News*, March 2, 2019, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47428246>.

¹⁰⁷ “The European Union Pledges to Rebuild the Headquarters of the G5 Sahel Joint Force in Sévaré, Mali,” Press Release, European Commission, July 25, 2018, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-4646_en.htm. For information on the funding challenges that the G5 Sahel nevertheless still faces, as well as other challenges, see Fatiha Belfakir, “G5 Sahel Force Struggles with Funding, Coordination,” *Voice of America News*, October 27, 2018, <https://www.voanews.com/extremism-watch/g5-sahel-force-struggles-funding-coordination>.

¹⁰⁸ Zoë Gorman, “Pursuing Elusive Stability in the Sahel,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, March 26, 2019, <https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-background/2019/pursuing-elusive-stability-sahel>.

in terms of personnel recruitment.¹⁰⁹ There are local peacebuilding actors who can be mobilized, but in the words of one report, “[F]ew local level peacebuilders have much connection to, or understanding of, Mali’s national government or regional administrations. Some do not see the government as a powerful or relevant actor that they need to engage with. Others do not know how to approach it, whilst a few see it as hostile towards civil society.”¹¹⁰ Women, in particular, have been excluded from peacebuilding and conflict resolution efforts, even in spite of the presence in Mali, as two scholars note, of “a relatively energetic and engaged women’s movement.”¹¹¹ The importance of a long-term plan for peace was articulated clearly in UN Security Council Resolution 2423 (2018), which:

Requests the Secretary-General to take appropriate steps to allow for the swift conclusion of a “Pact for Peace” between the Government of Mali and the United Nations, with the support of the members of the international mediation, in the wake of the upcoming presidential elections... with the overall objectives to accelerate the implementation of the Agreement, contribute to the stabilization of Mali and strengthen the coherence of international efforts in Mali, with the support of MINUSMA, on the basis of mutual commitments by all actors involved...¹¹²

There has indeed been a great deal of international engagement in mediation and peacebuilding. For example, over the course of 2018, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue has played a role in mediating a peace agreement between Peul and Dogon communities in Koro, a town in the Mopti region of the country;¹¹³ a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement between two Tuareg communities (the Dawsahak and the Imajgan);¹¹⁴ and a unilateral ceasefire commitment by the armed group, Dan Nan Ambassagou.¹¹⁵ Additionally, since 2013, Interpeace, in collaboration with the Malian Institute of Action Research for Peace, has engaged in a plethora of initiatives to support the ongoing peace process.¹¹⁶

¹⁰⁹ See Shyamika Jayasundara-Smits, “Bracing the Wind and Riding the Norm Life Cycle: Inclusive Peacebuilding in the European Capacity Building Mission in Sahel–Mali (EUCAP Sahel–Mali),” *Peacebuilding* 6, no. 3 (2018): 233-247; and Denis M. Tull, “Rebuilding Mali’s Army: The Dissonant Relationship Between Mali and Its International Partners,” *International Affairs* 95, no. 2 (2019): 405-422.

¹¹⁰ Reeve, “Mali on the Brink,” 36.

¹¹¹ Anne Marie Goetz and Rob Jenkins, “Agency and Accountability: Promoting Women’s Participation in Peacebuilding,” *Feminist Economics* 22, no. 1, 2016: 221.

¹¹² United Nations Security Council Resolution 2423 (2018), paragraph 5.

¹¹³ “Signature d’un Accord de Paix Entre les Communautés Peulh et Dogon de Koro au Mali,” Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, YouTube video, August 31, 2018, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PRc2q5qH-6w&feature=youtu.be>.

¹¹⁴ “Two Rival Tuareg Communities from Mali Sign a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement,” Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, June 1, 2018, <https://www.hdcentre.org/updates/two-rival-tuareg-communities-from-mali-sign-a-cessation-of-hostilities-agreement>.

¹¹⁵ “Youssaouf Toloba and His Dan Nan Ambassagou Armed Group Sign a Commitment Towards a Ceasefire in Central Mali,” Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, September 28, 2018, <https://www.hdcentre.org/updates/youssouf-toloba-and-his-dan-nan-ambassagou-armed-group-sign-a-commitment-towards-a-ceasefire-in-central-mali/>

¹¹⁶ For more information, see the Interpeace website, <https://www.interpeace.org/programme/mali/>.

Yet, in general, international efforts—peacebuilding activities, in particular—have “been more accountable to the imperatives of external donors and military partners than to local aspirations for peace, justice and good governance,” as one scholar points out.¹¹⁷ This has been particularly salient in the area of peace and mediation. One interviewee highlighted the risks of an internationally driven process, stating, “We should not leave dialogue and mediation initiatives in the hands of foreigners. The government has to be responsible of the dialogue between the communities. If not, it calls into question the traditional foundations and relationships of the country.”

Given the lack of a central mechanism to bring parties together and to follow-up on discussions, the diversity of initiatives at the local and capital levels seems to fuel a dynamic of competition between the actors involved, particularly concerning financial incentives and opportunities. In the absence of impactful mediation processes led by the Malian authorities, local initiatives have emerged to support dialogue and reconciliation efforts in particular communities. However, interviewees have cautioned that the leaders driving these initiatives have been instrumentalized and are not necessarily the right individuals for the role. Accessing certain communities requires a certain credibility and legitimacy, but effective leadership remains sparse. In this environment, opportunities for mediation and dialogue amongst parties can exacerbate tensions, mistrust, and distance between communities. Imam Mahmoud Dicko, president of the Islamic High Council, has also expressed, “In reality, the big issues are not being addressed. It is as though the West lives off wars, as though wars need to be created, for them to justify their power.”¹¹⁸

C. Humanitarian Activities

Malian communities suffer from a wide range of humanitarian needs, including lack of potable water and other water, sanitation and health (WASH) services. One interviewee indicated that 60% of Malians living outside of Bamako do not have access to clean water. Additionally, as already noted, there are continual school closings, persistent poverty and lack of economic opportunities in the formal economy, as well as constant insecurity and violence against civilians. According to figures from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), in early 2019, there were approximately 4.1 million people in Mali (more than 20% of the total population) in need of humanitarian assistance.¹¹⁹ Approximately 2.6% of Malians suffer from acute malnutrition.¹²⁰

In 2018, displacement in and around Mali has significantly escalated, as compared to 2017. According to a recent report by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre and the Norwegian Refugee Council, there has been a 360% increase in forced displacement due to attacks and targeted violence by NSAGs, including extremist groups, inter-communal

¹¹⁷ Luca Raineri, “Mali: The Short-sightedness of Donor-driven Peacebuilding,” *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development* 11, no. 1 (2016): 88-92.

¹¹⁸ “Shadow War in the Sahara.”

¹¹⁹ “Bulletin Humanitaire Mali,” 1.

¹²⁰ “Plan De Response Humanitaire—Janvier-December 2018: Mali,” Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, February 2018, 4, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/mali_hrp_2018_vfinale.pdf.

conflicts, and military operations.¹²¹ In Mali, there have been significant increases in community violence, particularly between Peul herders and Dogon and Bambara farmers. In June 2019, armed militias attacked and killed nearly 100 civilians and wounded 38 in a Dogon village close in Mopti, with others wounded or missing.¹²² This attack represents one of the most severe since the recent Ogossagou massacre of March 2019, demonstrating the staggering escalation of violent attacks on civilians and the extreme nature of inter-ethnic conflict, particularly between Dogon and Peul militias, who, according to European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, “have been retaliating against civilian populations.”¹²³ It has been reported that the Malian defense forces had advanced warning of the attack but failed to react. Coupled with increased insecurity throughout the country, to which civilians are most vulnerable, the conditions that push displacement are worsening, while also making returns more difficult.¹²⁴ Indeed, the current situation also does not facilitate the return of Malian refugees, in particular the Tuareg, who are living, in particular, in Mauritania and Burkina Faso and who lack the ability to return in their land of origin.

International humanitarian actors have an uneasy relationship with Malian communities. Some Malians perceive that humanitarians engage in intelligence gathering. Humanitarian NGOs operating in Mali have also been criticized for being blind to the political impacts of their activities, leading local resentment toward them to build.¹²⁵ Criticisms have also been levied that international humanitarian actors have fallen short in terms of addressing the root causes of community-level violence. As one interviewee described, some humanitarian organizations appear to be “creating violence in their lack of understanding, respect, and in their actions while humiliate[ing] local communities.” Interviewees highlighted that local communities are not adequately integrated into project development processes to guide new ways of working and to create impactful programming. Due to the fact that local populations have received assistance for a protracted period of time, there is a definitive sense that local actors are not empowered, and instead, exist in a state of learned helplessness resulting from the dominance of international presence and programming. Interviewees indicated that, although certain international humanitarian actors—for example MSF and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)—dialogue with the main relevant actors, UN agencies refrain from engaging with NSAGs. There is a general lack of trust and communication between NSAGs, local communities, and the GoM, fueled by dissatisfaction with the limited peacebuilding and development actions, as the previous sub-section discussed. A component of these disconnects is, as interviewees mentioned, that humanitarian programming is not always aligned with the needs of the communities. There is also a widespread sentiment that all international intervention in the country, including the presence of international

¹²¹ “Global Report on Internal Displacement 2019,” Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre and Norwegian Refugee Council, June 2019, <http://www.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/2019-IDMC-GRID.pdf>.

¹²² “Massacres au Mali: Une Attaque ‘Terroriste,’” *BBC News*, June 10, 2019, <https://www.bbc.com/afrique/region-48585177>.

¹²³ “ECHO Daily Flash,” Emergency Response Coordination Centre, European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, June 12, 2019, <https://erccportal.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ECHO-Flash/ECHO-Flash-List/yy/2019/mm/6>.

¹²⁴ “Global Report on Internal Displacement,” 11.

¹²⁵ Stephen L. Esquith, “The Political Responsibility of Bystanders: The Case of Mali,” *Journal of Global Ethics* 9, no. 3 (2013): 377-387.

humanitarian actors, is oriented toward preventing the movement of populations out of Mali, or the Sahel more broadly, and into Europe.

Over time, insecurity has led international NGOs to limit staff presence, particularly that of international staff. Security has had a significant impact on the quality, delivery, and effectiveness of aid programming.¹²⁶ In 2018, the International NGO Safety Organisation (INSO) recorded 216 security incidents that affected humanitarians in Mali.¹²⁷ According to INSO figures, since 2016 in Mali, there have been 10 aid workers killed, 31 injured, and 19 kidnapped.¹²⁸ Today, expat aid workers in conflict affected areas are able to stay in a particular location for a maximum of seventy-two hours before having to relocate. Thus, international humanitarian organizations rely on their national staff for more long-standing presence in a community, creating a dangerous transfer of risk onto local staff and their families. Other approaches have included remote management and requests for a more robust security apparatus to protect humanitarian actors from the security risks inherent in this operational environment.

International humanitarian actors have cited the challenge of dealing with local Malian NGOs that are closely aligned with NSAGs, making it difficult to ensure the impartiality, neutrality, and independence of remote programming. Still, international NGOs have also relied on connections with NSAGs to ensure security and access. Persistent access obstructions have also hindered humanitarians' abilities to conduct needs assessments. As a consequence, some humanitarian organizations have relied on Barkhane and Malian military actors to undertake needs assessments, despite the fact that these actors lack adequate knowledge and understanding about how to do so adequately. Humanitarian organizations have also turned to Barkhane and MINUSMA to provide for their security. As already noted, MINUSMA and Barkhane engage in operations that might be considered—or that might be easily confused for—humanitarian programming. International NGOs take the public position that they do not collaborate with these forces, although their local implementing partners might.¹²⁹ Further complicating this confusion is the implication of local NGOs, often relied upon as implementing partners by many international agencies in conflict-affected areas, in implementing QIPs. Indeed, an NGO may become an implementing partner for an international humanitarian agency while also implementing programming for Barkhane or MINUSMA.¹³⁰

¹²⁶ For an overview of security issues that humanitarian actors face in Mali, see “Country Analysis: Mali,” International NGO Security Organization, 2019, <https://www.ngosafety.org/country/mali>.

¹²⁷ Issa Sikiti da Silva and Philip Kleinfeld, “In Militarised Mali, Humanitarian Responders say Aid is an Afterthought,” *The New Humanitarian*, March 11, 2019, <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2019/03/11/militarised-mali-humanitarian-responders-say-aid-afterthought>.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*

¹²⁹ Marín, “Perilous terrain,” 17.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*

III. Implications for the “Triple Nexus”

This section examines the implications of this case for the “triple nexus,” also referred to as the “New Way of Working,” a policy concept that aims to forge linkages between humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding initiatives. The overarching aim of the “triple nexus” is, when possible, to facilitate collaboration, coordination, information sharing, and joint planning and analysis between practitioners engaged in humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding activities. The notion undergirding this concept is, as one report states, that peacebuilding, development, and humanitarian actors “all have the same broad objective, namely to contribute to the protection and well-being of affected populations and to improve their resilience to external and internal shocks.”¹³¹ Furthermore, effectiveness can be stymied, as another report notes specifically of humanitarian action and development work, due to the fact that the “aid architecture is governed by a rigid compartmentalization of humanitarian and development aid,” and indeed, “aid is often programmed according to sectoral silos.”¹³² Analysts have written that, due to the fact that “the humanitarian–development aid architecture is strictly segregated, divided by mandates and rules that were originally designed to meet different kinds of needs,” there is a risk that “this rigidity is hampering the aid system’s ability to manage risks and rapidly respond to shocks and stresses.”¹³³

The “triple nexus,” the current manifestation of international efforts to grapple with these issues, is the culmination of a decades-long process of flirting with, and ultimately merging, two separate nexuses: one between humanitarian action and development, the other between peacebuilding and development. Regarding the humanitarian-development leg of the nexus, as one report notes, the notion of linking these two fields dates at least back to the 1980s, when “practitioners and academics identified a critical gap between humanitarian assistance and development activities surrounding the food crisis in Africa,” ultimately leading “to the emergence of the concept of ‘linking relief, rehabilitation and development [LRRD].’”¹³⁴ This notion of LRRD, originally envisaged by policymakers as sequential—relief first, then

¹³¹ Alfonso Medinilla, Lidet Tadesse Shiferaw, and Pauline Veron, “Think Local. Governance, Humanitarian Aid, Development and Peacebuilding in Somalia,” Discussion Paper No. 246, European Centre for Development Policy Management, March 2019, 3, <https://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/DP246-march-2019-think-local-Governance-humanitarian-aid-development-peacebuilding-Somalia-ECDPM.pdf>.

¹³² Cyprien Fabre, “Humanitarian Development Coherence, The Commitments into Action Series,” Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2017, 3, <https://www.oecd.org/development/humanitarian-donors/docs/COHERENCE-OECD-Guideline.pdf>.

¹³³ Katie Peters and Florence Pichon, “Crisis Modifiers: A Solution for a More Flexible Development Humanitarian System?” Overseas Development Institute, November 2017, 5, <https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/11861.pdf>. For more analysis on how the humanitarian–development nexus, as a framing device, can limit the scope of diverse operational approaches within each sector, see Marzia Montemurro and Karin Wendt, “The Limits of Labels. HERE ‘Mandates Study’ Mali Report, HERE-Geneva, 2018, <https://www.alnap.org/system/files/content/resource/files/main/HERE-Role-of-Mandates-Mali-Report-2018.pdf>.

¹³⁴ Medinilla, Shiferaw, and Veron, “Think Local,” 1. See also François Grünewald, “The State of the Humanitarian System 2018 Case Study: Mali,” ALNAP Paper, London, ALNAP/ODI, <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/SOHS%202018%20Mali%20CS.pdf>.

rehabilitation, and finally development—later came to be seen as a “continuum” in order to “accommodate the simultaneity of the root causes and symptoms of conflict and humanitarian crises.”¹³⁵ Meanwhile, policy interest began to emerge in the security-development nexus, assuming the form of the “human security” concept in the 1990s.¹³⁶ These two issue areas—security and development—came to be seen as “inextricably link[ed],” as the UN Secretary-General stated in 2004.¹³⁷

The World Humanitarian Summit in 2016 laid the groundwork for synthesizing these two strands of policy thinking. At the Summit, the United Nations Secretary-General and eight UN agencies signed,¹³⁸ and the World Bank and the International Organization for Migration endorsed, a commitment to “[implement] a ‘new way of working’ that meets people’s immediate humanitarian needs while at the same time reducing risk and vulnerability.”¹³⁹ The goal was to cultivate a humanitarian-development nexus. Later that year, António Guterres, after replacing Ban Ki-moon as United Nations Secretary-General, added “sustaining peace” to the nexus, filling out the third leg of the “new way of working” paradigm.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁵ Alfonso Medinilla, Alisa Herrero Cangas, and Matthias Deneckere, “‘Living Apart Together’ EU Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid in Situations of Fragility and Protracted Crisis,” Discussion Paper No. 206, European Centre for Development Policy Management, December 2016, 8, <https://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/DP206-Living-Apart-Together-Medinilla-Herrero-Deneckere-December-2016.pdf>.

¹³⁶ Ivan Briscoe and Bibi van Ginkel, “The Nexus between Development and Security: Searching for Common Ground in Countering Terrorism,” Policy Brief, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, March 2013, <https://www.icct.nl/download/file/Briscoe-van-Ginkel-Nexus-between-Security-and-Development-March-2013.pdf>.

¹³⁷ See Reitano, “Comparing Approaches.” By 2007, the term “security-development nexus” had become integrated into the EU’s official foreign policy. See Medinilla, Cangas, and Deneckere, “Living Apart Together.”

¹³⁸ The eight agencies are the World Health Organization, the United Nations Development Programme, the World Food Programme, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the United Nations Children’s Fund, the United Nations Population Fund, and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. For more information, see “The ‘New Way Of Working’ Examined: An ICVA Briefing Paper,” International Council of Voluntary Agencies, September 2017, https://www.icvanetwork.org/system/files/versions/ICVA_NWoW_Briefing_paper.pdf; and “Commitment to Action: Transcending Humanitarian-Development Divides: Changing People’s Lives: From Delivering Aid to Ending Need,” World Humanitarian Summit, May 23, 2016, https://www.agendaforhumanity.org/sites/default/files/WHS%20Commitment%20to%20action%20-%20transcending%20humanitarian-development%20divides_0.pdf.

¹³⁹ “Commitment to Action.”

¹⁴⁰ “Secretary-General-designate António Guterres’ Remarks to the General Assembly on Taking the Oath of Office,” United Nations Secretary-General, December 12, 2016, <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2016-12-12/secretary-general-designate-ant%C3%B3nio-guterres-oath-office-speech>.

What does the “new way of working” or the “triple nexus” mean in practice? As one report states:

The NWOW [New Way of Working] is a transformative commitment to transcend humanitarian and development divides focusing on what results are needed to be achieved on the ground collectively. The focus is not on agency-specific, mandate-bound outputs but a consolidated direct impact in changing people’s lives and moving away from a situation of humanitarian vulnerability in crisis settings. At the core of the NWOW is the commitment to articulate and achieve concrete, measurable, time-bound collective outcomes that aim to reduce needs, vulnerability and risk, as installments towards achieving the SDGs [Sustainable Development Goals] particularly in protracted crisis contexts.¹⁴¹

Policy implementation within the UN system, according to OCHA, would entail an “RC/HC [Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator] who facilitates joint problem statements, and the identification, implementation and financing of collective outcomes, engages with the national and local authorities and supports connectivity between all actors and capacities available in country to contribute to such outcomes.”¹⁴² In terms of joint strategic planning on collective outcomes, the “triple nexus” has entailed humanitarian actors aligning their activities with the 2030 Agenda for SDGs. For example, the strategic plan of the World Food Programme includes a commitment to prioritize SDG #1 (“zero hunger”) and SDG #17 (“strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development”).¹⁴³

One major concern that policy actors in the humanitarian sector have articulated about the nexus in general is that it risks politicizing humanitarian action. Disaggregating humanitarian action as much as possible from development and peacebuilding work, conceptually and operationally, can be crucial to local acceptance of humanitarian actors, and hence, to programmatic effectiveness. At the heart of this concern is the acknowledgement that, in many operational environments, the perceived legitimacy of humanitarian actors’ aims and activities is tenuous. The “triple nexus” can only succeed if peacebuilding-development-humanitarian linkages do not lead to the perception, or the reality, that humanitarian action has been subsumed by a political agenda. Taking this point further, as one author has written about the distinctive nature of humanitarian work from that of the other two prongs of the nexus:

¹⁴¹ “Multi-stakeholder Regional Workshop on the New Way of Working—Central and West Africa,” Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and United Nations Development Programme, May 31 and June 1, 2018, 4, <https://www.agendaforhumanity.org/sites/default/files/resources/2018/Aug/NWOW-Workshop-Report-20180713.pdf>.

¹⁴² “New Way of Working,” Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2017, 11, https://www.agendaforhumanity.org/sites/default/files/New%20Way%20of%20Working%20booklet_0.pdf.

¹⁴³ “WFP Strategic Plan (2017-2021),” World Food Programme, July 2017, 4, https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000019573/download/?_ga=2.93360989.1197838355.1556725764-1793524709.1556725764. See also “Agenda for Sustainable Development Goals,” <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/?menu=1300>.

Humanitarian action is driven exclusively by people's needs, wherever and whoever they may be. Development, on the other hand, not only has the primary purpose of addressing the needs of people, but it also (and legitimately so) aims to strengthen the State and its institutions. Development, including post-conflict reconstruction, gives effect to a political project for a country. There are situations where the two purposes—addressing the needs of people and the State's political project—might not be quite aligned. For instance, when development processes are too slow and needs too urgent. Or, if development priorities and actors are contested. Or, if needs are found in areas that lie effectively outside the control of the State.¹⁴⁴

An MSF report concurs, noting that “the traditional idea of principled humanitarianism sits awkwardly alongside peacekeeping, counter-terrorism, social equality, economic development and climate change mitigation,” the reason being that “humanitarian action—as an endeavour intended solely to support human beings—cannot be so easily aligned with policies that are designed to correct political, social and economic injustices.”¹⁴⁵ A related aspect is the importance in humanitarian work of having the ability to work in territory controlled not by the government but by NSAGs. A triple nexus that does not account for this element could, as one expert has stated, “make for a one-sided nexus that leaves millions of people out.”¹⁴⁶ And finally, as the “triple nexus” has been piloted across the globe, issues have also arisen about the lack of local inclusivity. As various reports have noted, in countries where the triple nexus has been implemented, there has been “an absence of real local involvement”¹⁴⁷ and a “limited degree of ownership and leadership of local and national authorities in the process.”¹⁴⁸

What is the relevance of this policy concept to Mali? Policymakers (including humanitarian and development actors, as well as donors) have promoted for actors operating in the Sahel broadly—and in Mali, specifically—the types of policy planning and operational synergies that the nexus envisages.¹⁴⁹ However, the barriers to its implementation are telling, including,

¹⁴⁴ Filipa Schmitz Guinote, “A Humanitarian-Development Nexus That Works,” *Humanitarian Law and Policy Blog*, International Committee of the Red Cross, June 21, 2018, <https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2018/06/21/humanitarian-development-nexus-that-works/>.

¹⁴⁵ Monica de Castellarnau and Velina Stoianova, “Bridging The Emergency Gap: Reflections and a Call for Action After a Two-year Exploration of Emergency Response in Acute Conflicts,” Médecins Sans Frontières, April 2018, 27, <https://arhp.msf.es/sites/default/files/BRIDGING-THE-EMERGENCY-GAP-FULL-REPORT.pdf>. Also see Geoffrey Pinnock, “‘Unblurring Boundaries’: Opportunities for Clarity in the Humanitarian-Development Nexus Discourse,” International Humanitarian Studies Association Conference Paper, August 28, 2018.

¹⁴⁶ Hugo Slim, “Nexus Thinking in Humanitarian Policy: How Does Everything Fit Together on the Ground?” Keynote Address to the World Food Programme, International Committee of the Red Cross, October 25, 2017, <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/nexus-thinking-humanitarian-policy-how-does-everything-fit-together-ground>.

¹⁴⁷ Reitano, “Comparing Approaches,” 2.

¹⁴⁸ Jones and Mazzara, “All Together Now?” 5.

¹⁴⁹ See Issa Sikiti da Silva and Philip Kleinfeld, “In Militarised Mali, Humanitarian Responders Say Aid is an Afterthought,” *The New Humanitarian*, March 11, 2019,

in the words of one UN report, the fact that a “[l]ack of understanding of [the] NWOW and implementation discourages many actors from engaging;” “existing coordination mechanisms [are] not conducive to discuss [the] Nexus;” there is a “[l]ack of implication of national authorities;” and a “lack of clarity on financing of collective outcomes.”¹⁵⁰

Indeed, the interview findings of this paper amount to a scathing rebuke of the appropriateness of the “triple nexus” concept in this context. It is important to highlight that none of the local actors interviewed mentioned the “triple nexus” by name, reflecting the fact that this concept, widely discussed at the strategic and policy levels by actors engaged in various dimensions of the international response, has not necessarily filtered down or been translated to the frontline level on the ground. But local interviewees did express disappointment about the impact that each leg of the nexus has had on communities. The international humanitarian actors interviewed that did speak about the “triple nexus” were dismissive or disparaging of the notion.

In Mali, the various concerns expressed about the viability of the “triple nexus” policy concept have no doubt proven valid. In this context, there has been a definitive blurring of the lines between peacebuilding, development, and humanitarian activities. As mentioned, MINUSMA and Barkhane—both considered parties to the conflict—have assumed responsibility for humanitarian needs assessments and have also provided security for humanitarian actors. Furthermore, UN agencies engaged in humanitarian activities work only in government-controlled areas, bringing the impartial nature of their activities into question. There is a sense in Mali that the entire international assistance project (whether it be peacebuilding, development, or humanitarian activities) is driven by self-interest and has not been helpful for the country.

Peacebuilding has been subsumed by the counterterrorism agenda, meaning that short-term security gains have been prioritized over more extensive, long-term, inclusive, bottom-up peacebuilding efforts. Analysts have broadly acknowledged, even before 2012, that development efforts have been stuck in an equilibrium of stalled progress by which donors have appeared content to keep development aid flowing despite severe governance shortcomings on the part of the GoM. By cultivating linkages between humanitarian, peacebuilding, and development efforts, humanitarian work in Mali has become implicated in the shortcomings and failings of the nexus’ other two prongs.

This analysis reveals that, in Mali, the very notion undergirding the nexus—in the words of one expert, “combining different good things in difficult situations”¹⁵¹—is a myth. Indeed, the lesson of the case of Mali is that one should be cautious about the assumption that breaking down bureaucratic silos can render distinct but compatible altruistic activities more effective. Instead, this case points toward the insight that actors in each of these domains (peacebuilding development, and humanitarian action) should engage in much deeper introspection about how to achieve the ideals to which their work aspires. Without improving upon each of the

<https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2019/03/11/militarised-mali-humanitarian-responders-say-aid-afterthought>; and “Plan De Response Humanitaire,” 19.

¹⁵⁰ “Multi-stakeholder Regional Workshop,” 21.

¹⁵¹ Slim, “Nexus Thinking.”

nexus' three prongs individually, inter-linking these prongs will actually have little utility for the local actors on the ground that the "triple nexus" ultimately aims to serve.

IV. Conclusion

The portrait that this paper has painted of the current situation in Mali is a dire context in terms of humanitarian needs, development failures, and worsening security challenges. In the long run, these issues deeply affect the civilian populations within the country, as well as the complex sub-region that is the Sahel, which endures in a state that is extremely tense and volatile. Weapons and violence have spread throughout Mali, fueling tensions and violence within and between communities. The instability of the region, and the country's porous borders, contribute to Mali's fragility. Furthermore, the regional implications of how the conflict in Mali is addressed cannot be underestimated. Neighboring countries such as Burkina Faso are plagued by the same crippling conditions that Mali is facing in unemployment and economic collapse, failing state and military infrastructure, and school closures, contributing to increasing insecurity and the rise of jihadist groups who have accelerated their attacks against communities and state authorities.

The GoM has not yet demonstrated strong capacities to build good governance and to address the fate of its communities and citizens and the aspirations of its very dynamic youth. Indeed, the GoM is almost absent in some parts of the country. This is true, particularly, in the eastern, central, and northern parts of the country, but major social and economic challenges (including criminal networks, drug trafficking, and modern-day slavery, among others) remain in the other parts of the country as well. The corruption and sheer inertia that continues to grip the authorities has yet to be addressed. Local leaders—including Islamist leaders, the CMA, the Tuareg Self-Defense Group and Allies, and military commanders—must also be held accountable, understanding the implications of privileging violence over peace, arms over dialogue, and power struggles over implementation of peace agreements. In light of the GoM's limited will and capacities, and notwithstanding the strong international presence to fill this void, a key question remains: how can one imagine alternatives, that would endow locals with more robust and meaningful leverage and resilience for to decide and drive their own future?

There are important shortcomings of international military interventions, which have not demonstrated a positive impact in terms of peacebuilding, the protection of civilians, and the conditions for a pacified environment. Moreover, these interventions have in many ways accelerated tensions within the country. Currently, there is no alternative to Barkhane, and no movement toward long-term solutions for the ongoing instability in the country. Barkhane, and the rest of the international forces in Mali, remains as a short-term response to the crisis, pushing the agenda, above all else, of neutralizing jihadism. It is crucial that donors in the humanitarian and development field engage in innovative approaches, local direct support, and monitoring of operational international impacts. A language of truth, and holding the central authorities accountable, is needed.

Within this context—wherein each of the three prongs of the "triple nexus" plays some role in aggravating the country's fragility and limiting an independent development future as a

state or a nation—forging linkages between humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding initiatives appears far from worthy as a policy priority. The concerns that the “triple nexus” can blur operational lines in ways harmful to humanitarian action have manifested in Mali. Humanitarian action, along with its driving principles and approaches, has been subsumed and instrumentalized by security priorities and international military agendas, jeopardizing essential assistance and protection to Malian communities at the frontlines. In light of this reality, Mali may indeed be emblematic of a context in which international actors should push in the opposite direction of the “triple nexus,” with humanitarians being more vocal on the violations against civilians, the politicization of aid, and denouncing and distancing themselves from practices that create confusion on the ground and harm relationships with local actors.